Yes.

Do you have a better dataset to support your assertion?

it's not the data set that's the main problem - it's the fact that my claim and moral realism are not synonymous. So it's as if I've said most people have two arms and you've said "ah, but this survey shows most people only have one head"

Total gibberish.

It's called the 'categoricity' of moral prescriptions. It was given that ugly title by Kant, but it is almost universally acknowledged (including by many who are not moral realists - indeed, one prominent anti-realist - Richard Joyce - bases his whole silly case on it!!). Anyway, I haven't done a survey, but I have read the literature. Unlike you.

He says Reason is a subject, and I don't know what that could mean. — Janus

I am a subject. You are a subject. Reason is a subject. Get it yet?

Me: someone killed Janet.

You: who - I have no idea what a 'someone' this killer could be is.

Me: erm, a person - a someone, not a something.

You: nope, not getting it. Incongruence. I agree with the person who said incongruence because that sounds fancy. He's said nothing - just belched hot air and flung insults around - but I like that he said incongruence. Maybe the reason no one agrees with you is that you're not making any sense, but just using these deductively valid argument thingies that no-one seems able to follow despite them being models of good reasoning.

I am not answering until we agree on what the problem is because this is subtle stuff and so until you agree on the precise nature of the problem I am not going to address it, for otherwise you'll just change the goal posts mid point.

So, do you now agree that this representation of the Euthyphro problem is accurate:

1. If moral values are the values of a subject, then what is morally valuable will be contingent, not necessary.
2. Moral values are necessary, not contingent
3. Therefore, moral values are not the values of a subject

No. See my previous - https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/330175

Didn't make sense. You didn't raise a problem, just described the theory.

Express it as an argument in which the negation of my theory is the conclusion. Otherwise I genuinely don't know what problem you're trying to raise.

As I've said before, in my experience most people don't actually know what the Euthyphro problem is. You're fast confirming that.

OK - so help me understand. What is it?

This:

1. If moral values are the values of a subject, then what is morally valuable will be contingent, not necessary.
2. Moral values are necessary, not contingent
3. Therefore, moral values are not the values of a subject

you seem to think it is not to do with modality. It is entirely to do with it.

Hm. Can you relate that back to the Dialogue?

No. The dialogue is not about morality, but peity. Have you read it?

Yes - a while back. So, you have the right interpretation of the dialogue, in modal terms, but cannot relate it back to the dialogue.

I'm sceptical.

But the question is asked "do the gods love peity because it is holy, or is it holy because the gods love it" or something alone those lines.

So, that becomes "is something morally valuable becuaes the gods value it, or is it valuable and so the gods value it?"

And then we have to change 'gods' to 'Reason' or 'the subject'.

And then I say "it is valuable because Reason values it"

And then I wait for you to tell me what the problem is.

I've read it. I know what I'm talking about.

I'm sceptical that you've read it.

And then we have to change 'gods' to 'Reason' or 'the subject'. — Bartricks

Ah. I didn't notice you do this.

That seems to take us away from the post that puzzled me: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/329164

Well, you have to change it to make it relevant to my position.

The original is not about morality. Or a god. But peity. And gods.

The 'Euthyphro' problem - the one that contemporary philosophers think dispels divine command theory - bears little resemblance to anything in the dialogue.

That's not to deny it is a problem, just that we really don't need to read the dialogue.

What puzzled you?

My argument concludes that moral values are the values of a subject, and the subject qualifies as a god. And as moral values exist, the god exists.

No grounds for puzzlement. Unless you think 'a god' and 'God' mean the same. But it puzzles me why you'd think that.

And Plato's dialogue doesn't mention God either.

So you are accusing me of lying? That's not nice.

But then you say we need not have read it...

What puzzled you? — Bartricks

That your argument bears no resemblance to the Euthyphro I remember, however vaguely, nor to the tertiary sources I have at hand.

Well I can't address the version in the dialogue - the dialogue you've definitely read - because it doesn't address my position. It is about peity and gods, not morality and a god.

Why don't you read it and confirm what I'm saying.

Technology makes it easy to count the 70 places that this is not so.

But you just said we didn't need to read it...

yes, because it doesn't address my position.

But by all means find the famous passage and quote it and we'll see.

Although I'm off to bed now, but I'll address some kind of problem tomorrow if you can raise one (although it won't be from the original dialogue). Good night!

it's not the data set that's the main problem - it's the fact that my claim and moral realism are not synonymous. — Bartricks

Your claim includes the statement that some immoral act is immoral regardless of our personal opinion on the matter. That is a position of moral realism.

It's called the 'categoricity' of moral prescriptions. It was given that ugly title by Kant, but it is almost universally acknowledged (including by many who are not moral realists - indeed, one prominent anti-realist - Richard Joyce - bases his whole silly case on it!!). Anyway, I haven't done a survey, but I have read the literature. Unlike you. — Bartricks

Categoricity is not in any sense 'almost universally acknowledged' it is accepted in a particular field of ethics and not even the most prevalent one. What evidence do you have (other than your own increasingly shrill arrogance) that such assumptions are 'almost universally agreed on'?

including by many who are not moral realists - indeed, one prominent anti-realist - Richard Joyce - bases his whole silly case on it!!) — Bartricks

Yes, but Joyce's categoricity is to do with the property of moral utterances as @Banno has already mentioned. Your assertion is both categorical and moral realism. Categoricity is not in opposition to moral realism, so simply saying that your position is categorical does not serves as a rebuttal to my claim that it is moral realism.