But this requires that we ascribe to eliminative materialism, which is a metaphysical position that requires justification.

The late lamented Tom Wolfe wrote a great essay on this very question, back in 1997, but it's still a great read - Sorry, but your soul just Died.

In short, the implication of neurophilosophy is that the vocabulary of philosophical issues, including terms like 'causality', and 'rationality' are being superceded by brain functioning terms, in the same way the old vocabulary of substances (earth, air , fire and water) were superceded by modern physics and chemistry terms. — fresco

But nobody except eliminative materialists believe it, and they're a very small clique of academic philosophers.

Besides, there's a strong argument against the very idea - which is that the interpretation of the meaning of neural data is itself a matter of judgement. You won't find anything like 'judgement' in the raw material of brain science, so you have to say what the data means. And so you're then back in the field of meaning again - semantics, semiotics, interpretation. Try saying anything without resorting to that.

Fresco. I cannot for one moment see how "neurophilosophy signal the end of philosophy as we know it". I think what we must bear in mind here right from the beginning is the basic difference between the two disciplines, science and philosophy. Where science, on the one hand, works "with" facts, i.e. finding new facts, attempting to proof them, connecting them to other facts. disproving old facts etc, philosophy, on the other hand, works "on" facts: this is what Wayfarer is saying, I think, when referring to "the field of meaning". So, yes, discovering new scientific facts indeed have implications for philosophy, but then on a different level: the level of "meaning". "Eliminative materialism" is an excellent example of this. In a broader sense it nothing else than the continuation of the old battle between mind and matter in philosophy. In this context it is an extreme materialistic theory. In philosophy of mind it is a form of "physicalism" and can be viewed as one of the latest attempts to reduce mind to physiological processes in human nervous system.

Neurophilosophy involves the application of neuroscience to philosophical issues like 'free will', and 'reasoning'. — fresco

My first reaction is to wonder if we need a new and detailed term: "neurophilosophy"? Neuroscience is throwing up many interesting avenues of thought, and it seems appropriate that philosophers should/will consider them. But isn't that just "philosophy"? Do we need to subdivide, so that neuroscience somehow gets its own dedicated branch of philosophy? If we did do this, wouldn't it prevent any cross-fertilisation between this and the philosophy of other (perhaps similar or related) topics?

If it's not a derail - and I'm sorry if that's what this note turns out to be :sad: - is there any advantage at all to separating out the philosophy of each and every topic, so that each has its own? I can't see one. Can you? :chin:

To all.

Okay, I'm semi sceptical myself, but the cross species research implies that if 'philosophy' is contingent on human language, there is a fundamental issue beyond mere problems of interpretation.

Science is pretty much a Platonic cave shadow of what the real, unknown laws of nature are. At best, science has an uncanny ability to resist experimental testing. At worst, it is just a citation carousel for which the corrupt, academic journals are so well-known.

That is no different for neuroscience. The human brain is not human technology, and its true construction logic is simply unknown. If you really understand it, then you can build it yourself. Neuroscience apparently can't. Hence, what they know, can only be much more limited than that. The proof is always in the pudding.

The assumption of several posters here is that neuroscience is 'reductionist' In the sense of 'explainable in terms of causal mechanisms'. The Churchlands deny this and point out that neural functioning resists isomorphism with, say,' logic circuitry' and seems to point to 'vector space transitions'. (Other modelling involving differential equations has also been suggested).
What comes to my mind here is that since 'causality' has a debateable status in both philosophy and science, it could be that neuroscientific models are attempting to move beyond what we normally seek as 'explanation'. Furthermore, once we take a step away from 'normal logic' the very notion of 'rationality' is up for grabs.
I apologise the vaguary of these ideas, but I am trying to imagine the scenario of 'pulling the rug' from under 'causal explanation', perhaps in a similar manner to that in which relativity pulled the rug from under 'time' as an independent parameter.

brain functioning terms — fresco

Well, yes, as more and more the brain correlations to qualia are getting tracked.

Karl Popper and John Eccles (a brain expert) wrote The self and its brain, pubd 1977. Popper claims he doesn't subscribe to "thinking substance" because he has problems with the usage of the concept substance. This is why Wittgenstein said philosophers should get day jobs, by which he means get really abreast of the sciences. I am a little surprised at Popper because he must have known by 1977 about half a century of research into new dimensions. Physics by no means excludes the "existence" in some sense of the word, of whatever does thinking, in intersection with those dimensions science is becoming familiar with, and by extension any not "discovered yet". Nor does it exclude that we are each individuals.

What Popper and Eccles both show is that nerve manifestations, sensory, motor and other, while often quicker than what is "consciously" conscious to our memory of it or our power to articulate about it, is not proven to be the original cause of our actions etc.

This is plain honesty about logic and honesty about science and about causes.

Russell (if Feser quotes him accurately) maintained that because physics doesn't tell us about causes, "physics proves there is no such thing as causes". Russell must have been the original of the drunk who never finds his keys anywhere else than under lamp posts. No wonder he didn't manage to ban the bomb!

I don't think Feser quotes Russell accurately, Russell being focussed on the symmetry of equations in which no 'time directionality' is involved. This has recently been stressed by Rovelli, in which the before/after dimension for cause/ effect are at best 'local', or related to observer reference frames.

Neuroscience like any other 'science', is about prediction and control. In that sense it may seek 'causal mechanisms' which you correctly report, fail to correlate with specific neural activity. However, the philosophical issue ensuing is NOT specifically about the viability of such a quest, but about the status of 'causality' per se in the Russell sense. Also it raises the secondary issue of the ethics of 'control' given that 'behavior modification' has many well established social functions.

The assumption of several posters here is that neuroscience is 'reductionist' In the sense of 'explainable in terms of causal mechanisms'. The Churchlands deny this... — fresco

The Churchlands are reductionists par excellence. Let’s see....quick google Churchlands neural reductionism....oh to hell with it, see for yourself. But their entire thesis is that ‘mind is the output of the physical brain’ and can be understood through the lense of neuroscience.

Tell you what - look at the Notre Dame review of Hacker and Bennett, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience. The salient passage is this one:

In Chapter 3 of Part I - “The Mereological Fallacy in Neuroscience” - Bennett and Hacker set out a critical framework that is the pivot of the book. They argue that for some neuroscientists, the brain does all manner of things: it believes (Crick); interprets (Edelman); knows (Blakemore); poses questions to itself (Young); makes decisions (Damasio); contains symbols (Gregory) and represents information (Marr). Implicit in these assertions is a philosophical mistake, insofar as it unreasonably inflates the conception of the 'brain' by assigning to it powers and activities that are normally reserved for sentient beings. It is the degree to which these assertions depart from the norms of linguistic practice that sends up a red flag. The reason for objection is this: it is one thing to suggest on empirical grounds correlations between a subjective, complex whole (say, the activity of deciding and some particular physical part of that capacity, say, neural firings) but there is considerable objection to concluding that the part just is the whole. These claims are not false; rather, they are devoid of sense.

Wittgenstein remarked that it is only of a human being that it makes sense to say “it has sensations; it sees, is blind; hears, is deaf; is conscious or unconscious.” (Philosophical Investigations, § 281). The question whether brains think “is a philosophical question, not a scientific one” (p. 71). To attribute such capacities to brains is to commit what Bennett and Hacker identify as “the mereological fallacy”, that is, the fallacy of attributing to parts of an animal attributes that are properties of the whole being.

And speaking of Feser:

the puzzle intentionality poses for materialism can be summarized this way: Brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, the motion of water molecules, electrical current, and any other physical phenomenon you can think of, seem clearly devoid of any inherent meaning. By themselves they are simply meaningless patterns of electrochemical activity. Yet our thoughts do have inherent meaning – that’s how they are able to impart it to otherwise meaningless ink marks, sound waves, etc. In that case, though, it seems that our thoughts cannot possibly be identified with any physical processes in the brain. In short: Thoughts and the like possess inherent meaning or intentionality; brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, and the like, are utterly devoid of any inherent meaning or intentionality; so thoughts and the like cannot possibly be identified with brain processes. — Ed Feser

It is not clear cut that the Churchlands were conventional 'reductionists' since they advocated eliminativism.

In the context of materialist understandings of psychology, eliminativism stands in opposition to reductive materialism which argues that mental states as conventionally understood do exist, and that they directly correspond to the physical state of the nervous system.

In short, for eliminativists, concepts like 'free choice' do not 'exist' in the sense of being 'functional targets for explanation'.This is not to deny ' the existence of free choice' as a functional concept in social relationships. Eliminativists seek 'bottom up' explanations by looking at simpler component 'vectors' , like 'gratification', but they do not seem to rule out 'emergence' of complex behavioral structures which have social significance.

But to dwell on the conventional explanatory merits, or failures, of neuroscience is to miss my point, which is that such disputes question the very nature of 'explanation' itself.

Sorry, but your soul just Died. — Wayfarer

Thanks for the link. Wolfe is always a good read.

Well, yes, as more and more the brain correlations to qualia are getting tracked.

But the story on causation hasn't move an inch. There is no coherent story. Materialism hits a brick wall when it tries to explain how interacting matter can give rise to conscious experience.

Again, you miss the point. What we call 'conscious experience' tends to be a nebulous hotchpotch involving language, images, and sense data. In our culture we distinguish it from 'dreams' and 'hallucinations', and neuroscience throws some light on the bases for those distinctions. The phrase 'gives rise to' is as premature as the question 'what gives rise to disease' asked in medieval times, since the concept of 'disease' was as nebulous then, as 'conscious experience' is now.

Now there are some, including myself, who are tempted by the conundrum, 'how can thinking think about itself ?', but that assumes we know, what both 'thought' and 'knowing' mean. Neurophilosophy throws those questions back at us.

Again, you miss the point. What we call 'conscious experience' tends to be a nebulous hotchpotch involving language, images, and sense data. In our culture we distinguish it from 'dreams' and 'hallucinations', and neuroscience throws some light on the bases for those distinctions. The phrase 'gives rise to' is as premature as the question 'what gives rise to disease' asked in medieval times, since the concept of 'disease' was as nebulous then, as 'conscious experience' is now.

Now there are some, including myself, who are tempted by the conundrum, 'how can thinking think about itself ?', but that assumes we know, what both 'thought' and 'knowing' mean. Neurophilosophy throws those questions back at us. — fresco

I don't think there is anything nebulous about "conscious experience". It's very clear what we refer to when we use that term. It's just difficlut to explain or define it using language. The same is true for "thought". We all know what thoughts are, it's just difficult to define using language. It's not that consciousness or thoughts are nebulous. It's the language talking about them that is nebulous.

"Knowing" might be different, because knowing is indeed a bit of a nebulous thing, floating around with "belief" and "guesses". But it's important not to confuse nebulous language with nebulous subjects.

'how can thinking think about itself ?' — fresco

The brain doesn't know the whyness of its thinking, which is why we often rationalize a reason for what comes to mind. All the brain has to go by is the product/result of its neuronal analysis, and so the brain qualia output serves a purpose.

I disagree. We 'know' what 'a behavior X' is, if we understand the function of X, and the essential components of X which contribute to that function. I suggest this is not the case for 'thought'.

Yes. All,that matters, is what happens next, from a 'structural integrity' pov.

I disagree. We 'know' what 'a behavior X' is, if we understand the function of X, and the essential components of X which contribute to that function. I suggest this is not the case for 'thought'. — fresco

Thought is not a behaviour. Do you claim that you do not know what thoughts are? Your requirements for "knowing" seem to presuppose materialism, in that everything has a "function" and "components".

The claim that 'thought is not a behavior' implies that 'being animate' is not a necessary condition for thought. 'Thought involves 'brain activity' with or without overt bodily movement. In fact from the pov of 'embodied cognition' (Varela et al) both brain and body are both essential tor 'thought'.
The alternative is to advocate dualism.

The claim that 'thought is not a behavior' implies that 'being animate' is not a necessary condition for thought. 'Thought involves 'brain activity' with or without overt bodily movement. In fact from the pov of 'embodied cognition' (Varela et al) both brain and body are both essential tor 'thought'.
The alternative is to advocate dualism. — fresco

This all seems to presuppose materialism, that is that thought is a product of brain and body. But it's also possible that brains and bodies are representations of thought that only exist in specific kinds of thoughts. The actual substrate of thoughts might be something entirely different.

Everything does have a function..that is what 'thinghood' boils down to.
Properties of 'things' are expectancies of potential functional interaction with them.

Systems philosophy proposes a completely different solution, biperspectivism, in which the mechanical (reductionist) perspective is appropriate from the external-scientific viewpoint, but cognitive descriptions are appropriate for the internal/introspective perspective.

"Does neurophilosophy signal the end of 'philosophy' as we know it ?"

One might hope.

Philosophy certainly has its uses, but over the millennia various products of philosophy have superseded the parent. Physics, for example; literary and art criticism; psychology and neurology. The ur-philosophers are now 2500 years in their graves. It makes sense to return to the foundation--especially in religious thought and practice, but in studying knowledge?

Hmm..the issue raised by neurophilosophy is what constitutes 'the problem', rather than 'the solution'.
That is why they reject Chalmers' 'hard problem' as a pseudo-problem.
But I agree that 'domains of discourse' (perspectives) can be useful for the larger picture of philosophy with the proviso that those domains are not mutually exclusive. For example, it is clear from a neurologifal pov that what we call 'the exercise free will' has its roots in 'unconscious processes'. But since 'free will' has social importance, and its exercise can be modified, (learning=restructuring of neural circuitry). The 'problem' may turn out to be 'ethical' rather than epistemological.

Yes. I agree with Rorty on that 'supercedence'...that 'philosophy' has nothing authoritative to say about epistemology(Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature)

Neurophilosophy involves the application of neuroscience to philosophical issues like 'free will', and 'reasoning'. — fresco

Think about what ‘an explanation of reasoning’ might look like. When you explain something, you give reason for why it is so; so how could any explanation explain explaining? The whole story with reductive materialism is extremely simple: the mind is not something amenable to explanation in terms of the physical sciences, therefore it must be eliminated. That’s all there is to it.

It exactly mirrors religious fundamentalism, but applied to science — ‘our dogma says that everything must be understandable in physical terms, so if the mind cannot be, then it can’t be real’. And the payoff is the release from the existential anxiety of dealing with an unknown.

Neurophilosophy involves the application of neuroscience to philosophical issues like 'free will', and 'reasoning'. The Churchlands, for example, have used the phrase 'eliminative materialism' to deconstruct issues like 'free will' in terms of combinations of neural processes such as 'gratification mechanisms' and 'neural pathway establishment', both of which are becoming well understood and are not species specific.

In short, the implication of neurophilosophy is that the vocabulary of philosophical issues, including terms like 'causality', and 'rationality' are being superceded by brain functioning terms, in the same way the old vocabulary of substances (earth, air , fire and water) were superceded by modern physics and chemistry terms.

There would be some value in listing the physical processes, “brain functioning terms”, and facts of biology involved in ideas such as “free will”, but it would make speaking and thinking about the topics utterly tedious, leaving the value negligent.