I can follow a valid argument just fine. I can also spot a false premiss. Your first premiss(in the OP) is false. Plain and simple. Something being valued is not equivalent to something being morally valuable.

You're also all over the place here. You've just contradicted yourself, yet again.

Do you see it?

...my valuings of things - do not constitute moral values... — Bartricks

1. For something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued. — Bartricks

You can't follow a valid argument - as you've just demonstrated.

Where is the contradiction? Those two claims are consistent. Together they 'entail' that for something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued by someone, just not me.

So you're patently not very good at following arguments.

And the first premise is not false. This is a philosophy forum - how about arguing something rather than just pronouncing? I have explained why the burden of proof is squarely on the shoulders of anyone who wants to deny 1. if you disagree about that, 'argue' that I am wrong. Don't just declare it. I mean, how arrogant are you that you think if you disagree with something that's sufficient to demonstrate its falsity. Show your reasoning!

Your valuing of things counts as being valued. If being valued is equivalent to being morally valuable, as the premiss clearly sets out, then your valuing of things results in those things being morally valuable. If what you said is true, then all things valued would be morally valuable.

They are not.

Therefore, either one of your premisses is false or you've an invalid argument.

You could always address the earlier arguments. I've shown enough.

Er, what? Premise 1 says something about what it takes for something to be morally valuable. For something to be morally valuable, it needs to be being valued.

That is consistent with - consistent with - it also being the case that if I value something it is not thereby made morally valuable.

I really don't see how you can't see that - no wonder you're having trouble with the argument as a whole!

Here: only a person can be president of America. I am a person, but I am not the president of America. Those are not contradictory statements.

Likewise, only something that is being valued is morally valuable. I am a valuer, but if I value something it is not thereby morally valuable.

Sheesh.

Something being valued is not equivalent to something being morally valuable. — creativesoul

The above is true. We all know that much. Even the OP has admitted not all his values are moral values. What's curious is how he can still somehow think/believe that the first premiss in the OP is true. It contradicts with the way things are.

So, are you now rejecting your original argument? The one you just presented is new.

All moral value is value.
Not all value is moral value.

Agree?

Er, I am the OP.

So, are you now rejecting the original argument? This one is new. — creativesoul

What on earth are you on about? Look, this exchange is going to get mighty rude mighty fast unless you up your game and start making sense.

All moral value is value.
Not all value is moral value.

Agree? — creativesoul

Yes = all moral value is a kind of value, yes.

...all moral value is a kind of value... — Bartricks

Cool. What makes it moral - in kind? What do all moral things have in common such that having it is what makes them moral things, as compared/contrasted to things that are not?

Have you read the OP? It tells you.

For something to be morally valuable it must be being valued by someone.

But evidently not your or I.

So, for something to be morally valuable is for it be being valued by someone, but the someone in question is not you or I, or any of the rest of us.

What's distinctive about moral value, then, is that it is a kind of valuing that we are aware of, but is not done by any of us.

Who is it done by? Well, by Reason. Again, that's what the argument uncovers. We don't start out by stipulating what moral values are, we discover it by consulting our reason about them - the same faculty that brings them to our awareness in the first place.

Yeah....

Nevermind.

Oh, well thanks for that total waste of time. I thought you were laying some big trap for me - laying a trail of little question bread crumbs all the way into the, er, oven of contradiction. But no - nothing. Up. Your. Game.

Good warriors and true have tried the sword of reason to evict the resident Troll from his cave, and, alas, all have failed. :rofl:

Good warriors and true have tried the sword of reason to evict the resident Troll from his cave, and, alas, all have failed. :rofl: — Janus

I take trolling to require a lack of sincerity. I don't believe that Bartricks isn't sincere.

Water balloons of ignorance against my machete of truth more like. Have you ever considered that perhaps the reason no-one can dent the argument is that it is sound? I mean, that's a pretty straightforward explanation.
Why can no-one show it to be invalid despite trying every dirty trick in the book? Because it is valid, that's why.
Why can no-one raise a reasonable doubt about a premise? Because they're all true, or at least far better supported by reason than their opposites.

I have actually mentioned the only hope for defeating it - this argument:

1. If I am morally valuable, I am morally valuable even if no subject values me
2. I am morally valuable
3. Therefore, I am morally valuable even if no subject values me

So I have actually put a machete on the table for anyone to pick up and have a go if they think they're hard enough. But no, you stick to your water balloons. Odd.

1. If I am morally valuable, I am morally valuable even if no subject values me
2. I am morally valuable
3. Therefore, I am morally valuable even if no subject values me

So I have actually put a machete on the table for anyone to pick up and have a go if they think they're hard enough. But no, you stick to your water balloons. Odd. — Bartricks

Perhaps this is because it's rather obvious you desperately want someone to play along so you can display your superior resoning some more. Unfortunately most people aren't interested, and in any event the flaw of that argument is rather obvious.

Perhaps this is because it's rather obvious you desperately want someone to play along so you can display your superior resoning some more. — Echarmion

Well, obviously I'm confident I can deal with it. But I'm also interested in what's true and so want to test my argument against a rival reasoner. That's what philosophers do, right?

I was referring to the mythical 'Troll'. See here:

In any case the other sense may fit too: as it seems Bartricks must be either slow-witted, or arguing in bad faith (not sincere); I can't see any other explanation for his refusal to even consider the possibility that his argument is unsound, possibly even invalid (some have claimed this; I can't be bothered spending the time to determine if it is so). He's like a Troll, blindly deflecting all missiles hurled at him, and all swords thrust at him, and stubbornly refusing to budge an inch from his cave, from his myopic stronghold.

Thank you, Hugh. Insightful as ever. I am having a bit of trouble with your simile though. I am like a troll in a cave who, even without looking, is successfully deflecting all the missiles and sword thrusts that come his way. Okay. I know it is meant to be insulting in some way, but it sounds impressive. I mean this: "yeah, well, you're really good at what you do - so there!" is a really incompetent insult.

Deflecting is not successfully refuting. And staying in the cave at all costs is not the ideal you should be aiming for.
And it wasn't meant to be an insult, but a wake-up call, so you got it wrong again.
Your intellect is a blunt instrument as usual. It could be sharpened, but that's up to you.

my argument refutes all rival positions. You genuinely don't have the first idea how arguments work, do you? Yet you're confident you do, and confident I'm wrong. It's an all too common combination.

Your argument is a sorry mess, Bartricks; everyone but you can see that. If you really believe what you are saying, and it is not just the fact that you have a monumental ego which will not allow you to admit your shortcomings, admit that you are mistaken, then I feel pity for you, man. Come to think of it I feel pity for you either way.

Either argue something or go away. Your contributions lack both insight and wit, so they're just an annoying distraction. Go and find another thread to derail while I wait for someone worthy to address my argument. I'm tired of steamrollering kittens.

You're waiting for something you have already decided you will never accept, so it will be a long wait. As you wish, I'll leave you with your delusions and your lonely boredom.

my argument refutes all rival positions. You genuinely don't have the first idea how arguments work, do you? Yet you're confident you do, and confident I'm wrong. It's an all too common combination. — Bartricks

If an argument is stated by Bartricks, then it refutes no rival positions.
The argument in the first post of this thread was stated by Bartricks.
Therefore, the argument in the first post of this thread refutes no rival positions.

(The premises above are self-evident, by the way.)

Oh very witty.
Well that at least has the merit of being valid. But it isn't sound. It does, however, accurately express how you think.

Because no-one is pressing the most obvious and cutting criticism of the view I am defending, it seems it is up to me to respond to it. That is, for want of a real opponent I must follow a long tradition of addressing myself to imaginary critics.

So, I have argued that moral values and prescriptions are the values and prescriptions of a mind, a subject-of-experiences: Reason. The case is simple: values and prescriptions require a valuer, a prescriber. Subjects-of-experience - minds - are manifestly the only kinds of thing capable of being valuers and prescribers. Yet as the values and prescriptions of morality are clearly not our own, we must conclude that the valuer and prescriber is someone radically other - another mind, but not any of ours. Reason.

However, if there is another apparently sound argument that leads to the negation of my conclusion, then that itself raises a reasonable doubt about the soundness of my argument. Even without being able to identify the false premise in my argument, one would be within one's rights to reject its conclusion on the grounds that another, seemingly equally powerful argument, negates it.

There is such an argument, here:

1. If I am morally valuable, then I am morally valuable even if no subject values me
2. I am morally valuable
3. Therefore, I am morally valuable even if no subject values me

Both 1 and 2 seem every bit as self-evident as any premise in my argument. That is, Reason represents both 1 and 2 to be true as forcefully as she does the premises of my argument.

However, the fact Reason has been discovered to be a subject now gives us reason to question just what those representations really mean. We can look to our own analogous representations for insight.

Imagine I say "I value you staying alive even if I do not exist" or "I value you being happy even if there is no-one around" or something like that. What would you take me to mean? Surely not that somehow my values will exist even in my absence. That's silly. No, what I mean to express is that I value you being happy for your own sake, rather than for mine or anyone else's. I value you being happy even in circumstances in which I, the valuer, do not exist, because you can still be happy under those circumstances and it is you being happy that I value.

This is just the nature of intrinsic valuing; to value something intrinsically is to value it for its own sake, rather than one's own. If I value a work of art intrinsically, then I don't want anyone to destroy it, including in circumstances where I do not exist - something I might express by saying "don't destroy it, even if I don't exist", or even "don't destroy it, even if I want you to"

By hypothesis, intrinsic moral value involves the subject - Reason - adopting precisely this intrinsic valuing attitude towards something (by hypothesis, that is what it is for something to have intrinsic moral value). But if, when I value something intrinsically, I might well say "don't destroy this even if I am not around" or some such, then it is reasonable to suppose that this is what Reason will say about the things that she values intrinsically. So, if she values me intrinsically, she'll represent me to be valuable even under circumstances in which no-one values me. Just as I might say "I value you being happy even if no-one is around" Reason says "I value Bartricks being happy even if no-one is around" and/or even "I value Bartricks being happy even if no-one values Bartricks being happy".

I conclude that premise 1 of the counter-argument is not true. Yes, Reason does represent it to be true. But all Reason is doing when she represents premise 1 of the counter-argument to be true is telling us that she values me intrinsically, not extrinsically. So it appears to be true, but actually it isn't.

There. The original argument appears to be sound and the only argument that held out any hope of raising a reasonable doubt about it is unsound. The argument is sound, then.

Interesting post by Scott Aaronson, based on research of a friend of his (the paper is provided, but I haven't read through that yet).

Anyway, it gets into eigenvectors (?) as potentially effective measures of objective moral standards - based on what I got. I don't quite understand eigen-business, but this was thought-provoking nonetheless:

https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1820