The particulars of the dialogue itself, probably not the foundation of subjectivist condemnation. The dialectical form of the conversation may very well be, however, insofar as, no matter what somebody says, somebody else can find something wrong with it if he puts enough effort into it. — Mww
I think, Socrates, that the godly and pious is the part of the just that is concerned with the care of the gods, while that concerned with the care of men is the remaining part of justice. (12e)
You say that moral values cannot be the values of just any old subject, such as you and I, because we might disagree, and that would make moral values subjective or contingent in a bad way — Janus
I have allowed for Reason changing her mind when circumstances demand, but if she were able to simply change her mind even though circumstances have not changed, then she could not be a reliable guide to moral values, unless you allow that they are merely subjective and contingent in a bad way. — Janus
That is absolutely not the argument I made! I think moral values ARE contingent. — Bartricks
You seem fundamentally not to understand the view my arguments have entailed. For you say that Reason would not be a reliable guide to moral value. Er, but moral values ARE her values. So how on earth - how on earth - could she be anything other than the most reliable guide to them?
Who is the most reliable guide to what Bartricks Potter values? Why, Bartricks Potter!
Who is the most reliable guide to what Hugh values? Why Hugh of course!
Who is the most reliable guide to what Reason values? Why Reason of course.
How has reason attempted to tell us about what she values - why she's given us a faculty of reason. So, if you want to find out what Reason values, consult your reason and the reason of others. — Bartricks
I've tried hard and failed to get a coherent answer, so I don't think the chances are looking too good.Ah, he was saying that reason is a subject? I'm not sure how that would make sense to him/wouldn't just be equivocating the word "subject," but I don't suppose I'd get an honest, straightforward answer from him. — Terrapin Station
If all we had to do was consult our faculties of reason about what is morally valuable then there could be no disagreement amongst those who did so and no need to posit Divine Reason. — Janus
I've tried hard and failed to get a coherent answer, so I don't think the chances are looking too good. — Janus
And you haven't addressed the problem with your claim that Reason could simply change her mind (presumably by Divine Fiat) about what she values even though no circumstances had changed, and that we should follow her nonetheless (whatever following her could even mean given the problem of how we could know what Divine Reason values or dis-values) — Janus
Justice stands above piety.
— Fooloso4
That's the point. The dialogue is remembered for it's attack on god when it should be remembered for its support for equity. — Banno
Value is a relation between an experiencing subject and the events/objects of their experience. It is neither an inherent property of the subject nor of the event/object. — Possibility
I have little idea what you're saying in most of the initial post you made about this. (That's why I responded with a "Say what?"--a lot of your post came across like gobbledygook to me.)
So I said that I could see saying that valuations are a relation between the individual valuing something and what they're valuing. But the valuation is strictly something mental the individual is doing. — Terrapin Station
I have never come across anyone competent in such matters who refers to the Euthyphro dilemma as "the Euthyphro". — Fooloso4
Don't forget that moral realism includes all forms of ethical naturalism as well as some of the 'true to archetype' forms of virtue ethics, so the moral realism required for the premise to be acceptable (arguments from authority issues aside) is not specified by the survey. Ethical naturalism particularly would class as realist, but be in opposition to the premise that moral values are not our values.
Then there's realists about morality who don't see morals as values at all but laws, or those who think moral statements are not normative at all but descriptive, those who think morality is a virtue, not a value (but still a non-subjective one). All of whom would still describe themselves as moral realists.
In all, I think the number of philosophers who believe in a non-subjective external source of moral valuing (which is what the premise here demands) is very slim. Certainly a minority. — Isaac
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