You tell me — Bartricks
What I told you is that if you're just telling me your view then I wouldn't need a citation for anything — Terrapin Station
I'm not trying to convince you of anything. — Terrapin Station
So good persuasive tactics from you. I'm sure folks are impressed. You'll have lots of followers soon. — Terrapin Station
If reason could value something other than what it values, or is valuing, per se, and not merely on account of differing circumstances, then what good could it be as a divine commander? — Janus
If reason could value something other than what it values, or is valuing, per se, and not merely on account of differing circumstances, then what good could it be as a divine commander? — Janus
I don't understand your question or its relevance to the OP. — Bartricks
Still, you say it is a bad argument because moral values are the values of a subject, namely Reason. — Janus
The ancients assumed that reason would lead us all to the same understanding. But their criterion was not ‘objectivity’ in the modern sense - the ideas of objectivity and for that matter subjectivity have changed considerably in the transition to modernity. The Eclipse of Reason discusses this in detail. — Wayfarer
1. If moral values are the values of a subject, then they will be contingent, not necessary
2. Moral values are necessary, not contingent (that is, if something is valuable, it is valuable of necessity not contingently)
3. Therefore moral values are not the values of a subject — Bartricks
1. If moral values are the values of a subject, then they will be contingent, not necessary
2. Moral values are necessary, not contingent (that is, if something is valuable, it is valuable of necessity not contingently)
3. Therefore moral values are not the values of a subject — Bartricks
2 seems clearly false to me — bert1
Moral values are relations between a subject and their experience of behaviour: theirs and/or others’. It is a property of the subject only in relation to behaviour, and a property of behaviour only in relation to the subject. This means that moral values are contingent upon both subject and behaviour. — Possibility
↪bert1 For what reason? — Shamshir
That is considered by most to constitute a decisive refutation of all subjectivist views about moral values and prescriptions. — Bartricks
EDIT: Looks like Bartricks might be right. Seems the majority of philosophers are moral realists and moral cognitivists according to philpapers survey. — bert1
Looks like Bartricks might be right. Seems the majority of philosophers are moral realists and moral cognitivists according to philpapers survey. — bert1
It's okay to say that it's a relation between the subject and what they're valuing, I suppose, but the valuing part of that equation only occurs in the subject's brain. — Terrapin Station
The ancients assumed that reason would lead us all to the same understanding. But their criterion was not ‘objectivity’ in the modern sense - the ideas of objectivity and for that matter subjectivity have changed considerably in the transition to modernity. The Eclipse of Reason discusses this in detail. — Wayfarer
The Greek understanding of reason is significantly different from modern versions. — Fooloso4
The ‘valuing part’ you refer to is a set of measurable/observable events in the brain that can be related to the experience of valuing. That doesn’t amount to a value relation, — Possibility
you are skeptical of, and, in what way are you skeptical of it?specific claim about interpreting Euthyphro. — Terrapin Station
Moral values are relations between a subject and their experience of behaviour: theirs and/or others’. — Possibility
What is the
specific claim about interpreting Euthyphro. — Terrapin Station
you are skeptical of, and, in what way are you skeptical of it? — Mww
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