1, If Gold is water, then if Gold is heated it will turn to steam
2. If Gold is heated it will not turn to steam
3. Therefore Gold is not water. — Bartricks

Okay, that is valid in terms of the formal logic of it.

The problem with your argument above is with your second premise. Why should we assign "true" to "If something is morally valuable, then it is morally valuable irrespective of whether I value it"?

Either the collective agreement of moral thinkers is worthy of taking as sound (in which case you could reasonably refer me to them as evidence), or it is not (in which case you cannot and will have to argue your premise from prior axioms). If the former, then you'll need to explain why it is that these thinkers whose conclusions you have just declared trustworthy, largely do not agree with your conclusions. If the latter, then your argument fails as one of its premises has no justification. — Isaac

So, to respond to this, I think if most moral philosophers - or, well, just most people who carefully reflect on the matter - get the impression that moral prescriptions and values are categorical, then that counts for a lot, other things being equal.

Most moral philosophers do get the impression that moral prescriptions and values are categorical. And even among those who might deny it, most are likely to admit that they appear to be (they'll just deny that these particular appearances count).

But most moral philosophers also think that moral truths are necessary truths and so they think that moral values and prescriptions can't alter over time. This strikes them as every bit as self-evident as that moral prescriptions and norms are categorical.

Because moral norms and values could vary over time if they are the values and prescriptions of a subject, they reject subjectivist views.

The combination, then, of the categoricity and necessity of moral norms and prescriptions leads them - most of them - to embrace some form of objectivism.

And some of them embrace objectivism but find its demands too ontologically exotic and so become nihilists.

that's my crude analysis, anyway.

1, If Gold is water, then if Gold is heated it will turn to steam
2. If Gold is heated it will not turn to steam
3. Therefore Gold is not water. — Bartricks
Okay, that is valid in terms of the formal logic of it.

The problem with your argument above is with your second premise. Why should we assign "true" to "If something is morally valuable, then it is morally valuable irrespective of whether I value it"? — Terrapin Station

Because the reason of most of those who reflect on this represents that to be the case.

If I value hitting someone, that does not mean it is morally good for me to hit them.

In a court case the defence do not think it will be sufficient to exonerate their defendant from any wrongdoing simply to demonstrate that he/she fully approved of what he/she did.

We would consider a defence team who thought that might do the trick to have, well, lost their reason.

There is, for instance, little doubt that Himmler fully approved of gassing Jews and homosexuals. Indeed, so much so that he approved of gassing himself should he turn out to be either of those things. But that did not make it right for him to do those things, or good for him to do it. And so on.

These things are manifest to reason. Premise 2's truth is manifest to reason.

If you think it's morally okay to hit someone, that does not mean that it's morally okay for you to hit someone in anyone else's opinion. It's only okay in your opinion. But that might only get you a cup of coffee if you've got 25 cents, too. (Well, or a couple bucks or whatever it costs now, depending on where you go.)

So that it's your opinion that it's morally okay to hit someone doesn't imply that it's morally okay or not for you to hit someone independently of anyone's opinion.

It's just that the opinions of those in power, which can be a democratic majority of opinions, determines what's allowed socially and legally. Most people do not feel that it's okay for you to nonconsensually hit someone else (at least not where you do any significant physical damage).

There is, for instance, little doubt that Himmler fully approved of gassing Jews and homosexuals. Indeed, so much so that he approved of gassing himself should he turn out to be either of those things. But that did not make it right for him to do those things, or good for him to do it. And so on. — Bartricks

Sure, it's only morally okay in his opinion. Other people disagreed with him. So they're not going to allow him to do that.

So that it's your opinion that it's morally okay to hit someone doesn't imply that it's morally okay or not for you to hit someone independently of anyone's opinion. — Terrapin Station

But now you're not addressing the argument.

Premise 2 says "If I value something, it is not necessarily morally valuable".

Opinions have not been mentioned. And premise 2 is manifestly true. So the argument is sound.

You're confusing the opinion that something is the case, with it being the case.

Given that we are social animals, then as a general rational principle what counts universally as morally valuable is what promotes society, and what counts as morally reprehensible is what is anti-social, what promotes disharmony.

I think there is universal (for all intents and purposes) agreement regarding egregiously antisocial acts such as murder, rape, torture that they are morally reprehensible, at least when carried out against members of one's own community.

Ideally what is considered to be one's own community would be all of humanity, and indeed if humanity is to continue as a flourishing global community and perhaps if it is to even survive in anything more than scattered communities that have reverted to a hunter/gatherer or basic agricultural life, this would seem to be the only way forward.

You might say that all these moral principles are the deliverance of a subject:Reason, but I don't believe there is any Reason apart from human reason, so I would say these principles are delivered by human reason at its best, that is reason freed from prejudice and bias.

I can't swallow the idea of Reason as a sentient subject; I cannot make any sense at all of that idea, unless you equate reason with God. But then God, as traditionally understood is more than merely Reason, He is also Love, and Goodness and so on. I can't say I believe in God, though.

So, I would disagree with your premise that to be morally valuable is to being valued by a subject. How are you going to convince me that I am wrong about that?

Sure, it's only morally okay in his opinion. Other people disagreed with him. So they're not going to allow him to do that. — Terrapin Station

You don't seem to understand. If Himmler's values are moral values, then if he values gassing Jews and Homosexuals it will actually be morally good for him to do so (and good for everyone else to do so too). It won't just be that he has the opinion it is good. It will actually be good.

And it won't be, obviously, Which just underscores why the argument is sound. It underscores that moral values are not made of Himmler's values, or yours, or mine.

Premise 2 says "If I value something, it is not necessarily morally valuable".

Opinions have not been mentioned. And premise 2 is manifestly true. So the argument is sound.

You're confusing the opinion that something is the case, with it being the case. — Bartricks

Well, if you morally value something, then necessarily it is morally valuable to you. It's not necessarily morally valuable to anyone else.

No it isn't. It is self-evident that you cannot make an act right or good by either issuing a prescription to yourself to do it, or by just valuing yourself doing it. As. Virtually. Everyone. Recognises.

No it isn't. It is self-evident that you cannot make an act right or good by either issuing a prescription to yourself to do it, or by just valuing yourself doing it. — Bartricks

What is is for an act to be morally right or good to someone is for that person to consider the behavior in question permissible to obligatory conduct.

You don't seem to understand. If Himmler's values are moral values, then if he values gassing Jews and Homosexuals it will actually be morally good for him to do so. It won't just be that he has the opinion it is good. It will actually be good. — Bartricks

What it is to "actually be good" to someone--and it's always to someone is for that person to have a particular disposition towards the act.

Again, we're not talking about opinions.

Here's an argument that is obviously sound:

1. If my cheese is made of my thoughts, then if I think there is some cheese in the fridge, then necessarily there is some cheese in the fridge
2. IF I think there is some cheese in the fridge there is not necessarily any cheese in the fridge
3. Therefore cheese is not made of my thoughts

Your response? You ask what evidence there is that 2 is true. I point out that it is a self-evident truth of reason.
You seek to deny 2 by pointing out that if someone thinks there is some cheese in the fridge, then 'in his opinion' there is some cheese in the fridge.

Er, yes. But there won't necessarily be any cheese in the fridge, yes?

Likewise, if Himmler values gassing people, that does not mean it is necessarily good for Himmler to gas people.

It may result in Himmler forming the opinion that it is good. But it still won't be good, will it?

The view you keep expressing is the view the argument refutes.

Your response? You ask what evidence there is that 2 is true. I point out that it is a self-evident truth of reason. — Bartricks

When we're talking about morality, I don't at all agree that it's self-evident that morality isn't ONLY mental dispositions towards actions. I think it rather couldn't be clearer that that's all that morality is. I wouldn't say that it's "self-evident," but it's clear as day that there are no extramental moral assessments to be found anywhere in the world.

If I were to believe that cheese is only a mental phenomenon, then of course, necessarily, if you have that mental phenomenon, then there's cheese in the fridge.

I don't believe that that's the case with cheese. But it couldn't be clearer that it's the case for morality.

The mistake both you and Bartricks share lies in thinking that moral value consists in being valued. It is really much more simple than that: moral value consists in what fosters social harmony and general well-being and happiness.

The weakness of Bartricks' argument lies in its first premise.

moral value consists in what fosters social harmony and general well-being and happiness. — Janus

First, that would only be the case to an individual who values social harmony, general well-being and happiness. There could be an individual who doesn't value those things and who values something else instead. They wouldn't be wrong about those other things being moral value, because there would be no facts that they're getting wrong. They would just have an unusual disposition.

So, to recap, you now accept that my argument is valid. Something I've been repeating ad nauseum.

You have tried to take issue with premise 2. But you haven't raised any reasonable doubt about it.

Premise 2 is self-evidently true. And when I point this out, you reply that a quite different claim is true. What's that got to do with anything?

First, that would only be the case to an individual who values social harmony, general well-being and happiness. — Terrapin Station

No, a person who didn't not value those things would not be a morally motivated person, by definition.

So, to recap, you now accept that my argument is valid. — Bartricks

Modus ponens is valid under traditional logic. If we ignore semantic problems with certain natural language formulations, and we retain the modus ponens relations, then sure, insofar as that goes, it's valid.

Of course, we shouldn't really ignore semantic problems once we start plugging in natural language, but that's an issue we've already discussed.

No, a person who didn't not value those things would not be a morally motivated person, by definition. — Janus

By your definition, maybe. Not by theirs. There aren't factually correct definitions. Just more or less common ones. It's not correct to be common, or incorrect to be uncommon.

You don't understand the point of the cheese example either.

Here it is again:

1. If my cheese is made of my thoughts, then if I think there is some cheese in the fridge, then necessarily there is some cheese in the fridge
2. IF I think there is some cheese in the fridge there is not necessarily any cheese in the fridge
3. Therefore cheese is not made of my thoughts

It is deductively valid and apparently sound. It has exactly the same form as my argument - the one you're trying to take issue with.

Now, you have to deny a premise. A premise of THAT argument, not some other premise you've just made up.

So, you say "well, 2 is false becusae if I think there is some cheese in the fridge then in my opinion there is some cheese in the fridge".

Er, yes, perhaps - but that doesn't contradict 2 so it doesn't begin to challenge it.

That's EXACTLY how you are responding to my argument.

Premise 2 of my argument says "If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable"

You are trying to challenge it by saying "ah, yes, but 2 is false because if I value something then in my opinion it is valuable"

Er, well maybe - but that is consistent with 2 and doesn't contradict it.

Why can't you see this???

Tell you what, I'll just think you understand it, and then you will. That's how the world works according to Terrapin, isn't it?

It is deductively valid and apparently sound. It has exactly the same form as my argument - the one you're trying to take issue with. — Bartricks

Why don't you understand that I don't accept the second premise in your argument when it comes to morality?

Tell you what, I'll just think you understand it, and then you will. That's how the world works according to Terrapin, isn't it? — Bartricks

How many times have I made it clear that just because one person feels that x is morally permissible, it doesn't imply that anyone else will feel that x is morally permissible?

That's just wrong. there is a common definition of morality, that it is to be concerned with personal interrelations. To be unconcerned about social harmony, general well-being and happiness is to be unconcerned about personal interrelations. Using people for one's own gratification, for example, is a one way street, not an interrelation.

Modus ponens is valid under traditional logic. If we ignore semantic problems with certain natural language formulations, and we retain the modus ponens relations, then sure, insofar as that goes, it's valid.

Of course, we shouldn't really ignore semantic problems once we start plugging in natural language, but that's an issue we've already discussed. — Terrapin Station

Why do you keep talking like you're an authority on these things? You thought my argument was invalid, didn't you? Be honest. And then you decided it was valid.

My argument is deductively valid it just leads to a conclusion that you don't like.

The argument's premises are true beyond a reasonable doubt. You can't challenge one by simply saying random things. You have to address the actual premise and show how another valid argument, with premises that are more powerfully self-evidently true than mine, has a conclusion that negates it.

That's just wrong. there is a common definition of morality, that it is to be concerned with personal interrelations. To be unconcerned about social harmony, general well-being and happiness is to be unconcerned about personal interrelations. Using people for one's own gratification, for example, is a one way street, not an interrelation. — Janus

I just said that there were common and uncommon definitions. (Not that I'm agreeing that your definition is common, but that's irrelevant for the moment.) What I said was that it's not correct to be common or incorrect to be uncommon. You're apparently saying that that is wrong. Per what?

Why do you keep talking like you're an authority on these things? You thought my argument was invalid, didn't you? Be honest. And then you decided it was valid. — Bartricks

I just explained this re formal logic versus plugging in natural language. What's difficult to understand about that?