Oh, I found another one, right here! — schopenhauer1
Ok, this is what I perceive to be your main issue right now in this argument, no?
A person has to exist for there to be an agenda. By not having a new person, there is no person, and ergo no agenda that this person is to be following. My agenda is to prevent someone else from being forced into an agenda, and by not having a new person who actually will be forced into an agenda, my agenda has not made an agenda for someone else. — schopenhauer1
that's hardly my fault for bringing you to that embarrassing realisation. — S
Your original claim to me was that the prevention of suffering matters, and that anything else would be having an agenda for another person. Logically, included in that "anything else" would be the prevention of joy. That also matters. If prevention of joy is having an agenda for another person, then prevention of suffering is having an agenda for another person. And if prevention of suffering isn't having an agenda for another person because there is no person, then prevention of joy isn't having an agenda for another person because there is no person.
It isn't clear to me whether or not you understand this problem because you haven't been addressing it directly, which means that the problem will continue to persist unresolved.
Whether you realise it or not, you have been forced into a dilemma and must choose from limited options. Not included in those options is having your cake and eating it. Your current tactic seems to be to appear as though you're addressing what I'm saying without actually doing so. — S
Oh you're so clever :roll:. — schopenhauer1
I just see your "problem" as almost nonsensical, so unresolved would not even apply. It doesn't matter that the parent has an agenda per se, it is the fact that someone else will be LIVING OUT the parent's (society's?) agenda(s). — schopenhauer1
Another red herring. — S
So then why did you make that comment to me in the first place? I'm not having an agenda for another person by making the valid point that you try to hide the full picture by never mentioning all of the other hugely important things that, by implication, you're in favour of preventing? This raises a serious question of motivation: do you want to mislead or not? Because I've raised this problem with you numerous times and yet you continue to do it? What does that suggest? — S
I know you got sidetracked, but I was interested in your response to this:
"Wouldn't, say, physics fit that description--something structural, it's not reflected upon, but it runs our lives. So would you say that physics is morally problematic? " — Terrapin Station
The problem is they aren't commensurable per se. One is about the universe, one is about human nature. You never answered, why is someone going to the fridge from the couch? I know funny question. — schopenhauer1
I am not misleading anyone. — schopenhauer1
Well, one is about human nature, too, unless you think we're somehow "outside of physics." — Terrapin Station
Re going to the fridge, I already said because they're hungry, but I pointed out that they might not have any negative phenomenal assessment of that at all, and you pointed out that you weren't talking about that anyway--you're saying something that's independent of any individual's assessment of their states. — Terrapin Station
Right, hunger.. Let's start there. In the Schopenhauer view, the "negative" state is that which is not at some sort of satiation- to be deprived. — schopenhauer1
What I'm saying is that it makes no sense to me that you'd be saying that something is morally problematic even though an individual has no issues about it. They don't at all mind any of the states in question, etc.
You explained that it's because it's "Something that is so structural, it is not reflected on, but runs our lives." Well, that's true of things like physics, our autonomic nervous systems, etc., too. So why wouldn't those be morally problematic on your view? That's not a commentary about conventional linguistic frameworks. So conventional linguistic frameworks that we'd use have nothing to do with the issue. — Terrapin Station
The fact that we are in a deprived state = suffering. It matters not what people evaluate about this or that actual experience. In this model, it is acknowledged that we are always in a sense becoming and never fully being. Becoming has a quality of not fully satisfied. — schopenhauer1
Again, why does the guy grab something from the fridge? Why isn't he satisfied without doing so? Is it something related to a deficiency in hunger, thirst, comfort, entertainment? — schopenhauer1
Even if one were to concede that something like hunger is bad, — S
And then it would just turn into me trying to figure out why he'd be insisting that everyone feels a way that they clearly do not on my view (and in my personal experience, including my own). — Terrapin Station
One thing weird about the "systematic" view schopenhauer is endorsing is that it implies that the preferred state would be to just sit like a lump and not want to do anything--as if that's some ideal for some reason. — Terrapin Station
So we don't have to keep going over this. — Terrapin Station
Let's just get to WHY one would have a view that something is morally problematic even though someone doesn't have a problem with it. — Terrapin Station
One thing weird about the "systematic" view schopenhauer is endorsing is that it implies that the preferred state would be to just sit like a lump and not want to do anything--as if that's some ideal for some reason. — Terrapin Station
Oh yeah, that's also pretty insane. Nietzsche was right on this point, and Schopenhauer was wrong. Ironically, a life without everything that Schopenhauer would call suffering wouldn't be worth living. But in reality, life with suffering is worth living in the majority of cases. — S
So all of this is wrong about Schopenhauer's view. Schopenhauer's ideal would probably be something like Nirvana- a complete lack of lack. I've said this before about Schop- his world would be one with absolutely nothing or absolutely everything. There would be no deprived states. All being or all nothing. There is no becoming or flux. Thus, a world "worth living" in a Nietzschean "suffering makes things worth it" isn't even in the radar of this kind of holistic metaphysics. That's intra-worldly affairs, and Schop's metaphysics is the "world" itself. — schopenhauer1
Do you agree that the Disneyland example is an example of a misleading proposition? Why is it misleading? Obviously because the part about dragging children along the ground by horse for miles and miles is deliberately not mentioned, right? — S
So all of this is wrong about Schopenhauer's view. Schopenhauer's ideal would probably be something like Nirvana- a complete lack of lack. I've said this before about Schop- his world would be one with absolutely nothing or absolutely everything. There would be no deprived states. All being or all nothing. There is no becoming or flux. Thus, a world "worth living" in a Nietzschean "suffering makes things worth it" isn't even in the radar of this kind of holistic metaphysics. That's intra-worldly affairs, and Schop's metaphysics is the "world" itself. — schopenhauer1
Okay, but presumably you agree with him. So WHY do you feel it's wrong? (If why you feel it's wrong is identical to why Schopenhauer feels it's wrong for some reason, you can just report that, but in that case, why does Schopenhauer feel it's wrong?)
I'm presuming that you're not just parroting Schopenhauer's views without critically thinking about them very much. — Terrapin Station
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