The question is not well-defined. In the first sentence he says it is 'suicide', by which I presume he means the question 'Shall I commit suicide?'. In the second sentence he says the question is 'Is life worth living?', which is a correlated but different question.

It is possible for somebody to decide (not) to commit suicide despite their finding life (not) worth living.

Also, the audience to whom the question is posed is biased. Since they can read the question they are alive and hence must have already decided the answer to the question is 'No, I shall not commit suicide, for the present at least'.

Why?

I mean, it's just an introduction to the essay. If you disagree then maybe you can still find insight in the essay, or perhaps you could just put it down and read something else. If you agree, then you'll read it.

It seems to me that one would just support this as the one truly philosophical problem by saying: "If you answer in the affirmative, then all the other problems of philosophy are never addressed, and in the negative, then you may take up the other problems knowing that life is worth living"

The question is not well-defined. In the first sentence he says it is 'suicide', by which I presume he means the question 'Shall I commit suicide?'. In the second sentence he says the question is 'Is life worth living?', which is a correlated but different question. — andrewk

Later on in the essay, Camus remarks that life does not need a meaning in order to be lived, and can, in fact, be 'better' without a meaning. That is not my point, however.

My question is, whether the question of living or ending the life is the first question that one should ask before going into the other philosophical questions. Although, I admit, by taking up the other problems, one must have already agreed to live the life. Still, I assume, this idea and essay in general has a lot to add to the question of the meaning of life.

It seems to me that one would just support this as the one truly philosophical problem by saying: "If you answer in the affirmative, then all the other problems of philosophy are never addressed, and in the negative, then you may take up the other problems knowing that life is worth living" — Moliere

I do agree. But why couldn't the very first question be like this? What would be the reason to disagree with this to be the first question?

It could be, sure. But that's why I'm saying that it's just the introduction to the essay. He even remarks that times may change and that his essay may not be relevant in other times, but that it seems relevant in his time. It's not so much an essay about "This must be the first question in philosophy", as it is an essay about confronting a world seemingly without meaning, as well as wondering if, logically speaking, that would indicate that death is preferable to continuing to live.

So the first problem of philosophy is a moral question, one that Shakespeare addressed "To be, or not to be?" Levinas also thought that Practical Philosophy is 1st Philosophy. It is a question that has to do with the will's contest against itself. Why the will to power stops me from doing what I want to do?

The question of suicide masks the real issue, which is our own temporality. It's true we want to be happy, be at peace, but it this is not always possible, and living a temperate life might alleviate some pain, but in the end it is all the same, death sooner or latter. It's not meaning which counts, it is the ability to accept what is, to will what is, inspite of what is. I think that is only possible by finding something transcendent, beyond one's self.

We all tend to have a bias towards the future, don't we. Not the person in 4th stage cancer, not the 90 year old solitary man that can barely get out of bed. Not the convicted felon looking at 30 years imprisonment. Why shouldn't these people seek early release from their misery? There is no answer that applies to all, each must make their own decision.

Why did Socrates commit suicide? He could have escaped, his friends had already made the arrangements. His act of will was in accordance with the rest of his life, his love of Athens, and its laws, and his willingness to abide by them. He found something higher than himself, yet immanent in the world.

My interpretation of Camus' philosophical project is that he was coming to terms with Nietszche's proclamation of the Death of God. Camus had been quite spiritually inclined, his PhD was on Plotinus. So I think the whole question is, is life meaningful without any transcendent aim, goal or purpose? If we are simply acting out the imperatives of survival - then what's the point? Should we even ask that question? Because if it is true that we are no more than matter, then death ends the problem altogether; we can simply exit the painful predicament of existence into the nothingness from which we came. That's what I think he's wrestling with.

Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy. — Camus

This is the important sentence. Elsewhere Kant argues that all philosophy ultimately aims at answering these three questions: “What can I know? What should I do? What may I hope?” I have no idea whether Camus was familiar with Kant's "ultimate question" formulation.

These are games; one must first answer. — Kazuma

I agree with Camus: A great deal of philosophy is kind of a game, and will not lead to a confrontation with ultimate questions about life or anything else. "Is life worth living or not?" and phrased another way, “What can I know? What should I do? What may I hope?”

Men must decide how to live their lives; we are specially burdened by that requirement. Most people do not opt for suicide, but that does not mean that most have made their life worth living by examining it, or by pursuing the most meaningful course they could take for themselves. We generally don't ask "What should I do?" We ask "What's next on the list?"

Camus' and Kant's questions are a pain to answer, because there is always the risk that we will find reasons to stop living the way we do, and instead live some other way; and then there will probably be hell to pay. Others in our lives may not appreciate our discovery that our lives are kind of empty meaningless affairs. What does that say about their lives?

There is but one truly serious philosophical problem and that is suicide. — Kazuma

@Bitter Crank
This question is most pertinent on a Monday before work. This is sort of a joke but it is also a metaphor for the instrumentality of things. You do your little work week, consumption, cultural upkeep thing and then the weekend comes and goes and it seems like a sort of vapid affair as you start all over. Those moments where you got caught up in the "flow" of your hobbies, past times, and friends cannot be maintained for longer than certain span. The routines of life give you a bit of angst as you wonder what it is for. However, if you were given unlimited freedom, and no routine, you would still ask what it is for. Thus, there is no way out of the situation.

There is a pendulum swing between survival through cultural upkeep (all the routines needed to survive and be well-adjusted in your culture) on one side and boredom on the other. Ennui is kind understanding the vanity of existence, and an acute awareness of one's own need to need and want because you will need to sustain and entertain day after day. Throw in the idea that you may be harmed in various contingent (unwanted/unexpected/circumstantial) ways and Camus' question becomes pertinent.

Camus may have meant it to be a question one asks continually to see if one is really just going through the motion or gaining as much as he/she can out of their time. The problem with Camus' is its a mirage of freedom. Cultural upkeep is just part of surviving as a human and is part of our situatedness and throwness into the world. Human needs are also not simply willed, but are an integral a part of or psyche (things like the need to be with others, etc).

Also, the notion of instrumentality may overcome any feelings of intense freedom as one's options are played out and one becomes aware that first, we have to have an image of what makes one free, and then we realize that this image itself is simply grounded in cultural expectations (i.e. traveling must be good because that is how books and movies and media portrays what freedom is).. These images are really no more free than the cultural milieu that one finds oneself in.. So "freedom" actually becomes a cliched version of itself by living out exactly what the culture wants you to live out as your sense of freedom..

Camus then goes on to give his own cliches which feed back into what an acceptable version of freedom is.. live like an actor he says..because if you are a different person you can live a bunch of lives in one.. (forget the fact that this creates havoc for any relationships and is quite selfish at best)

Or have many lovers like Don Juan.. (again a lot of selfishness here)..

Camus seems to have a theme of freedom in the selfish ME culture that we see playing out today. At the same time, the ME culture is no more than just a socially accepted way to relieve ones daily routine. Group oriented cultural cliches (on the opposite side of things.. family, tribe, religion, etc.) really won't do much either.

So we simply go back again the idea of that life is really just the pendulum swing between cultural upkeep and finding various ways to overcome boredom through goal-seeking. To go beyond that and say you have the magic elixir of life which is some sort of hip manic living as various characters in some tragic-comedy, questing for quantity of experiences, lovers, etc.. is not really going to solve anything. It's trying to make a satire of life.. like a laughing Sisyphus.. But sometimes one cannot laugh through everything.. One still wants and needs and cannot escape certain things with ones own sense of revelry.

However, what does seem useful from Camus is his idea of revolt. By living, you are in a sense living a revolt because you realize your situatedness, and this pendulum swing, but you decide to live it out. However, this is not to romanticize it. The revolt though can also be about constantly being aware of the situation and not letting yourself pretend it's not there.

I think it's a little (a lot) disengenious. The vast majority of suicides are by the severely mentally ill, the terminally ill, people who have experienced some great bereavement or another, unbearable shame, and those suffocating under crippling debt.

I really highly doubt it was a serious issue for Camus himself. Are we really supposed to believe that this man would have lethally inflicted harm upon himself for some vague, ephermal reason like the world having no objective meaning? I don't buy it.

What method was he going to use? When was he going to do it? How was he planning on mitigating the effects his death would have on his loved ones? Note or no note? Is it a mistake? Is there no other option? How will he find the courage to do it? For people whom suicide really is a serious issue, these are the kind of issues they grapple with. I don't get the impression Camus seriously considered any of them.

I mean even if his response to 'the absurd' was to think suicide IS the best option, it's still a gigantic leap from there to actually DOING the act. He was never going to actually kill himself - at least not as a response to 'the absurd'. His solution to this supposed issue was already a foregone conclusion before it was raised. There's no serious issue of suicide if you were never going to do it in the first place. It doesn't need to be argued against or even thought about at all.

"Should I kill myself because the world is absurd?" There's no point even asking this question because I'm not going to actually lethally harm myself even if the answer is yes. I suspect Camus was never going to either. It's a non-issue.

The vast majority of suicides are by the severely mentally ill, the terminally ill, people who have experienced some great bereavement or another, unbearable shame, and those suffocating under crippling debt.

Citations for that?

I mean even if his response to 'the absurd' was to think suicide IS the best option, it's still a gigantic leap from there to actually DOING the act. He was never going to actually kill himself - at least not as a response to 'the absurd'. His solution to this supposed issue was already a foregone conclusion before it was raised. There's no serious issue of suicide if you were never going to do it in the first place. It doesn't need to be argued against or even thought about at all.

"Should I kill myself because the world is absurd?" There's no point even asking this question because I'm not going to actually lethally harm myself even if the answer is yes. I suspect Camus was never going to either. It's a non-issue. — dukkha

I agree..but I think most people reading the essay also know he wasn't meditating on suicide as a way to explore the "real" sociological reasons for why people actually commit suicide. Rather, he was using as a device to explain how to live a "meaningful" life. It was a rhetorical device and a signal that the book was about the worth of what we do. However, for all the reasons I explained in my previous post, his solutions are not very convincing and he overlooks a lot of baked-in things about the human condition. Remember, he broadly falls into the existentialist camp (though he tried to renounce this label). One reason he does fit in this camp is the idea of authenticity and radical freedom. The problem is that humans simply aren't as radically free as we think. There are psychological mechanisms that keep us more conservative than willing whatever we think we are free to do. Also, the structural conditions of life essentially make it the same kind of life for everyone- survival through cultural upkeep/routines and entertainment-seeking through cultural means. Schopenhauer, in this regard was a much more astute existentialist than the 20th century versions of it.

I would personally argue that the most serious philosophical problem isn't whether or not we should cease our own consciousness, but whether or not we ought to create another consciousness. For the former question inherently depends on the the latter question.

This looks to me like you haven't read the essay, or at least missed the part near the beginning where he makes a distinction between people who kill themselves due to distress, and suicide as the result of a process of thought.

Furthermore, he's arguing against suicide -- arguing that it is possible to find joy even in a world without meaning. So it wouldn't matter that "he's not really going to kill himself!" -- he's arguing the extreme circumstance that it is not logical to do so.

Remember, he broadly falls into the existentialist camp (though he tried to renounce this label). — schopenhauer1

While I agree that he falls broadly into the existentialist camp, it's also fair to say he's writing in response or as critical of existential philosophies (as he defines the term, of course). So it's also fair to say he is not an existentialist. On one hand you have the broad historical category where we group some authors together because they have similar themes or moods, but on the other you have a crisper definition offered by Camus which he is critical of.

Also, any opinions on why this is or is not the most serious philosophical problem? — Kazuma

It probably seems to be one of the most important problems for people with severe depression. I'd actually say that the most important problem for them is getting psychiatric help though.

For me, it's never been any more of an issue than the following question would be to most people: "Should I construct and always wear a hat that looks like a giant beach ball and that has five tiger gongs hanging off of it that I regularly strike?"

But why couldn't the very first question be like this? What would be the reason to disagree with this to be the first question? — Kazuma

Really, the first question that the vast majority of people (and maybe everyone) deals with re philosophy is one of these two:

(1) Just what is "philosophy"?

or

(2) Hmm--wait a minute. This doesn't resemble the stuff that I've known as "philosophy" to this point. What is the relation of this stuff to what I was calling "philosophy"?

Often the answer to (1), and to an extent the answer to (2), is "Oh, it was 'that stuff' that I was doing." But still, they must figure out (1) or (2) before moving on where they know that they're doing philosophy.

Citations for that? — Wayfarer

If you look at the low side of the estimate it's not a "vast majority" for this single reason, but it's not all the reasons he listed:

The most common underlying disorder is depression, 30% to 70% of suicide victims suffer from major depression or bipolar (manic-depressive) disorder. — http://www.mentalhealthamerica.net/suicide

That site also says:

Substance abuse is another great instigator of suicide; it may be involved in half of all cases. About 20% of suicides involve people with alcohol problems, and the lifetime rate of suicide among people with alcohol-use problems is at least three or four times the average. Completed suicides are more likely to be men over 45 who are depressed or alcoholic.

And here is some info from Psychology Today, re an article written by Alex Lickerman, M.D., on "The Six Reasons People Attempt Suicide":

1. They're depressed. This is without question the most common reason people commit suicide. Severe depression is always accompanied by a pervasive sense of suffering as well as the belief that escape from it is hopeless. The pain of existence often becomes too much for severely depressed people to bear . . .

2. They're psychotic. Malevolent inner voices often command self-destruction for unintelligible reasons. Psychosis is much harder to mask than depression, and is arguably even more tragic. The worldwide incidence of schizophrenia is 1% and often strikes otherwise healthy, high-performing individuals, whose lives, though manageable with medication, never fulfill their original promise . . .

3. They're impulsive. Often related to drugs and alcohol, some people become maudlin and impulsively attempt to end their own lives . . .

4. They're crying out for help, and don't know how else to get it. These people don't usually want to die but do want to alert those around them that something is seriously wrong . . .

5. They have a philosophical desire to die. The decision to commit suicide for some is based on a reasoned decision, often motivated by the presence of a painful terminal illness from which little to no hope of reprieve exists . . .

6. They've made a mistake. This is a recent, tragic phenomenon in which typically young people flirt with oxygen deprivation for the high it brings and simply go too far. The only defense against this, it seems to me, is education.

And on the other hand, I'd say that the most important set of philosophical questions, at least for philosophy majors, would be this:

"Why am I majoring in philosophy? What do I expect to do with my degree? What do I want to do for a career?"

It's important to have good answers for onself to those questions. Some answers will suggest continuing on, and some will suggest making some changes.

For folks simply pursuing philosophy as an extracurricular/as a hobby/on their "own time" so to speak, the most important questions are simply those that interest them the most. And that could be anything.

1. If life is not worth living, then philosophy is not worth doing.
Therefore, the worth of every other philosophical question is dependent on the question of whether life is worth living.

2. The question of whether life is worth living is worth answering.
Therefore philosophy is worth doing.
Therefore life is worth living.

Premise 1 seems like a necessary truth, give or take.
Premise 2 is controversial, and only needs to be accepted by those thread participants who wish to avoid the performative contradiction of posting worthlessly.

While I agree that he falls broadly into the existentialist camp, it's also fair to say he's writing in response or as critical of existential philosophies (as he defines the term, of course). So it's also fair to say he is not an existentialist. On one hand you have the broad historical category where we group some authors together because they have similar themes or moods, but on the other you have a crisper definition offered by Camus which he is critical of. — Moliere

Yes, I agree that he emphasizes the "absurd" while Sartre emphasizes freedom. There are some differences like Sartre's freedom seems to be intrinsic while Camus seems to be contingent upon only confronting the "absurd". I am still critical of Camus ideas in regards to his "solutions" which amount to a sort of quantity of experience (the actor, the seducer, etc.). Though probably not to be taken literally, to me, it is very much (along with Nietzsche's ideas) provided the ethos of the "hip" manic lust for voracious experience seeking.. which actually just amounts to the cliched ideas of the traveling gypsy lifestyle, the party-goer, adrenaline junky, etc. etc. It seems very self-absorbed.. You know just "Do the Dew" as Mountain Dew would say...

Existentialist themes in media have been quite extensive since the end of the end of the 20th century..You have themes from movies like Office Space and the Big Lebowski... which kind of sees the Dude and Peter Gibbons as your everday man that faces realities in stride.. and then you have movies like Fight Club and such which were more of the Camus variety that you should live extreme experiences, and be happy that you made your own decisions while living in the absurd.. These kind of solutions, though presenting themselves as just entertainment, convey the general ethos of the middling existentialist idea that one can be content in the absurd.. That is not revolt but complacency.. Really looking at the situation head-on would be more of the Schopenhauer variety and seeing the structural situation we find ourselves in.

Premise 1 seems like a necessary truth, give or take. — unenlightened

I don't agree with that. Let's say that you've never at all considered whether life was worth living, but you engage in/with philosophy and you value it a lot. In that case, the value of philosophical questions has nothing to do with considering whether life is worth living.

The question of suicide masks the real issue, which is our own temporality. It's true we want to be happy, be at peace, but it this is not always possible, and living a temperate life might alleviate some pain, but in the end it is all the same, death sooner or latter. It's not meaning which counts, it is the ability to accept what is, to will what is, inspite of what is. I think that is only possible by finding something transcendent, beyond one's self. — Cavacava

'Ability to accept what is' - That's what Camus described as 'philosophical suicide'. By finding something transcendent, one can get too complacent. Camus argues that we don't know and that we can't possibly know. That's why accepting means creating an illusion and then accepting the illusion in order to feel more comfortable.

This is the important sentence. Elsewhere Kant argues that all philosophy ultimately aims at answering these three questions: “What can I know? What should I do? What may I hope?” I have no idea whether Camus was familiar with Kant's "ultimate question" formulation. — Bitter Crank

I agree with ''What can I know?'' But I don't see much sense in the following questions.

What if I can only know that I don't know what I should do, and therefore I can't be sure whether I should hope at all?

How could he impart the concept of hope in the ultimate questions if the questions haven't been answered yet?

Premise 1 seems like a necessary truth, give or take.
— unenlightened

I don't agree with that. Let's say that you've never at all considered whether life was worth living, but you engage in/with philosophy and you value it a lot. In that case, the value of philosophical questions has nothing to do with considering whether life is worth living. — Terrapin Station

That is certainly possible. However, if, as a matter of fact, and unknown to you since you haven't considered it, life has no value, then it surely turns out that your philosophising has no value, and you have mis-valued it.

It has no objective value, but "objective value" is a category error anyway.

It has subjective value to me, and that's the nature of value. It's a subjective phenomenon.

In that case you have already answered the question implicitly without having thought about it. If philosophy has value of whatever jectivity, then life has value of that jectivity, since life is necessary to philosophy.

But I don't buy implicit valuations. Valuing something is explicit. If you've never considered the question of "whether life is worth living," you don't have an "implicit answer" about it.

Your purchases are not really my concern. However, if you look both ways before crossing the street, you are implicitly valuing not getting run down, and you don't need to explicitly articulate this value to yourself.

Existentialist angst can be interpreted as merely a dark school of comedy and what Camus is actually asking is what is the value of our emotions. If the universe were merely logical and ruled by causality then suicide would seem to defy causality and logic with the question becoming why to do we even have emotions. Studies of generosity and altruism indicate that they support the ongoing evolution of the species and often promote reciprocity. Hence, by philosophy examining how supposedly irrational emotions promote rationality and evolution it can answer more of the Big Questions.

it can answer more of the Big Questions — wuliheron

Somehow knowing "how" something developed and living with the manifestation of that development seem like two very different questions or at least approaches to the question. Existential philosophizing is the DaSein, the person as being lived- the ready-to-hand of phenomenology. The present-at-hand of how and discursive reflection of how my own emotions came about is not equivalent to the actual experiencing of emotions.

It may put the emotions into perspective, but gives me no real direction of what to do, or how to think of the situation. In this case, the ready-at-hand experience is that of the human animal with his immense self-reflective abilities confronting a world that has no direction. That is the absurd according to Camus. Of course my difference with Camus is how he interprets our ability to be free within the absurd.. We are constantly impinged by the set-up of the world and our own psyche.. The need for needs and wants, the harms of the environment, the harms of every contingent unwanted pain, etc. etc.. The suffering of the world is sort of not addressed very well. This is where Schopenhauer's understanding fits much better.. His pendulum swing of survival through cultural upkeep and boredom and the subsequent entertainment-seeking that ensues.. The revolt then isn't being the "absurd" Nietzschean superman who climbs mountains, lives a bunch of lives at once, and conquers nations (the man of action without dithering thought)..these are all manic thought-experiments that have little bearing to the life lived of the human animal. Rather, the revolt comes from the ability to see the situation for what it is without flinching or distracting oneself from this idea.

Rather, the revolt comes from the ability to see the situation for what it is without flinching or distracting oneself from this idea. — schopenhauer1

The revolt comes as a result of our inability to occupy the lowest possible energy state. When human behavior is examined within the context of known physical laws, rather than idealism, it makes a great deal more sense. Hippies like to say, "When harmony is lost, balance will be restored" which leads to harmony eventually being restored. It is where physical laws and our emotions meet that the most interesting observations can be made, when the only thing we might know is nothing, but that's how we can sometimes learn the most interesting things because it provides the necessary analog perspective. The ultimate analog perspective being that it is the greater context of the Truth which determines the identity of everything else.