Er, yes. It establishes that not all value is moral value. Do you actually understand arguments at all? I mean, you've thrown the word 'quantification' in so that we'll all think you do. But it seems to me that you most certainly don't.

Yes. Take any metaethical theory - so any theory about what morality is - and it can be applied to Reason.

And yes, you try and figure out which one is true by consulting your reason. I mean, if you want to find out about me, you'd ask me, wouldn't you? I'd be your first port of call. So if you want to find out about Reason, you consult - well, Reason! Who else? How would you go about it? Oh yes, you'd just think one is right and it would be.

Er, yes. It establishes that not all value is moral value. Do you actually understand arguments at all? I mean, you've thrown the word 'quantification' in so that we'll all think you do. But it seems to me that you most certainly don't. — Bartricks

Odd reply from someone who has just been shown that his/her premiss is false on it's face.

That makes no sense at all. No I haven't. Which premise are you talking about? Again, you really, really, really don't understand arguments.

Your premiss is false. It contradicts the way things are. Need I spell it all out for you?

Yes. You. Do. Which premise? Spell it out. But in my words, not yours. Paste the premise and then tell me how anything I've said contradicts it.

And if my reason prescribes something different than yours? What then? — Janus

It is only "reason" if you can feed the premises along with the derivation path into a device so that it can use a purely-mechanical procedure to verify the derivation path as to arrive at the same conclusion. If this is not possible, then it is not "reason".

Note, however, that "reason" is not capable of discovering what premises to use, nor what conclusion to reach, nor what should be the derivation path between premises and conclusion.

Reason is just inferential execution that makes use of a few rewrite rules. It is just a mechanical thing .

Therefore, all this talk about "my reason(ing)" and "your reason(ing)" is absurd. It is based solely on a serious misunderstanding of what reason is, and/or what it can do. Seriously, the practice of glorifying reason is absurd.

It is only "reason" if you can feed the premises along with the derivation path into a device so that it can use a purely-mechanical procedure to verify the derivation path as to arrive at the same conclusion. — alcontali

That's a pretty limited interpretation.

That's a pretty limited interpretation. — Banno

What else can it do?

There exists a mechanical procedure to verify the purported path between conclusion and premises. It is the ability to carry out such mechanical inference that is defined as "reason". What else would it be?

In this context, there is no mechanical procedure to discover premises. There isn't one to discover conclusions. And even if you already have premises and conclusion, there is no mechanical procedure available to discover the inferential path that connects them.

It is not possible to discover anything new by using reason. It can only be used to verify what exists already. In that sense, it is a relatively weak capability.

You're just pronouncing. How about addressing the argument of this thread?

You are not a god - your words do not determine what's true.

The argument I have presented is about moral values. It establishes - whether you like it or not, and whatever theory you favour - that moral values are the values of a subject, a subject who is not me, or you, but Reason.

This it does. If you don't believe me, inspect it. Try and refute it. But don't just ignore it and make arbitrary pronouncements from on high.

it's not unusual to include induction as well as mere deduction. Probabilities, too. Abduction, for some. Empirical observation is not unreasonable.

The argument I have presented is about moral values. It establishes - whether you like it or not, and whatever theory you favour - that moral values are the values of a subject, a subject who is not me, or you, but Reason. — Bartricks

Reason is just a verification tool to travel safely from premises to conclusion. Morality rests on ultimate premises about which Reason necessarily says nothing at all.

Furthermore, once these ultimate premises are expressed in language, there is nothing subjective or subject-specific about them. At that point, these ultimate premises operate as the foundations of an absolutely objective theory. People are not needed for handling language-expressed abstractions, because machines can perfectly-well handle them too. Therefore, any reference to such a subjective person is totally unnecessary in axiomatic morality.

Empirical observation is not unreasonable. — Banno

Experimental testing is another purely mechanical procedure. If a machine cannot (conceivably) carry out or repeat the tests, then there is something wrong with the empirical theory. In that sense, objectivity means that a machine can do it too, also for empirical knowledge. Otherwise, it is subjective. Formal knowledge is always objective in a sense that there must exist a purely mechanical way to carry out the verification of its justification.

Paste the premise and then tell me how anything I've said contradicts it. — Bartricks

:brow:

You're asking me to address the coherency aspect. Validity/coherency is insufficient for truth. The premiss is not true. That's the problem being shown.

What part of that do you not understand?

...the first premise says 'if' my valuings are morally values (so not 'they are' but 'if') then if I value something necessarily it will be morally valuable.

If all your valuings are morally values, then if you value something it will be morally valuable. If some of your valuings are not morally values, then if you value something necessarily it will not always be morally valuable, for some of your valuings are not.

Not all your(or anyone's) valuings are morally values. Some is/are. Some is/are not.

:brow:

Your premiss is false. It contradicts with the way things are. Need I spell it all out for you? — creativesoul

Yes. You. Do. Which premise? Spell it out. But in my words, not yours. Paste the premise and then tell me how anything I've said contradicts it. — Bartricks

This premis is wrong, @Bartricks

1. For something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued — Bartricks

In reality anyone can value anything withoiut making it morally valuable. This is the reason we keep telling your that your premise is false.

I can say that a particular house is worth two hundred thousand dollars. Is this valuation? Yes, it is, I state the value of something. So it satisfies your statement of "being valued". Is this moral valuation? No it is not, a simple monetary worth has nothing to do with moral behaviour. Therefore your premise is false, because it names a process that is not true in every instance that it entails in its wording.

@Bartricks

To continue the thought from my immediately preceding post:

To wit, I corrected your saying to "... being morally valued", which you quaffed at, but I think it needed that correction in order to make the premise hold. But you decried that improvement, and therefore you, yourself, denied the truth of your own statement (after the implementation of the improvement, without which improvement your statement in the premise was clearly wrong.)

@Bartricks

I think it is also important to point out that I reject and resent your accusation of my not understanding an argument, my not knowing how arguments work.

I think you are so involved and have so much emotional investment in your ill-ly worded "proof", that you are consumed with emotions that prevent your ability to see reason.

This is a private opinion of mine, but I am confident it resonates with many users here.

My advice to you, unsolicited but maybe worth to use, is for you to sleep on it and look at the counter arguments that claim that your premise is invalid, tomorrow after a good night's sleep.

It is not the one making a claim who has the burden of proof - that's only something those who get all their information from youtube videos think. No, it is the one who says things that are contrary to appearances who has the burden of proof. After all, if you claim that the one who has made a claim has the burden of proof then you have made a claim yourself and have a burden of proof. And you are not going to be able to discharge that burden without appealing to other claims, and so nothing turns out to be justified. Which is really stupid, because that means you're not justified in thinking nothing is justified. — Bartricks

What on earth was that rant in aid of? Did I say the one making the claim always carries the burden of proof? You actually went to the trouble of quoting what I said, and then completely ignored it in favour of some straw man you can knock down. I said the burden is on the one making the outlandish claim. Exactly the position you seem to hold too. Your claim that all atheist moral philosophers either agree with Divine Command Theory, or dismiss it using Euthyphro is outlandish. So back it up. Where is the treatment of Divine Command Theory in any of the authors I mentioned? Note - your claim is that any moral philosopher would dismiss divine command theory only with Euthyphro, not (as I claim) that they might use Euthyphro as, say Singer does, to demonstrate how it is that those already decided to be atheists, share moral sentiment with theists.

Go to a bookshop. Pick up an introductory book on ethics - one written by a professional philosopher and published by a reputable academic publishing house, not one written by a scientist or a psychologist - and read what it says about divine command theories and the primary reason they should be rejected. — Bartricks

Elizabeth Anscombe rejects divine command theory on the basis of secularism and replaces it with a revival of virtue ethics, to give one example.

You can't challenge it by just insisting atheism is true.. I mean, you would and so would most others here, becsaue you think if you think something it is true. But a competent arguer would not do that.

You need to dispatch 1 on independent grounds. — Bartricks

This is utter nonsense. Replace with

Argument A.

1. If moral values and norms exist, a flying spaghetti monster exists
2. Moral values and norms exist
3. Therefore a flying spaghetti monster exists

Argument B

1. If moral values and norms exist, a flying spaghetti monster exists
2. No flying spaghetti monster exists
3. Therefore no moral values and norms exist

Are you suggesting that I cannot refute 1. simply by arguing that a flying spaghetti monster doesn't exist?

of those two hackeyed arguments argument a is stronger. But both are incredibly weak due to the gross implausibility of 1. So a total idiot would reject spaghetti monsterism on the grounds there is no spaghetti monster whereas someone who knew how to argue would instead reject the idea that morality requires a spaghetti monster.

so why do you reject spaghetti monsterism about morality?

I didn't say 'all'. Quote me. Come on. Find a quote where I say 'all'. Let's see if you understand language as well as you do arguments.

This is utter nonsense. Replace with

Argument A.

1. If moral values and norms exist, a flying spaghetti monster exists
2. Moral values and norms exist
3. Therefore a flying spaghetti monster exists

Argument B

1. If moral values and norms exist, a flying spaghetti monster exists
2. No flying spaghetti monster exists
3. Therefore no moral values and norms exist

Are you suggesting that I cannot refute 1. simply by arguing that a flying spaghetti monster doesn't exist? — Isaac

Er, no. You don't seem to understand the English language. Which of those two arguments is stronger. Say now. They are both unsound. Which is stronger though?

This premis is wrong, Bartricks

1. For something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued — Bartricks
In reality anyone can value anything withoiut making it morally valuable. This is the reason we keep telling your that your premise is false. — god must be atheist

Er, no. That premise is TRUE. You seem to have trouble understanding sentences. It does not say "for something to be morally valuable is for ME to be valuing it, does it?

Noooo. It doesn't say that. Indeed, I have argued that moral value is not composed of my valuings.

It doesn't say that for something to be morally valuable is for YOU to be valuing it either, does it?

noooo. it doesn't say that either. Indeed, I have argued that moral value is not composed of YOUR valuings.

It says "for something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued.

Now, learn to read. Then learn to understand arguments. Then read it again. Note what follows from what.

What. Follows. From. That. Premise. And. The. Other. Premises. Is. This. That moral value consists in something being valued by SOMEONE.

Not YOU.

Not ME

Someone.

Reason.

Once more - you cannot, absolutely 100% cannot, follow an argument.

I repeat my accusation! I tattoo it on my forehead. I have scrawled it in my own excrement on the wall. I am shouting it loudly at the screen. You. Cannot. Cannot. Follow an argument!

The cheek of telling me I am misusing words. You said I claimed my argument was 'infallible'. Where? I would never say that. It doesn't make sense. Arguments aren't 'infallible'.

My argument is 'sound'. That is, it is 'valid' and its premises are 'true'. Not 'infallible'. Quote me saying my argument is infallible!

You, my sun, are the won who is Miss using words.

Why, oh why, are you talking about Elizabeth Anscombe? What introductory book on ethics by her are you talking about? She didn't write one. She wrote an article called "Modern Moral Philosophy". It's shit.

Pick up an introductory book on ethics written by a contemporary moral philosopher. Read what it says about divine command theories.

I repeat: you don't know what you're talking about. The basis upon which most contemporary moral philosophers reject divine command theories of ethics is the Euthyphro. Not atheism. The Euthyphro. For the reasons I said.

a total idiot would reject spaghetti monsterism on the grounds there is no spaghetti monster whereas someone who knew how to argue would instead reject the idea that morality requires a spaghetti monster. — Bartricks

What? Why would only an idiot reject the existence of a flying spaghetti monster on the grounds of the complete lack of any evidence for one. That's the exact grounds on which we justify most things we consider do not exist. And what prevents me from doing both?

so why do you reject spaghetti monsterism about morality? — Bartricks

Because I have no grounds whatsoever to think there might exist a flying spaghetti monster.

I didn't say 'all'. Quote me. Come on. Find a quote where I say 'all'. Let's see if you understand language as well as you do arguments. — Bartricks

Go back over this thread and tell me you've not made a single quoting error, typo or exaggeration for rhetorical effect, then lecture me on the matter. Your claim that most atheist moral philosophers reject divine command arguments solely because of Euthyphro is also outlandish. In fact, I'd go as far as to say that a claim that any atheist moral philosopher rejected divine command theories purely using Euthyphro is pretty outlandish since you've failed to provide a single citation in support.

Which of those two arguments is stronger. Say now. They are both unsound. Which is stronger though? — Bartricks

Argument B is stronger, because it contains a premise which is self evident and can be falsified using a well-agreed upon method. All the while no one has any evidence of a flying spaghetti monster, the theory that no such thing exists is a good strong theory.

Notwithstanding that, your arguments as presented have little to do with Euthyphro because you have grouped {moral values and norms} which clearly exist, not {objective moral values and norms} which is what Euthyphro is about, and they do not clearly exist at all.

I'm not going to waste more time on this. If you've got a serious argument to make which references empirical data (most philosophers think this..., rational people conclude that...) then I expect you to be able to Cite sources, otherwise you're just consigned to the bin labelled 'stuff wot I rekon'.

What? Why would only an idiot reject the existence of a flying spaghetti monster on the grounds of the complete lack of any evidence for one. That's the exact grounds on which we justify most things we consider do not exist. And what prevents me from doing both? — Isaac

Because if premise 1 is true, there would be good evidence for one. As premise 2a is well supported.

You don't understand arguments, do you?

Baby steps Isaac. If. Morality. Requires a spaghetti monster. And it doesn't. It really doesn't. It doesn't. Okay. It doesn't. But 'if' it did - as premise 1 says - a premise that is false - but 'if' it did, then we'd have excellent, I mean, excellent evidence that there is a spaghetti monster.

That's why only an idiot would take issue with 2b. A wise person would take issue with premise 1. Because.....if premise 1 is true then the combination of 1 and 2a means that 2b is false.

Again, consider these arguments

A

1. If Isaac exists, then a flying spaghetti monster exists
2. Issac exists
3. Therefore a flying spaghetti monster exists

B

1. If Isaac exists, then a flying spaghetti monster exists
2. No flying spaghetti monster exists
3. Therefore Isaac doesn't exist

Now, which is stronger?

Why A, of course.

Because YOU do exist. Yes?

Now, 1 is false. But if 1 is true - and it isn't - but 'if' it was, then we'd have excellent evidence that a flying spaghetti monster exists. That evidence would be you.

Surely you can agree that you'd be a total idiot to think B is the stronger argument of the two?

Go back over this thread and tell me you've not made a single quoting error, typo or exaggeration for rhetorical effect, then lecture me on the matter. — Isaac

I have not made a single quoting error or exaggeration for rhetorical effect. Typos, yes. But what you did wasn't a typo, was it!?

You think B is stronger??? Seriously?!? Right. Well, that's confirmed my thesis about what you are.