What I'm saying is that those terms are meaningless, it's 'neuro-babble' which appears to connote something scientific but in reality says nothing. — Wayfarer

Why "something scientific"? You know what brains are, right? And you know what activity is. You should be able to put the two together. No one is claiming that it's a term used in the neurosciences.

So, if brain states are not the subject of the neuro-sciences, then what are you referring to when you use the term 'brain states'?

This is a philosophy forum, not a neuroscience forum. I don't know why you'd try to read comments as necessarily being about the sciences per se.

What are we referring to--do you know what "brain" refers to?

I know to what it refers to, but I am arguing that 'brain state' is a meaningless term.

You said in another thread:

Love, hope, etc. are physical things on my view--they're terms for particular brain states and particular behaviors/behavioral dispositions that accompany those brain states. — Terrapin Station

This is a typical statement of materialist or physicalist philosophy of mind, and that's what I am criticising. Consider the following quote from the Wiki article on Paul Churchland:

The Churchlands maintains that a future, fully matured neuroscience is likely to have no need for beliefs. In other words, they hold that beliefs are not ontologically real. Such concepts will not merely be reduced to more finely grained explanation and retained as useful proximate levels of description, but will be strictly eliminated as wholly lacking in correspondence to precise objective phenomena, such as activation patterns across neural networks.

Now, if you replaced 'belief' in the above, with 'love', and/or 'hope', that is what you mean, isn't it?

If not, what?

Why did you drop the previous discussion? It's worth figuring out why you'd say something so ridiculous as claiming that you don't know what "brain state" or "brain activity" could possibly refer to.

At any rate, yes, I'm a physicalist/"materialist." No, I'm not an eliminative materialist. Not all materialists are eliminative materialists. I've been explaining this to you and others for well over six months now, ever since I joined the other, now defunct, forum.

So no, I'm not saying anything like what the Churchlands are saying when they make eliminativist statements. I rather think that eliminativism is quite stupid.

When you say 'objective' what do you mean? Are geometry, physics, and the other sciences all strictly objective, or are they also subjective. Or when you say objective do you mean 'real' as existing in the world outside of us, separate from us as things?

Didn't Kant connect the subjective with the objective, uniting or mediating them with reason which is objective universally necessary, reason which is the paradigm example of objectivity, yet is also a subjective ability,

When you say 'objective' what do you mean? Are geometry, physics, and the other sciences all strictly objective, or are they also subjective. Or when you say objective do you mean 'real' as existing in the world outside of us, separate from us as things? — Cavacava

Mind-independent. The objective world doesn't depend on us perceiving, knowing, or talking about it. It's objective precisely because it doesn't vary based on individual perception, cognition, etc. It's also objective in that it doesn't depend on us being human. Man is not the measure, if anything is truly objective.

Didn't Kant connect the subjective with the objective, uniting or mediating them with reason which is objective universally necessary, reason which is the paradigm example of objectivity, yet is also a subjective ability, — Cavacava

Sure, if you accept Kant's account of reason. Then we can't know the noumena. Evolution is only true as it's correlated to us, not independent of us, even though evolution claims a time and process long proceeding humans, leading to human reason.

It's worth figuring out why you'd say something so ridiculous as claiming that you don't know what "brain state" or "brain activity" could possibly refer to. — Terrapin Station

It's not hard to figure out. It's a meaningless term. 'Headache' is not a meaningless term - when you say you have a headache, I know what you mean. When you refer to 'brain state', I don't think it really means anything - I'm saying that equating conscious experience with brain states doesn't mean anything.

At any rate, yes, I'm a physicalist/"materialist." — Terrapin Station

At least the eliminative materialists are consistent. So if you're not an 'eliminative materialist' - which materialist/physicalist philosopher do you think does represent your views? Any particular books, papers, etc?

You say that 'love, hope, etc' are physical things. My argument against that doesn't refer to love and hope, as such, but to logic and inference, the 'laws of thought' - such things as the law of identity, or the law of the excluded middle. But the same general argument can be extended to affective conditions such as love.

What I am arguing is that the basic rules of logic cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms of, physical laws. Ergo they're not physical. They can be represented physically, in writing or in computer algorithms. They can be grasped by the mind. But they're not physical, they belong to a different ontological category to the physical.

The same argument can be made in respect of all kinds of semantic content.

Mind-independent. The objective world doesn't depend on us perceiving, knowing, or talking about it. It's objective precisely because it doesn't vary based on individual perception, cognition, etc. It's also objective in that it doesn't depend on us being human. Man is not the measure, if anything is truly objective.

That's meaningless isn't it.

The objective as you have described it has no meaning, it may exist and have existed but that existence is meaningless without us. It was all meaningless until we came along and gave it meaning. It more a question of how we play into the schema of things, since there is no schema without us.

(Y)

I'm saying that equating conscious experience with brain states doesn't mean anything. — Wayfarer

That's not quite as unfathomable for you to say, as you obviously disagree with the view that they're identical. I can at least "intellectually" understand that the idea of them being identical might seem incoherent to you.

What's unfathomable, though, would be you saying that you have no idea what "brain state" would refer to period. That would be as unfathomable as you not being able to figure out, say "foot state."

At least the eliminative materialists are consistent. — Wayfarer

I'm certainly willing to entertain accusations of inconsistency. I only require that one specify the proposition that one believes I'm both affirming and denying.

which materialist/physicalist philosopher do you think does represent your views? — Wayfarer

We kind of went over this before. Even if there were someone with whom I agreed on a significant chunk of their views, I don't want to effectively "pledge allegiance" to them on a message board, because 100% of the time in my experience, that goes off the rails. Folks expect you to agree with whoever you named wholesale in various specific regards, and then it's a battle trying to dissociate yourself from the other person. Why can't you simply listen to what I say and cognize it, realizing that there's no better representative of my views than myself? There's no other philosopher with whom I agree much more than 50% of the time (and it might be less than that) , and with most, I agree far less than that. In fact with some, I literally disagree with every sentence they write.

What I am arguing is that the basic rules of logic cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms of, physical laws. Ergo they're not physical. — Wayfarer

As an argument, "cannot be explained in terms of x, therefore not x" is a non sequitur. Without getting into a huge tangent on what explanations are, explanations are things that we do, with a criterion that others accept them as explanations. That has no bearing on what something is ontologically.

Regarding "reduced to," depending on whether you use that term to simply denote identity, or whether you use it in a sense where identities are not necessarily reductions, this is either question-begging or also a non sequitur respectively.

Of course, I believe that logic, and everything else that exists, is physical. In my view, logic is simply a way that we think about relations of particulars, abstracting and extrapolating from particulars, all tempered by contingent facts re how our brains must work due to evolutionary requirements for survival given the sort of creatures we developed into phylogenetically. As a way that we think, it's a subset of brain states (which are processes).

Meaning is not objective, it's subjective, correct.

That doesn't imply that the definition he gave of "objective" is meaningless, of course. But it's us, as subjects, who assign meaning to it, as is the case with everything meaningful.

Why can't you simply listen to what I say and cognize it, realizing that there's no better representative of my views than myself? — Terrapin Station

Knowing other philosophers who say similar things, would help to understand what you mean. So far, I'm finding that very challenging.

What's unfathomable, though, would be you saying that you have no idea what "brain state" would refer to period. That would be as unfathomable as you not being able to figure out, say "foot state." — Terrapin Station

And I'm accused of non sequiturs?

In my view, logic is simply a way that we think about relations of particulars, abstracting and extrapolating from particulars, all tempered by contingent facts re how our brains must work where that was influenced by evolutionary "requirements" for survival given the sort of creatures we developed into phylogenetically. — Terrapin Station

A lot of people seem to believe that we understand the 'nature of thought' because it can be explained by evolutionary science. But that approach is called 'evolutionary reductionism'.

In any case, the challenge still stands. Meaning, logic, language, and the like, depend on the relationships of ideas, for which I say there is not an adequate physicalist account. You simply assume that these matters have been understood through the lense of evolutionary naturalism. I ask you for another representative of your views, and you don't have one. You're not advancing a coherent argument at all.

Meaning is not objective, it's subjective, correct. — Terrapin Station

So, when you say 'correct', you have no idea whether the person you're talking to understands what you mean - correct?

Knowing other philosophers who say similar things, would help to understand what you mean. So far, I'm finding that very challenging. — Wayfarer

Okay, but I don't know why. Is it a language issue? Is English not your first language and some things in English thus aren't clear to you? I try to write philosophy as plainly as I can while still capturing all the nuances of my view, and I don't mind explaining anything in other words just in case what I'd said isn't clear to someone.

And I'm accused of non sequiturs? — Wayfarer

Fallacies are pertinent to arguments. That is, to stating premises and then asserting that a conclusion follows from those premises. "Non sequitur," of course, means that something doesn't actually follow (from the premises at hand). But I hadn't claimed that some conclusion logically follows from premises that I'd stated. I rather explained that you should have trouble with "foot state" if you have trouble with "brain state." After all, it's just a different body part, followed by the word "state." Again, I think the problem is that you're reading a bunch of stuff into "brain state." You shouldn't be doing that. You should read "brain state" just as you'd read "foot state."

ideas, for which I say there is not an adequate physicalist account. — Wayfarer

Sure--of course that would be your view. You're not a physicalist after all. If you were to feel that there's an adequate physicalist account of phenomena such as ideas, then likely you'd be a physicalist.

You simply assume that these matters have been understood through the lense of evolutionary naturalism. — Wayfarer

What I was talking about with mentioning other philosophers is occurring in microcosm here. You're assuming that since I mentioned evolution, I see that as a wholesale explanation for everything. That's not at all my view. But it will probably be just about impossible from this point to dissociate myself from that template in your mind.

I ask you for another representative of your views, and you don't have one. You're not advancing a coherent argument at all. — Wayfarer

As if those two things have anything whatsoever to do with each other. They do not.

So, when you say 'correct', you have no idea whether the person you're talking to understands what you mean - correct? — Wayfarer

"Understands me" is what I'd say if we're being literal/technical about what's going on, not "understand what I mean.". I generally assume that others will understand me until it's clear that they do not. It's often clear with you and a couple other people here that "they do not." Those cases are interesting, because it's not so easy to figure out just what is going so wrong.

In your case, I'm suspecting it might be language issues to some extent--although that's just a guess, and it also seems to me that you have a tendency to read things where you apply dense ideological packages to what the person said, despite them not actually saying those other things. It seems like you often have some preconceived template in mind for most things, and then you understand things but fitting them onto those templates. When the actions of the other person don't mesh with the template, though, you can't figure it out.

At any rate, if you're interested in my definition of what understanding is, I can relay that, but it probably won't do much good with respect to how "well" we're communicating.

I just explained that you should have trouble with "foot state" if you have trouble with "brain state." After all, it's just a different body part, followed by the word "state." — Terrapin Station

If you can't see how fatuous that comparison is, then really we have nothing to discuss.

ALL that the phrase "brain state," qua "brain state" says is the exact same thing that "foot state" says, just about another body part. Hence why I find it ridiculous that you'd have no idea what "brain state" refers to.

All that other ideological stuff that you're reading into "brain state," qua "brain state," isn't actually there.

The objective as you have described it has no meaning, it may exist and have existed but that existence is meaningless without us. It was all meaningless until we came along and gave it meaning. It more a question of how we play into the schema of things, since there is no schema without us. — Cavacava

To say "it was all meaningless until we came along and gave it meaning" is to admit that something (the "all" being referred to) existed before human consciousness. And the advent of human consciousness simply tagged this existence with "meaning". Fine, but that still seems to imply a mind-independent existence. (By the way, what "meaning" does existence have? Or, what are you implying when you use the term "meaning"? Is it simply that we give labels to things, like Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden naming all the birds and beasts? Or that somehow our minds imbue existence with purpose?)

The notion that "there is no schema without us" has always struck me as a bit of navel-gazing. Or perhaps elevating one's self to the position of god. "Existence is nothing without me, so I must be awful important". Such thinking leads - logically - to belief in one's own immortality ("existence began with my birth, and ends with my death"), and omniscience ("I know all there is to know").

But there is still widespread acknowledgement that the central mystery of how neural matter gives rise to conscious experience — Wayfarer

The part I have bolded is the issue at hand - i.e., the notion that neural activity causes consciousness. As if synaptic firing precedes the thoughts that occur. If this is so, then it should be possible to show consciousness existing without corresponding brain activity (perhaps in the moment following the synaptic firing). Is there any such evidence?

Neural activity does not "give rise" to consciousness. It is consciousness.

The difference between observing neural activity and experiencing that neural activity as thoughts is one of perspective. I am not fond of analogies, but it is somewhat akin to watching other cars drive down the street and sitting behind the steering wheel of your own car when you go on a journey. Its all point of view.

To say "it was all meaningless until we came along and gave it meaning" is to admit that something (the "all" being referred to) existed before human consciousness. And the advent of human consciousness simply tagged this existence with "meaning". Fine, but that still seems to imply a mind-independent existence. (By the way, what "meaning" does existence have? Or, what are you implying when you use the term "meaning"? Is it simply that we give labels to things, like Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden naming all the birds and beasts? Or that somehow our minds imbue existence with purpose?)

What exists and what has existed prior to us as a species is in the history we tell ourselves about the world, and the cosmos. I am not claiming and I did not state that there cannot be any mind-independent being, simply that whatever does exists is only meaningful to regards to us, it has no meaning in-it-self. The sciences, physics, mathematics, chemistry are all objective, they are rationally based and they explain the phenomena. The subjective and the objective are mediated by reason.

I doubt nature has a end, a teleology. I think that practical reason is 1st philosophy, that what we ought to do, what we value, what we find meaning in, what we think is historical gives us place us within the schema of things within a community of others.

The difference between observing neural activity and experiencing that neural activity as thoughts is one of perspective. I am not fond of analogies, but it is somewhat akin to watching other cars drive down the street and sitting behind the steering wheel of your own car when you go on a journey. Its all point of view. — Real Gone Cat

However, it is not possible to observe neural activity as though from a third-person perspective. You can't reach that perspective on it. You might think it is possible, because intuitively, it seems like you're simply looking at something like an array of neural events from two perspectives. But the problem is that thought itself has an irreducibly first-person aspect; it can't be viewed from the outside.

You can see something like 'driving a car' from a third or a first person perspective, i.e. by either performing it, or watching it performed. But you're not able to watch the act of thinking in the same way, because there's no activity involved in thinking. If you were to watch the recording of brain activity, you might be able to infer what is being thought - with the right software, you can even interpolate images, but that is done through pattern-matching algorithms, which in effect replicate aspects of the process by artificial means. But you can't see 'neural activities' in the third person. (This is part of the import of the 'hard problem of consciousness', and also the 'neural binding problem'.)

As for the relationship of neural activity and consciousness, that works in two directions. So a blow to the head can cause one to loose consciousness, and changes to neural configuration can have cognitive and intellectual consequences. But it has also been found that by directed mental activities, one can actually change the physical configuration of the brain. There was a classic experiment a few years back:

Neuroscientist Alvaro Pascual-Leone instructed the members of one group to play [piano] as fluidly as they could, trying to keep to the metronome's 60 beats per minute. Every day for five days, the volunteers practiced for two hours. Then they took a test.

At the end of each day's practice session, they sat beneath a coil of wire that sent a brief magnetic pulse into the motor cortex of their brain, located in a strip running from the crown of the head toward each ear. The so-called transcranial-magnetic-stimulation (TMS) test allows scientists to infer the function of neurons just beneath the coil. In the piano players, the TMS mapped how much of the motor cortex controlled the finger movements needed for the piano exercise. What the scientists found was that after a week of practice, the stretch of motor cortex devoted to these finger movements took over surrounding areas like dandelions on a suburban lawn.

The finding was in line with a growing number of discoveries at the time showing that greater use of a particular muscle causes the brain to devote more cortical real estate to it. But Pascual-Leone did not stop there. He extended the experiment by having another group of volunteers merely think about practicing the piano exercise. They played the simple piece of music in their head, holding their hands still while imagining how they would move their fingers. Then they too sat beneath the TMS coil.

When the scientists compared the TMS data on the two groups--those who actually tickled the ivories and those who only imagined doing so--they glimpsed a revolutionary idea about the brain: the ability of mere thought to alter the physical structure and function of our gray matter. For what the TMS revealed was that the region of motor cortex that controls the piano-playing fingers also expanded in the brains of volunteers who imagined playing the music--just as it had in those who actually played it.

Source
This was one of the studies that lead to the discovery of neuro-plasticity.

The objective as you have described it has no meaning, it may exist and have existed but that existence is meaningless without us. It was all meaningless until we came along and gave it meaning. It more a question of how we play into the schema of things, since there is no schema without us. — Cavacava

Meaning is a loaded word. Ontological structure is better. Does the world have an ontological structure independent of us? Is it differentiated somehow? If so, can we know this? Do any of our current schemas approximate it?

I think that epistemology leads to and structures ontology, not the other way around. What we believe we know, determines what is, not what is determines what we think we know.

I think that epistemology leads to and structures ontology, not the other way around. What we believe we know, determines what is, not what is determines what we think we know. — Cavacava

So our reason imposes structure on the world?

I wonder what happens if we do make contact with Aliens at some point. Who is the measure of what is, us or them? What mediates between the two?

I prefer this one (making Earth great again):

However, it is not possible to observe neural activity as though from a third-person perspective. You can't reach that perspective on it. You might think it is possible, because intuitively, it seems like you're simply looking at something like an array of neural events from two perspectives. But the problem is that thought itself has an irreducibly first-person aspect; it can't be viewed from the outside. — Wayfarer

The problem with this objection is that you're rather mistaken that there is anything for which it's identical from reference point x, where x is a reference point at some remove from the object/phenomenon in question, and reference point y, where y is the object/phenomenon in question. It's a truism that all existents are non-identical at all different reference points, and that there are no reference point free reference points. What makes consciousness unique in this regard is that we are able to experience the same thing from both the reference point of being the object/phenomenon in question and from a reference point at some remove from the object/phenomenon in question. There is nothing else in the universe for which that is the case. Thinking that for all of those other things, reference points from some remove are the only reference points to be had, and not bothering to notice the uniqueness of all of those different reference points from some remove, are both grave errors.

because there's no activity involved in thinking. — Wayfarer

Geez, well there would be the whole crux of the problem with you then--there's no activity involved in your thinking.

and also the 'neural binding problem'. — Wayfarer

?? The neural binding problem doesn't have anything to do with the first-person/third-person perspectival dichotomy. We could note that that dichotomy engenders some additional difficulties for solving the neural binding problem, should one believe it's actually a problem (I do not), but the neural binding problem per se has nothing to do with the perspectival dichotomy.