Well, if you're denying that there are rational intuitions in support of claims such as "if something is morally valuable, then it is morally valuable even if no-one values it" then that's just something you believe. But your beliefs have no probative force at all. Sorry to break that to you - but reality is not in your gift.

Anyway, if you think that premise 2 has no support from our rational intuitions then, as far as you're concerned, 2 has nothing to be said for it. In which case, from your perspective anyway, the argument does not work as a refutation of my position.

So, do you think it challenges my position or not, for you're not really making much sense, to be honest.

I think it appears to be a refutation or at least something capable of raising a reasonable doubt about my conclusion's truth.

But if you think this is just a game and all you're doing is expressing your beliefs - beliefs that you can change at a moment's notice, beliefs that count for nothing in terms of evidence - then you must think that my original argument has no probative force, and that this apparent refutation doesn't either.

Can you see why I am confused by you? No, probably not. Silly question.

Look, l don't think you're in good faith. I think you're convinced I'm wrong, which - for you - constitutes my being wrong. And that's really all there is to it. There's no point in my trying to show why premise 2 is false, and why my case against it is not question begging, to someone who doesn't appreciate how arguments work or really what begging the question involves.

Indeed. Should we reveal the big secret that in any valid deductive argument, there is nothing in the conclusion that is not already entailed by the premisses — aletheist

Which, for you, means they're all question begging - right? You have such a poor grasp of how arguments actually work, that you think valid arguments are question begging by dint of being valid. That 's true isn't it - that's what you actually think. Be honest. And you're so confident you're right, you'll never be able to learn you're wrong.

Anyway, if you think that premise 2 has no support from our rational intuitions then, as far as you're concerned, 2 has nothing to be said for it. — Bartricks

Here is what I actually said:

my rational intuition finds my #2 vastly more plausible than your #1, while your rational intuition apparently indicates exactly the opposite. — aletheist

Arguments cannot be settled solely on the basis of rational intuitions, because they are not uniform; different people have different rational intuitions.

Can you see why I am confused by you? No, probably not. Silly question. Look, l don't think you're in good faith. — Bartricks

Right back at you.

You have such a poor grasp of how arguments actually work ... And you're so confident you're right, you'll never be able to learn you're wrong. — Bartricks

Right back at you again.

Moral values = thought/belief;
Thought/belief = O and S things;
Moral values can be neither O nor S things of thought/belief;
Moral values /= thought/belief. — Mww

A proper report does not change the truth conditions of what it's reporting upon.

All moral value consists of both objective and subjective things. Talking about moral value being one or the other cannot possibly take proper account of the fact that it consists of both. Moral value is both. One must talk in terms of both hydrogen and oxygen in order to take proper account of water. Water is neither. The same holds good for moral value.

As a tool, the objective/subjective dichotomy cannot possibly glean anything at all about that which is both... and is thus... neither. There is no hydrogen water, there is no oxygen water, at least not in terms of elemental constituents. We can name something whatever we want.

There is no objective moral value. There is no subjective moral value. There is moral value. It consists of a particular kind of thought/belief(about acceptable/unacceptable things). All things called "moral" have that same common denominator. It's always about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.

Moral value is a kind of thought.

All thought/belief formation requires one thing to become sign/symbol, a different thing to become significant/symbolized, and a creature capable of drawing a correlation between different things.

Moral value is about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. Having some moral value does not require being able to talk about. Weighing the differences between differing moral values does. Some moral value(thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour) is prior to language acquisition.

That leans towards/helps develop a good basis.

You may have been over this, but what standing do rational intuitions have compared to rational knowledge? — Echarmion

I don't know what you mean by 'rational knowledge'. But a rational intuition is another name for a representation of the faculty of reason.

Take the validity of this argument:

1. If P, then Q
2. Not Q
3. Therefore not P

Well, how do we know it is valid? We don't see it with our eyes, or smell it, or taste it, or hear it, or feel it. Validity doesn't have an appearance, smell, taste, sound or texture.

So how do we know it? Well, because our reason represents it to be valid - that is our reason effectively tells us that if assumption 1 is true, and assumption 2 is true, then 3 must be true.

I don't decide it is valid and that makes it so. I don't believe it is valid and that makes it so (though I do believe it is valid, but it is not my believing it that makes it so).

It is via our rational intuitions that we are aware of morality. I mean, morality is not something that our senses give us insight into. That's why it is not studied by the empirical sciences. It is not an object of sense. But we - most of us - are aware of moral norms and values. And our fundamental source of insight into moral matters is our reason.

Anyone who thinks otherwise is a) wrong and b) thinks moral philosophy is a waste of time, for moral philosophy just is the practice of applying our reason to moral questions.

So, I'd have thought that here - of all places - it should be agreed that it is via our reason that we are aware of morality.

But a rooky mistake in this area is to confuse rational intuitions - especially those that have moral representative contents (so, moral intuitions) - with that of which they give us an awareness. That is, to confuse the intuition that X is wrong, with its wrongness. A mistake that leads many quickly and confidently to conclude that morality is made of their own subjective states - and due to the staggering arrogance and ignorance that infects most people they will then never, ever, ever, change their position.

Anyway, ultimately all appeals to evidence are appeals to representations from our faculties of reason. For one thing is not evidence for the truth of some proposition until or unless it is generating some reason - epistemic reason - for us to believe the said proposition. And it is only by our faculties of reason that we can be aware of epistemic reasons to believe things.

So someone who denies the probative force of rational intuitions is someone who denies there is any evidence for anything. Although someone who denies the probative force of rational intuitions is almost invariably so confused a thinker that they won't realize this and will simply deny the probative force of intiuitions they find it inconvenient to acknowledge. The technical term for such people is 'fools'.

Like I say, I can't argue with someone like you. That's not to your credit - it jus means you're not sufficiently aware of the norms of consistency for it tot be anything other than a headache. You change your position in every post.

Rational intuitions have probative force. They're the only thing that does. All appeals to evidence are appeals to rational intuitions.

They don't always agree. That's why we have arguments in which we try to find clearer rational intuitions from which we can rationally infer the answer to contentious issues - issues where rational intuitions conflict.

It is called reasoning. But I can't do it with you, you're just not consistent enough and you reserve the right to change the rules at will. One minute rational intuitions are going to count, and the next they won't for no better reason than that I've shown that some of them stack up against whatever view you're defending.

It isn't worth the keystrokes.

But a rooky mistake — Bartricks

:blush:

Like I say, I can't argue with someone like you. — Bartricks

Right back at you one more time.

You change your position in every post. — Bartricks

Laughably false, as I have demonstrated over and over. I will not bother to go back and quote myself again; as someone once said:

It isn't worth the keystrokes. — Bartricks

Yes, don't quote yourself - not a reputable source and just a little bit narcissistic. Anyway, I am now off to play a game of chess with a cat - which I think will be more rewarding than trying to reason with you.

Is this wacko still here?

I submit it is a natural condition of being human that there exists a sub-system of intrinsic values necessarily incorporated into the cognitive apparatus — Mww

What does all that even mean?

A natural condition. All humans have it. Intrinsic values. "Intrinsic" seems redundant. Remove it.

A sub-system?

Are there values 'embedded' into our thinking by virtue of other people's language use prior to our being able to take account of them?

Sure.

We draw correlations between pre-existing situations and pre-existing language use long before we begin to talk about our own worldview. In that way, perhaps our adopted morality(moral thought/belief) is part of the subsystem of the cognitive apparatus required to reflect upon one's own thought/belief? It would not be part of the cognitive apparatus required to have some moral value.

such wit.

Wacko just means crazy person.

and 'witless' means foolish and irrational

One can know what the appropriate thing to say is during certain situations, all the while being both foolish and irrational.

One can be witty, foolish, and irrational.

He hasn't been banned yet, but in accordance with good hunter/ gatherer ethos he certainly ought to be shunned.

↪aletheist
Indeed. Should we reveal the big secret that in any valid deductive argument, there is nothing in the conclusion that is not already entailed by the premisses
— aletheist

Which, for you, means they're all question begging - right? You have such a poor grasp of how arguments actually work, that you think valid arguments are question begging by dint of being valid. That 's true isn't it - that's what you actually think. Be honest. And you're so confident you're right, you'll never be able to learn you're wrong. — Bartricks

“(>ლ)”

A deductive argument is non-ampliative which is what aletheist is stating in definitional form. This is logic 101. But the stolen valour and shitty attitude is entertaining!

I submit it is a natural condition of being human that there exists a sub-system of intrinsic values necessarily incorporated into the cognitive apparatus
— Mww

.........What does all that even mean?
.........A natural condition. All humans have it. Intrinsic values. "Intrinsic" seems redundant.
.........Remove it. — creativesoul

Nahhhh, I don’t think I will. Natural condition modifies human, i.e., the general, empirically real, phenomenon; sub-system of intrinsic values modifies human i.e., the particular, rationally ideal, phenomenon. All humans are both, always congruent in the former, yet not always congruent in the latter.

It would not be part of the cognitive apparatus required to have some moral value. — creativesoul

True, but inconsistent with what I said. I didn’t say anything about moral value being required for cognitive apparatus; I said incorporated into: just as the wet ingredients of a pastry are incorporated into the dry to construct a finish-able product, so too are moral values incorporated into pure practical reason, aka cognitive apparatus, to construct the finish-able product called a volition of will.

A proper report does not change the truth conditions of what it's reporting upon. — creativesoul

A proper report must change the truth conditions of that which is being reported upon, if the truth conditions being reported upon are known with certainty to be false.
.........Empirically, a report by the police that I was in Santa Fe last weekend will be properly reported to the police as me being in Vancouver, if I certainly was in Vancouver last weekend.
.........Rationally, my report to myself of the loud boom just around the corner from my sight as the sliding glass door from a 4th floor balcony, was properly reported to myself by my sight as merely a minor fender bender between a little ol’ lady and a meter maid.
——————

All thought/belief formation requires one thing to become sign/symbol, a different thing to become significant/symbolized, and a creature capable of drawing a correlation between different things. — creativesoul

Agreed. The creature, if it is a human creature, always draws a very specific kind of correlation between the symbol and the symbolized, which we come to know as the subject/copula/object propositional relation. While there may be no such things as subjective or objective moral values, moral values in and of themselves can be, and sometimes must be, subjects or objects of propositional correlations.
——————

Some moral value(thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour) is prior to language acquisition. — creativesoul

Absolutely, albeit with reservations concerning the parenthetical; the moral value antecedent to language, and indeed, everything else, including pure practical reason itself, is a feeling.

And for the human creature, the sole moral value is.........are you ready for it???

...........the worth of his own private happiness.

BOOM!!!!!

I don't know what you mean by 'rational knowledge'. But a rational intuition is another name for a representation of the faculty of reason. — Bartricks

Essentially, I'd consider everything that can be derived from synthetic a priori conclusion knowledge. Descartes "I think, therefore I am" would be an example, if it were entirely correct.

Well, how do we know it is valid? We don't see it with our eyes, or smell it, or taste it, or hear it, or feel it. Validity doesn't have an appearance, smell, taste, sound or texture.

So how do we know it? Well, because our reason represents it to be valid - that is our reason effectively tells us that if assumption 1 is true, and assumption 2 is true, then 3 must be true.

I don't decide it is valid and that makes it so. I don't believe it is valid and that makes it so (though I do believe it is valid, but it is not my believing it that makes it so). — Bartricks

Ok, that sounds convincing. There is no way to "reason" the validity of logic itself, so it makes sense to call it an intuition.

It is via our rational intuitions that we are aware of morality. I mean, morality is not something that our senses give us insight into. That's why it is not studied by the empirical sciences. It is not an object of sense. But we - most of us - are aware of moral norms and values. And our fundamental source of insight into moral matters is our reason. — Bartricks

Right. I agree with the reason bit, but I think what makes moral stances a unique is that they are not just intuitions, which you can only assert, but are reasoned from principles. You can make arguments for and against them, so they aren't just intuitions.

But a rooky mistake in this area is to confuse rational intuitions - especially those that have moral representative contents (so, moral intuitions) - with that of which they give us an awareness. That is, to confuse the intuition that X is wrong, with its wrongness. A mistake that leads many quickly and confidently to conclude that morality is made of their own subjective states - and due to the staggering arrogance and ignorance that infects most people they will then never, ever, ever, change their position. — Bartricks

But, if it's the case that moral stances are arrived at via rational intuition, and intuition is not constitutive but rather descriptive, what would moral philosophy consists of? It seems to me getting the right answers would merely be a matter of having the right intuitions, no arguments required.

And if there are no arguments required, there is no way to test the rational intuition. There is no way to know, under this system, whether you actually have a rational intuition or just imagine it being so.

Ok. I see no point in continuing here.

I agree with the reason bit, but I think what makes moral stances a unique is that they are not just intuitions, which you can only assert, but are reasoned from principles. You can make arguments for and against them, so they aren't just intuitions — Echarmion

Yes, moral intuitions - a subset of our rational intuitions - are 'about' morality, but they are not morality itself. Just as I cannot make an act right - not of necessity, anyway - by just ordering myself to do it, or make it valuable - not of necessity anyway - by valuing it, likewise I cannot make an act right or good by simply having the rational intuition that it is.

So, having the rational intuition that something is the case - that an argument is valid, or that a course of action is enjoined, or that something is morally valuable - does not constitute its validity or its being enjoined or its being morally valuable.

Nevertheless, rational intuitions are prima facie - that is, default - evidence that what they represent to be the case, is the case.


But then you say this:

It seems to me getting the right answers would merely be a matter of having the right intuitions, no arguments required.

And if there are no arguments required, there is no way to test the rational intuition. There is no way to know, under this system, whether you actually have a rational intuition or just imagine it being so — Echarmion

This simply does not follow. If you allow - and you must on pain of being unable to argue for anything at all - that rational intuitions have probative force, then we do - absolutely do - have a way to test rational intuition. Rational intuitions!

So, you've on the one hand accepted the probative force of rational intuitions only to in the very next breath deny it! Rational intuitions count. Ultimately they're the only thing that counts, because they're our only source of insight into what Reason prescribes and values, and Reason is our ultimate source of insight into what's true.

The whole of philosophy - proper philosophy, that is - is premised on this. I mean, am I not doing philosophy? You think that in presenting this argument, I am not doing philosophy:

1. If something is morally valuable, it is the object of a valuing relation
2. Only a subject of experiences - a mind - can value things (that is, can be the bearer of the valuing attitude)
3. Therefore, if something is morally valuable, it is the object of a subject-of-experience's valuing attitude?

That is an argument. It is valid. That is, our reason seems to tell us - not just me, but virtually everyone who consults their reason - that the argument is valid. That is, that reason says the conclusion will be true if the assumptions are. And reason also seems to say that those assumptions are true. So it appears to be sound.

Others may dislike the conclusion, but disliking something is not evidence it is false. Those who wish rationally to reject its conclusion must find something else reason seems to say that contradicts what this argument entails.

And that is precisely what I have done - there do indeed seem to be some other things that reason seems to say that, in combination with other things she seems to say, contradict the conclusion of the above argument.

So this too appears to be a sound argument:

1. If I am morally valuable, I am morally valuable even if no subject values me.
2. I am morally valuable
3. Therefore I am morally valuable even if no subject values me

The conclusion of my first argument says that for something to be morally valuable, it needs to be featuring as the object of a subject's valuing attitude. That is, for something to be morally valuable, someone needs to be valuing me. Yet the conclusion of this argument contradicts that.

That is where we are at. Reason seems to be telling us contradictory things. I think there's a way through.

I think that this premise: "If I am morally valuable, I am morally valuable even if no subject values me" is actually false. And I think I can show it to be false without begging any questions.

Oh. Well....good luck, then.

Squiggle squoggle. Gibberish.

By your own admission you never took logic 101. Here's that quote from you that I am currently having tatooed across my buttocks:

would it interest you that I've never actually took a course in formal logic? — Happenstance

My argument is valid. You can squiggle and squoggle it to your heart's content - you can try your utmost to translate what I said into your squiggle-squoggle language and then declare that according to your squiggle-squoggle language my argument was not a valid squirt, or a transitive modal. But that won't stop it being valid.

To be perfectly honest, I don't think you have anything to say. Nothing apart form insults, anyway. And that would be starkly apparent if you used English -as you briefly did earlier - so you have to squiggle and squoggle instead and then other like-minded squiggle squogglers can approving squiggle and squoggle in turn. To my ears, however, it is just a herd of cows mooing at each other.

Anyway, the argument is valid. And it establishes that moral values and prescriptions are the values and prescriptions of a subject, a mind, a person.

That is inconsistent with the thesis that moral values and prescriptions are mine. So it is inconsistent with individual subjectivism, if the individual is identified as me. Likewise if the individual is identified as you or anyone else among us, including a group of us (if, that is, a group of us is a subject - which it isn't). So it refutes the metaethical theories known as 'individual subjectivism' and 'inter-subjectivism' respectively (views that no-one takes seriously anyway).

It is inconsistent with non-cognitivist views.

It is inconsistent with objectivist views (so inconsistent with objectivist naturalism, and inconsistent witwh objectivist non-naturalism).

It is, in other words, inconsistent with all metaethical theories bar one: my one. The one described in the conclusion. So. It. Refutes. Them. All. Something you can never recognize - never - because you have already decided in advance, so sure of yourself are you, that anyone who claims to have done such a thing is deluded.

If you want to refute my argument the only hope - the only hope - rests with this argument:

1. If I am morally valuable, I am morally valuable even if no subject values me.
2. I am morally valuable
3. Therefore I am morally valuable even if no subject values me.

For that argument is also valid and its premises appear every bit as powerfully self-evident as any premise of mine, yet its conclusion is inconsistent with the conclusion of my argument.

It isn't sound. But it does appear to be.

Didn't catch this reply earlier:

And it refutes all subjectivist views bar mine.
— Bartricks

But no-one claims that:
being morally valuable is one and the same as being valued by me,
— Bartricks

That would imply me liking cats more than dogs is a moral stance, but it clearly isn't. What this argument establishes is trivial. — Echarmion

No, it establishes its conclusion - it establishes that moral values are not my values. Or yours. Now run the same argument for all 7billion people on the planet. It is sound in all of their cases too.

So, what you are now admitting is that the argument establishes - proves - that moral values are not the values of any one of us.

And the same argument works for a group, if a group could be a subject (which it can't be).

So, what you are now admitting is that moral values are not the values of any one of us, or any group of us.

Good. That's, you know, what I was arguing. Arguing it with a valid argument that you could not see was valid, despite its validity being obvious.

Now you're just pretending it doesn't matter - that you I believed that all along or that everyone already does! Really? Okaaay. Whatever you say!

So, to recap, this argument is valid and apparently sound:

1. To be morally valuable is to be the object of a valuing relation
2. Subjects and only subjects can value things
3. Therefore, to be morally valuable is to be the object of the valuing relation of a subject

That seems to establish the truth of moral subjectivism. But moral subjectivism is a family of views, not just one. I am a subject. You are a subject. There are literally billions of them.

However, this argument is valid and sound:

1. If being morally valuable consists of being the object of my valuing attitudes, then if I value something necessary it is morally valuable
2. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable.
3. Therefore, being morally valuable does not consist of being the object of my valuing attitudes.

That argument works just as well for any subset of my valuing attitudes. And it works just as well if we swap you for me, or anyone else for me.

So moral values are not the values of any of us. Whose values are they, then? Well, the subject whose values they are. Reason. Her. She isn't me, she isn't you, she is herself.

Is that trivial? Er, not by anyone's wildest dreams. If you think that's a trivial conclusion then you have no grasp whatsoever on the concept of triviality. What you mean by 'trivial' is 'sound'. The argument is 'sound' and it establishes an astonishing conclusion.

All of your attempts to show my case to be invalid have failed. The argument I have laid out is simple and obviously valid to anyone who reflects on it. You have had to change the argument - desperately play around with the placement of key terms, or try and blind everyone with symbols. But it won't work - the argument is valid and so unless fault can be found with a premise the conclusion must be accepted.

The only real challenge to my view comes from this argument, as just noted in my reply to your fellow logic garbler, Happenstance.

1. If I am morally valuable, I am morally valuable even if no subject values me
2. I am morally valuable
3. Therefore I am morally valuable even if no subject values me.

That is valid and it seems as sound as my argument. Yet it contradicts it and thus raises a reasonable doubt about the truth of its premises.

By your own admission you never took logic 101. Here's that quote from you that I am currently having tatooed across my buttocks:

would it interest you that I've never actually took a course in formal logic?
— Happenstance — Bartricks

:lol: :lol: :lol:

You must have one seriously fat arse. How does that work? Do you have, ‘would it interest you that I’ve never’, on the left cheek and ‘actually took a course in formal logic’, on the right cheek?

That reminds me of a joke: An airplane lands on a desert island to refuel and the pilot chances upon a castaway.

‘I’m so glad that you’re here. I’ve been stranded on this island for ten years’, said the castaway. The pilot, being a wag, replies, ‘I will rescue you from this island if you can name the people I have tattooed on my butt.’

The pilot pulls down his trousers to show the castaway his tattoos. ‘The one on the left is Pope John Paul II and the one on the right is Nelson Mandela but I don’t know the one in the middle’ said the castaway. ‘Wait, I’ve got it! It’s Bartricks!’

Well, that seems entirely fitting to me, for I shit all over everyone.

Once more, your only hope - and obviously I think it is a vain one - of refuting my case rests with this argument:

1. If I am morally valuable, I am morally valuable even if no subject values me.
2. I am morally valuable
3. Therefore I am morally valuable even if no subject values me.

But presumably you can't see that until I turn it into some worms and triangles and squares. Here's my best attempt:

1. wormy triangle square. Wall. Square. Two more worms.
2. worm and a lopsided v.
3. Therefore,worm square lopsided v, square, wall, triangle, worm, worm. bee. snail.

There, that make more sense to you?

I thought of another tattoo for you:

I'm confusing Happenstance for someone who gives a shit about my crappy argument!

But I wormed and squared it for you! No gratitude some people.

But I wormed and squared it for you! No gratitude some people. — Bartricks

^ doesn't understand logic synbols. Shocker. I guess to someone like yourself, it would look like worms, much like a child's interpretation: 'Miss, them der writing looks like worms. Tee Hee!'

Anyway tell us again how a definition of non-ampliative implies question begging. That shit was hilarious