'rather than discussing it in a framework familiar to me', you mean. If it can't be reduced to the kinds of terms that physicalists can comprehend, then you say I'm talking about a 'subjective feeling'. But to try and explain why it's not a subjective feeling, requires you think outside the square that you wish me to step into. — Wayfarer

No. I mean framework which we share, prior to the conclusions you or I draw. That's the only way discussion can proceed. You say "to try and explain why it's not a subjective feeling, requires you think outside the square that you wish me to step into", but this still begs the question. It wouldn't constitute an explanation, if I already took the step I'm asking you to justify.

The argument against mysticism (here at least) is that it rejects any form of falsification, yet doesn't specify what falsification is to be replaced with as a means of collective maintenance of concepts. And I don't mean falsification in the PhilSci Popperian sense, I mean it in the community-of-language-users sense. It's the very means by which we meaningfully communicate with each other, our joint holding of concepts, our discovery of those community resources by trial and error. The key word there being 'error'.

Without the possibility of error we have Wittgenstein's 'sensation S' - meaningless garbage.

So if you can't explain why I'm using 'subjective' wrongly using words which already have a shared community concept attached to them, if I must first buy in to your alternate language, then all I'm doing is translation, and translation is a two way process. You could as easily do the same.

From the link:

(life) does not merely exist in accord with the laws of physics and chemistry; rather, it is telling the meaningful story of its own life

I mean... humans as individual entities are both at once. We're quantum shit interacting to bring atoms interacting to bring molecules interacting to bring chemicals interacting to bring chemical processes interacting to bring intracellular bodies and systems interacting to bring cells interacting to bring cellular systems; like tissues, neurons; interacting to bring organs (and other distinct functional units) interacting to bring bodily systems interacting to bring bodies interacting with themselves and their environment to bring minds.

If you follow that chain backwards, you'll notice that it neatly tracks the temporal order of their emergence in the universe. This is not a coincidence (cosmogenesis->abiogenesis->evolution->"the first eye opening"). Components contingently organise into systems which are components contingently organised into systems which are components...

The more general ontological point about agency? Agency's just one way to get shit done.

... humans ...We're quantum shit interacting to bring atoms interacting to bring molecules interacting to bring chemicals interacting to bring chemical processes interacting to bring intracellular bodies and systems interacting to bring cells interacting to bring cellular systems; like tissues, neurons; interacting to bring organs (and other distinct functional units) interacting to bring bodily systems interacting to bring bodies interacting with themselves to bring minds.

If you follow that chain backwards, you'll notice that it neatly tracks the temporal order of their emergence in the universe. This is not a coincidence (cosmogenesis->abiogenesis->evolution). Components contingently organise into systems which are components contingently organised into systems which are components...

The more general ontological point about agency? Agency's just one way to get shit done. — fdrake

:up: :up:

Another nice thing about the hierarchy; our mind's distinctive features are relatively impotent in it - you can will your leg to move, but that doesn't mean you instruct your skin, sub-tissues, cellular systems, intracellular environments, chemical processes etc. Our thoughts only resonate on the higher order components; no mere thought or sensation determines the fluctuations of the iron atoms in our haemoglobin. It's almost as if minds require the presence of the lower order interactions in the chain to make sense of their being (what, how, why minds are).

you can will your leg to move, but that doesn't mean you instruct your skin, sub-tissues, cellular systems, intracellular environments, chemical processes etc. — fdrake

I'm not sure if this is what you were getting at, so either to expand, or to contrast your approach..

Something like The Will is not only unable to effect matter lower down in the heirachy, it is simply incoherent to talk about it doing so. The Will is a component of a model in human activity. Yes, it describes a sensation we have that some action is of our doing (as opposed to external, or instinctual), but it's so much more than that (responsibility, moral culpability, identity... ) which is absolutely fine at the level of human activity because all that stuff is useful at that scale.

Take the basic concept down to the scale of neurons interacting (which can be done, carefully) and all that baggage comes with it, but makes no sense whatsoever at that scale.

It's almost as if minds require presence of the lower order interactions in the chain to make sense of their being. — fdrake

There isn't any theory of consciousness that goes beyond explaining functions. That there is a "what it's like" aspect to consciousness is plain. Science hasn't gotten there yet.

Science also doesn't have a picture of what happened at the very beginning of the big bang. So science drops away from the beginning and end of the story you're wanting to tell.

IOW, it's not a scientific story you're telling.

it is simply incoherent to talk about it doing so. — Isaac

which is absolutely fine at the level of human activity because all that stuff is useful at that scale. — Isaac

Aye. Intention makes the most sense as a folk psychological concept and part of our social ontology IMO; but I would be extremely surprised if there wasn't an autonomous decision making process that bodies and minds together can do, that corresponds somehow with felt qualities associated with decision making. A "top down" causation of the body's self model on the body.

That there is a "what it's like" aspect to consciousness is plain. — frank

Sorry, I don't feel this. Can you explain it to me?

Sorry, I don't feel this. Can you explain it to me? — fdrake

What?

What? — frank

I just don't understand. Felt what is it like-ness? First person? Guess I just don't experience it like that.

I would be extremely surprised if there wasn't an autonomous decision making process that bodies and minds together can do, that corresponds somehow with felt qualities associated with decision making. A "top down" causation of the body's self model on the body. — fdrake

Yeah. Again, off topic, but some interesting work has been done on possibly connecting the parts of the brain responsible for distinguishing self from other to the experience of willing something. It's mostly looking at it from the point of view of understanding some types of psychosis, but it's a promising line of enquiry with regards to both where the sense of willing comes from and what it's evolutionary origin might be. It's possible that all the hugely complex structure of human identity derives from a simple mechanism to distinguish actions precipitated by the frontal cortex from actions precipitated from the amygdala. Too reductionist...?

where everything is made up equivalently of energy or information as its fundamental substrate, — Pfhorrest

Energy or information as ontic simples seem incoherent to me.

As far as theories go, the idea that experience is related to consciousness is pretty sound. — Isaac

Do you see a difference between "is related to" and "reduces to"?

the obverse of ennui. — ZzzoneiroCosm

That is a very good way of describing the “mystical experiences” that I have had, and just as I earlier in this thread described how I’ve observed such ennui to negatively impact my ability to think clearly and rationally, so too these “mystical experiences” seem to have a strong positive impact on the same.

Having experience with bipolar disorder, there are also strong similarities between those two states and depressive and manic states, respectively.

During “mystical” or manic states I’ve had some of my most profound philosophical insights, some of which of course did not later stand up to more sober scrutiny but some of which did.

Friends who have done LSD tell me that I sometimes sound like someone who just came back from a really good trip, the “mind-opening” kind.

I don’t attach any epistemic or ontological significance to any of this, these are all just emotional states of mind to me that are ultimately explainable in neurological terms, but I can’t deny that such states of mind can make a significant difference, in either direction, on my ability to reason clearly and insightfully.

ADDENDUM: It strikes me now that just as I earlier described ennui/angst as arationally generating a false need for “meaning” where there is no rational question, so too “mystical experiences” as I have had are most notably characterized by a profound but not necessarily rationally grounded feeling of meaningfulness.

Do you see a difference between "is related to" and "reduces to"? — frank

Yeah, but only in that being merely related to involves some other component, whereas being reducible to means one thing entirely consists of the other.

In the case of consciousness though, I'm just using the term colloquially. Why would we theorise some additional factor which might go toward constituting consciousness?

We make a presumption in predicting the weather that it's entirely reducible to the motion of particles, we can't demonstrate that it is because it's too complicated, but we don't then invoke some mystic woo, just because we can. So I can't think of any reason not to say that ontologically, consciousness is simply something that brains do.

Do you have some reason for wanting to add some additional constituent (other than brains), that wouldn't also apply to every physical system too complex to describe reductively?

Yeah, but only in that being merely related to involves some other component, whereas being reducible to means one thing entirely consists of the other.

In the case of consciousness though, I'm just using the term colloquially. Why would we theorise some additional factor which might go toward constituting consciousness? — Isaac

Let's review: drake presented a scenario that seemed to span from cosmology to neuroscience. I pointed out that he doesnt have bookends for that stack (which I thought might lead him to back off of the forthrightness and own it as more opinion than science).

You advised me that at least one side of his story is solid: that we do have a robust theory of consciousness that explains phenomenal experience satisfactorily.

But then you seemed to back away from that, and you argue that though we lack a robust theory, we need not expect a scientific revolution to cover phenomenal experience.

You may be right, but we don't know that because, as I said originally to troll boy, we don't have a complete theory of consciousness.

We don't do science by eliminating any path that might turn the world upside down for us. We follow crazy ideas because we're courageous and flexible.

ADDENDUM: It strikes me now that just as I earlier described ennui/angst as arationally generating a false need for “meaning” where there is no rational question, so too “mystical experiences” as I have had are most notably characterized by a profound but not necessarily rationally grounded feeling of meaningfulness. — Pfhorrest

Thanks for your thoughts.

If it's true that a mind at every moment locates itself along an ennui-to-meaningfulness continuum it would seem rational to distance the mind as far as possible from ennui - ennui is a kind of human suffering - without, of course, drifting toward a non-rational metaphysical commitment. Possibly, the human mind is under fundamental pressure to extract meaningfulness from its world.

It would take a book, although one thing I could say is that it(materialism) provides no account of meaning — Wayfarer

Which makes it incomplete. Not fallacious.

Back more on topic...

I like that line of thought so much I’m planning on majorly expanding the last chapter of my philosophy book to address it, this relationship between ennui or the feeling of meaninglessness or the Absurd, and its polar opposite, the feeling of profound meaningfulness, cosmic love, like a noncognitively religious or mystical experience. I’m thinking of calling them ontophobia (existential fear) and ontophilia (existential love).

Atheism is crucial to all viewpoints using the terms God, no god, creator, no creator, etc. and vice-versa.

I'm agnostic about the origens of the universe. Atheism and Theism are both crucial to that as well.

Which is precisely, like you said, talking out of one's ass. — god must be atheist

Yep. That's the fun. If we aren't talking out of asses, we are burrowing/examining someone else's shit, are we not?

Arguing about panpsychism is really beyond the scope of this thread.

The more salient point is that having my philosophical opinions didn’t send me spiraling into desperate search of meaning. I philosophized for decades holding broadly similar opinions all the while before this kind of angst started to afflict me. Philosophy is neither the cause of nor solution to existential angst. It’s just a mental health condition.

Arguing about panpsychism is really beyond the scope of this thread. — Pfhorrest

Yes, of course! .. but some things need to be said.

The more salient point is that having my philosophical opinions didn’t send me spiraling into desperate search of meaning. — Pfhorrest

Yes, that is true, but I am saying that your philosophy is a conduit for the attack. Philosophy is instrumental in mental health: the way that we think is, in fact, the manifestation of the spirit.

I philosophized for decades holding broadly similar opinions all the while before this kind of angst started to afflict me. — Pfhorrest

That really doesn't work as an argument though (I just have to say).

Philosophy is neither the cause of nor solution to existential angst. It’s just a mental health condition. — Pfhorrest

But, it is precisely your philosophy that lends you to believe (and follow) the thinking that keeps you from knowing the real cause of the mental health condition, is a spiritual attack.

would be extremely surprising that there were two different flavours of consciousness, that agree with each other almost all the time, but differ solely in whether they agree or disagree with (the framing of) a philosophical point. — fdrake

Yes it would. Truth is stranger than fiction.

Truth is stranger than fiction — frank

While things aren't always what they appear to be, they usually are.

It’s no secret that Dennett is a moist robot, although he also paid his way through college playing jazz piano, which earns immediate respect from me.

While things aren't always what they appears to be, they usually are. — fdrake

I dont even know what means. :rofl:

I dont even know what means. — frank

You can have another koan then!

We should learn to be more surprised by falsehoods than by truths.

We should learn to be more surprised by falsehoods than by truths. — fdrake

You're like somebody's grandpa, "Stop your wild speculations and simmer down! Goddammit. Wheres my pipe?"

Wheres my pipe? — frank

I miss my pipe.

All of this is often portrayed as falling naturally out of something we all feel. — fdrake

The same is true of Marxism btw, and that's not a coincidence. The word "robot" comes from an author's lament about what capitalism tries to turn people into. And from there it became a rich vein of sci-fi speculation.

But I share your concern about grand ontological projects gliding past large gaps in our understanding. That is exactly what I was warning you about with your hierarchy theory.