Not that I agree with your assessment of what most moral philosophers think with regards to your premise anyway...
I think most moral philosophers would agree that if something is morally valuable, its moral value is not constitutively determined by our valuings. — Bartricks
...may well be true, but that's a weaker position that the one you're using in your argument.
1. For something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued. — Bartricks
Most moral philosophers would disagree with this, for example. Especially those who are moral realists. Thus making the moral value you talk about as being categorical distinct from the moral value that most philosophers talk about as being categorical (where they talk that way). Kant, for example. the archetype of categorical morality, saw a moral value as a rule specifically that one did not value anyway. Otherwise, for him, it would not be moral. So your starting premise, the one on which you hinge your conclusion that categorical moral values must be valued by someone, is not one which most philosophers agree with. A standard which you've previously used to justify their prima facae acceptability. — Isaac
According to your view - which you clearly don't understand - if Joe values (values - VALUES - values, values. V. A.L.U.E.S) raping Jane, then it will necessarily be good for Joe to rape Jane. — Bartricks
no, — Bartricks
I am saying that if Joe is a banana, he is bent and yellow. — Bartricks
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