• Banno
    24.8k
    The OP is like toy morality. Like a My First Morality Playset™ that you give to undergrads to play with, before slowly introducing them to the things that matter.StreetlightX

    Perhaps. If so. don't discourage him playing; it may lead to something worthwhile.

    Jesus, we're a patronising bunch of pricks.

    Not that that's a bad thing. I think it's on the door as you come in.
  • Janus
    16.2k
    As I see it you are simply reifying a human faculty.
  • Banno
    24.8k
    @Bartricks

    Full marks for resilience.
  • Janus
    16.2k
    Resilience or resistance?

    the faculty of reason - what we often call 'our reason' - is a faculty that gives us an awareness of the values and prescriptions of Reason herself. But Reason herself is not the faculty, any more than the things I see are my sightBartricks

    So, for you reason is a human faculty and Reason is the values and prescriptions that faulty gives us an awareness of? But what if different people's faculties of reason show them different values and prescriptions? How could we know whose faculty is dysfunctional and who would be, consequently, wrong? How could our faculty of reason, by itself, tell us such a thing if it is dysfunctional as it may well be?
  • Streetlight
    9.1k
    I know I know. I just had a moment when I thought - is this what non-philosophers think we do all the time? One can only be struck by the total incongruence of the OPs concerns to what ordinary folks might be concerned with when it comes to moral questions.

    Constructively: the OP might ask after what makes anything said in it specifically moral. Say 'valuing' is indeed 'subjective'. But is all valuing moral? And is morality exhausted by the act of valuing?
  • Janus
    16.2k
    I think that's true when it comes to secular "ordinary folk" but what @Bartricks is essentially proposing is a form of "Divine Command" theory, and many religious "ordinary folk" do live by that conception of morality.
  • Banno
    24.8k
    Resilience or resistance?Janus

    Resilience. In order to really come to terms with Rationalism, or any other philosophical school, one must feel it in one's guts. How better than to take the style of argument and use it for some other purpose? That's what @Bartricks may be doing. He's applying his thinking in a new context. Way cool.

    The resilience is demonstrated by the sheer number of replies he has put forth this morning.
  • Streetlight
    9.1k
    Ah, I missed the God stuff. But then, the conceptual problems set in even before the equation of God with the 'subject'. See the sneaky edit of my last post. Or concisely: is morality a cognitive act? Or a result of cognitive acts?
  • Banno
    24.8k
    I have a fucking awful head cold and am filling in time here. When the cold settles, I will go back into the Real World and again Crusade for the Good of All.

    OR at least post a few really poignant memes.
  • alcontali
    1.3k
    So, for you reason is a human faculty ...Janus

    That is wrong, because "reason" is merely a mechanical faculty, that can be executed by machines. Humans can do it too, but are way less efficient at it; and much more error-prone.
  • Banno
    24.8k
    what Bartricks is essentially proposing is a form of "Divine Command" theory,Janus

    I gather from something I noticed - not going to look for it now - that you used Euthyphro? That's another direction I would have taken.
  • Banno
    24.8k
    My First Morality Playset™StreetlightX

    Let's crowd fund to set it up. We'll be bigger than Lego!
  • Streetlight
    9.1k
    Mine would not be suited to children. It would involve a trolly. And it would not be pretty.
  • Janus
    16.2k
    I'm just not convinced it is a new context, despite things being worded differently. But if you are right, then it is cool. And as Wittgenstein said: "Don't for heaven's sake, be afraid of talking nonsense! But you must pay attention to your nonsense.” "Paying attention" should also include paying attention to other's (constructive) criticisms of your nonsense.
  • Janus
    16.2k
    I gather from something I noticed - not going to look for it now - that you used Euthyphro? That's another direction I would have taken.Banno

    Yes, but I was accused, without supporting argument for the accusation, that I did not understand it. :smile:
  • Banno
    24.8k
    :lol:


    Bloody trollies. The ubiquitous carnal lust of the dilettante ethicist.
  • Janus
    16.2k
    Sure, but it is nonetheless humans who program the machines, no?
  • Banno
    24.8k
    Meh. The test will be if he continues with his philosophising or goes back to working at his lath.
  • Banno
    24.8k
    but I was accused, without supporting argument for the accusation, that I did not understand it.:smile:Janus

    Yeah; you probably don't. :razz:
  • Janus
    16.2k
    Ah, I missed the God stuff. But then, the conceptual problems set in even before the equation of God with the 'subject'. See the sneaky edit of my last post. Or concisely: is morality a cognitive act?StreetlightX

    As I see it morality is inter-subjective and does not exist in a rational vacuum, so I guess that would qualify it as cognitive, in an enactive or embodied (as opposed to merely computational) sense at least.
  • Janus
    16.2k
    From wood-turner to head-turner, eh?

    Quite possibly, and if not I would have appreciated the instruction. :wink:
  • Banno
    24.8k
    if not I would have appreciated the instruction.Janus

    Good idea. Who will we get to instruct us?
  • Streetlight
    9.1k
    Ah, I should have asked: only cognitive? But yes, the body changes everything. Enminded bodies. And once you have enminded bodies, morality must become 'ecological', 'thick' and implanted in the world, rather than thin and deliberative. The OP is the latter. Hence the absence of other people.
  • Janus
    16.2k
    Good idea. Who will we get to instruct us?Banno

    God knows.... :joke:
  • Bartricks
    6k
    So, for you reason is a human faculty and Reason is the values and prescriptions that faulty gives us an awareness of? But what if different people's faculties of reason show them different values and prescriptions? How could we know whose faculty is dysfunctional and who would be, consequently, wrong? How could our faculty of reason, by itself, tell us such a thing if it is dysfunctional as it may well be?Janus

    Yes, reason is the faculty that gives us fallible insight into the values and prescriptions of Reason, who is a subject, a mind, like one of us though also importantly different.

    Different people's faculties manifestly do give them different representations. And what this tells us - and our faculties of reason themselves tell us to think this - is that our faculties of reason are not infallible and thus not to place too much trust in what your own says but to compare it with those of others.

    So, my reason says that if something is morally valuable, it is morally valuable irrespective of whether I happen to value it. Now I know that virtually everyone else's says the same thing, for this apparent fact about moral values is widely acknowledged among those who have reflected on the matter - that is, those who have consulted their reason on it.
  • Bartricks
    6k
    I ask one question - what is wrong with my argument? Is it invalid? No. Are any of its premises false? Well, I can't see any reason to doubt any of them and plenty to think they're all true.

    Now last time I checked, that's how we figure out what's true. We don't ask ordinary folk. We ask Reason by consulting our reason.

    I suggest that you simply feel revulsion at where my argument leads. Well, we're not 6 anymore and we have to grow up and realise that what's true isn't always what we want it to be. And I thought I was the one who was supposed to be a child in a nursery playing with toy theories who was going to be taken to big school by you - come on, I've put down my bricks, show me my mistakes, it's the only way I'll learn.
  • Bartricks
    6k
    Okay, well then you're not seeing aright are you - I mean, you couldn't be more wrong if you tried.
    Reason is a subject. So, Reason is an object, as subjects are objects. Now, to 'reify' something is to 'mistakenly' identify it as an object. Am I mistaken? No. If I am, show me - you haven't yet.

    And 'our reason' is a 'faculty'. A 'faculty' is not an object. So, in calling our reason what it is - a faculty - I am not reifying it.
  • Streetlight
    9.1k
    I ask one question - what is wrong with my argument? Is it invalid? No. Are any of its premises false? Well, I can't see any reason to doubt any of them and plenty to think they're all true.Bartricks

    The problem is not with your argument; it is with its relevance (to morality). Irrelevance is much worse than error. One can correct an error. Relevance requires reengineering one's assumptions from the ground up.
  • Bartricks
    6k
    Yes, but I was accused, without supporting argument for the accusation, that I did not understand it. :smile:Janus

    Yes, quite right - I could not make head nor tail of what you represented the Euthyphro to be. I then very kindly laid out what I take the Euthyphro to be and asked if you agreed, but you said nothing.

    So here is the relevant portion of that post again, copied and pasted.

    Tell you what, to move things along I'll suggest what the supposed problem may be, and you can just confirm that it is as I say it is.

    The problem is that if moral values are the values of a subject, then they can change over time. What's morally valuable at one time, may not be at another. For after all, we know from our own case that what we value can alter. I may value sunshine at one time, but not at another. Tastes can and do change.

    And thus, though - for example - pain seems to be in generally something that is morally bad, nothing stops it from being the case that in the future pain might be morally good. For the subject-whose-valuings-constitute-moral-values - let's call her Trisha for convenience and so that you don't keep calling her God - may value us suffering in the future even though she currently seems to disvalue it.

    Why is that a problem? Well, because, as most contemporary moral philosophers agree, moral truths appear to be necessary truths. Just as it is necessarily true that the conclusion of this argument will be true if the premises are -

    1. If P, then Q
    2. Not Q
    3. Therefore not P

    likewise it is necessarily true that sadism is morally bad, when it is bad.

    The above argument does not just happen to be valid at the moment. It is always and everywhere valid. Its validity does not alter. It does not have a best-before date.

    Likewise for substantial moral truths. Such truths may be very complex and sometimes hard to discern - like the answers to complex sums - but whatever they are, they are necessary truths.

    So, expressed as an argument, the problem the Euthyphro draws attention to is this:

    1. If moral values are the values of a subject, then what is morally valuable will be contingent, not necessary.
    2. Moral values are necessary, not contingent
    3. Therefore, moral values are not the values of a subject

    Fair enough?
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