A subject. The one described in conclusion 9 above. The one whose values constitute moral values; the one among whose prescriptions are moral prescriptions. A god.

A subject. The one described in conclusion 9 above. The one whose values constitute moral values; the one among whose prescriptions are moral prescriptions. A god. — Bartricks

Why do you call it Reason?

I don't understand the question — Bartricks

In other words, you're positing moral values independent of any individuals. As you said, "moral values full stop."

I'm asking what reasons there are to believe there are such things as "moral values full stop."

You said you understand values better than I do. So explain the reasons to believe that there are "moral values full stop."

Because:

1. Moral prescriptions are prescriptions of Reason
2. Moral prescriptions are the prescriptions of a subject
3. Therefore moral prescriptions are the prescriptions of a subject, Reason

No, not positing, concluding. See the argument for details.

What would you have me call her?

Moral prescriptions are prescriptions of Reason — Bartricks

No they aren't. And Reason is not a god.

https://www.prageru.com/video/is-evil-rational/

I am not watching any videos. Refute my argument and stop expressing your opinions - they count for nothing at all.

The first premise of the argument hinges on this. You're not saying that what you're concluding in the argument is the same as what we're stating in the first premise, are you?

No, the argument is not circular if that's what you mean.

What is Reason? — frank

This is indeed a really important question.

I think that reason is no more than the ability to verify that a conclusion necessarily follows from its evidence. It is a purely mechanical procedure that machines can also carry out. Reason itself does not produce evidence nor conclusions. That is achieved by other, unknown mental faculties.

In other words, you cannot discover new knowledge merely by reasoning. That is in my opinion the reason why metaphysics, i.e. trying to discover new knowledge by reasoning, is such a worthless endeavour.

Well it is nice to have opinions. But yours are all false as my argument demonstrates, doesn't it!!

I mostly agree with that. I think reason is a kind of behavior that includes rationality. But being rational and reasonable is no guarantee of anything. Doctors once put leaches on people to treat pneumonia. We wouldn't say they were approaching this irrationally or unreasonably, because they thought they had good grounds for their actions.

They didn't have good grounds though, and they were wrong. Reason often reflects fashion.

Right. So it doesn't do any good to look at its conclusion for what I'm asking you, because what I'm asking you is something about the first premise. The first premise is not the same as the conclusion.

I just don't want you to get banned. Anyway re the first post?

"Right. So it doesn't do any good to look at its conclusion for what I'm asking you, because what I'm asking you is something about the first premise. The first premise is not the same as the conclusion. "

yes, the first premise does not express the conclusion. I am unclear what it could be for something to be valuable yet not be the object of a valuing relation. But I am open to suggestions.

I'm not sure I understand that comment. You think that there is moral value "full stop" where it's not a particular individual morally valuing something right? Isn't that what the second part of the first premise is saying?

Yes, to say that something is valuable, I think, is to say that it is featuring as the object of a valuing relation. So there's the valuer - who is the one doing the valuing, so the one to whom the thing has value - and then there is the fact the thing is featuring as the object of a valuing relation.

So moral values are not themselves valued.

It seems to me that you are getting hung up on the 'full stop' - that 'full stop' just expresses their categorical nature. That is, when something is morally valuable it is not 'valuable to me', but just 'valuable full stop' - that is, valuable regardless of whether I happen to value it.

Many take that to entail that moral value is objective. But I think that's a mistake, for moral value would retain its categorical nature if being morally valuable consisted in being the object of a single subject's valuings.

So another way of making the argument would be this:

1. if being morally valuable consisted in being the object of one of my valuings, then if something is valuable it would not be morally valuable irrespective of whether I value it. (if P, then Q)
2. If something is morally valuable, then it is morally valuable irrespective of whether I value it (Not Q)
3. Therefore, being morally valuable does not consist in being the object of one of my valuings. (Therefore not P)

It seems to me that you are getting hung up on the 'full stop' - that 'full stop' just expresses their categorical nature. That is, when something is morally valuable it is not 'valuable to me', but just 'valuable full stop' - that is, valuable regardless of whether I happen to value it. — Bartricks

So how does that relate to "there's the valuer - who is the one doing the valuing, so the one to whom the thing has value - and then there is the fact the thing is featuring as the object of a valuing relation"? What happened to the valuer?

.

,

I'm sorry but I'm still not following this. Right now I'm still stuck on your P from #1

1. If my values are moral values, then . . . . — Bartricks

I still don't know what this means. If you could give me some specific examples of things that you would consider to be "my values" and things that you would consider "moral values" that would be a big help to my understanding you - it would help me to get a handle on what you're saying.

Yes. So?

1, If Gold is water, then if Gold is heated it will turn to steam
2. If Gold is heated it will not turn to steam
3. Therefore Gold is not water.

That's valid, yes?

that's my argument.

Yes, that's fine. I'm writing a different response but I need to get back to it in a minute.

If you value something - and I take it that you do value some things - then what you are doing is 'valuing' something. It is an activity that you, a subject, are engaged in.

Take loving someone. If you love someone you value them. The person you love is the object of your esteem. That - and no doubt a great deal else - is what's involved in loving someone. To be loving someone is to be adopting a valuing attitude towards them, and to be beloved is to be the object of a valuing attitude.

As for what's morally valuable - well, you are morally valuable, I am morally valuable, character traits, such as kindness, generosity, honesty- these are morally valuable (usually). Happiness is often morally valuable and so on.

And now imagine that there is someone who is kind, and generous and honest but who is not loved by any human - not the object of any other human's valuing attitudes. They are, at least where human valuings are concerned, not-valued.
They're morally valuable though, aren't they? None of us value them, but they are morally valuable.
Therefore being morally valuable cannot consist in being the object of the valuing attitudes of humans.

Either the collective agreement of moral thinkers is worthy of taking as sound (in which case you could reasonably refer me to them as evidence), or it is not (in which case you cannot and will have to argue your premise from prior axioms). If the former, then you'll need to explain why it is that these thinkers whose conclusions you have just declared trustworthy, largely do not agree with your conclusions. If the latter, then your argument fails as one of its premises has no justification. — Isaac

I think they don't agree with my conclusion because they are not aware of my argument and/or they think that that there is better evidence that the conclusion is false than that it is true, for most contemporary moral philosophers seem to think that the Euthyphro dispatches it.

But I think most moral philosophers would agree that if something is morally valuable, its moral value is not constitutively determined by our valuings.