Let's start this way: three terms: god, religion, theology. Pick one, and start your post with "God is," or "Religion is," or "Theology is." — tim wood

Religion is a set of beliefs that consists of two parts.

The transcendental part are rituals, prayers, festivities, and similar behaviours. The religous-law part is a set of rules that forbid particular behaviour types and from which the believer can derive the moral status of the behaviour he intends to engage in.

It is the religious-law part that tends to cause political issues.

Politicians may argue that their lawmaking activity would be above religious law, while religious communities will insist that it is exactly the other way around. Since I benefit from anything that damages the political power of the ruling elite, I definitely side with the religious view.

In other cases, I do not even seek to side with one, particular party, because I already benefit from the mere existence of the conflict. I find the position of the arms trader to be the most interesting. That is especially so, when it is possible to simultaneously sell weapons to both sides.

Logic is only the form of reason, evidence is its substance. Reason means offering exactly that, reasons, to (dis)favor one opinion vs another.

Quiddities, genus/species, special features, four causes? It seems strange that a crew of smart people couldn't have been more specific. — tim wood

Comparative religion covered a very broad range of material. But there was a big emphasis on 'history of ideas'. 'The history of ideas is a field of research in history that deals with the expression, preservation, and change of human ideas over time. The history of ideas is a sister-discipline to, or a particular approach within, intellectual history. ...The historian Arthur O. Lovejoy (1873–1962) coined the phrase and initiated its systematic study in the early decades of the 20th century.'

Personally, the history of ideas has really shaped my approach to philosophy also, insofar as I tend to understand it in terms of underlying themes or tropes that you can trace in different cultures and historical epochs. Another unwritten factor behind that is the kind of minds or forms of consciousness associated with different cultural epochs - minds vastly different from our own which moderns will usually find extremely hard or impossible to comprehend (although will be generally quick to categorise as simply archaic and of no relevance on those grounds).

'Old school' comparative religion tended to be very conservative and based on the field work and observations of anthropology and sociology, but also incorporated theories of religion, such as studies from, and criticism of, well-known texts like The Golden Bough - A Study in Comparative Religion by anthropologist Sir James George Frazer. Also Durkheim, Max Weber, Peter Berger (another favourite) and many names that now escape me.

One scholar that I really liked was Max Mueller. I found his work on 'linguistic archeology' and the common roots of the Indo-European languages utterly fascinating.

My own approach was driven by an interest in the spiritual enlightenment pointed out by such luminaries as Ramana Maharishi (30 December 1879 – 14 April 1950) an Indian sage and jivanmukta (liberated being), born Venkataraman Iyer, but most commonly known by the name Bhagavan Sri Ramana Maharshi.

Also by Swami Vivekananda who introduced Advaita Vedanta to the US in the late 19th century and underwent long speaking tours by train.

And also Soyen Shaku who spoke alongside Vivekananda at the Parliament of Religions which was held in Chicago, 1880's. He was the first Rinzai Zen monk to speak in the US, and his reprinted Lectures of a Buddhist Abbott still stand up quite well (and are still in print).

It was these kinds of books (along with Alan Watts and D. T. Suzuki), mainly discovered via the then-thriving Adyar (Theosophical Society) bookshop, that drove my interest in comparative religion in the first place, as it seemed the most likely faculty in which to find discussion of those kinds of teachings and ideas.

In a way it was, but again old-school comparative religion was very much arms-length, you studied religions like you might study species of butterfly pinned to a board, and it was in no way 'confessional' in orientation (as it ought not to be). But this had begun to change in the mid-20th century with the advent of 'scholar-practitioners', of whom a famous example was the Romanian scholar Mercia Eliade. His works were quite influential in the Department. Also Huston Smith, who died not that long ago at 97, and who was an eclectic scholar-practitioner.

. So I conclude that the essential meaning of "religion" is "tradition" : a link to the past. — Gnomon

Can't completely agree - while it is of course true that 'tradition' means 'to carry forward', but the idea of 'joining' or 'union', as in 'union with the divine' (or theosis or apotheosis) is not temporally-bound in any way. The tradition is seen in some sense as a vessel for preserving the gist of such teachings, but from their perspective, the subject is 'the deathless'.

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I think one thing that hasn't been stated in this thread, is the role of, or idea of gnosis, or 'higher knowledge'. It is universally assumed by the participants here that religion is invariably a matter of belief, and by most people, belief in non-existent mythological figures.

However, of the many tributaries that formed what became known as 'religion', were streams such as shamanism, yoga, and other such disciplines, traces of which you even find in Pre-socratic Greek philosophy (and for that matter, related to the Orphism of Plato). Amongst these streams also was what were to become various gnostic schools, which were generally, and successfully, suppressed by the nascent Roman Church in its formative stages. "History", it is said, "is written by the victors" - and no more so than in this matter. So the idea of there being higher states, direct knowledge, and so on, which are relatively commonplace in Hindu and Buddhist schools, more or less went underground in Western culture, which has had many profound consequences for the 'history of ideas' in the West.

there are many groups which disagree with the statement that religions are always a human creation — Samuel Lacrampe

I suppose a bunch of somebodies will disagree with the statement that 2 + 2 = 4. Be that as it may...

I think religion is ALWAYS a human creation. This isn't a reflection on the gods. Suppose that the gods are real. Religion, as @Wayfarer said, is "an attitude of awe and reverence to the gods". If a people have an encounter with a god, they are likely to feel awe, fear (or terror), reverence, and more all to overwhelming degrees. Religion is the response to an encounter with the holy, a connection. Since the gods thought to be real don't conveniently pop in every day religion finds ways of recreating the encounter. The Eucharist, Passover, the gods in the Hindu temples, meditation practices, ascetic practices, and so forth provide a way for subsequent generations to share (symbolically) the encounter.

That religion (a response to the holy) is a human creation would seem axiomatic. The gods do not need religion.

In some religions (thinking here of the classical period) the gods were thought to need sacrifices. A passage in the Epic of Gilgamesh states that when a sacrifice of burnt offerings was being made, "The gods gathered around the altar like flies". The gods were hungry. Since the gods didn't literally descend from the heavens and consume the sacrifice, the sacrifice was eaten by humans, and thus shared with the gods. In other references, libations are poured out on the ground for the gods. I don't know how many extant religions operate with that idea.

Without any consensus, discussions tend to fall apart. — tim wood

With this I can agree. However I do not agree that it follows that we ought start with agreement as to our various definitions. Much off philosophy, essecialy Socratic method and linguistic analysis, shows this to be not just unnecessary but counterproductive.

A better approach would be to map out the differences...

With this I can agree. However I do not agree that it follows that we ought start with agreement as to our various definitions. Much off philosophy, essecialy Socratic method and linguistic analysis, shows this to be not just unnecessary but counterproductive.

A better approach would be to map out the differences... — Banno

Absolutely. Definitions can't be treated as if they were some technical matter enabling the true meat of a discussion, definitions are what a discussion consists of entirely. To really agree on definitions is to just agree. The reason why we can't agree on a definition of God/Religion/Theology is because they are no mere acts of taxonomy, the meaning of the words is their use and their use is intimately tied to people's lifestyles, identity etc. You can no more easily get someone to give an inch on a definition than you can persuade them to act this way or that, best to simply present alternatives.

What is faith? — 180 Proof

Elephantine, indeed. A species of belief, to be sure; but not a species of truth. Mapping out the differences and similarities between faith and certainty might be interesting.

Sure; but it doesn't stop the discussion. Take

God:
Is that which nothing greater can exist — Samuel Lacrampe

Ridding Anselm's notion of inconsistency is a work of ages...

Sure; but it doesn't stop the discussion. Take

God:
Is that which nothing greater can exist — Samuel Lacrampe


Ridding Anselm's notion of inconsistency is a work of ages... — Banno

True, but in the meantime I can at least relax in my favourite armchair (or God, as I call it). The armchair than which no greater armchair can exist.

I majored in comparative religion. In the first class we sort of ‘workshopped’ possible definitions of religion. We found, to my surprise, that we couldn’t arrive at one; that every proposed definition couldn’t accomodate some form of religion. — Wayfarer

A family resemblance, then. Given any definition of religion, there is some item that counts as religious and yet does not fit that definition...

And yet some things must be taken as given in order for the discussion to even begin.

Perhaps it would be worth while attempting to discuss ‘god’, ‘religion’ and ‘theology’ without using those terms.

BAN those terms from the discussion but keep them in the title. Then people will have to reconsider how to express their views by other means.

That could be a fruitful means of finding some common terminology if not a universal concept everyone can partially agree with.

No matter how it is approached I don’t see a way to get away from bringing up terms and phrases like ‘rational’, ‘emotional content’, ‘universal pattern’ and/or ‘learned habit’.

I’d be up for the above or an in-depth discussion on Geertz def. If you start a thread along either of those lines let me know.

Thanks

faith", in the context of this discussion, is the belief supported by the probable or the reasonable, regarding religious claims. — Samuel Lacrampe

Just because Tom Aquinas says it doesn't make it so. All of these arguments are easily deconstructed these days: probability and reason cannot prove the contents of faith.

So did we ever decide which topic to focus on? The discussion seems to meander all over the place.

What is faith?
— 180 Proof

Elephantine, indeed. A species of belief, to be sure; but not a species of truth. Mapping out the differences and similarities between faith and certainty might be interesting. — Banno

:up:

Might be.

:mask: - "hygiene"

In the context of Biblical, Vedic and other extant theistic traditions wherein worship consists in submission of the child/female/servant/Profane to the elder/male/master/Sacred, Faith denotes trusting hopeful dutiful worship (via second-hand anecdotal accounts (e.g. revealed)) of Mysteries.

At further remove, as I discern it, Faith is nothing but magical thinking, that is, trust hope confidence in Supernatural Mysteries (via "thoughts & prayers") over above defeasible thinking vis-à-vis Natural Evident Problemata (via reflective inquiry & problem-solving) -- and positing all 'meaning & value' in terms of any one of  arbitrarily countless, otherworldly, spiritual Hereafters at the expense of demeaning & devaluing this worldly, ineluctably singular, physical Here & Now.

Faith doesn't have to be blind, like love or hatred, to be blinding like staring at the midday sun. 'Believing is seeing' the Faithful preach trumping 'seeing is believing' (e.g. "Crede ut intellegas" ~Augustine ... "Credo quia absurdum" ~Tertullian(?) ... Indeed, the NT says, “I will destroy the wisdom of the wise and frustrate the intelligence of the intelligent." ~1 Corinthians 1:19).

But isn't this 'disposition' retrograde? degenerative? infantilizing? As babies we learn to believe long before in later childhood we learn to think adequately, and longer still before, if ever, we learn to think for ourselves; yet Faith consists in prioritizing 'believing over thinking' - imploring us to be "Born Again", which sounds like willing a prematurely senescent 'second childhood'.

:eyes: - "gesundheit"

There are religious cranks..... :roll:

And there are also secular bigots.

Indeed, the Tanakh says, “I will destroy the wisdom of the wise and frustrate the intelligence of the intelligent." ~1 Corinthians 1:19). — 180 Proof

I just want to point out that this quote isn't in the TANAKH; just in New Testament.

Faith is nothing but magical thinking — 180 Proof

This seems correct: magical thinking, which is an infantile mode, is quite comforting. It reduces complexities to simple answers; one definitely doesn't have to think as much (unless they have to go on a proselytizing campaign and think up ways to convince people to accept the same tenets of faith. In that sense, Paul was an excellent salesman.) It even stops all sorts of nagging questions from arising in the first place. It neatly ties up all sorts of loose ends. I always thought this was the purpose of faith..., no?

Can't completely agree - while it is of course true that 'tradition' means 'to carry forward', but the idea of 'joining' or 'union', as in 'union with the divine' (or theosis or apotheosis) is not temporally-bound in any way. The tradition is seen in some sense as a vessel for preserving the gist of such teachings, but from their perspective, the subject is 'the deathless'. — Wayfarer

Yes. But I was talking about the physical motivation behind the felt human need for union with Mother, Father, Family, Tribe, and God. That urge to unite is "deathless" as long as it has roots in human nature. And Culture, including Religion, is the offspring of Human Nature, which is an outgrowth of Physical Nature, and so forth.

External traditions (e.g memes; ceremonies) are symbolic cultural models of inner natural emotions. When we observe Hindus bathing in the Ganges, and Baptists immersed in rivers or water tanks, we can see the common human urge for purging and purification. Inner Meanings are preserved and propagated in outer traditions.

Every time we use empty names like these in a sentence they mean something in a relevant language-game but not in others. "Meaning is usage", no? Anyway, skim the wiki for empty name I again link here and you'll be hard pressed to object to my definition of "God" in a serious manner. The Rorschach-like semantic baggage of this (transcendental) signifier in particular nearly screams "Empty Name" . — 180 Proof

I'm really not Atalanta, 180; you may care, then, to keep your golden "balls" safely in your hand for a different chase. Which is what your "empty name" amounts to - that is, a distraction not here relevant.

From the site you referenced:
"There are no empty names. All names have a referent. The difficulty with this theory is how to distinguish names like "Pegasus" from names like "Aristotle."... Some philosophers, such as Alexius Meinong have argued that there are two senses of the verb "exists", exemplified by the sentence "there are things that do not exist". The first, signified by "there are", is the so-called "wide sense", including Pegasus, the golden mountain, the round square, and so on. The second, signified by "exist" is the so-called "narrow sense", encompassing only things that are real or existent. The difficulty with this "two sense" theory is that there is no strong evidence that there really are two such distinct senses of the verb "to be".

Justice, freedom, liberty, & etc.; or even two, three, & etc.? "But these are abstract!" you might argue. Fair enough, you want words - nouns presumably - that have "referents." How about horse, pig, or cow.
Strictly speaking, these have no referents either. If you say they do, horses and pigs and cows, I then ask, which one?

The idea of deflating and dismissing a something because in some arcane semantic sense you're not able to pin a tail on its ass may be useful in some circumstance, but doesn't touch the fact that in referring to unicorns and Pegasus and Nessie, most people have a reasonably clear idea of what is referred to. So why do it here? God is a word with meaning. What meaning may be a good question, even one that, surprise, is being looked into here. Does reason in any sense dictate we terminate the discussion as nonsense because "God" is an empty name - particularly and especially because it manifestly is not?

However I do not agree that it follows that we ought start with agreement as to our various definitions. Much of philosophy, especially Socratic method and linguistic analysis, shows this to be not just unnecessary but counterproductive. — Banno

Really? is it not so that the substance of most if not all Socratic dialogues starts with some form of "What is..."? Then Socrates butchers the proffered answer, not so much to show that the answer doesn't hold, but that the thing itself is not-so-easy to define? That is, they all start with definition.

Did you note in the OP reference to two kinds of definitions? One the always already agreed to and established, and the other contingently granted "for the sake of argument," that could turn out to be not the case?

Of course we start with definitions all the time, else even communication fails. Most of these called "common understandings," even when they're not so common. Perhaps you're thinking of arguments of dictionary against dictionary, or dictionary against no-dictionary. But I should like to think that most of us are beyond that. I call for preliminary definitions as starting points. If we (find that we) cannot even start, we ought to acknowledge that, institutionalize it, and in consequence close and seal off all further philosophy of religion topics as being intrinsically non-sensical.

What is faith? — 180 Proof

A deliberate decision to place one's confidence in belief. For my purposes, I look for a blend of the Kantian felicity that faith (in place of the knowledge that is denied - because inaccessible) gives to thinking on matters of ethics and religion/God, that cannot otherwise be known; and the Heideggerian questions of the as-structure of faith; i.e., what does it mean to have faith, and what is faith, when it is functioning as faith.

There is in this no affirmation of a particular existent, indeed, arguably, there cannot be. Instead it's utility. what it's good for. And for a lot of things, it would seem that faith is better than nothing. Whether or not we are, or are not, better people for having faith - or having no faith - seems an interesting question. But as is characteristic of this topic, such questions need to be approached before being asked outright.

Really? is it not so that the substance of most if not all Socratic dialogues starts with some form of "What is..."? Then Socrates butchers the proffered answer, not so much to show that the answer doesn't hold, but that the thing itself is not-so-easy to define? That is, they all start with definition. — tim wood

...and are, as you say, butchered. Socrates knows that he knows nothing; further, as demonstrated by his method, nor does anyone else, since they cannot provide definitions that will stand.

Did you note in the OP reference to two kinds of definitions? One the always already agreed to and established, and the other contingently granted "for the sake of argument," that could turn out to be not the case? — tim wood

Yep. It doesn't help.

Of course we start with definitions all the time, else even communication fails. — tim wood

Well, no. We start with some agreement, sure; we don't need preliminary definitions. Indeed, the thread seems to be doing well despite their absence.

Per Kierkegaard, faith is like floating in water that is 70,000 fathoms deep and mainly has to do with forgiveness.

Socrates knows that he knows nothing; further, as demonstrated by his method, nor does anyone else, since they cannot provide definitions that will stand. — Banno

Though he still manages to believe that beauty=knowledge=virtue. That death is not important. That people do evil out of ignorance. (and if he knows nothing, how does he avoid this?) He certainly seemd to have epistemological beliefs; iow he has his process for demonstrating ideas are incorrect. He seemed to know the qualities that made up virtue; courage for example. He seemed to be a dualist, since our true self was our soul - not like the Christian soul but neverless not the body, but the internal thinking and deciding self - rather than what we own and status, etc.

Of course this is all reported by others, but then so is his quote about his knowing he knows nothing.

god, religion, theology — tim wood

I prefer to just assume that one is using one of the standard definitions (a la those found in major dictionaries, encyclopedias, etc.), unless one specifies otherwise.

God is a word with meaning. What meaning may be a good question, even one that, surprise, is being looked into here. — tim wood

Of course empty names can be meaningful; I've repeatedly said (shown) as much already (re: theology, etc) . And the OP asks for a definition "God is ..." and not an interpretation (or testimonial) e.g. "God means ..." so moving the goal-posts now is just ... evasive. :yawn:

Does reason in any sense dictate we terminate the discussion as nonsense because "God" is an empty name - — tim wood

What are you talking about? I've neither attempted to nor implied we should "terminate the discussion" in any way for any reason; in fact, I'd hope to spur us on to a more rigorous (i.e. logical-semantic or epistemological or even ontological) level than the usually pedestrian liturgical/mysterian apologia. Apparently, you, tim, are not interested in - capable of(?) - a more freethought (i.e. atheological) approach.

d hope to spur us on to a more rigorous (i.e. logical-semantic or epistemological or even ontological) level than the usually pedestrian liturgical/mysterian apologia. — 180 Proof

As for definitions of the 'ground of being':

one infinite source of all that is: eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, uncreated, uncaused, transcendent to, but also immanent in, all beings.

From review of D B Hart 'The Experience of God'.

Faith is gone in that context.

The necessity of ground of being allows for no counterfactual. If we understand the ground of being, we know nothing is given without it. We have nothing to just trust, sans reason.

Indeed, we are in the exact opposite position to faith: reason has given us understanding of that which is beyond death and possibility.

Though he still manages to believe that beauty=knowledge=virtue. That death is not important. That people do evil out of ignorance. (and if he knows nothing, how does he avoid this?) He certainly seemd to have epistemological beliefs; iow he has his process for demonstrating ideas are incorrect. He seemed to know the qualities that made up virtue; courage for example. He seemed to be a dualist, since our true self was our soul - not like the Christian soul but neverless not the body, but the internal thinking and deciding self - rather than what we own and status, etc.

Of course this is all reported by others, but then so is his quote about his knowing he knows nothing. — Coben

All good points. He abases himself to be exalted. I like Socrates, but he's only different from other gurus on the level of quality. He's not playing a different game altogether or refusing to play the game. To engage in conversation at all is already a self-assertion, a claim on attention, respect, trust, etc. And then a truly ignorant person is not only useless but dangerous.

If knowledge of our own ignorance is the most important kind of knowledge, then somehow this wonderful humility ends up back on top. What a surprise...

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