When clicking the link, it said "page unavailable". As that seems important to the discussion, I will wait a while and see if you can make it work before responding.

Thoughts? — JosephS

the link is bad.But if you're trying to suggest a Darwinian basis for values, then I'd listen to the sage advice of Richard Dawkins, who was asked about it in a televised debate:

Questioner: Okay, my question for you today is: without religion, where is the basis of our values and in time, will we perhaps revert back to Darwin's idea of survival of the fittest?


RICHARD DAWKINS: I very much hope that we don't revert to the idea of survival of the fittest in planning our politics and our values and our way of life. I have often said that I am a passionate Darwinian when it comes to explaining why we exist. It's undoubtedly the reason why we're here and why all living things are here. But to live our lives in a Darwinian way, to make a society a Darwinian society, that would be a very unpleasant sort of society in which to live. It would be a sort of Thatcherite society and we want to - I mean, in a way, I feel that one of the reasons for learning about Darwinian evolution is as an object lesson in how not to set up our values and social lives.

Link fixed.

This is not Social Darwinism as a moral theory as much as it is Darwinism in meta-ethics. How do moral theories compete. At least that's what I intend.

How do moral theories compete — JosephS

The question is implicitly darwinian. But I will try and find some time to read the article now that the link is restored.

Quite right. My first concern in asking is whether the question is meaningless or trivial. What I'm trying to understand is whether we can say 'thou shalt not kill' is 'good' because in the environments we're familiar with those groups that failed to adopt this precept were outcompeted and either withered or went extinct.

Can this sense of 'good' as correlative of group success (within certain environments) be the basis for an 'objective' moral good? Two groups that are equally successful (equal against what measure and what time frame?) might still differ on this principle. Both A and ~A might both be 'good' if, within the confines of their moral system, their differences balance out. State ownership of capital in China and individual ownership of capital in the US might both be 'good' within their disparate environments.

Related is a cultural belief in an ultimate moral authority (God) and how this anchor impacts selective advantage. I've read on studies that related how the action of non-believers differ with respect to believers vis-a-vis rule following. A theory on Darwinian selection might be expected to tell us how the trend towards atheism in the US would impact our cultural principles as reflected in law.

I have no doubt this is not novel. I'm more interested in the critical issues surrounding this perspective on morality, or whether it is simply not well considered.

Here is an article by someone who can actually support their argument. Thoughts? — JosephS

The article, "Darwinian Morality" is yet another exercise in infinite regress, as well as a complete misunderstanding as to what "reason" is. Seriously, the author utterly misunderstands formal knowledge.

If morality is a set of rules embodied by language expressions, then there is no way in which "reason" can discover what these basic rules should be. Mere "reason" can also not discover which derived rule (=theorem) can be proven from these basic rules. Pure "reason" is strictly limited to the ability to verify the proof that a particular theorem necessarily follows from the aforementioned basic rules.

The 1936 Church-Turing thesis insists that there must be a purely mechanical procedure to verify a knowledge solution. Otherwise, it is not knowledge; and if it is not knowledge, then the appropriate tool for the problem is not "reason".

The tool of "reason" cannot discover new knowledge. The tool of "reason" can only verify the justification of knowledge. Hence, the entire exercise in "reasoning" in the article will never lead to any new insights, simply, because that is the prerogative of other, unknown mental faculties.

A bit of analysis wouldn't hurt.

The introduction is pretty straight forward.

So to the section Warnings of the Wary. Three points are raised:

• ought/is dicotomy
• failure of interspecies similarity
• historical horrors

Then Darwin and the Evolution of the Moral Sentiments.

Not self-interest, but survival through altruism.

The (Partial) Renewal of Evolutionary Ethics

There remain those who would indulge in eugenics.

I'd like to know what you mean by

If I could, with enough information, tell you which moral principles will tend to develop in which environments (and possibly with what justifications) does that undermine theories of moral relativism? — JosephS

Does the ability to predict a set of moral values confer objectivity to morality?

I agree that predictability indicates a rationale. I don't follow the step to objectivity?

Also what exactly do you mean by environment? I consider morality to be social being and in my opinion that makes environment synonymous with society itself. If that's the case then doesn't it amount to saying different people/societies develop their own unique morals and that sounds like subjectivity rather than objectivity. Perhaps you have something else in mind when you use the word "environment". Please clarify.

Understanding objectivity as truths, fixed and unchanging, and usually determined through consensus of opinion, I think we'd be better off looking for common moral values that cut across all cultures and peoples.

About this topic, from the (now fixed link's) Introduction part I find this important. It shows from what perspective the author starts:

All that we can understand, imagine, believe, and do is dependent on the anatomy and physiology of our brains, which are products of natural selection as much as our limbs and our other organs. We try to maintain ourselves in existence for as long as possible—to achieve a respectable span of 70 or 80 years—and to produce offspring who will themselves be capable of producing offspring. It is pointless to ask what the purpose of our existence is.

What comes to my mind is the 'anti-natalism' humbug as a perfect example of how truly complex things turn out with morality and reductionism isn't perhaps the best way to tackle these issues. Because I assume this thread isn't about the morals of one historical person and what he thought, but an idea that our morals are based things like evolution. Why stop there, why not go to physics and quantum field theory and look from there the answers and the causes for our morals?

Fashionable nonsense I would say.

Wayfarer quoted above ever so annoying Dawkins with a quote that assures me of how annoying Dawkins is. There he links "Darwinian society" and "Darwinian morals" to Thatcher, hence he likely isn't a great fan of the famous female politician, but clearly in his example shows how think of things 'Darwinian'. I'd say once things get as complex as morality, reductionism may not be the best way forward.

I'd say once things get as complex as morality, reductionism may not be the best way forward. — ssu

I agree. It may well be the case that what we call our sense of morality is the result of evolved mechanisms (I, for one, think it probably is), but it is also true that the weather is the result of all the interactions of all the air molecules from their previous state (or something like that). It doesn't mean that an attempt to analyse said particles will be fruitful in any way.

But nor does it mean we can't predict the weather to a 'better than guesswork' level. I think this is where we are with ethical naturalism. It's useful to a point and in a very particular context. Wondering why there's so much general agreement, even between cultures who have never met... ethical naturalism may be a useful way to think about that. Wondering whether to spend more on health care even at the expense of people's financial autonomy...I doubt ethical naturalism will be anything other than a pointless distraction.

Wondering why there's so much general agreement, even between cultures who have never met... ethical naturalism may be a useful way to think about that. Wondering whether to spend more on health care even at the expense of people's financial autonomy...I doubt ethical naturalism will be anything other than a pointless distraction. — Isaac

Could not have said it better myself.

The article, "Darwinian Morality" is yet another exercise in infinite regress, as well as a complete misunderstanding as to what "reason" is. Seriously, the author utterly misunderstands formal knowledge. — alcontali

I think I can appreciate what you're saying about the infinite regress. In considering a normative theory of ethics and applying it to the present environment, one which seeks to consider actions from a Darwinian perspective gives rise to unresolvable regress, hence no clarity can be established as to how we ought to act. Did I get that right?

In contrast, my initial thought process entailed a descriptive theory, rather than a normative one. It still bodes poorly for applying any predictions on our present environment, in as much as the theory will take itself into account as part of the environment. Might this settle down to some equilibrium (dynamic or otherwise)? I suppose, or it could blow up.

But, if I may float a bit, there exists a hope of utility in the way I initially perceived it.

I am going to throw out the most rank of naive hypotheses, for the purpose of demonstrating a hypothetical benefit, and for no more. That hypothesis is that social acceptance of homosexuality is positively impacted by a broad perception of reaching population equilibrium. That the social "current" and its promotion of child bearing is strongest when there is a newly encountered expanse to be populated (or captured) and that this current wanes when neighbors encroach or resource utilization reaches its perceived limits (progressively, not acutely). That the weakening current allows the frustrated forces (eddies in the flow) to present themselves and sexual heterodoxy to gain a measure of recognition.

If this were not a straw dog hypothesis, I might look to collect data on cultures and periods, including where homosexuality was strongly inhibited and where, alternatively, homosexuality was accepted. I would have to consider the impact of other factors that might confound -- agrarian vs post-industrial, monogamous vs polygamous, evidence of religious dogma.

Say for the sake of argument that the hypothesis is eventually validated. Well, the good news is that we might be able to predict continuing evolution of social policy in the US towards acceptance of homosexuality.

But what does this indicate for the future? Look forward to efforts to colonize the stars. The Earth will likely get to and remain in a state of equilibrium, population-wise, in as much as getting any appreciable number of people out of our gravity well is infeasible (even with a Space Elevator - I read about the intractability of moving a human population off-world but can't find the cite at present).

Given our previous, fictional, result, in an environment with broad availability of resources (asteroids for mining) and energy, but with a need for workers, on our space ships/moons/terraformed planets, retrenchment could be a predictable result.

And this is where the utility lies. If we can predict the flourishing of discriminatory mores, based on our review of how people in a given environment evolve with respect to values and ethics, we have a chance to intercede. We can seek to inhibit what, without a thorough understanding of sociology and ethics, would otherwise typically arise. Public campaigns, anti-discrimination laws and charters, used proactively to anticipate and mold perceptions prior to the onset of negative signals. Using normative ethics (which it outside of theory scope) to impact a scientifically predictable, but undesirable, change in social mores.

With the last paragraph, I've stood my entire premise on its head -- that 'good' can be understood in terms of its statistical/predictive growth and perpetuation. Does this mean that by frustrating it, I am doing 'bad'? At this my brain gets just muddled by contemplating that the normative effort entailed in short-circuiting the predicted result might itself be incorporated as part of the descriptive theory -- but only after the fact, bringing it back to 'good' (assuming success).

The main point I made was that of being able to make predictive claims as to which mores will develop and whether this reflects a sense of an objective moral standard (objective is reflective of its predictive capability -- it is the encompassing standard that would be objective and universal, not any particular principle in any particular environment). — JosephS

Morality (the classification of human events as moral or immoral):
1) Is a human universal. (Brown, 1991)
2) Facilitates the survival of humanity by counteracting the inherent capacity for misinterpretation (bias, error, and illusion) which leads to social conflict.

Similarities between the moral codes and value systems of the World's major Book Religions and systems of Moral Philosophy form a consensus on morality which is likely to have a basis in human nature rather than human culture.

If I could, with enough information, tell you which moral principles will tend to develop in which environments (and possibly with what justifications) does that undermine theories of moral relativism? — JosephS

Moral relativism is absurd, because if morality is different for every person and/or social group, everything and nothing is moral and immoral across individuals and/or social groups.

Oh, someone who can 'actually support their argument' eh! You don't get away with that.
First, you don't support an argument, nincompoop. Arguments are supports. What, do you have crutches for your crutches? Is your wheelchair on a wheelchair?
Second, go back to my thread and show me how my argument fails - that is, show me that I did not support my claim. Having little snide digs on other threads - think I wouldn't notice!!

If I could, with enough information, tell you which moral principles will tend to develop in which environments (and possibly with what justifications) does that undermine theories of moral relativism? — JosephS

How do moral theories compete? — JosephS

there exists a hope of utility — JosephS

this is where the utility lies. — JosephS

Good essay.

There's really only one kind of broad ethical theory that underpins all these questions, and it is utilitarianism.

It is a good essay, and deserves a much more detailed response than I'm able to provide at this moment. A couple of passages jumped out, one of which was:

A person is, from the biologist’s perspective, a temporary federation of replicators that are working to be represented in future generations, sometimes threatened, sometimes exploited, and sometimes assisted by other federations of replicators (Dawkins 1999). We exist not to glorify God, nor to exercise rationality, nor to bring about any particular conditions of society, but merely because we are assemblages of successful replicators. Reproduction is the habitual practice of every organism; it is not the specialization of females, but of every living creature, and sooner or later, after the completion of this task, the individual dies.

I think the ease with which a religious philosophy is categorised and cast off ought to be questioned here. It might have little utility, or even none at all - but that's not the point. Religious philosophies are in the business of ultimate ends, the summum bonum - just the kinds of things which biologically-centred theories either bracket out, or relegate to the personal or social. But the distinctive difference of evolutionary theory, is that it's a theory which is intimately bound up with human identity, goals and purposes.

I could say more, but will leave it there.

That hypothesis is that social acceptance of homosexuality is positively impacted by a broad perception of reaching population equilibrium. — JosephS

That would be about one particular element or rule in a system of morality, and not about the entire class of morality systems, which is what the article is about.

If you want to talk about one element across morality systems, for example, category theory tries to handle that, using functors between systems. Theories can be modelled as categories. Since theories are (axiomatic) rule-based systems, a morality is a theory. A functor is then a mapping between two such (morality) systems.

Still, I am absolutely not an expert on functors. I always hope that I am going to read something surprisingly effective when perusing that type of literature, but up till now, I haven't found anything that I can really use out of the box. Besides that functor approach -- which is not necessarily easy to use -- I don't know of any other attempt at juxtaposing (morality) systems.

Moral relativism is absurd, because if morality is different for every person and/or social group, everything and nothing is moral and immoral across individuals and/or social groups. — Galuchat

I dont see how that makes moral relativism absurd. All you did was explain what moral relativism is.

It is different for every person and social group at certain times depending on the situation. Being part of the same species and the same culture can instill similar morals within each person.

Why do we have moral dilemmas if morals were objective? Morals are related to our goals as individuals. When our goals come into conflict we say that we have a moral dilemma. When we share a goal it can be said that we share morals.

RICHARD DAWKINS: I very much hope that we don't revert to the idea of survival of the fittest in planning our politics and our values and our way of life. I have often said that I am a passionate Darwinian when it comes to explaining why we exist. It's undoubtedly the reason why we're here and why all living things are here. But to live our lives in a Darwinian way, to make a society a Darwinian society, that would be a very unpleasant sort of society in which to live. It would be a sort of Thatcherite society and we want to - I mean, in a way, I feel that one of the reasons for learning about Darwinian evolution is as an object lesson in how not to set up our values and social lives.

Was this quote before or after he wrote The Selfish Gene? In the selfish Gene he explains how altruism evolved naturally. He also doesnt seem to understand that moral codes are a natural outcome of intelligent social beings with long memories.

Besides that functor approach -- which is not necessarily easy to use -- I don't know of any other attempt at juxtaposing (morality) systems. — alcontali

Comparative Religion would be one.

I dont see how that makes moral relativism absurd. — Harry Hindu

I can't help you with that.

Oh, someone who can 'actually support their argument' eh! — Bartricks

Carly Simon, is that you?

I'd like to know what you mean by
If I could, with enough information, tell you which moral principles will tend to develop in which environments (and possibly with what justifications) does that undermine theories of moral relativism?
— JosephS

Does the ability to predict a set of moral values confer objectivity to morality?

I agree that predictability indicates a rationale. I don't follow the step to objectivity?

Also what exactly do you mean by environment? I consider morality to be social being and in my opinion that makes environment synonymous with society itself. If that's the case then doesn't it amount to saying different people/societies develop their own unique morals and that sounds like subjectivity rather than objectivity. Perhaps you have something else in mind when you use the word "environment". Please clarify.

Understanding objectivity as truths, fixed and unchanging, and usually determined through consensus of opinion, I think we'd be better off looking for common moral values that cut across all cultures and peoples. — TheMadFool

The baseline claim is that moral systems and the principles that are encapsulated by that system are selected for like many other Darwinian effects. It is normative in as much as if you value group survival in your environment (cultural, technological, philosophical, geographical=area+climate+resources, competitive) you will choose these principles (alternative configurations might give equally likely survival chances so this doesn't rule out multiple solutions). And if you don't -- you'll be replaced by a group that will. If you go extinct, voluntarily or not, you are maladapted -- objectively.

Objective truth is reflected in how the theory tells us if you adopt these mores in this environment you will (likely) thrive. If you don't, you will probably not. It does not rule out crosscutting rules, neither does it rule them in.

This effort stands like those who were trying to piece together the periodic tables. Disjointed islands that eventually came together. Is the logical conclusion of the questions asked an overarching theory of ethical selection?

There's really only one kind of broad ethical theory that underpins all these questions, and it is utilitarianism. — Wayfarer

I agree that what Darwinian Morality implies is a baseline utilitarian goal, the good of group survival, the ethical systems at work subordinate to that goal need not be consistently utilitarian, do they? I'm thinking now of how we value individuals, even the indigent, such that we take them to the hospital when they are in critical need, even in cases where the cost outweighs any obvious societal benefit (and then let them die rather than give them a million dollar heart transplant). There is a utilitarian argument there, but it strikes me as a bit tortured. It's easier, I feel, to defend it on deontological terms.

I think the ease with which a religious philosophy is categorised and cast off ought to be questioned here. — Wayfarer

There is an argument (I believe either Dawkins or Hawking voiced it) that suggested a disbelief in God because he is "not necessary".

Both in that as well as the quote you cite, the dismissive attitude is disappointing. I can appreciate a certain detachment, but the perfunctory declarative tone comes across as smug.

The structure and fabric of the universe may at once produce a species prone to create (many different) creation myths without denying the existence of a God. I prefer to contemplate the variety of faith beliefs as many avenues to wisdom.

Was this quote before or after he wrote The Selfish Gene? — Harry Hindu

It was from a televised debate in Australia in 2012 with the now-jailed Cardinal George Pell. Very disappointing affair from both parties in my view. That was the one thing Dawkins said that I agreed with, although I would have loved someone to have asked him ‘why, then, have you spent the latter part of your career attacking the foundations of the alternative to Darwinian morality’?

There is an argument (I believe either Dawkins or Hawking voiced it) that suggested a disbelief in God because he is "not necessary". — JosephS

The famous example comes from when Pierre Simon LaPlace (‘France’s Newton’) presented his master work to Napoleon:

Laplace went in state to Napoleon to present a copy of his work, and the following account of the interview is well authenticated, and so characteristic of all the parties concerned that I quote it in full. Someone had told Napoleon that the book contained no mention of the name of God; Napoleon, who was fond of putting embarrassing questions, received it with the remark, 'M. Laplace, they tell me you have written this large book on the system of the universe, and have never even mentioned its Creator.' Laplace, who, though the most supple of politicians, was as stiff as a martyr on every point of his philosophy, drew himself up and answered bluntly, Je n'avais pas besoin de cette hypothèse-là. ("I had no need of that hypothesis.") — Wikipedia

I'm thinking now of how we value individuals, even the indigent, such that we take them to the hospital when they are in critical need, even in cases where the cost outweighs any obvious societal benefit (and then let them die rather than give them a million dollar heart transplant). There is a utilitarian argument there, but it strikes me as a bit tortured. It's easier, I feel, to defend it on deontological terms. — JosephS

I’m sure. The essay says that ‘everyone accepts’ that individuals are entitled to humane treatment - but I think it originates with Christian social philosophy. There’s no natural justification for it, it’s simply taken for granted, although whether it can be sustained indefinitely in the absence of its underlying rationale is an open question in my view.

After all, the most vocal advocates of evolutionary materialism, Dennett and Dawkins, never tire of telling us we’re ‘moist robots’ or what amounts to sperm carriers, as it if amounts to a ‘philosophy’. :-)

I prefer to contemplate the variety of faith beliefs as many avenues to wisdom. — JosephS

Agree. I subscribe to a kind of naturalism with respect to religions - that they're the expressions of encounters and epiphanies from many different cultures and periods (a la Huston Smith). It's 'naturalistic' in the sense that it sees these expressions as being natural to h. sapiens, but not naturalistic in the sense usually implied by scientific naturalism.

.I doubt ethical naturalism will be anything other than a pointless distraction. — Isaac

Ethical naturalism cannot tell us what we ought to do in particular situations, to be sure, other than the general dictum that we ought to do what we think is best for ourselves and others, for those, that is we consider to be our community.

People do, unfortunately, have limited feelings for, and hence, conceptions of, community. And there are situations where we genuinely don't know what would be best. But if everyone felt that all of humanity was their community, then humanity would have a far better chance of surviving long term, that is for sure. But that is probably impossible, given our (perhaps self-protective) limited capacity for empathy.

I can't help you with that. — Galuchat

Just because something is relative doesn't mean that it doesn't exist.

Morality would be the relationship between multiple individuals or groups goals.