The difference between them is the fine line we call the present moment.

By "semi-(in)determinate" I basically wanted to emphasize that not all future events are fully indeterminate. — javra

That's right there is a fundamental continuity, expressed in a very simply form as Newton's first law, inertia, which makes future events somewhat determinate. According to this law though, inertia may be interrupted by a force. This makes the determinateness of the future rather complicated because the continuity expressed as inertia is always being interfered with by forces. So the determinateness of the future is really reliant on the determinateness of forces, and "force" is a complicated concept.

Here's the basic problem with "force". By Newton's fist law, a force is what interrupts the continuity of predictability. In Newton's second law, the force itself is described as being predictable according to the principles of the first law. However, the predictability of the force itself may be interrupted by another force. This produces a potential infinite regress, exposing a fundamental indeterminateness. This indeterminateness indicates that we do not really understand the nature of force.

That's right there is a fundamental continuity, expressed in a very simply form as Newton's first law, inertia, which makes future events somewhat determinate. — Metaphysician Undercover

I conceptualize it differently. Something more akin to stratifications along a determinancy-indeterminacy spectrum. But I greatly doubt I'd be able to properly explain myself in the soundbite form that forum discussions require.

Still, as a best attempt to sum things up, one aspect of my thoughts on the matter is that certain determinate states of affairs supersede indeterminate states of affairs in their causal influence (in more Aristotelian terms, something akin to a universal telos and the natural laws it necessitates being a prime example - but this phrase may not express too much). This while indeterminate states of affairs play an active role in existence. To me, the future is partly determined by those states of affairs that supersede the causal influence of all others, and partly undetermined due to ontically indeterminate states of affairs. Kind of thing.

Here's the basic problem with "force". By Newton's fist law, a force is what interrupts the continuity of predictability. In Newton's second law, the force itself is described as being predictable according to the principles of the first law. However, the predictability of the force itself may be interrupted by another force. This produces a potential infinite regress, exposing a fundamental indeterminateness. This indeterminateness indicates that we do not really understand the nature of force. — Metaphysician Undercover

I know I have hindsight on my side, but Newton loses me with his premise that the space of the universe has a singular geometric axis point. (Nope, it doesn't.) As I've previously mentioned, I'm not a determinist, but a causal compatibilist of a Humean type (not of the type that specifies freedoms of this and that nature to be themselves fully deterministic yet still existent as freedoms - which I take to be metaphysical bs). Which is to say that I easily accept your argument against Newtonian notions of deterministic force. Yea, I'm of the view that there is an interplay of ontic chaos and order within existence. Nevertheless, imo, tackling causation in its broadest sense - to include Aristotle's four causes - is not something that is ever easy.

The unborn future is inherent in the past,
It’s ‘will be’ is real, with no unreal contrast class,
As there’s no opposite to existence—no Nil;
It’s not just that future is going to exist.

The present now undergoes an updating,
In a fleeting swoosh that passes it away,
For the ‘now’ fades, consumed, as future becomes,
Yet, what will become past can’t just non-exist.

Is future connected to the present?
Yes, and in more ways than you’d want it sent,
As the consistencies you might resent:
All future flowers from seeds of the present.

As of now we hold reality’s attention—
This is the time of our present comprehension.
What is past exists only in our memory,
The future only in our imagination.

Memory’s ideas recall the last heard tone;
Sensation savors what is presently known;
Imagination anticipates coming sounds;
The delight is such that none could produce alone.

I don't think Entropy provides us with a principle to distinguish between future and past. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why not? Please explain.

In the OP you asked "what type of knowledge allows us to say that there is a difference between future and past" not for "a principle". Entropy isn't merely "a principle" but a physical theory (re: statistical mechanics, thermodynamics, information theory ...)

It may distinguish between before and after, but this is insufficient to distinguish future from past. — Metaphysician Undercover

Explain why entropy is not sufficient (enough) "to distinguish future from past"?

Btw, MU, stating that entropy (which describes the disordering of closed systems) can "distinguish between before and after" - that is, relations among discrete system-states [micro] - seems to entail differentiated magnitudes, or degrees, of disorder of closed systems in their entirety [macro], wherein Minimum Disorder corresponds to "past" and Maximum Disorder to "future" (i.e. Arrow of Time); and so, for consistency's sake, either entropy is "insufficient" for both - this I hope you'll explain - or sufficient for both (in different ways) which is epistemologically warranted (e.g. beginning with what I've sketched here).

I conceptualize it differently. Something more akin to stratifications along a determinancy-indeterminacy spectrum. But I greatly doubt I'd be able to properly explain myself in the soundbite form that forum discussions require. — javra

But don't you agree that the determinacy of the future is distinct from the determinacy of the past, being grounded or justified in a different way? Determinacy of the past is grounded in consistency of memories which produces a certainty in the idea that something specific actually occurred. So determinacy of the past is complex due to the necessity of coherency in "what happened". Determinacy of the future is based in an assumption of continuity, the idea that things will continue to exist as they have, if not caused to change. And since things are caused to change, determinacy of the future is made complex by the need to understand causation.

Both forms of determinacy are complicated, but they are made complicated by different elements. So we cannot make one determinacy-indeterminacy spectrum, we would need two, one relating to the past and one to the future.

Why not? Please explain.

In the OP you asked "what type of knowledge allows us to say that there is a difference between future and past" not for "a principle". Entropy isn't merely "a principle" but a physical theory (re: statistical mechanics, thermodynamics, information theory ...) — 180 Proof

Entropy refers to the ordering of the descriptive quantities which describe a specified system. The second law of thermodynamics states that within a closed system entropy cannot decrease as time passes. So there is a number of problems here. First, we cannot find, or create a completely closed system so the theory cannot be properly tested. But more relevant, is the fact that if we take an increase in entropy as an indication of a later time, this produces the basis for a before and after. And we cannot derive past and future from before and after because past/future requires a principle which is not available within the concept of before/after. Before and after implies a changing time, movement in a particular direction, the supposed "arrow" of time. But future and past implies a specific point in time, dividing one section of time from the other.

So one (entropy) implies the notion of a changing time, while the other implies a static division between two distinct sections of time. The difficulty in understanding time is to establish consistency between these two ideas, as they both appear to be well grounded principles which are fundamentally inconsistent with each other. The approach of "entropy" makes the point in time (the present for example, but not necessarily the present) a moving target. The approach from future/past makes the point in time a static divisor. If the point is static, the idea of determinate periods of time is well supported. But if the point is moving, then the idea of determinate periods of time cannot be supported.

Btw, MU, stating that entropy (which describes the disordering of closed systems) can "distinguish between before and after" - that is, relations among discrete system-states [micro] - seems to entail differentiated magnitudes, or degrees, of disorder of closed systems in their entirety [macro], wherein Minimum Disorder corresponds to "past" and Maximum Disorder to "future" (i.e. Arrow of Time); and so, for consistency's sake, either entropy is "insufficient" for both - this I hope you'll explain - or sufficient for both (in different ways) which is epistemologically warranted (e.g. beginning with what I've sketched here). — 180 Proof

Why entropy is insufficient is that "past and future" cannot properly refer to the division made at any random point in time, which can be properly referred to with "before and after". For example, if we take a point in time two years ago, there is a before and after relative to that point. We cannot convert this before and after into past and future though, because "past and future" implies "the present" as the dividing point. And, it is quite obvious that this is inconsistent with the premise which clearly states a point in time two years ago. It's very clear that to call this point in time two years ago "the present" is a falsity.

.

But don't you agree that the determinacy of the future is distinct from the determinacy of the past, being grounded or justified in a different way? — Metaphysician Undercover

In the context of your full reply, its almost a trick question for me: yes when addressed epistemologically, but no when addressed ontologically - ontologically they're two different facets of the same overall process.

Whereas we’ve previously mostly addressed past and future epistemologically, we’re now starting to mainly address them ontologically. By analogy:

If we are to address the present epistemologically, the present is that portion of time in which we (in part) hold direct awareness of everything that is not past and future. I’ve bracketed “in part” because, on one hand, the present is also where we intend things (with intentions always extending toward the future) as well as – hopefully not making this overly complex – being a time-span during which we are also aware of the past (memories) and the future (expectations). Still, when I’m aware of a bird chirp in the present, for example, this awareness pertains to neither the past nor the future.

But once we address the present ontologically, our views should take into account and thereby encompass all individual, intra-personal, experiences of the present. Many views can be found in relation to the issue of an objective present. My own – again, very difficult to justify in a forum setting – is that the objective present is a non-deterministic version of the theory of relativity’s notion of the present: the objective present, to my understanding (here summarized), consists of pockets of causal interactions between individual observers (or agents). For example, when two or more people interact, they will ontically share the same present moment; when there is no interaction between persons, there then is no guarantee that their two or more intra-personal present moments will be synchronized. (But a) this is a mouthful and b) again, other perspectives on the ontology of the present moment can also be found.)

The jump from the epistemological to the ontological consideration of the present requires different approaches. So too with the jump from the epistemological to the ontological consideration of the past and future. I'll try to explain myself better below.

And since things are caused to change, determinacy of the future is made complex by the need to understand causation.

Both forms of determinacy are complicated, but they are made complicated by different elements. So we cannot make one determinacy-indeterminacy spectrum, we would need two, one relating to the past and one to the future. — Metaphysician Undercover

Given what we've so far discusses and in large part agreed upon, we could argue that the objective past - though stored in memories (both unconscious and consciously recalled) - is solidified (another way of saying fixed or determinate). Whether or not our experiences of the present are, for example, hallucinations also gets solidified by their noncontradictory accord to our past.* As to the future, I can only address this via my own philosophical understandings; these include a determinate, Aristotelian telos which entails certain natural laws (such as that of gravity, for one example - notice how gravity can be extrapolated to be a noncontradictory coherency between gives that produces mass to which other gives are attracted ... long story though). Epistemologically, yes, we know gravity will continue to occur due to an upheld causal continuity between past and future. But, for me at least, ontologically, gravity is as determinate a property of existence as is this Aristotelian telos. Any hypothetical personal experiences of gravity not being as it always was can only be discovered in the future to have been hallucinations. At the same time, and with the same aforementioned determinate givens, I do subscribe to a limited freedom to choose between alternative means toward goals. Keeping this as simple as I currently can: This ontological interplay between determinate, time-invariant aspects of being (which thereby persist throughout the future) and partly indeterminate decisions on the part of agents in the present, is then one facet of a reality wherein there is a mixture of interacting indeterminacy and determinacy (of chaos and order).

While I did state "stratifications" in the plural, when it comes to ontological appraisals, I also find that the determinacy of the past and of the future are two different facets of the same overall ontological process. But I get that this is imposing my own worldview into this discussions in manners that I cannot properly justify on a forum platform. Still, to provide an example of the way I think of things in relation to the past and the future:

* You see an oasis in the dessert; at this moment, your drinking of water in a little while (the future) is plausible because the present experience currently isn't contradicotry to the past. But once you arrive there and there is only sand, you now know that the experience of the oasis was only a mirage - because this conclusion is now the only one that is not contradicotory to the entirety of your solidified past. To this logic is implicit a desire to avoid the dolor of chaos that comes with extreme unpredictability. This impetus in us is not something we have a freedom to choose but is rather a predeterminate facet of our being - one that, roughly speaking, predetermines and also facilitates our capacity to choose goals and alternatives toward them - those that to us seem to optimally minimize our overall future dolor (in a mixture of both short- and long-term appraisals). Due to this determinate facet of our being, we will generally not freely choose to believe (although we could when metaphysically appraised) that a physical oasis was there but then it progressively vanished physically as we approached it. This would shatter the solidity of our past and, along with it, of our present - as well as most, if not all, our expectations of what will be in the future. And this would be exceedingly unpleasant. So, instead, we typically choose to appraise the oasis as a mirage.

Hope that example made some sense (I can easily see how it wouldn't to some/many). To try to recap, our past is solidified, determinate, fixed, though only composed of memories, for reasons aforementioned. Our future is, at least to me, a mixture of determinate and indeterminate states of affairs - in which we seek to obtain, or actualize, goals via a limited freedom of choice but, importantly for me, due to a fully determinate innate impetus to minimize overall dolor that (to me) is part and parcel of all sentient beings. And it is due to this same impetus (that is always conjoined with the future) that our past is as determinate as it is.

Now, I get that I've said a lot, and that a lot of it might be confusing, so I'll stop short and wait to see how the cookie crumbles. Short on time so I posted. I'll try to regroup if I need to.

Neither the past nor the future exist. All that exists, exists in "the now", and the now is the present reality. Everything that ever happens, happens in that moment.

The types of things that exist in the present moment, are spirit and matter: matter being the physical things, like computers and cameras, while the spirit is a way of thinking that directs the matter and seeks to propagate it's momentum, spreading from one mind to another.

So, because the past is only an abstract concept of a moment that has already happened and it doesn't actually exist, all things that exist are things in the present moment that have arrived to be with us as a result of the past.

For example, you have mentioned memories. What is a memory? It is a way of thinking in the imagination. The imagination might not be wrong to remember a memory, because it is re-imagining what the eyes, ears and mind actually did comprehend. But the future is different, because when we imagine what will happen in the future, we cannot be relying upon anything but a speculation, a promise or a calculation.

Therefore, naturally we do not allow future events to be used as facts, while we do accept the imaginations of witnesses as fact, (if in the present moment, the judge believes the witness' testimony to be reliable).

Other artifacts of the past that exist to remind us in the present, are objects, photographs, recordings, rubble, fossils etc.

But in absence of all rubble and photographs, and without anyone to give testimony to the past, we would really have no idea. The past would have literally disappeared. So in reality, the past doesn't exist at all, just it's echoing in the present by way of artifacts, and it is upon the facts of the past that we qualify our rights in the present.

The future on the other hand, is a coming moment. The things we do now contribute to a chain of events that, with skill and notwithstanding coordination of events beyond our control, we can contribute toward creating a specific situation when the present moment arrives at that place on the timeline.

Doesn't 'knowledge' itself presuppose "a difference between past and future"?

Also, more precisely, the empirical / computational concept of Entropy ... :death: — 180 Proof

Yes, we find ourselves able to know the past and unable to know the future. And entropy determines the direction of the arrow of time, the notion of which is intelligible only in terms of past and future.

In the context of your full reply, its almost a trick question for me: yes when addressed epistemologically, but no when addressed ontologically - ontologically they're two different facets of the same overall process. — javra

What I was trying to show is that the difference is ontological. But we have to approach a demonstration of ontology with epistemic principles in order to make sense, so the ontological difference I was describing appears epistemological. The point was that the determinacy of the future is known by a completely different epistemological process from the way that the determinacy of the past is known, and therefore we can conclude that these distinct types of knowledge, knowledge of the past, and of the future, have distinct objects.

If we are to address the present epistemologically, the present is that portion of time in which we (in part) hold direct awareness of everything that is not past and future. I’ve bracketed “in part” because, on one hand, the present is also where we intend things (with intentions always extending toward the future) as well as – hopefully not making this overly complex – being a time-span during which we are also aware of the past (memories) and the future (expectations). Still, when I’m aware of a bird chirp in the present, for example, this awareness pertains to neither the past nor the future. — javra

I don't completely agree with this, because I don't see how you jump to the position of drawing any conclusions about the present. The point of the thread was to approach the present from the position of recognizing a difference between future and past. When it becomes necessary to conclude that there is a difference between these, then the conclusion of a present, as necessary to complete the separation between them becomes justified.

You have suggested that we have direct awareness of something which is neither past nor future, and this amounts to the present. But until we established accurate principles for things past, and things future, we are just wasting time thinking about what kinds of things might be neither. Take your example of a bird chirp. You know that sensation takes time, don't you? So by the time that you are aware that you've heard a bird chirp, that bird chip is in the past. Therefore, I don't think it is possible that you could actually be aware of a bird chirp in the present.

Looking at it from this perspective, "the present" becomes quite difficult to grasp. We might be able to isolate and distinguish the way that we relate to the past, from the way that we relate to the future, in theory, but in practise these two are completely intertwined. So the theory tells us that the future is different from the past, and therefore we ought to conclude a present which separates these two. But in practise, our relations with the past are all mixed together with our relations with the future, and suddenly it becomes evident that there is no sharp division between the two. Then we ought to consider the possibility that what we call "the present" is really just a mixing of the future and the past.

You see an oasis in the dessert; at this moment, your drinking of water in a little while (the future) is plausible because the present experience currently isn't contradicotry to the past. But once you arrive there and there is only sand, you now know that the experience of the oasis was only a mirage - because this conclusion is now the only one that is not contradicotory to the entirety of your solidified past. — javra

I'll take this example of drinking water, and explain why I see an ontological difference between past and future. We have a difference between having drank water in the past, and, will drink water in the future. The truth, or reality of having drank water in the past relies solely on the accuracy of the memory. I remember having drank water, and we say that there is a truth or falsity to this memory, which is dependent on my capacity to remember. With respect to the future, I anticipate drinking water. But the truth or falsity to whether or not I will drink water is beyond my control, as your mirage example demonstrates. The way Aristotle explains this (the sea battle tomorrow is a famous example) is that there is no truth or falsity in relation to future events. So he explains with a number of examples, very articulately, how it doesn't make any sense to assume that there is any truth or falsity to whether or not specified future events will occur.

Because we are talking truth and falsity, it appears like this is an epistemological issue. But it is really an ontological issue which has epistemological ramifications. What it says is that the world is such, or the reality of being, existence, is such that we can make true and false statements concerning events of the past, but we cannot make true or false statements concerning events of the future.

And entropy determines the direction of the arrow of time, the notion of which is intelligible only in terms of past and future. — Janus

I think that this is demonstrably false. Entropy and the arrow of time are compatible with eternalism. "Past and future" only have meaning in relation to the present, and the present is not compatible with eternalism. Therefore entropy and the arrow of time do not rely on past and future for intelligibility. As I explained, they are based in before and after, which is distinct from future and past.

I think that this is demonstrably false. Entropy and the arrow of time are compatible with eternalism. "Past and future" only have meaning in relation to the present, and the present is not compatible with eternalism. Therefore entropy and the arrow of time do not rely on past and future for intelligibility. As I explained, they are based in before and after, which is distinct from future and past. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't agree that eternalism denies the phenomenological temporal movement which is understood in terms of past, present and future. It merely denies that there is any privileged or absolute past, present and future and it denies that only some universal present moment is all that really exists, with the past ceasing to exist and the future yet to exist. As Plato says: "Time is the moving image of eternity".

I don't completely agree with this, because I don't see how you jump to the position of drawing any conclusions about the present. The point of the thread was to approach the present from the position of recognizing a difference between future and past. When it becomes necessary to conclude that there is a difference between these, then the conclusion of a present, as necessary to complete the separation between them becomes justified. — Metaphysician Undercover

Maybe a misstep on my part. In fairness, my point was to illustrate the difference between experience-based epistemology of time, and reasoning based appraisals of what time is ontically, this via the example of the present moment. And this as an analogy to discussions regarding the past and future. Your mention of how the bird chirp is already the past at the moment we hear it (a moment which is the experienced present, but not the experienced past) is by my appraisals one of reasoning based ontology regarding time - but, again, not a description of how the present is experienced by us: (at the risk of being repetitive) we experience the present to be the present; it's our informed reasoning that tells us that what we are aware of at any given moment occurs in the past. Nevertheless, you bring up a very established interpretation of the present - one that I don't have a desire to debate against. And this thread isn't about the present but about past and future, as you rightly point out.

What it says is that the world is such, or the reality of being, existence, is such that we can make true and false statements concerning events of the past, but we cannot make true or false statements concerning events of the future. — Metaphysician Undercover

I acknowledge that. The past is determinate; the future is in many ways contingent. Because of this, one does not place truth values on statements regarding the future in almost all cases. (I'm thinking of exceptions such as, "it's true, rather than false or else uncertain, that the natural laws will apply tomorrow as they have today," but examples such as this are likely not what you were addressing.)

I don't agree that eternalism denies the phenomenological temporal movement which is understood in terms of past, present and future. — Janus

The issue, as I explained to 180 is that the understanding of past present and future does not produce any understanding of temporal movement. There is a part of time called the past. there is a part of time called the future. There is a division between them called the present. There is no temporal movement implied here. But what we observe is change and to understand change we assume a temporal movement. However, you can conceive of the present as static, eternal, with the entirety of the physical world changing relative to the static present. The static present has no movement, so there is no temporal movement, only a changing world relative to the 'God's eye view'. But there is a fundamental incompatibility between the two perspectives, the one has "temporal movement", the other denies it. the entropy perspective, expressed by the second law of thermodynamics, necessitates a temporal movement, as the arrow of time. so that law produces an understanding of time which is inconsistent with the understanding of past, present, and future.

Change is temporal movement, which we conceptualize as past, present and future. There is no "static present", really, for us, there is just past and future in the sense that we cannot speak about the present until it is past. Past is what has become fixed, the present is where change happens, so not static, and the future is what is yet to come. I don't know what more you are looking for.

Change is temporal movement, which we conceptualize as past, present and future. — Janus

We do not conceptualize change as past, present and future, we conceptualize it as before and after. And, this before and after may be conceptualized as completely in the past, completely in the future, or part past and part future. There is no place for "the present" in the conceptualization of change.

...the present is where change happens, no not static... — Janus

Change requires time, it takes time for an event of change to occur. If a change were happening at the present, then when the change starts, part is in the future. Likewise, by the time the change is finished part would be in the past. If you assume a midway point, then part of the change is in the future and part is in the past. So a change cannot occur at the present because it has temporal extension, and part would be in the future, and part in the past, with none of it at the present.

This ought to become evident to you when you recognize what I said above, that we conceptualize change in terms of before and after. There is a before the change, or prior to the change, and there is an after the change, posterior to the change. That's how we understand change, before and after. And if you say that there is a duration of time during which the change occurs, then there is a prior part, and a posterior part of that duration with a point dividing them. if the prior part is in the past, and the posterior part is in the future, there is never any part which is present. The present is always a dividing point between future and past.

For example, if we take a point in time two years ago, there is a before and after relative to that point. We cannot convert this before and after into past and future though, because "past and future" implies "the present" as the dividing point. And, it is quite obvious that this is inconsistent with the premise which clearly states a point in time two years ago. It's very clear that to call this point in time two years ago "the present" is a falsity. — Metaphysician Undercover

The only inconsistency (or incoherence), MU, is you refering to the Past "two years Ago" which is synomous with two years Before "the present" yet dissociating Before and After from Past and Future. You use the former in terms of the latter, MU. Res ipsa locquitur. Saying "We cannot convert this before and after into past and future" is ... nonsense.

The issue, as I explained to 180 is that the understanding of past present and future does not produce any understanding of temporal movement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Assertion without argument or evidence isn't an explanation. And "temporal movement" is a perceptual illusion/cognitive bias (no doubt an adaptive trait), so ...

:roll:

There is no "static present", really, for us, there is just past and future in the sense that we cannot speak about the present until it is past. — Janus

:up:

"static present" — Janus

Probably this is referring to the block universe eternalism mode of time.

Perhaps, but it's not clear MU has accepted that model. As far as I understand that model all moments are thought as being present together. The question this raises is as to whether each moment of time is a changeless quanta.

On that view temporality would be a movement from one frozen moment to the next with nothing in between. This is not how we experience time though, for us it is a continuum of change. It would be analogous to how the 24 static frames per second of a movie are experienced by us as continuous movement.

There is no "static present", really, for us, there is just past and future in the sense that we cannot speak about the present until it is past. — Janus

Are you sure?
What about an emulated static present?

I don't know what you are referring to.

I'll attempt to explain.

An animation is the composite of two or more stillframes.
If we are to perceive the animation at whole, it is entirely present and static.
Likewise each frame by itself is a static present bit.

But if we were to emulate these frames, i.e give them an angle or keyframe - then through a rotary process, one may produce a momentum or tempo which animates what is still.

One could make more or less the same analogy through/with light.

So in summary, there is a static present but it's not perceivable from within the frame of reference; so if you were to slightly edit your claim as 'static presenting' then I would be inclined to agree.

So in summary, there is a static present but it's not perceivable from within the frame of reference; so if you were to slightly edit your claim as 'static presenting' then I would be inclined to agree. — Shamshir

I'm still not entirely clear on what you are saying. But responding to the above if I read you rightly, I would say that saying there is no "static presenting" is equivalent to saying "There is no "static present", really, for us". But then perhaps I did not read you rightly?

Maybe I phrased it poorly, but I think you understood.

I meant to say, that all references made are made to and/or from a static present.

But the referencing itself is not static.
It is, for lack of a better word, flowing - hence flowing in and out of stillframes and presenting, not merely present.

So by saying there is no static presenting, you would be saying there is no static present from within the static present.

So

There is no "static present", really, for us — Janus

I would agree, that it is not perceivable.

The only inconsistency (or incoherence), MU, is you refering to the Past "two years Ago" which is synomous with two years Before "the present" yet dissociating Before and After from Past and Future. You use the former in terms of the latter, MU. Res ipsa locquitur. Saying "We cannot convert this before and after into past and future" is ... nonsense. — 180 Proof

The problem with this claim of yours, that two years ago is synonymous with two years before the present, is that it requires a further premise which states that the past is before the present. When you derive your concept of before and after from the second law of thermodynamics your are not provided with such a premise. Before and after are defined in terms of entropy. There is no reference to "the present" here.

Now we have to refer to concepts of "past, present and future" to determine whether "past" necessarily means before the present. So let's say past means gone by in time, having already occurred, and future means expected to occur, or going to occur. We need a principle by which we can say that things which have already occurred are "before" things which are going to occur, and vise versa, things which are going to occur are "after" things which have already occurred.

We can say that before means earlier in "time", and after means later in "time", But our concepts of "past, present, and future" have not produced a concept of "time", so this doesn't provide the needed principle. To derive a concept of "time" form these concepts of past, present, and future, requires that we take notice of an exchange between these, things expected to occur, do occur, and become things which have occurred, for example. This relates to the concept of "change", and we say that things are changing. Notice, that what we observe is a direction to change, future things become past things, and never the opposite. This is the principle which supports conversion of past and future into before and after. So, your claim that "past" is synonymous with "before the present", is supported by this empirical claim, an inductive conclusion, that there is a direction to change. "Earlier and later", "before and after" presuppose change, and a direction to change.

The issue I raised, is that there is a gap between the concepts of "past, present, and future", and "the directionality of change and time". These are distinct sets of concepts (conceptual structures) which have not been made compatible with each other. Take "past, present, and future" for example. We have the distinction between already occurred and expected to occur, and this is an intelligible difference. There is nothing here to indicated that what is expected to occur might not have already occurred in the past, and nothing to indicate that what has already occurred might occur in the future. These assumptions are supported by referring to the other conceptual structure, that of the directionality of time. That inductive principle places those restrictions. Likewise, within the conceptual structure of the directionality of time, there is nothing which provides a basis for distinguishing between events which have already occurred (past), and other events which are just expected to occur (future), because it provides no principle for dividing one section of time from another.

So what I was asking for, was the principle by which we relate these two distinct conceptual structures. It's obvious that the relation is made through 'the present", so that "past" becomes before the present, while "future" becomes after the present. But if this is the case, there are some ramifications. It appears like change could only occur at the present, and as I explained in my reply to Janus above, this is problematic.