Yes. Scientists have looked for the correlates of consciousness in particular things. But, as you implied, the locus of Mind is in the relationships between things. Mind is meta-physical, like Mathematics, not physical, like neurons.‘mind’ as a concept refers collectively to relations of experience — Possibility
Scientists have looked for the correlates of consciousness in particular things. But, as you implied, the locus of Mind is in the relationships between things. Mind is meta-physical, like Mathematics, not physical, like neurons. — Gnomon
My own suspicion is that our consciousness is really just a highly organized form of something that is fundamental. What I mean to say is that basic subjectivity is there everywhere in nature at a very low level. But in the case of dirt or something like that, it isn't organized in the right way so as to yield an inner experience that is anything like ours in terms of its structure. — petrichor
At the bottom-most level, there is probably no consciousness as we think of it. As at that level, there is no differentiation at all. There is only unity, and so there is no division of subject and object. Consciousness as we think of it always involves a subject and objects. One side of this relation does not occur without the other. — petrichor
I sometimes think that it might be simply a matter of relation, but with the important consideration that there is being. What do I mean? When we normally imagine two things in relation, we see them both in our mind's eye as objects "out there" in a space, and we are apart from them or bracketed out. This misleads. Suppose you just have primitive Being, or Unity, or whatever, The Undifferentiated. Call it what you like. Then, somehow (don't ask me how!), it divides, or comes to relate itself to itself, as in a reflection, or something like that. Whatever the case, suppose you now have two things, A and B, and they are in relation. There is no perspective outside of these. There is no objective point of view. There is no third thing. We need to resist imagining it that way, as if we occupy a perspective separate from both A and B. There are only two perspectives. For A, B is an object. For B, A is an object. And for each, it is itself, a subject. For B, A is A. That seems trivial. But for A, "I am A." See the difference? — petrichor
A physical system manifests itself only by interacting with another. The description of a physical system, then, is always given in relation to another physical system, one with which it interacts. Any description of a system is therefore always a description of the information which a system has about another system, that is to say, the correlation between the two systems. The mysteries of quantum mechanics become less dense if interpreted this way, as the descriptions of the information that physical systems have about one another. — Carlo Rovelli, ‘Reality is Not What it Seems’
We imagine the world to be empty of subjectivity, to be pure object, pure surface, pure exterior, only because we tend to visualize things as though from outside, and we bracket out ourselves and our perspective points. But if you realize that in order for a rock to really be, that there must be something that is the rock, a curious realization starts to emerge. And consciousness starts to seem slightly less mysterious, almost necessary even. It seems that this is just what it is for a thing to be. It must have its own side. Things must have interiors. Something finds itself as that thing. When people like Hawking ask, "What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?", this is the answer. It isn't that we have equations and then these somehow get actualized and substantialized. No, being is there from the start, and the equations only describe the way being relates itself itself to itself. And it is in the nature of being to be! It can't not be!
So I guess this is a kind of panpsychism, which is really a dissociated monopsychism. Every particle interaction is likely a sort of experience. — petrichor
Scientists have looked for the correlates of consciousness in particular things. But, as you implied, the locus of Mind is in the relationships between things. Mind is meta-physical, like Mathematics, not physical, like neurons.
— Gnomon
Technically, I agree. But I don’t find this helpful as an either-or dichotomy, as if the metaphysical is not physical and vice versa. Mind refers to a capacity to interact with an aspect of reality that is not reducible to measurable/observable events or objects in spacetime. — Possibility
We imagine the world to be empty of subjectivity, to be pure object, pure surface, pure exterior, only because we tend to visualize things as though from outside, and we bracket out ourselves and our perspective points. But if you realize that in order for a rock to really be, that there must be something that is the rock, a curious realization starts to emerge. And consciousness starts to seem slightly less mysterious, almost necessary even. It seems that this is just what it is for a thing to be. It must have its own side. Things must have interiors. Something finds itself as that thing. When people like Hawking ask, "What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?", this is the answer. It isn't that we have equations and then these somehow get actualized and substantialized. No, being is there from the start, and the equations only describe the way being relates itself itself to itself. And it is in the nature of being to be! It can't not be! — petrichor
The fundamental absurdity of materialism is that it starts from the objective, and takes as the ultimate ground of explanation something objective, whether it be matter in the abstract, simply as it is thought, or after it has taken form, is empirically given — that is to say, as substance, the chemical element with its primary relations. Some such thing it takes, as existing absolutely and in itself, in order that it may evolve organic nature and finally the knowing subject from it, and explain them adequately by means of it ; whereas in truth all that is objective is already determined as such in manifold ways by the knowing subject through its forms of knowing, and presupposes them; and consequently it entirely disappears if we think the subject away. Thus materialism is the attempt to explain what is immediately given us by what is given us indirectly. All that is objective, extended, active— that is to say, all that is material — is regarded by materialism as affording so solid a basis for its explanation, that a reduction of everything to this can leave nothing to be desired (especially if in ultimate analysis this reduction should resolve itself into action and reaction). But we have shown that all this is given indirectly and in the highest degree determined, and is therefore merely a relatively present object, for it has passed through the machinery and manufacture of the brain, and has thus come under the forms of space, time and causality, by means of which it is first presented to us as extended in space and ever active in time. From such an indirectly given object, materialism seeks to explain what is immediately given, the idea (in which alone the object that materialism starts with exists), and finally even the will from which all those fundamental forces, that manifest themselves, under the guidance of causes, and therefore according to law, are in truth to be explained. — Arthur Schopenhauer, WWR, Pp 32-33
For example, though your brain and mine are both part of the same ultimately unified whole, you'll never find my mouth reporting your experiences because the information about your experiences isn't causally directing my mouth movements. Your memories aren't in my head, in other words. But at bottom, we are one. And it is ultimately the same self-relating unity having the experiences of both of us. — petrichor
You might wonder then why I doubt a computer is conscious. My answer is that I think it is the relations between the substantial elements of the system that are important, since their interactions are likely atoms of experience. The abstract relations between pieces of code are not the substantial interactions that are happening in the chip. What is happening in the code is perhaps best seen as virtual, just a way for us to think at a high level about how to organize the low-level operations. But the chip is like a Turing machine, just erasing and writing 1s and 0s according to some simple rules, with no awareness of what this information represents. Even that is too high-level. A charge in a circuit, isn't to itself a '1' or a '0'. — petrichor
I agree with aspects of both analyses, but consider this. We're speaking as if what is 'physical' is known when it's not. Matter itself is actually a very mysterious thing. We have a culturally-inherited mental map of 'mind and matter' but in reality both terms are abstractions.
Furthermore we assume that, whatever 'mind' is, it's a product of evolution, which is understandable as an essentially physical process - so that mind has emerged from the evolutionary process. But I question the notion of the supremacy or ultimacy of the physical as being the source or origin of what we understand as 'mind' - even though it seems obvious that it must be that, and even though we don't have any clear alternative. — Wayfarer
But the biology of the living and recently deceased is the same. Like a computer that is on or off is the same.
So if it isn't mind, what is this separate power supply that determines whether an organism is on or off?
Yes. What's missing from current computers is Qualia. 1s and 0s can be processed mathematically, but don't add-up to the quality of consciousness.If we are to create something that is conscious in the way we are, it seems to me that we need something qualitatively different from a computer. — petrichor
I see that you have thought deeply about the mystery of Consciousness. And your conclusion is similar to mine, that something like the ancient theory of Panpsychism must be involved. As you hastened to point out, that doesn't mean that atoms or single-cell organisms are conscious, but they do "sense" their environment in exchanges of energy ("atoms of experience")My own suspicion is that our consciousness is really just a highly organized form of something that is fundamental. What I mean to say is that basic subjectivity is there everywhere in nature at a very low level. — petrichor
In my thesis, I call that source of all that is, BEING : http://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page10.htmlSuppose you just have primitive Being, or Unity, or whatever, The Undifferentiated. Call it what you like. — petrichor
For the purposes of distinguishing between the space-time world and the infinite-eternal BEING, I refer to the ultimate source as G*D, but only in a non-humanoid sense. As a form of PanEnDeism, we can imagine that the holistic G*D created our world to serve as something like a mirror. Thus, an undifferentiated BEING could become subject and object. I wouldn't take that metaphor too literally, but it might give us a clue to answer the old "why create an imperfect world?" conundrum.Maybe the primordial unity objectifies itself and thereby becomes a subject. — petrichor
My answer to the Mind/Body problem is to note that both are forms of fundamental Information. We now know that Information is not just mind-stuff, but also material-stuff. Scientists have equated Information with Energy, and Energy with Matter. So, in my thesis the emergence of Mind/Consciousness from Matter/Body is a high-level instance of the Phase Changes that are found throughout Physics. I could go into much more detail, but for now, I'll just leave it as a speculation.And then we wonder how our interiority could possibly "emerge" out of special arrangements of these empty, purely structural, substanceless objects. No wonder there is a mind-body problem! — petrichor
Yes. Holism is essential to my theory of Enformationisminformation integration, a la Tononi — petrichor
Yes. That's why computers cannot become conscious until they develop a point-of-view (self image) and are able to intend future actions that are not pre-programmed.But a computer running a simulation of a brain or whatever, has, in its physical substrate, a very different causal structure, one that probably lacks the kind of intentional content we want it to have when we want it to be conscious in the way that we are. — petrichor
I tend to use the term ‘integrated’ rather than ‘organised’. — Possibility
The proto-consciousness at the bottom-most level, in my view, is a vague awareness of more than this-here-now, whose only evidence is a one-dimensional transfer of information/energy that is immediately integrated into the system. — Possibility
Any description of a system is therefore always a description of the information which a system has about another system, that is to say, the correlation between the two systems. — Carlo Rovelli, ‘Reality is Not What it Seems’
An entangled system is defined to be one whose quantum state cannot be factored as a product of states of its local constituents; that is to say, they are not individual particles but are an inseparable whole. In entanglement, one constituent cannot be fully described without considering the other(s). The state of a composite system is always expressible as a sum, or superposition, of products of states of local constituents; it is entangled if this sum necessarily has more than one term.
We need to remember that a ‘rock’ is a conceptual object to you and me, but not to itself. If you break a rock in half it becomes two rocks, and there is no evidence whatsoever that the rock notices the difference. — Possibility
But I have read that this has been achieved on a small and limited scale, where a computer simulation was capable of demonstrating a limited social ‘relationship’ with a ‘pet’. It was an interesting read (I’ll try to locate it). — Possibility
For clarity, I define Physical and Meta-Physical according to my personal interpretation of Aristotle (see Glossary). I also try to make a clear distinction between Real and Ideal. They are all various forms of universal Information, but for the purposes of dialog we must be more specific.Technically, I agree. But I don’t find this helpful as an either-or dichotomy, as if the metaphysical is not physical and vice versa. — Possibility
Furthermore we assume that, whatever 'mind' is, it's a product of evolution — Wayfarer
But I don't know if I agree that objects 'truly are' at all - this is one of the reasons why rocks (as paradigmatic 'objects') are denoted as being 'things' rather than 'beings'. — Wayfarer
Perhaps 'one' not in a numerical sense, but a qualitative sense, i.e. all of the one kind, not all part of the one thing. — Wayfarer
Yes. What's missing from current computers is Qualia. 1s and 0s can be processed mathematically, but don't add-up to the quality of consciousness. — Gnomon
Yes. The underlying "substance" is generic Information. Digital information is Quantitative (discontinuous), while Analog information is Qualitative (continuous). Computers process 1s & 0s as abstractions that never occur in reality. But humans process information in terms of values between Zero and 100%. That's the insight of Bayesian logic : binary logic is two-valued (absolute, either/or), while human logic is multi-valued (probabilistic; both/and). That's why programmers are now experimenting with Analog computers that use Bayesian logic to approximate human reasoning (inference). Such calculations allow freedom, but also errors. The role-playing robots in WestWorld are supposed to have analog brains, which makes them eerily life-like, but also unpredictable.Yes. What's missing from current computers is Qualia. 1s and 0s can be processed mathematically, but don't add-up to the quality of consciousness. — Gnomon
I don't know if qualia is actually missing. I just think that, though being a modification of the same underlying substance, it must be quite different in structure. — petrichor
No. Digital processing is unlikely to be aware of anything apart from voltage fluctuations. But Analog processing might be the first step toward self-awareness. Simple awareness is an inference from incoming information that something is out there. Higher level awareness (self-consciousness) might require more detailed inference that includes self-reference.Are the 1s and 0s represented themselves aware of anything? Is the digital image represented by them itself aware of itself? No, no, no, and no. — petrichor
Your Rovelli quote is very interesting. I'll have to read that book. I suspect that he is putting his finger perhaps on just what consciousness is, without saying so. To be aware of something is precisely to be a system with information about another system. — petrichor
The puzzle to me is the question of how, if such a situation obtains, interactions ever occur at all! How is it determined that two particles actually collide if their positions before the collision are undefined? There must be something to this picture that I am missing. Maybe the problem here is in thinking of the space between as a pure emptiness, which, for such elementary particles, means complete isolation. — petrichor
I have often thought it curious to realize that nobody has ever seen a photon in flight, "from the side", so to speak. From the side, we see a tennis ball flying through the air only because photons are arriving on our retina that came directly from the tennis ball. Without local photon impacts on the retina, there is no seeing. All photon detections are measurements of an increase in energy somewhere, a jump in an electron's energy level. Never is a photon seen between its source and its destination. If it is detected, that's it, it has arrived. The detection point is its destination, and it has been converted into something else. A photon, in other words, is never seen as a photon. It is always seen only as a loss of energy at the source or a gain in energy at the destination. A photon, for us to see it in flight, would have to be emitting photons! — petrichor
When we think we see an object, we are not actually directly experiencing it, but instead looking at an image that our mind creates. Thus, we are not directly experiencing the object. — Tzeentch
If we saw directly through the eyes we'd be seeing everything upside down.
As Heidegger pointed out with his "ontological difference", Being is not a being among beings, not a thing in the world among other things. No, it is underneath them all, everywhere present to itself. Really, it is probably even better to locate the ground (or groundlessness?) I am talking about prior to being and non-being, as such a distinction only seemingly belongs to states of affairs in the world, but not to the world as a whole considered in its ultimate, bottom-most essence. Words just fail here. Every way of trying to talk about it shows itself as problematic. — petrichor
It is actually impossible to imagine a universe in which there is, say, only one hydrogen atom. That unique thing has to have someone else imagining it. Existence requires existing among other existents, a fundamental dependency of relation. If God also exists, then God would be just another fact of the universe, relative to other existents and included in that fundamental dependency of relation. — Pierre Whalon
Here's the kicker though. Ultimately, everything is connected. It is one thing. There is just one big experience going on, one big causal network. — petrichor
Our personal mental states seem locally limited and personal only because the whole complex of information is not integrated in my little brain. Information about the whole universe is not available to my brain. Only a limited number of causal impacts are directed at my brain at any given moment. And my mouth can therefore never report on information that isn't causally antecedent to its movements. Our personal isolation is an illusion that results from the fact that the amount of information about the rest of the universe available to any particular part of the universe at any given time is limited. What is known anywhere is a function of how information is integrated, and what is within the light-cone of what sets an absolute limit. Though at our most fundamental level, we are one, I can't remember your childhood, and so I fail to realize that I am you at the bottom-most level. Even more inaccessible to Petrichor's brain are the memories of a distant alien outside his light cone. — petrichor
Yes. The unity of two or more things requires a relationship of some kind. But they don't always have to "touch" physically. The may also have a meta-physical relationship. For example, a group of stars. lightyears apart from each other may form a constellation from our perspective on earth. But that geometrical relationship is not based on the physics of energy exchange. Except for minimal light energy and gravity, there is no touching. Their connection is in the mind of the beholder. And they are known only as pin-point abstractions. That mathematical relationship is meaningful to humans for reasons that have little to do with the stars themselves. They are perceived as a system due to their participation in a common "substance" : Information, (EnFormAction) which touches everything.Really, it seems to me, for two things to interact, some sort of unity must be involved. Two things cannot remain truly, fundamentally distinct and independent and at the same time interact. They must touch. And for them to touch requires that they are of a common substance. And if they truly touch, they become in some sense continuous with one another. — petrichor
The Mind of G*D : the First and Final Cause. That concept boggles my mind, so I try to remain agnostic. But it seems to follow logically from what we know about how information works in the real world.Ultimately, everything is connected. It is one thing. There is just one big experience going on, one big causal network. — petrichor
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