It's not relativism if its what people universally want. In other words they all want the same kinds of things, just for different people — Janus

It is if the list of things people want for various groups exhausts the list of things it is reasonably possible to want. It seems, depending on the group, people want anything from rape and torture to self-sacrificial altruism. So basically, all you're saying is that out of the range of behaviours it is reasonably possible to want who people want it for varies relativistically.

Give me an example of a group that wants murder, rape and torture for their own members (excluding ritual sacrifice).

Note I'm speaking about the orthodox view regarding the evolution of the idea of individuality and individual rights. Is that what you are speaking about? — Janus

It wasn't, no, but it can be. I was originally talking about your direct quote in reference to it, which was

"in tribal communities individuals are understood predominately in terms of the social roles, and what they would be entitled to would vary according to their roles (and their attendant importance to the community)."

Ie that entitlement varies according to roles and importance within a community.

" Typically in ancient cultures humane treatment is predominately a matter of compassion, not of what was rationally considered to be fair and just treatment"

Ie that tribal cultures do not rationalise any humane treatment they may act out.

But if you want to limit it to the notion of individual rights, then we can do that too. Tell me what 'rights' a 10 year old has in our society, and we'll compare to the orthodox view of child-rearing hunter-gatherer tribes.

Give me an example of a group that wants murder, rape and torture for their own members (excluding ritual sacrifice). — Janus

There isn't one. My point isn't that people don't want certain things for certain groups. It's that, if those groups are selected entirely to meet relativist notions of who's in and who's out, then the whole of morality becomes relativist. There's nothing an individual is constrained from doing which they feel like doing. If they feel like raping someone, just declare them to be outside your group and now you can. That's relativist morality.

By the way, I'm going out now so replies will be delayed. I know it's just an open forum, but it feels rude to just suddenly not reply for ages without saying anything.

If they feel like raping someone, just declare them to be outside your group and now you can. — Isaac

Who is in who is out is determined socially, communally, not arbitrarily by individuals I would say. Of course in hunter/gatherer societies everyone is in and everyone is familiar with everyone else. That is the paradigm of community. There may be special priveleges, as there usually is within families, for the father and the mother, for elders, for tribal leaders, for the shamans and so on.

Murder, rape and torture would not be tolerated within those communities because such acts would undermine the harmony of the group.

I found an article by Gray here: https://www.psychologytoday.com/au/blog/freedom-learn/201105/how-hunter-gatherers-maintained-their-egalitarian-ways

Reading it I found it very interesting but found nothing in it that contradicts anything I have been arguing and I remain convinced that hunter/gatherers do not have ideals of individual human rights. Interestingly the Western conception of human rights involves private property, a notion of which would have likely been non-existent in hunter/gatherer groups. This is not to say that people would not have had their own clothes, or baskets, or digging sticks, weapons, dwellings or whatever, of course, but the possessive notion of private ownership would likely have been absent..

No problems, I need to stop now, too. I appreciate your politeness. We can resume at our mutual convenience.

Right, well in that case you'd need some evidence that in the famously egalitarian hunter-gatherer tribes, the 'chief' regularly abuses his/her power for arbitrary reasons. — Isaac

It's not really possible to argue based on how "regular" an "abuse" of power is, because all tribal societies already have religion. So we cannot make comparisons. What we can say is that, obviously, tribes have no judiciary. Conflict resolution is personal in tribal societies. That means that more powerful lineages are more difficult to hold accountable.

What we can also do is compare the trajectories societies took towards modernity and compare them. If we do that, we notice that regions with a strong religious establishment also have a tradition of secular rule that is, at least in theory, subordinate to a religious authority. In China, such a subordination never existed. This corresponds with a notion of "rule of law" in modern society, which again is much weaker in China.

If you want to dismiss this idea, fine. I am not going to be able to give you convincing evidence, because I am no anthropologist, and these are just things I remember from books I read, that seemed convincing to me.

What you wrote doesn't even pertain to the first 200,000 years of human culture, so no, it is not evidence of the 'almost always' correlation you're claiming. — Isaac

Right, but in those first 200.000 years, there was, so far as we know, no such thing as a declaration of universal human rights.

I don't understand what point you're making here. Your argument is that there can be arbitrary abuse of power. In an egalitarian society (one on which power is distributed equally), who is it that the abuse of power is forcing? — Isaac

Tribal societies are relatively egalitarian. But there are nevertheless more powerful and less powerful lineages and groups in a tribe.

But I don't really want to make an argument about the functioning of tribal society. What I am saying is that it seems to me that religious authority was an important ingredient for the development of western individualism.

If we regard moral propositions as purely subjective, enforcing law and order amounts to nothing more than 'might makes right', right? — JosephS

Isn't this the current situation? When have humans ever had a true moral code that was applied equally to all citizens? It seems to me that if you have money and power you can get away with almost anything, or moral codes don't apply.

Moral codes are simply imaginary ideas to keep the general population content and in check, like religion.

I would think that we look for an objective standard in order to justify applying that standard to others. — JosephS

Is this because we use "objective" to mean an impartial or fair assessment? Objectivity as the absence of undue personal bias? But that applies to people and the way they make assessments/decisions. It doesn't seem to apply to a body of rules.

We can say empirical science is objective insofar as it describes the relations between objects. It allows us to make accurate predictions, which is only possible if it at least describes the relations between phenomena objectively, which here means as they really are

But I don't think many people suppose there is a moral object floating around somewhere that we can describe.

Sort of a painfully obvious question occurred to me that is more of a 'houskeeping' matter: do you think Darwinian ethics included discussing all branches of Philosophy?

But I don't think many people suppose there is a moral object floating around somewhere that we can describe. — Echarmion

Events are as much fact as objects are.
The holocaust is an example of what was an immoral fact (perceived particular).

Events are as much fact as objects are.
The holocaust is an example of what was an immoral fact. — Galuchat

If it's an immoral fact, then there must be some facts that are moral and some that are immoral. That is, immorality needs to be established in addition to the facts. Therefore, it's not sufficient to just establish the factual nature of an event to establish immorality.

Given that establishing what is and is not a fact is all that empirical science is capable of, what other objective science do we apply?

If it's an immoral fact, then there must be some facts that are moral and some that are immoral. That is, immorality needs to be established in addition to the facts. Therefore, it's not sufficient to just establish the factual nature of an event to establish immorality. — Echarmion

Correct.
As explained here, empathy establishes what is moral and what is immoral.

Correct.
As explained here, empathy is what establishes what is moral and what is immoral. — Galuchat

In what sense can empathy be said to be objective?

In what sense can empathy be said to be objective? — Echarmion

Check out recent research on mirror neurons.

The holocaust is an example of what was an immoral fact (perceived particular). — Galuchat

It's not considered a moral fact by everyone - hence the subjectivity of morality. There are some that deny the event even happened.

Check out recent research on mirror neurons. — Galuchat

We cant see emotions. We see bodily responses and facial expressions which some people can fake or hide. So what is it that mirror neurons are mirroring?

In what sense can empathy be said to be objective? — Echarmion

We can share feelings because we are members of the same species, but we are also individuals that have goals that can conflict or work together. All humans experience sorrow, but not always about the same thing or in the same circumstance.

Who is in who is out is determined socially, communally, not arbitrarily by individuals I would say. — Janus

This is interesting, but potentially problematic, for me. If the in/out status of society members is not determined individually, then how do you resolve the sorties paradox? Are two people a community, three, four.. ? To go back to the hypothetical example of me and my mate deciding that we'd rape anyone except each other. Have we made a moral choice because we decided not to rape each other (our communally determined 'in group') yet if I'd made the same choice about just me it would become immoral. I don't think that really captures what morality is for you, so, is it just a numbers game or something else?

I'd need a better idea of the mechanism, how this communal decision comes about. I think, in Nazi Germany, for example, there was not only a concerted and deliberate effort to convince people that Jews were the out group, but many disagreed, so I can't see the fact of the matter arising organically.

I found it very interesting but found nothing in it that contradicts anything I have been arguing and I remain convinced that hunter/gatherers do not have ideals of individual human rights. — Janus

What about the fierce defence of autonomy, even for children? Is that not a right held more highly there than here? I don't know how much of Gray's work is gone into in that article, but do you think, after reading it, that a 12 year old child in western Europe really has more 'rights' than one in the communities Gray describes? I fail to see what they might be.

Interestingly the Western conception of human rights involves private property, a notion of which would have likely been non-existent in hunter/gatherer groups. This is not to say that people would not have had their own clothes, or baskets, or digging sticks, weapons, dwellings or whatever, of course, but the possessive notion of private ownership would likely have been absent.. — Janus

Yes. This is something that interests me too. The extent to which private property is tied up with rights. I don't think the western conception of 'rights' is a healthy one, based as it is on individuals and their rightful accumulation of property, but that's probably way off topic here.

Conflict resolution is personal in tribal societies. That means that more powerful lineages are more difficult to hold accountable. — Echarmion

Really? The 'powerful lineages' are easy to hold to account in Christian/religious cultures? Do you know how many cases of child abuse the Catholic Church covered up? Do you know how many cases of child abuse have been reported in the entire time since (for example) the San bushmen came under the Botswanan legal system? I'll give you a clue, its hundreds (possibly thousands) and none respectively.

Right, but in those first 200.000 years, there was, so far as we know, no such thing as a declaration of universal human rights. — Echarmion

So now it's become an actual legal document we're supposedly referring to. You do realise this whole discussion started with a claim that there was no barrier to inhumane treatment in non-Christian cultures, now we're talking about the fact that there was no written legal document. And you suggest my feeling of furious back-peddling is my misinterpretation?

What I am saying is that it seems to me that religious authority was an important ingredient for the development of western individualism. — Echarmion

That's a far cry from what you started out saying. I don't have any problem agreeing with this much weaker claim, but I also don't think it was a necessary ingredient as @StreetlightX pointed out earlier, it just happened to be one.

Really? The 'powerful lineages' are easy to hold to account in Christian/religious cultures? — Isaac

I did not say that.

So now it's become an actual legal document we're supposedly referring to. — Isaac

I did not say that either.

You do realise this whole discussion started with a claim that there was no barrier to inhumane treatment in non-Christian cultures, now we're talking about the fact that there was no written legal document. — Isaac

No, I don't realize that. Rather, it looks to me it's you, and only you, who keeps insisting that this is what we all must mean, for whatever reason. Despite being told numerous times that this is not what I am saying, you still keep strawmanning me.

That's a far cry from what you started out saying. — Isaac

What I started out saying was this:

Well not necessarily only christian social philosophy, but in general most ideas of inalienable rights and equality are, at least historically, connected to religious ideas. Religious law was the first real check on arbitrary use of power.

Note that I said "historically connected", which was meant to specify that this was not necessarily how things had to happen, or that a similar system could not have happened any other way. Only that, historically, this is how it did happen.

Sort of a painfully obvious question occurred to me that is more of a 'houskeeping' matter: do you think Darwinian ethics included discussing all branches of Philosophy? — 3017amen

As a descriptive effort, and this is how I first approached my question in the OP, it was a consideration from a meta-ethical perspective. I think the answer then is yes. Since that posting my mind has been flipping -- a la the necker cube. At one point I will see this as a matter of fact Darwinian process, wherein the various schools and strains of ethical thought are caught up in the neural web (not of individuals but of groups of individuals) working to an imperfect effort of group survival, in various degrees unreflective of their subordination to the true objective (those that die out can talk all they want about fact-value to their hearts content in their oblivion).

At the next moment it occurs to me how perfectly trivial and meaningless the premise is (my concept, not others' conceptions). And in those moments I look at my question as one of sociology, not precisely ethics, and how ethics, or morality, supersedes the descriptive effort.

I don't imagine this is new, but it is rather new to me.

My follow-up post in the thread talks about the utility of the descriptive effort and I think that one still makes sense to me. The descriptive/normative interplay as well as the self-referential aspect of an ethical theory that incorporates other ethical theories in the mesh has me grasping.

It got me to thinking about MC Escher and the Droste Effect. Escher left a hole in the middle of this work and it has been left to others to understand how it ought to be resolved. I imagine a hole in our ethical theories where the ought and is come together, perhaps never to be resolved.

I've also been thinking of computational ethics, in as much as everything I tend to do ends up falling back on data -- because that's what I do. I will work on a new discussion with that topic when I get a chance.

….interesting. Computer ethics is definitely an intriguing topic, particularly relative to robots and the marketing of products and services.

Accordingly, my friend has proprietary software that can predict many (not all) human purchasing habits with some success, among other things... .

I guess to that end, abstract computational abilities, as well as abstract philosophical one's (Metaphysics, Epistemology, etc..), what did Darwin say about those?

In fact, the very idea of an “ought” is foreign to evolutionary theory — Wayfarer

Perhaps I am not giving this idea its due or perhaps what I am talking about is considered elsewhere, but the premise I'm contemplating has the "ought" at a subordinate level of encapsulation. Peoples' ethical model include the "ought" in order to support the superior "is" existent within group selection. The "is", just in case this is too muddy, involves the statistical disadvantage of maladaptive principle selection.

Now, questioned about this, we must reject it. A contrived "ought" is no good. Normative theories only have true weight when we can implement them righteously.

I am still trying to ingest this message. In particular, this:

So, there is no separation of "is" (fact) and "ought" (value), because awareness is both objective (fact-based) and subjective (value-based). Ethical fact and value constitute the two poles of empathy. — Galuchat

My current conception:
Awareness is perception (sensation mental effect) and cognisance (perception acknowledgment). Perception is objective (fact-based), and cognisance is subjective (value-based). So, empathy is ethical awareness (awareness of morality and immorality). Ethical perception involves exteroception and mirror neuron operation. Ethical cognisance draws upon ethical knowledge (morality).

I don't imagine this is new, but it is rather new to me. — JosephS

Another factor to consider is the influence of 'the Scottish Enlightenment' on Charles Darwin's writings. Recall that Darwin laboured over his manuscript for decades before publication, and often mused about its philosophical and ethical implication. The Scottish Enlightenment 'was the period in 18th- and early-19th-century Scotland characterised by an outpouring of intellectual and scientific accomplishments. ....

Sharing the humanist and rationalist outlook of the European Enlightenment of the same time period, the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment asserted the importance of human reason combined with a rejection of any authority that could not be justified by reason. In Scotland, the Enlightenment was characterised by a thoroughgoing empiricism and practicality where the chief values were improvement, virtue, and practical benefit for the individual and society as a whole.

Among the fields that rapidly advanced were philosophy, political economy, engineering, architecture, medicine, geology, archaeology, botany and zoology, law, agriculture, chemistry and sociology. Among the Scottish thinkers and scientists of the period were Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Adam Smith, Dugald Stewart, Thomas Reid, Robert Burns, Adam Ferguson, John Playfair, Joseph Black and James Hutton.' (Wikipedia)

You see many influences of this not only in Darwin but also in the ultra-Darwinism of Dawkins and neo-darwinism generally.

Peoples' ethical model include the "ought" in order to support the superior "is" existent within group selection. The "is", just in case this is too muddy, involves the statistical disadvantage of maladaptive principle selection. — JosephS

It's too contrived to be realistic. The problem is basically with Enlightenment thinking. It's great in some respects, produces fantastic technology, and I wouldn't want to be without it. But the issue is, it contains many deep assumptions about the nature of things which don't actually hold up, the consequence being a state of 'false consciousness', so to speak, which is deeply embedded in contemporary culture. Seeing through that is the aim of philosophy proper. Of this, Darwin has no inkling.

This is interesting, but potentially problematic, for me. If the in/out status of society members is not determined individually, then how do you resolve the sorties paradox? — Isaac

I imagine that hunter/gather groups were democratic, and were so naturally, without having any explicit notion of democracy. They probably would have been more democratic than our so-called democracies, because everyone would have had a voice, even children, as the article affirms. This is easy to achieve in, even natural for, small groups, where everyone knows and cares about everyone else. Sure, it is easy to there would have conflict and antipathies, but the rules or mores of the group would have been there to resolve such situations and re-establish harmony.

I think it is reasonable to believe that if an individual was anti-social to a significant enough degree to cause problems for the group, they would have been ostracized. If there were a leader then the leader may have decreed it, or it could have been the will of the whole of, or the majority of the group.

As to Germany, I agree that the ostrasization and attempted extermination of the Jews would not have been the will of the people, because it was a totalitarian state. So I am not arguing with you over that. All I am saying is that the motive would not have been to create disharmony in the society, but to eliminate what was understood to be, irrationally, a source of disharmony.

What about the fierce defence of autonomy, even for children? Is that not a right held more highly there than here? I don't know how much of Gray's work is gone into in that article, but do you think, after reading it, that a 12 year old child in western Europe really has more 'rights' than one in the communities Gray describes? I fail to see what they might be. — Isaac

I don't know about "fierce defence" I think that language is somewhat tendentious. If autonomy was granted to children it could have simply meant that those communities had no notion of adulthood and an age where individual moral responsibility is achieved in the kind of way we conceive those. Having said that, in Australian Aboriginal tribes, as far as I know, children were required to go through "initiations" when they reached certain ages, and I don't believe that would have been a matter of choice.

Yes. This is something that interests me too. The extent to which private property is tied up with rights. I don't think the western conception of 'rights' is a healthy one, based as it is on individuals and their rightful accumulation of property, but that's probably way off topic here. — Isaac

I totally agree with you about that. The very idea of every part of the world being owned by someone is totally absurd; it does seem like a kind of disease which mankind, if it is to survive very much longer will have to cure.

I think it is reasonable to believe that if an individual was anti-social to a significant enough degree to cause problems for the group, they would have been ostracized. — Janus

This is certainly evidenced by the anthropological accounts, but doesn't this suggest that some moral feeling precedes a decision about who is in/out of one's community? The ostracised is, at the time of the decision, in the community, so the decision to ostracise is only beneficial to the harmony of some members (everyone who isn't ostracised) and not others (the ostracised) at the time of the decision. Post hoc, it can be said that the decision was for the goal of social harmony for the community (because post hoc, the community consists only of people who benefited from the decision). But at the actual time of the decision, this isn't true (if moral goals remain subjective). 149 people want the community to one way, 1 person wants it to be another, so ostracising them is not for the good of the community, it's for the good of the 149.

It seems that you want to exempt (or set aside perhaps?) the act of determining the in/out status of people from moral judgement. The fact that the Nazis decided that Jews were not a part of their community was itself an act. An act which avails itself of moral judgement. If we follow that what is 'moral' is that which is best for the social harmony of {your community}, then how can we make moral judgements on decisions about who is in/out of {your community}? Against which community's benefit do we judge the Nazi's decision to exclude Jews from what they considered their community?

Having said that, in Australian Aboriginal tribes, as far as I know, children were required to go through "initiations" when they reached certain ages, and I don't believe that would have been a matter of choice. — Janus

Not according the accounts I've read, but there are conflicting accounts, so we can draw whatever conclusion to a point. There is certainly considerable social pressure to conform (which is no different in western cultures), but I've read accounts of young women who just walk away from it, no-one stops them.

But I asked, not for just a depiction of the tribal child's life, but for a comparison. A 12 year old child can be made to attend school against their will, forced to adhere to whatever rule the teachers at that school stipulate (without any say in them whatsoever), they are told what to wear, how to have their hair, what to do, how to speak, what time they must go to bed, what they can eat, who they can befriend...
Here in the UK schools have isolation rooms which are perfectly legal. Children can be put into isolation for disobeying a teacher. Treatment which is against the Geneva convention for prisoners of war.

We see 'rights' through the lens of our culture. We think we've granted so much because we have a myth of progress which tends to see all change as moving in one direction. I don't see things that way. Tribal (non-Christian) cultures have a great deal to teach us about humane treatment and individual rights, and most of what they can teach us is stuff Christianity (and other religions) has concertedly and deliberately sought to wipe from our culture the better to ensure obedience.