You also say that my argument is confused. Oh is it? No, it isn't - it is deductively valid (so, its conclusion is true if its premises are). So you need to deny a premise. Which one?

OK, I get your usage. But where I think the confusion comes in is that 'objective' is mostly used to refer to things which are considered to be existent independently of human minds. In that sense God or gods would be said to exist objectively if they exist apart from the human imagination.

I don't think many moral objectivists would be silly enough to think that moral principles just exist out there somewhere in the kind of way physical objects are commonly thought to. Mortal principles might be thought to exist as social realities independent of any particular mind, but obviously not independent of the existence of humans tout court.

You also say that my argument is confused. Oh is it? No, it isn't - it is deductively valid (so, its conclusion is true if its premises are). So you need to deny a premise. Which one? — Bartricks

I think your argument in its two premises and conclusion equivocates between individual moral evaluations and the objectivist, or inter-subjectivist, idea that moral principles are true independently of individual moral evaluations.

Where? You need to deny a premise, so which one?

For your convenience, here's the first leg of the case:

1. For something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued. (So, for clarity, for something - anything - to be morally valuable is for it to be the object of a valuing attitude)
2. Only a subject can value something
3. Therefore, for something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued by a subject.

To deny 3 you must deny either 1 or 2, so which one?

Here's the next leg:

1. If moral values are made of my valuings, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable
2. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable
3. Therefore moral values are not made of my valuings

Once again, to deny 3 you must deny either 1 or 2 - which one? Deny 1 and you're conceptually confused; deny 2 and you think it is morally good to rape someone if you value raping someone (which is as self-evidently false as that 2 + 3 = 97)

Perhaps I am wrong, but I really don't see a way of reasonably denying the conclusion of either argument, and together they imply that for something to be morally valuable is for it to be the object of the valuing attitude of some subject other than me, you, and everyone else.

I don't see any equivocation.

As for objectivists not being as crazy as I have represented them to be - on the contrary, that's precisely what they maintain. They can be sorted into either naturalist or non-naturalist varieties. The naturalist kind think that moral values are perfectly at home in the natural world. Well how? First, values are not objects. There are boulders and trees and clouds and giraffes. There aren't also moral values. Values are valuing relations - that is, to be 'valued' is to be featuring as the object of a valuing relation. That's a conceptual truth, yes? So, what, exactly, is doing the valuing according to the naturalist? I'll let them answer that.
Then there are the non-naturalists. They think moral values are moral values and not another thing. Which is just another way of saying that they think moral values just flit about by themselves. Or am I mistaken? I mean, these are cruel characterisations, I admit that, but I think they're accurate.

Note too that existing 'independently' of something is not the same as existing 'outside' of it.

For instance, a second storey cannot exist independently of a first storey. But a second storey does exis outside of a first story (first storeys do not contain second storeys).

So one could consistently maintain that moral norms and values exist outside of humans, but not independently of them. Indeed, I would maintain that this is precisely what is the case, at least for moral norms. For moral norms are prescriptions issued to us. They are not our prescriptions - so they exist outside of us - but they are not independent of us, for if we did not exist they would not be being issued.

Both premises equivocate between what it means to be valued by a subject.If all that were required for some judgement, principle or act to count as moral, as per your argument, is that it should be valued by a subject then a human subject valuing it would be enough to qualify it as moral. Of course that would only qualify it as moral for that subject; others may not value it. But that just is the subjectivist view of morality.

= I don't agree that it is correct, but I do agree that it is the subjectivist view. You apparently also don't agree that it is sufficient, so you posit an absolute subject. But that is an addendum to your argument or a hidden premise in it. I would say that Divine Command theory is more or less universally understood as being one kind of objectivist view of morality; to claim that it is subjectivist is what seems confused.

So one could consistently maintain that moral norms and values exist outside of humans, but not independently of them. — Bartricks

In your scenario if God considered moral norms and values only apply to humans they would not in that sense, and that sense alone, exist independently of humans, true. But if there were other sentient moral agents in the universe that God also considered moral norms and values to apply to, then they would exist independently of humans. Or even if God thought those moral norms and values prior to the existence of any moral agents at all, they would exist independently of the existence of humans or any other moral agents, but they would not exist independently of God's idea of moral agents, obviously.

I still don't know which premise you are denying. And when you say I equivocate, where do I do so? The word 'value' means the same throughout. If you think that moral values are not values, then just say that and let's see what you think they are.

I also did not mention God. The conclusion is that moral values are the values of a subject who is not me or you or any other human.

Re independence - my point was that you were conflating existing 'externally' to p with existing in a way that 'depends' on p.

You also seem to ignore entirely the second leg of the argument - the leg that establishes that moral values are not composed of my valuings or your valuings.

Note, it is in the conclusions of my arguments that we get closer to understanding what is necessary and sufficient for moral values. So, it is necessary for a moral value to exist that there be some valuing going on. But that is clearly not sufficient, for I can value something yet that does not necessarily make that thing morally valuable. Thus, it seems that though being the object of a valuing attitude is necessary for possessing moral value, it is not sufficient. This, like I say, is what the arguments establish, not what they assume.

The word 'value' means the same throughout. — Bartricks

It's not the word vale which is ambiguous , but what it means to be valued by a subject.

I also did not mention God. The conclusion is that moral values are the values of a subject who is not me or you or any other human. — Bartricks

The only such subject(s) that has/ have ever been conceived is God(s). If this universe were a computer simulation then you might say the values are moral because they are valued by the creator of the program, but that would only work if the programmer were the only one in existence. Other programmers might not value the same as s/he does, and then your problem would reappear at another level. Also there is the problem that Socrates raised; are virtues virtues because God(s) value them or do Gods value them, or are they valued by God(s) because they are virtues?

'God', on normal usage, is the name of a very particular kind of being. I did not mention 'God' so why are you? God is not mentioned in the premises or the conclusion.

I do not know what you mean when you say that I am equivocating over what it means to be valued by a subject.

Which premise are you denying?

So, it is necessary for a moral value to exist that there be some valuing going on. — Bartricks

Maybe they are valued by society and are moral as such. Society is not a subject, though, even if it can be thought as the totality of subjects. There may be subjects that do not agree with what are almost universally valued or disapproved of acts such as murder, rape, torture and so on.

I do not know what you mean when you say that I am equivocating over what it means to be valued by a subject. — Bartricks

If not human and not God(s), then what other kind of subject is there that could be doing the valuing?

I do not see which premise you are seeking to challenge.

When we say 'society values p' we either mean that the majority of the subjects constituting society value p - in which case no premise is challenged - or we mean that society itself, quite apart from its subjects, values p, in which case we must be supposing that society IS a subject in its own right otherwise the valuing is not being done by anything. And again, in that case no premise is challenged.

So, the example of 'society valuing things' does not challenge any premise in the first leg of the argument.

And when it comes to the second, we can use the second leg to put to death the idea that moral values could be synonymous with the values of society. For I can simply exchange 'I' for 'my society' and the argument remains sound. Here:

1. If moral values are the valuings of my society, then if my society values something necessarily what it values is morally valuable
2. If my society values something what it values is not necessarily morally valuable (see Nazi society for more details)
3. Therefore, moral value are not the valuings of my society.

As for what other kind of subject there could be - well, we discover more about the subject by inspecting morality more carefully, given that morality appears to be made of this subject's valuings and prescribings.

I mean, suggesting that the alternatives are limited to one of us or God is a false dichotomy if ever I saw one.

I do not see which premise you are seeking to challenge.

When we say 'society values p' do we either mean that the majority of the subjects constituting society value p - in which case no premise is challenged - or we mean that society itself, quite apart from its subjects, values p, in which case we must be supposing that society IS a subject in its own right otherwise the valuing is not being done by anything. And again, in that case no premise is challenged. — Bartricks

I haven't said that any premises are being challenged, if by that you mean being asserted to be incorrect or inconsistent; I have said that you are equivocating on the notion of <subject>. As to society being the "valuer'; we could say that a society is founded upon certain moral principles, which would not entail that everyone agrees with those principles, but would also not entail that society be, literally, a valuing subject, in the kind of sense that you seem to be suggesting.

I mean, suggesting that the alternatives are limited to one of us or God is a false dichotomy if ever I saw one. — Bartricks

I haven't said they are. But what other kind of subject is there that would satisfy the requirements for your argument? I mean if being valued by any individual human does not make something morally correct (which I agree with) what kind of subject would be able to make something morally correct, tout court, simply by valuing it? The only example I can think of is God(s). If you have something else in mind then spell it out, or else your idea of <subject> is ambiguous, or empty or even incoherent.

I am not equivocating. It is clear what I mean by 'subject' - a mind, a subject of experiences. After all, I defined 'objective' as meaning 'exists outside of minds' or 'exists as something other than states of mind'. So clearly by 'subject' I mean 'a mind' (as opposed to, say, a topic of inquiry).

And it means the same in every premise. So there is no equivocation.

An argument like this clearly equivocates:

1. Subjects can value things
2. History is a subject
3. Therefore history can value things

But my argument does not.

What you said about society valuing things didn't make any sense to me - yes, we can say that society is founded on moral principles, but it is exactly what moral principles (and values) are that is the topic of inquiry, so whether society is or is not founded on them is neither here nor there. The point, though, is that a) either 'society values p' is elliptical for 'the majority of the subjects constituting a society value p' in which case no premise is challenged, for subjects can value things, or b) society itself, distinct from the subjects composing it, can value things, in which case society is itself a subject and, once more, no premise is challenged.

So again, no premise in the first leg is challenged. And as for whether moral values would be identified with the valuings of a society (whether the society itself, or the majority of those composing it), no - clearly not, as the second leg demonstrates.

Once more you ask me something that the argument itself tells us about. We have discovered, via the arguments, that moral values are the values of a subject - of a mind. Not me, not you, but someone else.

Who? Well, that question is confused. I mean, you are a subject, yes? And you're not me, yes? So, now imagine I ask you "so who are you then?" That's confused, yes? You're you. You don't have to identify yourself with someone else - someone I already know. I know you now, via this. And you're you and not someone else.

Now, whose values are moral values? Well, the values of a subject. Which subject - who? Well, the subject whose values are moral values. Her. No one else. Her.

Is she God? Possibly - I don't know, the argument hasn't told us. But her values are moral values which, I think, makes her a god of a kind. It is not that she's a god and so her values are moral values - which seems to be how you're construing things. No, no, no. Her values are moral values and so she's a god. It is that way around.

Now, whose values are moral values? Well, the values of a subject. Which subject - who? Well, the subject whose values are moral values. Her. No one else. Her.

Is she God? Possibly - I don't know, the argument hasn't told us. But her values are moral values which, I think, makes her a god of a kind. It is not that she's a god and so her values are moral values - which seems to be how you're construing things. No, no, no. Her values are moral values and so she's a god. It is that way around. — Bartricks

To say that the subject whose values are moral is the subject whose values are moral tells us nothing: it is a tautology. You say that "she" is a god of a kind. But she cannot be of a kind, unless all other gods agree with her, otherwise the problem would be the same as with human subjects.

If she is a god only on account of her values being moral, and her values being moral are not determined by her being a god, then what determines her values as being moral? If you say that the values are determined as being moral by being moral you have not said anything; again it is simply an empty tautology. And none of this would tell us how we could know which values are moral, so what use is any of it?

The argument - the argument - tells us that moral values are the values of a subject, a mind, who is not one of us. And she exists because moral values and norms exist.

You seem to think that unless I can identify the mind with some other mind of our previous or independent acquaintance then my arguments show nothing. That is so confused it hurts.

An analogy: Janet is lying dead on the floor and a careful inspection of her body reveals that she has been killed by someone. She has not killed herself and she has not been killed by something non-agential. She's been killed by a subject.

Your response? "Who, then?! Who has killed her? Was it me - no. Is it someone else I know?" Me: "no, we can rule out that it is you, and we can rule out all of those people you know. Someone else killed her". You: "Who?" Me: "Er, the person who killed her". You "that's a tautology - all you are saying is that the subject who killed her, killed her. We have learnt nothing. So, perhaps she was killed by an object or killed herself, or me, someone I know, yes?" Me: "Er, no - she did not kill herself, that's been established. And no, you did not do it, that's been established. And no one you know has done it either, that's been established. But we haven't learnt nothing - we've learnt something quite significant, namely that she's been killed by someone!!

To continue my analogy:

You "but what use is that? How do we know who it was?"

Me "well, aren't we interested in what happened to Janet? And now we've discovered someone killed her. That's very significant, no?"

You: "No, not at all, all you've told me is that Janet was killed by a killer who is not me, or anyone I know. Big deal. What's the use"

Me: "Well, we didn't previously know that, did we - and it is very significant, as it means there's a killer on the loose".

You: "Well, what's the use of that if we don't know who they are?"

Me: "You're a detective!!! You're supposed to be interested in trying to find the killer, not just throwing up your arms at every opportunity. I mean, if we know there's a killer on the loose, then perhaps we can look at other suspicious deaths and try and figure out if the same killer was responsible. And so on".

I'm not asking who the subject is, but what kind of imaginable subject could make values moral simply by valuing them. This "analogy" is a red herring and only introduces further confusion to the issue. Best to stick with what we are discussing and the questions raised in that context.The only answer that I can think of to what kind of subject could make values moral simply by valuing them is God(s). But as I pointed out the difficulty there is as to whether the value is moral because God(s) value them, or whether God(s) value them because they are moral.

Aw, but I like my analogy. I would like to continue with it a little longer, if it is all the same to you.

Detective Janus: I am not asking who killed Janet, but rather I am asking what kind of a person could make Janet be dead just by killing her. All I can think of is God. God killed her. Case closed.

Me: well, I don't see why you're going straight for God - I mean, we're not even sure God exists. We're sure Janet has been killed by someone. And you ask what kind of a person could make Janet dead just by killing her, and I have to say I don't really understand what you're having difficulty with - the person who killed Janet made Janet dead by killing her.

Detective Janus: Well, once more that is just a tautology - you're just saying the person who killed Janet is Janet's killer. But I just don't see how anyone apart from God could have killed her. I mean, if it isn't me or anyone I know, or 'society', then it must be God. And that, of course, raises problems of its own. I mean, is she dead because God killed her, or did God kill her and that's why she's dead?

Me: er, is everything alright at home, sir?

Detective Janus: You are not understanding me. When I kill someone, it isn't Janet. And when others down at the office kill people, they're not Janet either. Now, you've said that the evidence shows that Janet has been killed. And you've also said that the evidence is that Janet's killer is not me, or anyone down the office, but some mysterious stranger. That isn't helpful at all. And my question is, given that when I kill someone it isn't Janet, what is it about Janet's killer that makes his or her act of killing a killing of Janet?

Me: Well, he killed Janet. The killer of Janet is Janet's killer. And that killer is not you, or anyone down the office, but someone else. I can't yet tell you much else about her killer, apart from that he/she killed Janet and that he/she is not you or anyone down the office. But, er, have you and the others down the office been killing people?

Spoiler alert: It was Colonel Mustard in the library with a candlestick.

I'm sorry Barty, but I'm not interested in discussing the analogy, because I don't think it is either relevant or helpful. If you're not interested in answering the questions I posed about your actual argument then I am done.

Having said that I will comment on this:

Me: well, I don't see why you're going straight for God - I mean, we're not even sure God exists. We're sure Janet has been killed by someone. — Bartricks

Because it seems to me that this shows where the analogy fails. If we see someone dead in a way that could not have been accidental, naturally caused ( including by some animal or other) or self-inflicted, then we must conclude that she was deliberately killed somehow and that therefore someone must have done it.

But when it comes to moral values we do not know in any kind of analogous way that they are true in any absolute sense. You are simply presuming that they are so for the sake of preserving your argument.

On the other hand, ignoring the problems with the nalogy, I have even been willing for the sake of the argument to grant that we do know they are absolutely true somehow, and I am also granting that the only explanation is that some subject other than a human subject must be valuing such principles in order for them to be moral and true. But I am saying that if you cannot explain what kind of subject this could be other than a God, if there are no imaginable alternative kinds of subjects, then I fail to see what your argument is supposed by you to be demonstrating or discovering.

One nun says to the other "Where's the candle", and the other replies, "Yes, it does, doesn't it"?

I think the analogy works well - I mean, it is barely an analogy at all - but I can see why you don't like it.

I have provided deductively valid arguments with premises that seem undeniable in support of every claim I have made.

You, by contrast, have said nothing to challenge any premise at all.

You gesture at the Euthyphro dilemma, but unfortunately it is not a dilemma as the answer to it is very straightforward: an act is right if and only if the god prescribes it, and something is morally valuable if and only if the god values it. These things the argument I gave demonstrates.

Describing a theory does not amount to refuting it. So, kindly say in more detail what the problem that the Euthyphro raises is, exactly, for I don't see it.

in fact, I'll go one better - I'll refute all views that aren't mine using the Euthyphro. How about that?

If an act is good if the god values it, or right because the god prescribes it, that still leaves open the question as to why we should believe that. In the context of the Euthyphro dilemma we can ask what if the gods disagree? But even in the context of monotheism we can still ask whether the the act is good because God values it or God values it because the act is good. Probably a smart theist will say that both are true. But again that presupposes an infallible perfectly good agent; and I can't think of any conception of such an agent other that the monotheistic God.

So again, I'm not seeing how your argument says anything different or more than the standard monotheistic arguments that constitute Divine Command theory.

in fact, I'll go one better - I'll refute all views that aren't mine using the Euthyphro. How about that? — Bartricks

If you can do that we all can and then we would have the self-contradictory claim that whatever any subject values must therefore be morally good.

I'll put it another way:basically your argument amounts to saying that because being absolutely morally good requires being valued by a subject and because we are not absolute subjects, then for there to be absolute moral goods there must therefore be an absolute subject. But the idea of an absolute subject just is the idea of God.

LIke I say, you're confusing descriptions with prescriptions. Moral rules, if there are any, are prescriptions. Now, can a machine issue a prescription? No, not literally. Someone can programme a machine to issue prescriptions, but then those prescriptions qualify as prescriptions only because we can trace them to a subject whose attitudes they express. — Bartricks

Well, yes, you can trace the rulings to a set of basic rules.

Whose attitudes these basic rules express is another matter. The setup would still work with pretty much arbitrary ones. I am not arguing here in favour of a particular set of basic rules, but once you accept any such set, then a mechanical device can verify rulings against the basic rules as the result of computational effort.

So, if you feed basic rules into the mechanical device, it will be able to verify a ruling for each case that you present to it. These rulings will only be accepted by people who subscribe to the basic rules.

Other people can feed other basic rules into the device and accept other rulings. As far as I concerned, you can select the basic rules that you prefer. I think that it would be unfair to ask people to accept rulings derived from basic rules that they do not subscribe to.

Having said this though, I think the whole polemic concerning whether morality is objective or subjective is flawed and plagued with category errors, reification and shallow thinking. Subjects are not apart from the world, or apart from the inter-subjective context in which the very idea of morality can become coherent. — Janus

No one is saying that people are apart from the world or that people can't interact with each other and influence each other.

But your finger isn't a hot dog, and even though you can flick someone with it, it's still your finger and not a communal finger.

he view I have defended above is subjectivist, not objectivist. I am defending a divine command theory of value - a divine command theorist about value is a subjectivist (in my sense of the term, given above), — Bartricks

That much is fine, actually. The problem is the argument you present, where you posit moral value "full stop." That is objectivist.

What you'd need to say is something I suggested already:

"If moral values are my valuings then if I value something it is necessarily morally valuable to God"

Although you'd probably want to change that to:

"If moral values are my valuings, then if I value something correctly, it is necessarily morally valuable to God."

(Ignoring the modality problems with the placement of your "necessarily.")

But as I said, "If moral values are my valuings, then if I value something correctly, it is necessarily morally valuable to God," is very controversial. Anyone who would accept it as a premise of a sound argument would already agree with what you're wanting to argue.

And of course your second premise wouldn't work with the addition of "valuable to God."