There are no unobserved' silent falling trees in the forest — fresco

Are you observing the silent falling trees in Iraq, right now?

There are no unobserved' silent falling trees in the forest ... — fresco

Well, because they'd not be silent, yeah.

They could be.

They could be. — Shamshir

That would have to be some freaky physics.

Nah, its nothing to do with physics. We can all 'turn the sound off in our mind's eye'. The 'observation' has still been made. There is no way we cannot observe 'the forest devoid of humans', and it Is arbitrary whether the sound is on or off in that imagined scenario.

This proposed 'relativity of existence' seems to me to render most philosophical discussion of 'ontology' to be what Wittgenstein called Geschwätz (idle chatter). — fresco

If there are no absolutes, there isn't anything to philosophically find out. It's all blah, blah, blah.

Nah, its nothing to do with physics. We can all 'turn the sound off in our mind's eye'. The 'observation' has still been made. There is no way we cannot observe 'the forest devoid of humans', and it Is arbitrary whether the sound is on or off in that imagined scenario. — fresco

Why would you be talking about us?

To view language as 'representalist' or 'nonrepresentalist' is not enough. I think that in addition to that we must regard it as a spectrum of 'substantivist' or 'nonsubstantivist'. Mind is existence, but it exists as some kind of mental substance. So as far as language is 'nonrepresentalist' it is 'substantivist', in the sense that it is some kind of 'matter' our consciousness is made of. We create/make our language from our mind-matter, and this ability is innate in humans, even if words in it are not related to anything and do not represent anything. Therefore I agree that language is much more than a representation of something. However, there must be a global structure of consciousness which encompasses both an object and a word and coordinates them, otherwise words would not have a denotative function. However, it certainly is not an exhaustive characteristic.

Or the tree could be very far away.

Sorry, I don't know what you mean by 'mind is existence'. For me 'mind' and 'existence' are two words that have meanings in other contexts but not when equated.

Sorry, I don't know what you mean by 'mind is existence'. For me 'mind' and 'existence' are two words that have meanings in other contexts but not when equated.

'Mind is existence' means only 'mind is [a part of] existence', therefore these words are not equated, but rather related as a part and the whole. If the whole of something is existence than its part is existence two.

In terms of the relativist thesis, 'minds' exist insofar that 'mind' is a useful concept in human interactions. So 'existence' is a word associated with 'utility' not 'a state of being'. By adopting this thesis, I am avoiding the category mistake (Ryle) of treating 'mind' as either a subjective or objective 'entity'.
So phrases like 'he changed his mind' is a semantically useful way of conveying 'he altered his position about something'. A proposed concept of 'mental substance' has no utility for me, even if it does for you. So it 'exists' for you but not me. At this point, consensus might be sought to establish utility.

To me 'existence' is simply 'ex[is]tence', therefore to me it is inseparable from a 'state of being'. Before utility, there must be some sort of 'actuality' and 'utility' is just its special case, applied to a specific practical purpose. Mind, without being a substantial entity in the first place, could not be a practically useful human faculty. We are in the opposite places of the spectrum a fundamental and applied characteristic. How something not materially real could be useful in a practical way as a tool. Every tool has to be something, useful tools cannot be made of nothing ex[is]ting.

Then we agree to differ. I refer you to my opening post involving statements about physicists that 'things' are merely 'interaction events'. Physicality, (or materiality) is just one possible characteristicc of those events which involve human physiology.

If it is your opinion, it needs further elaboration, namely, to discern the thing-centric perspective and the action-centric perspective. I understand, you propose that these two points of view are separated and can exist separately. Here I disagree with you, because the reality has inter-actions between 'things' that have some sort of being, at least at the foundation there must be something irreducible to interactions. Pure interactions do no exist. Furthermore, our consciousness shows a phenomenological world which is made of surfaces that do not show any 'micro-actions' in their structure. These 'surfaces', which are a result of the summation of physiological signals, is the source of the concept of substance, which is later reinterpreted as 'matter'. So what you say is that thing-centric phenomenal world is derived from action-centric chaos of non-entities? How are these two spheres of existence related, in your opinion? How we derive entities from non-entities?

Anything that cannot be easily measured with absolute precision will be regarded as relative. A ways of measuring things are always to some degree relative. The human mind's ability to reconcile the truth is always marked with some degree of relativity. This does not mean there is not absolute truth, it just means absolute truth is very hard to come by.

I don't intend to summarize Rovelli's book about 'reality is not what it seems' . Suffice to say, since 'all is in flux', including the status of atoms in surfaces, the sub particles of atoms themselves, and the perceptual states of observers. It follows that 'persistent utility' relative to human needs and time scales, coupled with the abstract permanence of words, is the sub text for the emergence of lay concepts of independent 'things'. The 'flux' point eliminates the need for an axiom of 'things interacting'.

I leave all absolutes, particularly 'truth', in the hands of religionists.

I suggest you looking at your hand for 10 secs and than tell me in how many ways it 'fluxes' in you head? :) And if it 'fluxes', what mysterious forms you can report to others? I myself see only one shape which is constant and is a thing that is obviously one and same me. Water can flux from one place to another, it assumes shape only when it is contained. Do you flux like water, or you simply move. Is there anything necessary to contain you? I believe that things do not flux, only their perception in consciousness fluxes which is called an illusion of time. Even if we agree that words are containers of 'things' fluxing, reality is a mixture of constancy and change, where constancy has the upper hand, made of interacting things contained by forces making clumps of matter 'thingy'.

Or the tree could be very far away. — Shamshir

Not from itself and the things around it, though.

independent 'things'. — fresco

I read Rovelli. What's thought of as 'things' are events, some of which can be very long.

If we can show that there are no absolutes, then we'll be close to knowing a heck of a lot, with not anything intrinsic being so in relational totality.

I'll take it that since there can't be anything outside of Totality that Totality must be relational.

Have a look at your logic. Of course 'things' don't 'flux' because 'thinghood' equates to persistent utility. The thing coined by the words 'your hand' remains functionally your hand despite the multiple dynamic changes occurring including blood flow, nail growth and skin loss.

Let's say you are right for now. My hand remains functionally the same, although it constantly changes. However, we could assess more precisely how much/many of my hand is the same and how much/many of my hand is different. My impression is that you believe that my/your hand is 1 % the same due to the unchanging function and 99 % different due to all sorts of actions and interactions. I believe that 70 % of energy in atoms is the same and 30 % of energy goes in and out. So we are oscillating energy forms that are rigid enough to counterbalance all influxes and outfluxes. We are the same not only as functions, but also as entities, beings and persons. Do you believe that a person is constant only as a function and all his/her identity is in flux all the time? Don't you believe in unchanging souls (or minds) in terms of identity and personhood? What connects you at the present moment to all past moments if your entire soul must have changed and fluxed out into the surroundings. Electron oscillates with respect to background of space, but it is the same; you move your hand with respect to space, but you only change its position, not the hand itself. We are complexes of electrons that move, but don't change their identity and don't fall apart which is why we call an accumulation of them a 'thing' which is real. Your are just trying to read nature "between the lines".

I leave all absolutes — fresco

Perhaps the two non-existent absolutes, if true, as None and One, say, as then being boundaries that cannot be reached, indicate that Totality is thus somehow in between as…? Fractionals? Whatever that means!

I should have spotted that 'body parts' probably constitute a special case as they are part of the observer domain. However, at the most basic level of analysis, 'particles' are considered to be shifting nodes of reinforcement of interfering 'matter waves'. The fact the we experience conglomerates of them as 'solid' is the result of the interaction of our micro-transient physicality with an object's micro-transient physicality. Without the observer there would be no 'solidity' !

Attempted 'visualization' is criticised by the pragmatists who argue that this is a bias inherited from Greek philosophy. (Rorty 'Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature')
More useful might be Lakoff's views on 'metaphor' which he relates to bodily experience.

'visualization' — fresco

Useless to talk about no absolutes and relations, due to too many metaphors but useful for hard reality addressing?

I still have a theory…

Insofar that humans have similar bodies, whose experience may form the bedrock of 'metaphor', they may share the same 'reality'.
Wittgenstein: "If a lion could speak, we would not understand him".

To be clear, are you saying it wouldn't be silent in the same way a feather wouldn't be silent?

I don't think theories equate to realities - what reality is behind our phenomenal perceptions are our ideas and constructs that are to be believed in. The sequence is mind-perception-phenomenon-projection (of a mental construct) behind it. So we can't tell for sure if it is interactions, flux or 'scrux' expressed as a mysterious formula. Therefore in a way I agree with you that reality at this depth is a useful concept or construct only so far as it is effective. But I still believe that the most perfect form of its representation is in the layer of perception phenomenon, not uglied by mental constructs and fantasies, however effective they would be. Our conscious mind as a whole has two lines of action - summation of signals and their antisummation. Theories of external reality are a result of the latter. So if existence is relative, not absolute, theories are relative two, put in another way - not real, certain truths. 'it Is' means only 'I believe it is'.