No, there's no 'we'. That too is just something inside our minds. — Isaac
I quite specifically said I imagine a heterogeneous sea of stuff, not a uniform one. I imagine variations in many possible fields, — Isaac
I can convince your mind that the table is a part of your body in less than two minutes. — Isaac
I can convince your mind that the table is a part of your body in less than two minutes. — Isaac
There's no "we," but there's an "our"? — Terrapin Station
So the "lumpiness" is a way it is, no? — Terrapin Station
By the way: — Terrapin Station
I'd definitely make a wager on that. — Terrapin Station
Not sure what you mean here. — Isaac
Yes, I think I'd grant that. I can see where you might be going - to say that at least something has at least one property. — Isaac
Right, but what is useful in knowing what form the bat's consciousness takes? Are we trying to get at what the bat knows, or the form its knowledge takes, or what, and why?The purpose is to underscore that if bats have conscious experiences--and presumably they do have some sorts of conscious experiences, then (a) those experiences are probably quite different from human conscious experiences (if for no other reason than they have some very different faculties than we do, such as an ability to employ echolocation with high precision during high-speed flight), and (b) it's not possible from a third-person perspective, a perspective which is the only one from which we can talk about bat consciousness (and bat brains if we're physicalists or "reductionists" as Nagel puts it in his paper), to know the properties of the conscious experiences of bats, from the bat's perspective, as the bat knows the same. — Terrapin Station
Right, but what is useful in knowing what form the bat's consciousness takes? Are we trying to get at what the bat knows, or the form its knowledge takes, or what, and why? — Harry Hindu
Science is asking what the problem is. Again, what is what is useful in knowing what form the bat's consciousness takes? Are we trying to get at what the bat knows, or the form its knowledge takes, or what, and why?It's underscoring a problem with developing a scientific account of mind. — Terrapin Station
Science is asking what the problem is. Again, what is what is useful in knowing what form the bat's consciousness takes? Are we trying to get at what the bat knows, or the form its knowledge takes, or what, and why? — Harry Hindu
Right, it's a property of that object reflect[ing] that wavelength of EMR, and it's also a property of your experience per se (which is what qualia are). — Terrapin Station
I want to ask: is it a disposition or ability to reflect the certain wavelength? — bongo fury
That's not what it is with respect to our experience, though--our mental phenomena don't reflect that wavelength of EMR. — Terrapin Station
but one is extensional relations and the other is an electromagnetic frequency. — Terrapin Station
So the colour quales and shape quales are distinguished in our experience by something which is not reflected in our experience. — fdrake
How can there be an "our" if there's no "we"? — Terrapin Station
Yeah, that's a property. In fact, even a homogeneous soup that's indeterminate would be properties. Since properties are simply ways that things are. — Terrapin Station
James Hetfield periodically sings "I am the table." — Terrapin Station
In terms of our experience, it's a particular dynamic state of synapses, neurons, etc. — Terrapin Station
In terms of our experience, it's a particular dynamic state of synapses, neurons, etc. — Terrapin Station
Yes, but my caveat is important. We couldn't say, that anything was a property of 'it' because even the idea variation, 'lumpiness' as you put it, is suffused with our way of life. — Isaac
Particular in the sense of general but awaiting a clear physical definition (which would decide if a particular brain state was an instance of it)? — bongo fury
the amount of cultural conditioning it takes to get someone to think that this is their 'spontaneous' self-report is incredible — StreetlightX
Right, but this now starts to sound physicalist about properties of experience. — Isaac
"Particular dynamic state of synapses, neurons, etc" is definitely something accessible to a third party — Isaac
I don't think it's incoherent at all. I think quite the opposite in fact. I can't think of what a 'property' might be without someone to define it. — Isaac
Not from tye perspective of being those states. — Terrapin Station
Terrapin Station is having difficulty imagining that our experience isn't parsed into properties — fdrake
Properties are how something happens to be, characteristics it has, even if that amounts to being indefinite. — Terrapin Station
I'm not saying something about concepts in that. I'm saying that your experience has to be some way or other, has to have some characteristics or other, etc. — Terrapin Station
what is missing from the third party account? — Isaac
where is that missing thing expressed physically? — Isaac
But what would the answer to "what properties does this object have" without anyone to identify them as such? — Isaac
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