That you think you're providing a theory neutral description of phenomenal character is part of the problem. — fdrake
I just answered this: the perspective of being those states. — Terrapin Station
What? I'm not saying anything about language. What the answer to a question would be is irrelevant. — Terrapin Station
You were hinting at concepts. I'm not talking about concepts. I'm not saying something about it being theory neutral. I'm just saying that I'm not talking about concepts. — Terrapin Station
Yeah, that's a property. In fact, even a homogeneous soup that's indeterminate would be properties. Since properties are simply ways that things are. — Terrapin Station
But where is that perspective if not in "Particular dynamic state of synapses, neurons, etc"? I'm afraid "At various reference points, including the reference point of being the thing in question." isn't really a coherent location for me. — Isaac
Take a coin for example. There's a frame of reference that is the coin itself, and there's a frame of reference that's not the coin itself, but that's relative to the the coin from some other position, right? — Terrapin Station
No. I don't see how there can be a frame of reference that is the coin itself. — Isaac
There's a coin, and it has a location, right? — Terrapin Station
I'm not saying anything about where it begins or ends or whether it's separated from anything else. Again, I'm not talking about the concept as such. — Terrapin Station
But 'coin' and 'location' are both concepts. Physical matter is a concept. — Isaac
I don't really talk in terms of qualia, but if I had to define them I'd say they're just facets or aspects of subjective, first-person, phenomenal experiences. I don't think they (either experiences or qualia) are "things", separate ontological objects apart from the objects that those experiences are of. That kind of separate-ontological-stuff talk is the sort of assumption I've been explicitly denying. — Pfhorrest
There are concepts, but the concepts are not about themselves. — Terrapin Station
No, but the stuff they're about doesn't actually have the properties we phenomenological conceive them having — Isaac
How in the world would you know this? — Terrapin Station
Presumably you wouldn't say that other people exist outside of your concept of rhem, right? — Terrapin Station
1. That conception is done in our minds and I can't think of a single reason why we would, by chance, construct the exact properties that somehow reality has (if maybe you take a Berkelean view that God conceives of properties). — Isaac
2. Physics has demonstrated to my satisfaction that many of the properties I think objects have cannot be reconciled with each other. — Isaac
3. Different people seem to have different phenomenological conceptions and so it seems impossible that the 'real stuff' is some way or other, that someone is just right about some of it. — Isaac
4. I think it's impossible to even think without foundational model, concepts on which to base thought. So I can't conceive of anything without those models. — Isaac
Yes, that's right. The idea of 'a person' is something I've constructed. — Isaac
Ok, and "yellowness" might be a property of my experience while perceiving an object reflecting a certain wavelength?
— bongo fury
Right, it's a property of that object reflect[ing] that wavelength of EMR, and it's also a property of your experience per se (which is what qualia are). — Terrapin Station
I want to ask: is it a disposition or ability to reflect the certain wavelength?
— bongo fury
With respect to the object (the objective stuff), it's the fact that it reflects that wavelength of EMR, sure. That's not what it is with respect to our experience, though--our mental phenomena don't reflect that wavelength of EMR. In terms of our experience, it's a particular dynamic state of synapses, neurons, etc. — Terrapin Station
Particular in the sense of general but awaiting a clear physical definition (which would decide if a particular brain state was an instance of it)?
— bongo fury
Say what?
No, particular as in particular. And it has nothing to do with definitions, etc. — Terrapin Station
Ok, but I thought you were happy to at least class all the particular cases of yellow-wavelength-reflection together as cases (albeit different particular cases) of possession of "yellowness" (in the objective sense) by an object?
So I thought you would be happy to form a corresponding class of cases (each of them particular and different of course) of possession of "yellowness" (in the mental sense) by a brain state? — bongo fury
Why would you think it's by chance? We seem to have access to the world, right? Via our senses. So you'd need a reason to believe that that's not in fact the case. — Terrapin Station
Physics can't demonstrate anything if you think we can't tell at all what the world is like. Besides, you have to conclude that you made all of physics up. — Terrapin Station
You'd need a reason to believe that (a) the world can't be different from different perspectives, and (b) that some people can't be wrong while others are right — Terrapin Station
If you need to construct a foundational model in order to think, then how would you even get started? Don't you need to think in order to construct a foundational model? Otherwise it would be the case that you could think without a foundational model. — Terrapin Station
So essentially you're a solipsist--at least an epistemological solipsist. So why would something like hate speech ever be a problem? You're just constructing the other people anyway, and can't you construct them however you'd like to construct them? — Terrapin Station
In short, your ontology is a complete mess — Terrapin Station
I'm guessing there are psychological reasons behind it.... — Terrapin Station
So the trouble with this line of argument is that an an absence of these properties also amounts to concepts. — TheWillowOfDarkness
what is missing from the third party account? — Isaac
I just answered this: the perspective of being those states. — Terrapin Station
But where is that perspective if not in "Particular dynamic state of synapses, neurons, etc"? I'm afraid "At various reference points, including the reference point of being the thing in question." isn't really a coherent location for me. — Isaac
Take a coin for example. There's a frame of reference that is the coin itself, and there's a frame of reference that's not the coin itself, but that's relative to the the coin from some other position, right? — Terrapin Station
Claiming some properties are absent when we aren't looking is commiting oneself to a presence of contingent states without these properties. — TheWillowOfDarkness
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