You're just being dismissive again without any arguments. — Bartricks

Hm. Seems to me that the issue is an inability on your part to see the argument before you.

A quick run down of my opinion, following on from some of the philosophy that happened after Descartes, would be that reason is about how we string words together. Your error, which you share with other rationalists, is to think that reason binds how things are; and that hence by reason alone you can deduce how things are. The poverty of that approach was set out long ago by Hume, Kant and others, but perhaps was best criticised during the linguistic turn in analytic philosophy. Few would take this sort of natural theology seriously now.

Absolutely spot on !

However, as an atheist who places most theological discussion in the 'word salad' category, I am surprised that nobody has come up the 'man in the image of God' theme as being the source of what we call 'reason' and 'ethics'. Obviously, there is a biological/neurological counter argument which ascribes these as epiphenomena of human behaviour, but instead of what could be that potential philosophical discussion, all I am seeing here is semantic jousting.

...'man in the image of God' theme as being the source of what we call 'reason' and 'ethics'. — fresco

I'm not sure to what you are referring.

I'm referring to academic believers (like Polkinghorne...nuclear physicist turned Anglican priest), who have argued that no 'prime mover' is needed to account for the physical universe, but is required to account for life, human 'reason' and 'ethics'.

As if "it exists as an abstract concept" said anything — Banno

It said something to me; maybe you weren't listening. One line ripostes get boring fast.

I can't make sense of their approach, either; there's a need for some ethical principle, therefore there must be a god...

But to call it ‘evil’ is to deny our contribution to it by our ‘natural’ resistance and fear. — Possibility

What did I call "evil"? Nothing. I wrote that the concept of God contains everything in it, although we have no way of grasping what infinity is. As far as evil is concerned, I was only referring to what occurs on this planet: that's all I can refer to. So until I know more, evil is definitely anthropomorphic. Neither humanity nor its capacity to commit evil is exterior to the concept of God.

It must be so; I've long had difficulty with the way philosophers talk about concepts.

Are there concrete concepts, to oppose to abstract concepts?

And moreover, what sort of thing is a concept?

Since I lean towards abiogenesis, and the view that 'ethics' amounts to 'folk psychology', I reject the 'need' issue.

I've long had difficulty with the way philosophers talk about concepts. — Banno

Yes, and especially in cyber-space it is very challenging to exchange ideas with others when it takes so long to find the common ground--or at the very least, understand what the other person assumes or means when she uses the word concept--, but impatience and cursory dismissal don't help to open communication and exchange of meaningful ideas.

"This sentence is not true" has no similar place. It is used to confound and entertain neophytes, instead. — Banno

Yes, agreed. There is something specifically problematic with the liar sentence ("This sentence is not true").

Imagine that you could define the True(x) predicate in arithmetic. In that case, for all possible sentences A, the following would hold:

True(g(A)) ↔ A is true in N

It would define truth in arithmetic. The problem is, however, that the diagonal lemma predicts the existence of a counterexample:

But the diagonal lemma yields a counterexample to this equivalence, by giving a "Liar" sentence S such that S ↔ ¬True(g(S)) holds in N.

The expression "S ↔ ¬True(g(S))" means "S says about itself that it does not have the property True". Hence, it is not possible to define the True() predicate in arithmetic. This result is known as Tarski's undefinability theorem.

It is no other than the liar sentence that pops up to prevent the definition of truth in arithmetic. It is simply the show-stopping bug. That thing has therefore a very specific importance in metamathematics:

Smullyan (1991, 2001) has argued forcefully that Tarski's undefinability theorem deserves much of the attention garnered by Gödel's incompleteness theorems.

The remaining problem, however, is that the diagonal lemma, which is practically the contrapositive of Tarski's undefinability, is generally considered mysterious:

Workshop on Proof Theory, Modal Logic and Reflection Principles. October 18, 2017 10:35–11:10, Moscow, Steklov Mathematical Institute.

The Diagonal Lemma (of Gödel and Carnap) is one of the fundamental results in Mathematical Logic. However, its proof (as presented in textbooks) is very un_intuitive, and a kind of “pulling a rabbit out of a hat”.

The diagonal lemma reappears in so many other results -- it trivially proves Gödel's incompleteness as well as Tarski's undefinability -- while at the same time, it is generally considered incomprehensible. Nowadays, I can "somehow work" with the diagonal lemma, but I admit that I do not fully grasp it (I wonder who does ...).

It would define truth in arithmetic. The problem is, however, that the diagonal lemma predicts the existence of a counterexample: — alcontali

Which, in the view of some, is why Godel retreated from true to provable. And, to be sure, the sentences in English are different animals from their counterparts in math-logic. The math-logic being rigorous, the English not.

Imagine that you could define the True(x) predicate in arithmetic... — alcontali

But the diagonal lemma yields a counterexample to this equivalence, by giving a "Liar" sentence S such that S ↔ ¬True(g(S)) holds in N. — alcontali

That doesn't look right.

And, to be sure, the sentences in English are different animals from their counterparts in math-logic. The math-logic being rigorous, the English not. — tim wood

Yes, in a sense that the symbolic language of first-order logic is obviously less prone to ambiguity. No, in a sense that some of the most famous proofs in math were written in natural language.

For example, John Nash's (published 1950) Nobel-prize (1994) winning theorem and proof is entirely in natural language:

----
Equilibrium points in n-person games

One may define a concept of an n-person game in which each player has a finite set of pure strategies and in which a definite set of payments to the n players corresponds to each n-tuple of pure strategies, one strategy being taken for each player.

Any n-tuple of strategies, one for each player, may be regarded as a point in the product space obtained by multiplying the n strategy spaces of the players. One such n-tuple counters another if the strategy of each player in the countering n-tuple yields the highest obtainable expectation for its player against the n − 1 strategies of the other players in the countered n-tuple. A self-countering n-tuple is called an equilibrium point.

The correspondence of each n-tuple with its set of countering n-tuples gives a one-to-many mapping of the product space into itself. From the definition of countering we see that the set of countering points of a point is convex. By using the continuity of the pay-off functions we see that the graph of the mapping is closed.

Since the graph is closed and since the image of each point under the mapping is convex, we infer from Kakutani’s theorem that the mapping has a fixed point (i.e., point contained in its image). Hence there is an equilibrium point.
----

Even though the text above is in natural-language English, it has always been considered an entirely legitimate proof.

Seems to be way off topic. Can you lead us back?

I don't want a coffee, which is why I am not currently drinking one. But I still have the ability to get myself a coffee. — Bartricks

Could "He" concentrate his entire being in, and only in, a cup of coffee, or the end of your penis, for all eternity if "He" wanted to. What would that look like?

Seems to be way off topic. Can you lead us back? — Banno

Let me try.

Concerning "omnipotence", there will necessarily exist a provable language expression:

I am omnipotent.

On the condition that omnipotence is a computable predicate which maps natural numbers onto yes/no in a theory of arithmetic that is strong enough to represent such predicates.

Weird, isn't it?

Of course, the Achilles heel of the problem is the whole idea of "computable predicate". If it is possible to readily determine if something is omnipotent or not, then it is computable.

The next problem would be to formally establish the conditions under which there will only be exactly one such provable language expression.

But how did you arrive at that conclusion?

If one is to suppose that the entire universe of space and time Is held in the hand and eye of God, then it makes no sense to me at least, to speak of God "wanting", because to want something is always to be insufficient in some way. Such a contradiction is forbidden because it makes no sense, and things that make no sense set no limit on God's potency or on anything else. They simply expose our human folly. God does not lack coffee.

So I have to conceive of God's creation as flowing not from any desire at all, but on the contrary, from a superabundance of quality - of love in that sense of love that is opposed to desire.

Just as the Great Nintendo does not lack stars or require the assistance of Mario to defeat Bowser.

What I'm particularly concerned about is why both goodness and knowledge are necessary. Doesn't this mean that knowledge, even omniscience, can't find reasons to be good. — TheMadFool

It seems fairly obvious to me that knowing things, even everything, and even how to be good, doesn't guarantee actually being good.

because to want something is always to be insufficient in some way. Such a contradiction is forbidden because it makes no sense, and things that make no sense set no limit on God's potency or on anything else. — unenlightened

First, I do not see why having a desire would be a deficiency. Far from it - a lack of desires will be a deficiency. A being who, for example, has no desire for there to be no cruelty is hardly perfect.

Perhaps what you are thinking is that to have a desire is to be in some sense frustrated. But this, I think, is not true. Imagine you are enjoying yourself and you want the enjoyment to continue and it does and your wanting it to continue is what has made it continue - well, there seems no frustration involved there. (And even if frustration is implicated - that is, if having desires does involve being frustrated to some extent - it does not seem that frustration is always a deficiency either; for instance, it would be entirely fitting to be frustrated that a free agent is behaving badly).

Second, nothing is forbidden to an omnipotent being - that's the point. The omnipotent being, to be omnipotent, would need to be Reason, and it is Reason who determines what does and doesn't make sense - so you can't take something that seems not to make sense to you and then insist that the omnipotent being is constrained to conform to your notion of what does and doesn't make sense. That notion, though it may be rational, is derived from Reason. That is, Reason determines what does and doesn't make sense. But Reason herself, being the arbiter of sense, is not bound to conform to the notion of sense she gives us. That's like thinking that if I say "one must always have tea first thing in the morning" I am somehow bound to have tea first thing in the morning. No, you can reasonably infer that I do have tea first thing in the morning - given this edict I have delivered - but you cannot reasonable infer that I am bound to do so. I am clearly not.

So I have to conceive of God's creation as flowing not from any desire at all, but on the contrary, from a superabundance of quality - of love in that sense of love that is opposed to desire. — unenlightened

Nope, no idea what that means. Love, note, involves having desires. You can't love someone and be indifferent to them. And a "superabundance of quality" - er, what's that when it's at home? Krishnamurti nonsense.

Could "He" concentrate his entire being in, and only in, a cup of coffee, or the end of your penis, for all eternity if "He" wanted to. What would that look like? — Janus

I have literally no idea what you are talking about. And let's keep my penis out of this Hugh Janus. I have no clue - none at all - what a 'concentrated being' would be (one that's had the water removed?). I don't think you do either.

But an omnipotent being can do anything. And so if 'concentrating' one's being is a thing, then obviously an omnipotent being could do it.

According to you an omnipotent being should be able to do anything; even if it were "not a thing" (whatever that means) it should be able to make it a thing. This just shows how nonsensical the whole stipulation is.

And yes I would prefer that you kept your tricky bar out of my huge anus.

You're just not getting this. What is and isn't a thing is constitutively determined by Reason. An omnipotent being would be Reason. And thus it is up to Reason what is and isn't a thing. And thus Reason can make anything a thing and then do it.

You seem to think that what you can conceive of places some limits on what an omnipotent being can do. It really doesn't.

So we have no way of knowing what is a thing and what isn't, since our reason is not determinative of what is a thing and what isn't. In that case how could we know that Reason could determine something, something which seems utterly unreasonable to our reason, to be a thing?

According to your argument our reason must be flawed because it can posit contradictions and arrive at antinomies and aporias. If this is so, as it must be, then how can we be sure that there is a divine Reason? It can't be merely because it follows from our reasoning that there must be a divine Reason, since our reason is necessarily flawed.

So we have no way of knowing what is a thing and what isn't, since our reason is not determinative of what is a thing and what isn't. — Janus

How on earth does that follow from anything I said? Of course we can know what is and isn't a thing - our reason (which are faculties, note - means of awareness) - provides us with the insight to know, and when we believe something to be a thing that Reason herself decrees to be so, and have come to believe it in manner that Reason approves of, then we know that it is a thing.

According to your argument our reason must be flawed — Janus

Again, that simply doesn't follow. It does in your mind, but that's why you need to update your mind. There's no 'must' about it. Our reason is, clearly, flawed, just as our sight is flawed, and our touch and so on. But there's no 'must' to it. There's a world of difference between saying something 'is' the case and saying that it 'must' be. I don't see at all how you got a 'must' out of it.

By your radically malfunctioning reasoning you can't know there is a computer monitor in front of you because sometimes your sight lets you down.

Anyway, you're changing the topic from one to do with the relationship between certain attributes to one to do with how we can know things - anything. So, stick to the topic and resist the urge to keep saying "how do we know?" and raising the prospect of radical scepticism at every turn.

We can know things - for knowledge is just about the right connections existing between a belief, the truth and reasons. The idea that those connections have to be bonds of steel that can never come apart is, I think, a massive exaggeration.

The important point where this debate is concerned is that an omnipotent being can yellow a seven.

Of course we can know what is and isn't a thing - our reason (which are faculties, note - means of awareness) - provides us with the insight to know, and when we believe something to be a thing that Reason herself decrees to be so, and have come to believe it in manner that Reason approves of, then we know that it is a thing. — Bartricks

And yet you say:

And so if 'concentrating' one's being is a thing, then obviously an omnipotent being could do it. — Bartricks

Which indicates that you are not sure if "concentrating one's being" is a thing. We cannot imagine God being able to create a stone so heavy that He cannot lift it and yet being able to lift to be a "thing"; according to our reason it is a contradiction, antinomy that results form our theological stipulation that God must be omnipotent and not even governed by reason as we understand it (although some medieval theological thinkers acknowledged that God must be governed by reason, that is could not act contrary to reason, because the alternative leads to the sovereignty of the irrational).

Again, that simply doesn't follow. It does in your mind, but that's why you need to update your mind. There's no 'must' about it. Our reason is, clearly, flawed (I mean, it seems self-evident to me that yours is), just as our sight is flawed, and our touch and so on. But there's no 'must' to it. There's a world of difference between saying something 'is' the case and saying that it 'must' be. — Bartricks

This is where you depart from reason. You say our reason is clearly flawed, and yet you say that it is not the case that it must be flawed. In any case the "must" there in my original statement was meant to indicate that we must conclude, not that it is an ontological necessity (although it might be), that our reason is flawed. You acknowledge that our reason is flawed, so how can you trust it to deliver the truth of being? Descartes ultimately relies on his faith that "god would not deceive us". But this is faith, not reason. And our own reason clearly does, since it is flawed as you acknowledge, deceive us.

Like I say, now you are derailing the debate. You are asking questions about how we can know things - anything. That's a huge question and not one directly relevant to the issue under debate here.

Where this debate is concerned, the issue is to do with the relationship between certain attributes - omnipotence, omnibenevolence and omniscience.

What I have argued is that from omnipotence we can get the others. For an omnipotent being has the power to do anything whatsoever. An omnipotent being can therefore be whatever they want to be. An omnipotent being is not going to be a way they do not want to be (they have the power to be, but that's different).

An omnipotent being has the power to make anything morally valuable, because being morally valuable involves being valued by Reason and an omnipotent being would be Reason because otherwise the omnipotent being would be bound by Reason (which is incompatible with being omnipotent).

So, because an omnipotent will be Reason, and because an omnipotent being is going to approve of her own character, then an omnipotent being will be morally good.

Which indicates that you are not sure if "concentrating one's being" is a thing. — Janus

Yes, I don't know what that is. Our source of insight into what's a thing and what's not a thing is our reason. And my reason says that, until more clarifying information is supplied, 'concentrating one's being' is not a thing. That is, not an intelligible activity. I mean, how can I 'be' more intensely? I genuinely don't know what you're talking about. Buddhists and Krishnamurti fans and continental philosophers would nod approvingly at such utterances (which counts for nothing, of course, as that's just the kind of thing they nod approvingly at, as one might to a certain drumbeat). But I don't know what you're on about.

There are coherent activities - going for a walk, lifting rocks, thinking things - and there are incoherent ones - yellowing a seven, concentrating one's being. The omnipotent being has control over what is and isn't coherent. But that doesn't mean that nothing is incoherent. I mean, that doesn't follow at all. No, some things really are incoherent.

She, the omnipotent being, can do anything. Not just anything that is currently coherent, but anything at all. Why? Because she determines what is coherent and what is not. What greater power could there be than that?

First, I do not see — Bartricks

Yup.