I have not mentioned an 'absolute entity' and I don't know what one of those is when it is at home. — Bartricks
So there can't be a moral obligation not to destroy a forest, then? That someone who thinks there is a moral obligation not to destroy a forest is conceptually confused? — Bartricks
↪Banno The view that moral values are 'our values' is actually even less plausible than the view that moral values are 'my' values. For both views are obviously false in that we cannot make rape right by favouring ourselves raping people, and the latter - your proposed view - has the additional vice of being incoherent, given that only individual subjects can favour things, but groups cannot. — Bartricks
You have argued that to be moral is to be valued by a subject. — Janus
And you have argued that since we, as subjects, often value differently, we human subjects cannot be that subject who is the moral-maker. — Janus
You have argued that to be moral is to be valued by a subject. — Janus
No I haven't, I have argued that to be morally valuable is to be being valued by a subject (the subject being Reason). — Bartricks
I am not positing 'absolute' moral values at all. I am not an absolutist. I am a relativist. — Bartricks
...you haven't yet cast a reasonable doubt on any of them, so far as I can tell. — Bartricks
1. If moral values are made of my valuings, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable
2. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable
3. Therefore moral values are not made of my valuings — Bartricks
It implies a god exists. — Bartricks
mean, I agree - if you don't ruthlessly follow Reason, you probably won't arrive at my conclusion. But that's to my conclusion's credit, I think. — Bartricks
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