Belief is necessarily not a virtue over consciously knowing what not to believe. and/or is this statement already obvious enough to grant as self-evident? — A Gnostic Agnostic

It's not good to have or state a belief when the object isn't known to be so, as it might ingrain itself, as well as that others might pick up on it as true, especially concerning invisible realms proposed.

Note also that in general what many believe can become their 'goods', in both of its meanings, prompting opposing beliefs to be labeled as 'bad' or 'evil'. That there even are opposing beliefs out there can seem to some to lessen the credibility of their own, and then might wish to wipe out the other believers, as nonsensical as that would be.

I am interested to discover whether or not there is a logic that can be constructed which renders the statement:

"belief" is not a virtue — A Gnostic Agnostic

This seems very similar to your other thread, 'rant on belief'.

In any case, the answer to your question is 'no'. A belief might or might not be correct (and so in some sense 'virtuous') depending on its content. You can have true beliefs, which are beneficial, or you might believe something abhorent, or completely fallacious. But none of that means that belief is necessarily a bad thing, any more than 'speech' might be (as you can engage in either virtuous or vicious speech-acts.)

I think what you're trying to do in both threads is criticize religious belief in particular, for its perceived evils associated with enforcing 'group-think' and dogmatism. Those a fair criticisms, but it seems to me you have an anti-religious ax to grind. But to give you some benefit of the doubt, and as your screen name includes 'gnostic', what do you think 'gnosticism' amounts to? How is it different from 'mere belief'? Is it a form of valid knowledge, and if so, knowledge of what? Do you think gnostics have beliefs, or do they have knowledge?

I agree there is a traditional distinction between 'knowlege' and 'belief' but these pragmatically involve 'degree of confidence', rather than that more nebulous concept 'truth'.

An argument being suggested above is that 'belief' could be a whole modus vivendi equating to 'being', but that argument essentially rests on one modus claiming superiority (i.e 'correctness') over others which are demoted to mere 'belief systems'.

I agree there is a traditional distinction between 'knowlege' and 'belief' but these pragmatically involve 'degree of confidence', rather than that more nebulous concept 'truth'. — fresco

or degrees of justification, I would say, or at least, degrees of justification that can be shared and tested by many. I've always though JTB should be JB in philosophy.

An argument being suggested above is that 'belief' could be a whole modus vivendi equating to 'being', but that argument essentially rests on one modus claiming superiority (i.e 'correctness') over others which are demoted to mere 'belief systems'. — fresco

I thought he was getting at the idea of being without belief as a modus vivendi which is better than having (a bunch of) beliefs. But yes, he seems to be claiming superiority for parsimony in beliefs. A belief that would need to be demonstrated to be true and this would be tricky.

Can it not also be said "knowledge is arrived at as a subset of falsifying "beliefs" which renders one knowing of what not to "believe"? — A Gnostic Agnostic

If you say it, and believe it is true. It is a belief.

I think the word wisdom would be better to use here. But still the contradiction will hold. It might be better to argue that parsimony in beliefs is wise, or the like.

I think at best it can be said it depends on from whose perspective one is looking. From your perspective I understand "that's a belief" but from my perspective it is not a "belief", it is a knowledge. I do not find coherence in the general notion that "knowledge" requires "belief" outside of knowing (of) a particular belief(s) to be false and the reasons why. — A Gnostic Agnostic

Well, if one wants to draw a hard line between knowledge and beliefs, there are all sorts of problems unless you think you are infallible. And I think thinking you are infallible is a problem. A problematic belief.

As a practical example: I know not to "believe" that either the Torah (implied: Bible as it begins with the Torah) or Qur'an are the perfect unaltered words of (a) god, contrary to the claims held by the respective 'states'. — A Gnostic Agnostic

I certainly think I am better off without certain beliefs. I don't believe that either about those books. And in fact I acknowledge the positive belief: I believe they are not the perfect....etc.

But we are all moving around with all sorts of heuristics, which are a subset of beliefs, and other kinds of beliefs. How to minimize risk at night on street, what friend X likes and doesn't like, what helps in a relationship, at work...I could go on and on. We are filled with and use an incredible range of beliefs to make choices. It is certainly good to see which are helping or not. And to evaluate beliefs we will have other beliefs and tools. This has given us great advantages over other animals. That we have beliefs and heuristics.

So, fine you lack a belief in the Abrahamic texts being perfect words of God. And that might be helpful to you. But your version of parsimony in belief might mess you up in other ways. That would all remain to be seen.

All knowing is belief but not all belief is knowing.

All knowing is belief but not all belief is knowing.

This is not coherent to me... where does it come from? Is this held as an axiom? If all knowing *is* belief, what does this say of ignorance? Is ignorance not required for a "belief" to even be possible? Can "knowing" not be the opposite of "belief" in that knowing what not to "believe"?

If ignorance is required for a "belief",
and "belief" is required by satan
in order that "believers" "believe"
that "belief" is a virtue, and
satan (evil) is god (good),

...does it now follow that
"belief" is not a virtue before
knowing who/what/where/why/when/how and if
*not* to "believe"?

Does this not juxtapose knowledge (knowing what not to "believe") and belief? Is this not what distinguishes knowledge from "belief"? How can all knowing be "belief" when knowledge of what not to "believe" exists?

Belief is formed in each individual from their experiences, knowledge is just the beliefs we have verified external to ourselves. Ignorance is the absence of knowledge or experience, the former more often and the latter more humorously. Faith is an example of a belief held without knowledge, faith is often held only by personal experience and hope.

Can "knowing" not be the opposite of "belief" in that knowing what not to "believe"? — A Gnostic Agnostic

I think that leads to all sorts of confusions. Knowing what not to belief would still require a belief. Which is why in philosophy, knowledge is considered those beliefs that are supported by strong justification. If you have strong justification for not believing X, then you believe and know that X is not false or not justified.

It would mean you have evaluated evidence and reached a conclusion. And the process you went through to do this is considered well justified.

On the street people often use 'belief' to mean things that are not supported by enough evidence, something like faith. But this leads to absurd things like one does not believe what one knows. One knows it. And since we re fallible what we know today may turn out to have actually been merely a belief. Evidence may come in to change our minds.

Faith is an example of a belief held without knowledge, faith is often held only by personal experience and hope. — Sunnyside

Trust' is a step up from 'faith', meaning that you have at least seen something happen, such as morning dawning. 'Faith' adds zero to what is wanted.

Crazy people believe things with no basis in reality, sane people know the difference by conferring with each other about their experiences. Crazy people trust their beliefs enough to jump off of buildings singing "I believe I can fly". Trust is not a step up from faith, both faith and knowledge require trust.

Crazy people trust their beliefs enough to jump off of buildings singing "I believe I can fly". — Sunnyside

I jumped off of the Empire State Building one time, and lived to tell about it because, luckily, I was only on the first step when I jumped. Geronimo!

I think that leads to all sorts of confusions. Knowing what not to belief would still require a belief.

Yeah... this is not coherent to me. Not to say it is not: if even only to me and no else, it is just not coherent to me.

Which is why in philosophy, knowledge is considered those beliefs that are supported by strong justification. If you have strong justification for not believing X, then you believe and know that X is not false or not justified.

With no offense intended to philosophers, and based on my own experience (I was in a living relationship with a B.A. in philosophy) I find the institution of 'philosophy' as lacking in the department of creating safeguards such that prevents severing what is practical (ie. useful) and not practical. It is not practical to define all knowledge as "belief" insofar as pursuing a true understanding of what "knowledge" actually is, if anything meaningful.

I hope for the sake of humanity, philosophy as a common practice shifts its attention toward clearly defining what "knowledge" actually is - I find it has a self-imposed boundary condition that would not otherwise be there by virtue of its treatment of such stuff.

From a Western sciences perspective, philosophy's handling of "knowledge" might as well be a "theory" - supported by strong justification (ie. a bed of evidence). If considered the same, a "theory" can be necessarily false based on certain conditions, such as a central taken-to-be-true (regardless of the circumstances giving rise to it) as not actually being true in the reality. This is where I find philosophy falls: once detached from the reality, it loses its efficacy and ultimately will always fall short.

It would mean you have evaluated evidence and reached a conclusion. And the process you went through to do this is considered well justified.

If you changed "evaluated evidence" to "used the conscience" this would be distinct from belief: it is possible to "believe" something never subjecting it to scrutiny (ie. conscience, evaluate evidence, test for validity etc.) it just sustains itself and can solidify and be made immovable (stubborn). Now if you take the "well justified" part, I find this to be the method used. Tried, tested and true - universal "well justified" methodology that acts as a model for any/all effective inquiry.

I find there can be "knowns" that need not "beliefs" supporting them - if philosophy as a school treats knowledge as necessarily requiring "belief", I'm afraid it may be just as severed from any meaningful attachment to the (un)reality as attention received by others regarding (matters pertaining to) it.

On the street people often use 'belief' to mean things that are not supported by enough evidence, something like faith. But this leads to absurd things like one does not believe what one knows. One knows it. And since we re fallible what we know today may turn out to have actually been merely a belief. Evidence may come in to change our minds.

In some religious buildings, "belief" can also mean things that are not supported by ANY evidence, therefor things like "faith" (established upon "beliefs") serve in its place. Else: knowledge of the evidence that clearly undermines the "belief" - to which they would not be bound - had they known (of) the evidence available to them, accomplished by way of the conscience having the ability to inquire, investigate, learn, discern and eventually graduate a "belief" into either a known of that which is true, or a known of what (ie. claim, worldview, belief etc.) not to "believe" by virtue of it being known to be untrue.

And this is where I think philosophy is dead: mishandling of what knowledge is. I am not unsympathetic - I understand how difficult the problem of "knowledge" is, as even theism denotes the problem of "knowledge" (of good and evil) as central to human conflict. The idea there is that there are fundamentally only two forces present ever-exchanging: good for evil, and evil for good. There is something to this, but it is not as it seems to many I find. I have contemplated this problem for approx. 4 years now, and just recently discovered how good and evil can be reconciled such that only good (being) remains. This solution I will make a new thread for... it is good that I visited the philosophy forums and am bouncing between religion and philosophy - reconciling them will be easier now that I understand how they are both trying to point at the same "thing". Both have problems, but both are a part of the solution - it will be a matter of how mature people can be regarding the topic.

I hope for the sake of humanity, philosophy as a common practice shifts its attention toward clearly defining what "knowledge" actually is - I find it has a self-imposed boundary condition that would not otherwise be there by virtue of its treatment of such stuff. — A Gnostic Agnostic

There's a lot of work on epistemology in philosophy.

I find there can be "knowns" that need not "beliefs" supporting them — A Gnostic Agnostic

It is not that beliefs support them. I am not saying the knowledge is supported (or not) by beliefs, just that knowledge is a set of certain kinds of beliefs. Ones arrived at rigorously.

Unless you are saying you are infallible when deciding 'known A' is true, then it may turn out to have been a belief that was not true.

In some religious buildings, "belief" can also mean things that are not supported by ANY evidence, therefor things like "faith" (established upon "beliefs") serve in its place. — A Gnostic Agnostic

Of course.

In some religious buildings, "belief" can also mean things that are not supported by ANY evidence, therefor things like "faith" (established upon "beliefs") serve in its place. Else: knowledge of the evidence that clearly undermines the "belief" - to which they would not be bound - had they known (of) the evidence available to them, accomplished by way of the conscience having the ability to inquire, investigate, learn, discern and eventually graduate a "belief" into either a known of that which is true, or a known of what (ie. claim, worldview, belief etc.) not to "believe" by virtue of it being known to be untrue.

And this is where I think philosophy is dead: mishandling of what knowledge is. — A Gnostic Agnostic

This whole section shows that you have not read much epistemology. Nothing you say here about the problems of belief, faith, the difference between beliefs that are not knowledge and knowledge is even slightly controversial in philosophy.

You're tilting at windmills.

Now of course you don't have to take on philosophy's use of the terms. But 1) this will cause confusions in philosophy discussions, here for example in a philosophy forum and 2) your final separation of belief and knowledge entails an implicit claim of infallibility.

But I'll leave you to it. It seems to me you are basing your beliefs not on the evidence.

Unless you are saying you are infallible when deciding 'known A' is true, then it may turn out to have been a belief that was not true.

It does not *only* apply to me, it applies to anyone. But yes - implicit is the assumption "I know..." is not being mistaken as "I believe I know..." (or equivalent) rendering "I know...(x)" and (x) actually is false. In such a case the "I know..." was wrong. But this is precisely what I am equating to the Abrahamic good and evil dilemma: if one eats from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, they will surely die. Please bear with me - I will be starting a new thread on this soon so will address it there.

This whole section shows that you have not read much epistemology. Nothing you say here about the problems of belief, faith, the difference between beliefs that are not knowledge and knowledge is even slightly controversial in philosophy.

Oh, well, please send my apologies to "philosophy" for not treating it as an authority on any real matter whatsoever. It may be pleased to "know"... whatever that means.

You're tilting at windmills.

It is not meaningful to me.

Now of course you don't have to take on philosophy's use of the terms. But 1) this will cause confusions in philosophy discussions, here for example in a philosophy forum and 2) your final separation of belief and knowledge entails an implicit claim of infallibility.

I do not take on "philosophy"'s use of terms - I define my own pertaining to my use only if not commonly understood. I'm still waiting for it to "know" what those terms are, because I "know" the global crisis is related to a language(s) problem(s) - that is, people not having respect for language, words and their use.

Like, you know, "believers" who call "unbelievers" racists for being critical of a "belief"-based religion which divides humanity between "believers" and "unbelievers" wherein the former are persecuted by the latter MEANWHILE vast numbers of "believers" "believe" the OPPOSITE is true, and "unbelievers" are persecuting "believers"? How is this possible?

If satan requires "belief" in order that "believers" "believe" that:
"belief" is a virtue, and
that satan is god (equiv.: evil is good)

...who calls themselves "believers"? And this is the problem philosophy faces - no distinction between one who is in a state of "knowing" (ie. what not to believe) and "believing". Is it unaware that "knowing" and "believing" can be in regards to yes/no questions? Such as:

Is the Torah the perfect word of god?

You can go many places from here, but will find that the Torah is a body of four independent source materials (as in: J, E, P and D) which were later redacted with a fifth. This finding rules out the "belief" that it was... delivered to a man on a mountain? And because the Torah is the beginning of the Bible, we now have a biiiiig problem with the West and Judeo-Christianity: it was built on false claims. Of course it stands to reason it will fall: but by the hands of who?

Is the Qur'an the perfect word of god?

Here we go again - more "perfect" books. What is this idol worship nonsense? The Qur'an is evolved from Syriac Christian strophic hymns which were:

i. not "Arabic" they were Syriac, and
ii. not "Islamic" they were Christian"

that grew into an attempted compendium of the Bible, but oddly incorporating a lot of non-Biblical content esp. from Judaism.

How many people "believe" the Torah/Bible/Qur'an are divinely inspired? What is the weight of the gravity of their "belief" being "dead wrong" (as the early Genesis account might have it) being they are themselves waging the war, instead of making peace? What if it is actually true that the ones who call themselves purveyors of "peace" (never-mind the internal wars... genocide of hundreds of millions) while essentially claiming a book and a man are not to be surpassed in any way?

Ummm, hello? Who is worshiping idols now? These people reading books and imaging idols are doing just that: worshiping books and idols.

It's inversion: "believers" are liable to "believe" the opposite of what is true. Only being in a state of "knowing" who/what/where/why/when/how *not* to "believe" guards from becoming bound to "believe" something that is not true. This I find "knowing" which is actually an absence of "belief" that might otherwise be acting on the being if not otherwise knowing of what not to "believe".

But I'll leave you to it. It seems to me you are basing your beliefs not on the evidence.

Okay... it seems to me the "belief"-based religions are doing what you think I am doing, which is basing "beliefs" not on the evidence? Why is the House of Islam still teaching Muslims Islam was formed in Mecca when all of the Mosques built up until 730 CE had a Qibla facing an entirely different city in South Jordan? Where did the pilgrimage used to happen and when did it actually change? Where did the Qur'an actually come from? Where did Muhammad come into the picture historically? What time did his life biographies become available (before being redacted)?

These, and many more, all have gravity. Muhammad is now probably a more powerful male central figure idol that male idol worshipers imitate and use to justify their own behavior. In reality, that blood is spilled over criticisms of him should be enough to any half-conscious being that they worship this man.

Oh, well, please send my apologies to "philosophy" for not treating it as an authority on any real matter whatsoever. It may be pleased to "know"... whatever that means. — A Gnostic Agnostic

I am not concerned about philosophy's feelings or honor. I don't know what to say otherwise to someone who raises a number of concerns about knowledge and beliefs that philosophy misleads people about, when in fact the concerns are very carefully looked at within philosophy and are part of basic texts on philosophy, basic articles and essays on epistemology. What should I say to a person making accusations about philosophy that clearly show that person has not read or has forgotten fairly basic stuff. I don't think I am the only person raising similar concerns in the thread. You can go boldly forward in part based on assumptions that are false, or you could consider the possibility that you don't know what you are talking about in this particular area. Up to you.

I think what you mean by "logic" here is known irrefutable facts.

Couldn't I say that I don't know anything other than this fact (that I don't know anything (else))? Everything else that we know is based on some assumptions that we believe in. We could go run a bunch of scientific experiments that tell us all sorts of interesting things, but all of that is based on some assumptions.

The line between belief and established irrefutable facts is blurry. I could believe that there is a god that is a purple stegosaurus swimming through the universe, but I think very few people would agree with me and I don't have much evidence to convince them. I could believe gravity pulls things down, and we could spend days or years dropping thousands upon thousands of rocks on the ground until we decide the evidence is strong enough to consider it an irrefutable fact that gravity pulls things down. But, still, those rock dropping observations are based on beliefs. The difference is that the claim of gravity pulls things down is a lot more convincing than that of the purple stegosaurus god.

(Response to the first post, the opening post.)

I believe I am a man. -- what's the virtue in this?

I believe you are a woman. -- there is no virtue in this belief

I believe there is a god. -- no virtue to be found. It's nice if you are a fellow believer or if you are the particular god concerned, but virtue? In the action? I see no virtue. It's no more viruous than tying your shoe or taking out the trash.

I believe there is a proof that renders the statement "belief is not a virtue" true. The proof is finding even just one example when belief is not a virtue. That does not make all beliefs unvirtuous, but shows that some beliefs are not virtuous, while others may be.

I am not concerned about philosophy's feelings or honor. I don't know what to say otherwise to someone who raises a number of concerns about knowledge and beliefs that philosophy misleads people about, when in fact the concerns are very carefully looked at within philosophy and are part of basic texts on philosophy, basic articles and essays on epistemology.

It is not intentionally misleading, it is due to a mishandling of 'knowledge'. It's the treatment of what knowledge actually is (or is not) that is itself problematic, rendering the enterprise of 'philosophy' fundamentally limited to/by that. That is not to say it is not useful: philosophy can be useful. But it is also limited. I understand this limitation, thus treat it with such limitation in mind.

Philosophy should not feel bad at all in this regard: religious approaches suffer the same. According to an Abrahamic model for creation, there are fundamentally only two trees at the head of it (speaking of "epistemology"): a tree of the living, and a tree of the knowledge of good and evil which "surely" causes death. It too fails to indicate exactly what this tree of knowledge is, but perhaps that is the point (ie. how does one truly 'know' anything? What is there to 'know'? How does one 'know' one knows, rather than "believing" to know? What is the agency of a true discernment? How best to discern?) - to use the conscience itself.

But to bring up again your reference to "epistemology" I am interested to understand your own understanding of what this is, or implies. I will keep my understanding simple:

From the top down.

And so my handling of the problem of good and evil starts with just that: it begins with good and evil, and all things are made possible by them, thus is relevant to any/all "philosophical" discussion that must at least grant there are people on the planet who understand creation as being headed by two inter-locked forces of good and evil. On the outside, they apparently consume each other. On the inside... what does one "believe" to know about good and evil? This brings up the 'GOD' problem, and I will be making a new thread that offers a solution such that solves for good and evil (that also takes care of the problems of "belief" and 'GOD') and it requires an understanding of 'knowledge' which is not exactly in line with how 'philosophy' handles it.

However if you were a "believing" Christian, for example, I would say to you that the solution for 'GOD' and/or good and evil requires an understanding of 'GOD' that is not exactly in line with Christianity - which a Christian might not like, because they are attached to their own institution. So again, this is not against 'philosophy' - it is *for* a different understanding of what 'knowledge' is and observing the entire 'context' with it.

What should I say to a person making accusations about philosophy that clearly show that person has not read or has forgotten fairly basic stuff. I don't think I am the only person raising similar concerns in the thread.

It doesn't matter - it is to no end. I don't find 'knowledge' in reading or remembering things others wrote down. In fact I find that people who are most attached to something that they "believe" in such to the point it defines who they "believe" they are, they are more likely to fall into the trap of enmity which results in them "accusing" others of what they are themselves guilty of, such as...

You can go boldly forward in part based on assumptions that are false, or you could consider the possibility that you don't know what you are talking about in this particular area. Up to you.

...this. This is exactly what 'philosophy' is - based on an assumption that is false. This will be fleshed out in the new thread that deals with the resolution of good and evil. Besides, if all 'knowing' is based in 'belief', nobody actually 'knows' what they are talking about, so I enjoy being on the same page as everyone else. Maybe we can come to some sort of understanding on what real 'knowledge' is and why it is important that it be distinct from 'belief'.

Maybe you will find something in the responses that follow which highlights the problem of treating 'knowledge' as 'belief'. I find it to be rather the opposite.

I think what you mean by "logic" here is known irrefutable facts.

I would say facts are facts that logic requires to make into 'knowledge'.

Couldn't I say that I don't know anything other than this fact (that I don't know anything (else))? Everything else that we know is based on some assumptions that we believe in. We could go run a bunch of scientific experiments that tell us all sorts of interesting things, but all of that is based on some assumptions.

You can definitely start there: 'I know nothing'.

If you are at least willing to admit 'I don't know' this is the condition required to know something. If one "believes" to know something, they will not seek to know it. It is like a "believer" who "believes" they already have the truth, so they stop searching for it.

This is just one of the many reasons why I repeat: belief is not a virtue.

The line between belief and established irrefutable facts is blurry.

It is also intentionally blurred by "belief"-based 'states' that wish people to "believe" something is true, when in fact it is not true.

I could believe that there is a god that is a purple stegosaurus swimming through the universe, but I think very few people would agree with me and I don't have much evidence to convince them. I could believe gravity pulls things down, and we could spend days or years dropping thousands upon thousands of rocks on the ground until we decide the evidence is strong enough to consider it an irrefutable fact that gravity pulls things down. But, still, those rock dropping observations are based on beliefs. The difference is that the claim of gravity pulls things down is a lot more convincing than that of the purple stegosaurus god.

One can have a "belief", and one can have reason to "believe". I am more interested in the "reasoning" part - I want to understand how it is reasoned. If the reasons are sound, the "belief" may be too sound, and perhaps true, but that does not mean "belief" is a virtue. How one reasons something can be virtuous (ie. chess players who calculate moves in relation to an adversarial player 'know' the weaknesses of that player) and a choice made based on this reasoning can itself be virtuous (ie. checkmate) but this doesn't make playing chess particularly a virtue unless learning/understanding what moves *not* to make next time to produce a better result. I find 'knowing' a better move comes with looking for a better move.

It should be less about the "belief" itself and more about the reasoning. I find the extent to which one relies on (ie. attaches themselves to) a "belief" the less they rely on reasoning for themselves. I find people who are less 'conscience' reason less, and prefer to have things that (at least seem to) work just be given to them. The point I emphasize is not to "believe" anyone or anything on the grounds that a "belief" may not be true.

This is a problem of how conscience one is, but I find interestingly that what one refers to as 'conscience' is actually the condition necessary to access what is referred to as 'GOD' - that is, 'GOD' actually has nothing to do with "belief" at all, and rather "belief" is the agency required to CONFUSE good with evil. Because "belief" is required for this, 'knowing' who/what/where/why/when and how *not* to "believe" is necessarily superior to "belief" and has much more to do with 'GOD' than "belief" does.

Perhaps better stated: instead of trying to understand what 'GOD' *is*, rather using the process of elimination (via the conscience) to determine what 'GOD' *is not* yields a necessarily more accurate result because it actively avoids falling into the trap of not "believing" something that is not true. If the conscience is used properly, what one is left with is either *nothing* or *whatever 'GOD' is*.

This is the approach the new thread will take: start with good and evil, and eliminate what 'GOD' is by virtue of being able to 'KNOW' what 'GOD' is not.

The good thing about this is nobody has to "believe" me, or in me, or even like me. They can hate me and see it for themselves unless they are themselves a barrier (ie. trying to protect a "belief" they want to be true).

(Response to the first post, the opening post.)

I believe I am a man. -- what's the virtue in this?

I believe you are a woman. -- there is no virtue in this belief

I believe there is a god. -- no virtue to be found. It's nice if you are a fellow believer or if you are the particular god concerned, but virtue? In the action? I see no virtue. It's no more viruous than tying your shoe or taking out the trash.

I believe there is a proof that renders the statement "belief is not a virtue" true. The proof is finding even just one example when belief is not a virtue. That does not make all beliefs unvirtuous, but shows that some beliefs are not virtuous, while others may be.

You highlighted something very important. It is already generally accepted that:

Belief is not necessarily a virtue,

But the statement:

Belief is not a virtue,

Some people attempt to undermine it by claiming some "beliefs" can be virtuous. The problem here is between 'belief' as an agency and "belief" as a particular. In the former, 'belief' is taken as an agency: the person does not know, therefor "believes". In the latter, "belief" is taken as an object: the person has a particular belief in/of (x).

The point of the argument is that the particular is actually unimportant - it is the agency of "belief" that is not a virtue, therefor there is actually no such thing as a virtuous "belief" - it is better to say there are virtuous people whose "beliefs" reflect their own virtuousness. I'm sure this is related to the body being a lamp and each person being a light unto the world, therefor discernment of what is good (ie. virtuous) and evil (ie. inverse of virtuous) is needed to never become subject to evil.

This may include "believing" evil is actually good - hence the problem of "belief", it is the agency required to confuse good with evil. There is an alternative, which is knowing what *not* to "believe".

It is not intentionally misleading, it is due to a mishandling of 'knowledge'. — A Gnostic Agnostic

In philosophy there are a myriad of 'handlings' of knowledge. There are many, many different takes on what knowledge is and how it should be handled and how one achieves knowledge. So which of the various ideas about knowledge in philosophy do you consider a mishandling of knowledge and which philosopher or school is this associated with?

As far as my own epistemology, I notice that I use a number of different methodologies to arrive at what I consider knowledge. It seems to me other people do that also, though they seem to, generally, argue that route X is the only way to knowledge or knowledge is only Y, all the while acting like there are a number of ways to get to knowledge and a number of different kinds of knowledge. So I have no specific approach. I notice a more ad hoc approach in myself. And in general I am satisfied.

In philosophy there are a myriad of 'handlings' of knowledge. There are many, many different takes on what knowledge is and how it should be handled and how one achieves knowledge. So which of the various ideas about knowledge in philosophy do you consider a mishandling of knowledge and which philosopher or school is this associated with?

That is good - if there is attention paid to the handling of 'knowledge' such that there are takes and handles, perhaps the disciplines responsible for this attention to clarity will hold to serve while considering other possibilities.

As to the question - I am not aware of the various ideas about knowledge in philosophy: I only understand things in terms of what I call "first distinction" which is not from any philosopher or school. At best I can only offer a background as to how I arrived at it as a principle of governing all things.

I am bound to know the answer to the question 'from whence human suffering?' I am bound to know this, and in my own experience I tend to approach the understanding of things from an epistemological way (ie. top-down) on the basis of what gave rise to their existence in the first place, hence 'from whence human suffering'. In the past, this was an unconscious process - for example, one of my pass-times is playing the piano, and I would interpret pieces of music by reducing them into a single 'idea' that uses itself to express itself in as many ways as "humanly" possible that impart also the "feeling" behind the idea. For example, if you listen to the track 'Time' by Hans Zimmer (soundtrack: Inception) you will hear a two-syllable motif that repeats. I know the 'idea' behind the musical 'motif' is "wake up", and the "feeling" of the piece is to start subtly quiet and grow into a loud screaming horn. There is an element of 'design' such that it is obvious there is a conscious being responsible for its existence. How this relates to "first distinction" is my finding of the most principle distinctions being inside/outside (of ones self) and whatever is going on in the inside (as in writing a piece of music) shows up on the outside somehow.

I evaluate creation in the same way, and find there is certainly a 'design' element in creation, and myself am bound to know the designer because it is absolutely beautiful, elegant, awe-inspiring, beyond belief etc. I do not have the words to describe it, but do not mind endeavoring such that others can "see" it for themselves and stop suffering what they suffer, which happens to involve "belief".

How acute is your imagination? Can you imagine a boundless universe with the following laws:

i. There are only two forces which consume one another in perpetuity: evil and good, and
iii. The default 'state' is all-knowing; else: "belief"-based ignorance, and
iii. All suffering is self-generated and self-perpetuated (ie. suffered) as a product of ones own ignorance

And the rest is boundless: the default 'state' is naturally all-knowing, because that is what 'GOD' is often imagined as being. Anything short of this can be understood as "belief"-based ignorance.

"Belief" is the agency required to confuse good and evil. If philosophy can prove this true, it would probably overtake all other institutions on the planet in terms of correctly identifying the most prime source of human suffering: ignorance. The "belief"-based religions of the world will never get it, because they are 'bound to believe' whereas others are bound to know things.

I am also bound to know if world peace is possible - so far, the answer is 'no' based on how much "protection" humanity gives to each others' "beliefs" such that they should be respected. No "belief" that can be proven untrue should be "respected" - it should be the other way around.

But one thing is true: the top-down approach always wins. Philosophy has this in its bag, and it should apply it to the Abrahamic problem of good and evil such that it designates 'evil' as a product of "belief".

As far as my own epistemology, I notice that I use a number of different methodologies to arrive at what I consider knowledge. It seems to me other people do that also, though they seem to, generally, argue that route X is the only way to knowledge or knowledge is only Y, all the while acting like there are a number of ways to get to knowledge and a number of different kinds of knowledge. So I have no specific approach. I notice a more ad hoc approach in myself. And in general I am satisfied

Even if you replaced the words epistemology with 'conscience', it reads the same, and it is all the same true. People might believe *their* way is the only way - they are just confident because their way worked and produced the right result. As you point out, there are many ways to arrive at the right result, and this is so true it is ridiculous: like a point in otherwise boundlessness, another point has boundless ways to approach it from.

Belief is sometimes a matter of choice — tim wood

No, it never is. That's a category error.

No, it never is. That's a category error. — S

Don't suppose you'd care to elaborate.

Belief just isn't the kind of thing which can be chosen. It's nothing like going clothes shopping or picking from a restaurant menu. That's just not how it works.

For mature adults, it is. The beliefs that accompany religion are poster-child for this topic; I have my own, and trust me they're considered and chosen. But included as well are beliefs about sports teams, love, almost anything else that might be subject to belief. Or, to take clothes, admittedly most of us don't make clothes, but we do choose which to buy. I think you have to provide an account for how, as you say,

it never is. — S

For mature adults, it is. — tim wood

No, it isn't. For anyone at all. Maturity and age are completely irrelevant. It's a category error to say that beliefs are chosen.

The beliefs that accompany religion are poster-child for this topic; I have my own, and trust me they're considered and chosen. But included as well are beliefs about sports teams, love, almost anything else that might be subject to belief. Or, to take clothes, admittedly most of us don't make clothes, but we do choose which to buy. I think you have to provide an account for how, as you say, — tim wood

All you've effectively done there is repeat your assertion that beliefs are chosen, along with some irrelevancies, like mentioning that they're considered. I never said anything about beliefs not being considered. They're just not chosen. And then you make a completely inappropriate analogy which I raised precisely because it works against you. When I go into a clothes shop, I can walk over to the t-shirt section, browse through the different colours and styles, pick one that I'd like to purchase, and then purchase it, so that I then have acquired it. I can choose from a range of options: the blue one, the red one, the black one, and so on. That's nothing like how I acquired any of my beliefs. I didn't choose to believe that I live on Earth, for example. I couldn't and can't believe that I live on Mars, or Mercury, or Venus, or Jupiter, or any other planet, even if I try my hardest. There's simply no choice in the matter. And that's obvious.

Sorry for the delay, I have been out and about recently.

Those a fair criticisms, but it seems to me you have an anti-religious ax to grind.

I understand the optics might suggest so: perhaps I can clarify so as to highlight my real motive.

In my own attempt to solve the problem 'from whence human suffering?' I ran into the problem of religious "beliefs". I compiled a list of assertions that are taken to be 'true' by various religious entities and tried them for their validity.

I found that there is a particular religious "belief" surrounding a particular book and a particular male central figure "mercy upon mankind" idol that serves as the highest "example" for humanity to be... exceeding problematic. Problematic to the degree of being the leading source of human suffering on the planet. Fundamentally I know this to be true, and feel I could exhaustively advance an argumentation that renders this 'true'. The problem is such "believers" place authority over truth rather than truth over authority and, despite even altruistic efforts, such arguments are met with slander and accusations.

Unfortunately, I find this same "belief"-based religion to be the *real* source(s) of both fascism/Nazism and socialism. It is all coming from one place, but being manufactured behind proxies by making people "believe" these are coming from somewhere else, such as Jews. It is not true and deliberately designed to take all attention away from the real source which is... again, another reason why "belief" is not a virtue. It can be an extremely detrimental vice that "locks" people in a perpetual cycle of blaming whoever they "believe" is responsible. It is possible to "know" who is responsible.

And so, the "ax to grind" is not but for the fact I find it to be the leading source of human suffering on the planet, which is actually the only thing I care about.

But to give you some benefit of the doubt, and as your screen name includes 'gnostic', what do you think 'gnosticism' amounts to?

The word 'gnosis' indicates 'knowing'. That is, as a stark contrast to "belief". It amounts to being able to "know" whether or not an assertion(s) is true or untrue, for example:

"Book Q is the perfect, inimitable, unaltered, inerrant word of god."
and/or
"Person M is the greatest example for all of humanity to emulate."

How is it different from 'mere belief'?

A belief can be anything, based on nothing. However a knowledge in/of something to be true/untrue demands the scrutiny of a specific assertion that can be falsified (ie. rendered certainly false). One can thus "know" if/when an assertion is true or untrue.

A gnostic will test such assertions (wherever possible) and evaluate what the implication(s) is (are) if a given "belief"-based claim is, in fact, certainly false. This is what I have done for the religion in question.

If over a billion people "believe" in a "belief"-based assertion(s) that are, in fact, certainly false, this overwhelmingly contributes to the problem(s) of 'from whence human suffering?' given their thoughts, feelings and actions are often guided and/or dictated by such "belief".

This includes waging wars against "unbelievers" for not "believing" in an assertion that is certainly false, while simultaneously claiming to be the ones being persecuted. It is an inversion - one that is not possible if not for "belief". Again, "belief" is the agency required to confuse good with evil, and vice versa. If not for "belief", if even granting Satan were a real "thing", people would not suffer "believing" assertions that are not true.

So, I find the problem to be "belief" itself, but also acknowledge that there is certainly a particular "belief" on the planet responsible for the deaths of hundreds of millions of people via genocide.

Is it a form of valid knowledge, and if so, knowledge of what?

Knowledge of who, what, where, why, when, how and/or if *NOT* to "believe" in an assertion(s) on the basis of their being certainly false. This ensures one never becomes "bound to believe" something that is not true and allows for considerations of others who are themselves bound.

Do you think gnostics have beliefs, or do they have knowledge?

It really depends on the person and their discipline re: the use of the conscience. One can "know" the who/what/where/why/when/how and/or if *NOT* to "believe" a particular assertion(s) while having their own "beliefs" that are constantly being tried and subjected to scrutiny.

I find the problem to be "belief" itself, but also acknowledge that there is certainly a particular "belief" on the planet responsible for the deaths of hundreds of millions of people via genocide. — A Gnostic Agnostic

That is demonisation, which is just the kind of thing that those who you're accusing engage in.

I find your analysis unconvincing and shallow. There are good reasons for criticising the manipulation of belief, but you're not making a case; you're basically stating a single idea over and over again. You're not showing any understanding of the meaning of gnosticism, other than a platitude about gnosis being knowledge.

I could say more, but I sense you're here to talk rather than to listen, so I'll desist.

Good points of course.

It is my experience that religious preachers and proselytizers are here to reinforce their own 'rationalities'. Its another aspect of the incestuous relationship between 'word magic' and 'religious belief' which inevitably involves repetition. Shallow 'questions' like this one are mere vehicles for those self reinforcement exercises.

That is demonisation, which is just the kind of thing that those who you're accusing engage in.

If there is a "belief"-based state responsible for the genocide of hundreds of millions, that is an observation. Demonisation would be using it as a rationale for further war, as "those who you're accusing engage in" would do. I use it as a rationale for ending war by advancing rationale as to why it exists in the first place and what would be needed to end it, peacefully. There is quite the difference between these.

I find your analysis unconvincing and shallow.

I expect you will follow up with reason...

There are good reasons for criticising the manipulation of belief, but you're not making a case; you're basically stating a single idea over and over again.

...and, is the idea unsound? We all know repeating a point doesn't make it true, but does it somehow make it untrue? Would not any true point be true regardless of how often it is stated? I probably repeat it often because that is what it keeps reducing into.

We can disagree whether or not the point is true, which is fine, as long as you have an actual reason (still searching)...

You're not showing any understanding of the meaning of gnosticism, other than a platitude about gnosis being knowledge.

...I don't understand what you mean by "showing any understanding of the meaning of gnosticism". Gnosticism doesn't have any special "meaning" associated with it insofar as I know. It's just a word, like other words. What one associates to/with it is kind of their own "thing".

"Beliefs" are like things - they should be (kept) private rather than forced by way of sword.

I could say more, but I sense you're here to talk rather than to listen, so I'll desist.

I wish you would have - I'm still looking for the reason.

Good points of course.

It is my experience that religious preachers and proselytizers are here to reinforce their own 'rationalities'. Its another aspect of the incestuous relationship between 'word magic' and 'religious belief' which inevitably involves repetition. Shallow 'questions' like this one are mere vehicles for those self reinforcement exercises.

Whatever is true, ultimately speaks for itself, but only if ones is attuned to listen. I find the notion "truth in plain sight" is indeed true: it is a matter of perception. "Belief" is what shapes perception such that good might be perceived to be evil, and vice versa. If even taking a yogic perspective, the entire point of yoga is to perceive the reality just the way it is less distortion(s). This requires the dismissal of any/all internal polarization prior to considerations of the reality.

The removal of polarization is ultimately what happens as one tends towards truth: there is no more enmity, as enmity comes from those who have an adversary as a result of the "us vs. them" dichotomy that "belief" brings forth.