. If I am morally valuable — Bartricks

What in the world would it mean for a person to be morally valuable?

What in the world would it mean for a person to be morally valuable? — Terrapin Station

It's when reason values you. Duh!

I have my own question: how is it "intrinsic" value if it's entirely based on the subjective assessment of reason?

It's when reason values you. Duh! — Echarmion

Haha. It's weird he doesn't see the category error there, though. Morality is about specific actions, or at least specific types of actions. A person overall isn't morally valuable or not.

Regarding reason, he seems to either be using that as something like a metonym for God, where he's hoping it will be less controversial, or he's simply positing some sort of platonic form of (unchanging, non-relative) reason (without realizing that to some of us, that's at least as controversial as simply saying "God is responsible"). Although how he's reconciling that idea with the claim that this stuff is subjective, I don't know.

See the OP for an answer.

It's when reason values you. Duh! — Echarmion

Correct. Note, a proposition won't be rendered false by you sneering at it. You don't have that power.

I have my own question: how is it "intrinsic" value if it's entirely based on the subjective assessment of reason? — Echarmion

We can value something as a means, or as an end in itself. When we value something as an end in itself we are valuing it due to what it is. That is, due to its intrinsic properties.

When Reason values something in that way, it is intrinsically morally valuable.

It's weird he doesn't see the category error there, though. — Terrapin Station

It's weird you don't see that it is question begging to insist that a category error has been committed when an argument has been provided that proves, beyond all reasonable doubt, that for something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued by Reason.

Again, see the OP. Register that the argument is valid and all its premises true beyond a reasonable doubt. Then draw the conclusion: to be morally valuable is to be being valued by a subject, a subject who is not me, not you, not anyone apart from herself.

1. For something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued.
2. Only a subject can value something
3. Therefore, for something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued by a subject. — Bartricks

You have a secret invisible 3rd premise that points to "a god" as the source of moral values:

3. Moral values are not my values or your values.

Your argument should read (roughly):

1. For something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued.
2. Only a subject can value something
3. Moral values are not my values or your values (not created in my subjectivity or in your subjectivity)
4. Therefore, for something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued by a subject (but not my subjectivity or your subjectivity; therefore the subjectivity of a god).


Premise 3 is easy to take issue with. I just say: Moral values are my values or your values.

There's nothing missing as the argument by means of which I arrive at the conclusion that moral values are the values - or valuings - of a god is longer than the one you're addressing.

Here it is:

1. For something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued.
2. Only a subject can value something
3. Therefore, for something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued by a subject.
4. If something's being morally valuable consists in it being valued by me, then if I value something, necessarily it is morally valuable
5. If I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable
6. Therefore, for something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued by someone other than me.

As you can substitute yourself for me, that argument operates to put all of us out of contention.

Now, no doubt you will just deny premise 5. But that's absurd. That means you think that if you value raping someone, then necessarily it is morally good for you to rape them.

That's plainly false. That's as manifestly false as the idea that if you think 3 x 18 = 67 then it does.

So, wrong and wrong. And note, just 'saying' that a premise is false won't make it so. So yes, you're right that it is easy to 'say' that moral values are your values (or my values). But they actually need to be - that is, it needs to be self-evident to most of us - that moral values are your values or my values for premise 5 to be placed in any doubt.

See the OP for an answer. — Bartricks

The issue is if you're positing reason as a platonic form. In that case it's not mental. It's a real abstract whatever-the-heck-platonic-forms-are-supposed-to-be-ontologically.

It's weird you don't see that it is question begging to insist that a category error has been committed when an argument has been provided that proves, beyond all reasonable doubt, that for something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued by Reason. — Bartricks

You didn't at all understand my post. The category error occurs in saying that a person, overall, can be morally valuable or not.

Also that's not what begging the question is.

If you're really interested in this stuff, learn about it. You don't have to admit ignorance about anything but at least quietly, to yourself, read a bit about stuff that people bring up that you don't understand. The more you read about it the more it will start to make sense. This is also not to suggest that it will lead to your views, your conclusions changing, so there's no need to be afraid of that.

No, I am not positing a Platonic Form. I mean, obviously not. I am positing a person - a subject of experiences. A Patonic Form - whatever one of those is - could not issue a prescription or value anything.

If you're really interested in this stuff, learn about it. — Terrapin Station

In the course of this discussion it has become painfully apparent to anyone who actually does know their stuff - that is, someone who's been properly educated and isn't just gleaning everything from Wikipedia pages and youtube videos - that you don't know what any of the following terms actually mean: category error; non-sequitur; begging the question; valid. It's also apparent that you don't know what a Platonic Form is or how Plato's view and those associated with it differ radically from mine.

So who have you read recently, then? Which contemporary moral philosopher's work have you recently read? I'm intrigued. Clearly you think you know a great deal more than me - so come on, if I'm to be shown the error of my ways I need to do some due-diligence on my teacher. Whose works have you recently read?

Now either make a proper argument - that is, construct a deductively valid argument that has the negation of either one of my premises or my conclusion as its conclusion - or go away.

No, I am not positing a Platonic Form. I mean, obviously not. I am positing a person - a subject of experiences. A Patonic Form - whatever one of those is - could not issue a prescription or value anything. — Bartricks

So you weren't suggesting some abstract notion of reason. You're referring to a particular person's reason?

In the course of this discussion it has become painfully apparent to anyone who actually does know their stuff - that is, someone who's been properly educated and isn't just gleaning everything from Wikipedia pages and youtube videos - that you don't know what any of the following terms actually mean: category error; non-sequitur; begging the question; valid. It's also apparent that you don't know what a Platonic Form is or how Plato's view and those associated with it differ radically from mine. — Bartricks

That's fine to say. But seriously, read about this stuff.

Who have you read, Terrapin? Oddly silent.

Er, no. Was one of your parents a goldfish? I say things and they just fall out of your head, don't they?

Reason is a person. A person. You know, like wot we is. A person.

What we call 'our reason' is a 'faculty'. That is, it is the means by which we gain some awareness of Reason's prescriptions and values.

Simple. Painfully, painfully simple.

Not Platonism, note.

Incidentally, what's the name of those contemporary metaethical theories that are often called - normally disparagingly - Platonic?

And also, what's the name of the thesis that two acts that are identical in all of their non-moral features will invariably be identical in terms of their moral features as well?

Reason is a person — Bartricks

Where does that person live just out of curiosity?

Seems you're not well read, Terry. Maybe you should learn a bit about this stuff before pronouncing so confidently on it.

Don't be offended. You could have decent conversations about this stuff, but you can't be so sensitive about criticism.

Not with you I couldn't - you pretend to be something you're not, namely someone who knows the area (when clearly you don't). Why would I take instruction from someone who doesn't know what they're talking about?

It's not taking instruction from me, it's trying to better yourself.