By your logic: 2+2=4 is inaccurate because it does not tell us that 3+5=8. — Artemis

2+2=4 is not an ethical principle, and doesn’t claim to be.

As if you had anticipated my question, you say "don't cause unnecessary suffering" is the ultimate code of ethics. — god must be atheist

Interesting choice of paraphrasing. I did not say "ultimate." I suggested that it is one example of an underlying principle that I believe to exist in most cultures across the world. Now, I haven't exhaustively studied all world religions/ethics, but I have yet to come across one that actually contradicts the wrongness of unnecessary suffering. Though people might disagree on what things are necessary or are suffering, generally all ethics seeks to reduce the sum total of suffering.

Or can you give me a good counter example?

2+2=4 is not an ethical principle, and doesn’t claim to be. — Possibility

Doesn't matter. Your definition of the word "inaccurate" should be applicable in both cases if it is to be... accurate (by both of our definitions of accuracy, mind you).

Doesn't matter. Your definition of the word "inaccurate" should be applicable in both cases if it is to be... accurate (by both of our definitions of accuracy, mind you). — Artemis

I disagree. 2+2=4 is correct in all details, exact. The statement ‘Don’t drown kittens in a burlap sack’ is not a faithful representation of an underlying ethical principle - which is what you are claiming the statement to be. As a specific command, it can be considered correct in all details and exact.

The statement ‘Don’t drown kittens in a burlap sack’ is not a faithful representation of an underlying ethical principle - which is what you are claiming the statement to be. As a specific command, it can be considered correct in all details and exact. — Possibility

You think it's okay to drown kittens??? :scream:

It's not a matter of just asserting or defining that satisfactory hedonic experiences are goodness, which people will argue about for sure; it's that for something to be a satisfactory hedonic experience just is for it to seem good, in the same way that an empirical experience of something is for it to seem true. — Pfhorrest

So could there be a satisfactory hedonic experience that did not seem good?

'cause I'm thinking along the lines of Moore, that something might be pleasant and yet not good.

You think it's okay to drown kittens??? :scream: — Artemis

Sure - just don't use burlap.

Sure - just don't use burlap. — Banno

Can I drown apes wearing sunglasses in burlap?

Depends on what colour your sunglasses are.

Mine or the ape's?

Yes.

You think it's okay to drown kittens??? :scream: — Artemis

I was waiting for that - it’s not what I’m saying at all, and I think you’re aware of that.

The statement ‘Don’t drown kittens in a burlap sack’ doesn’t say it’s not okay to drown kittens. Adhering to it as an ethical principle will prevent a particular behaviour, but the statement itself provides no information as to the rightness or wrongness of drowning kittens in general. Or drowning anyone. Or how we should treat kittens. So unless you also add quite a few more do and don’t statements, you won’t even come close to a faithful reflection of the ethical principles that govern behaviour in relation to drowning, kittens or burlap sacks. It’s only when a person actually drowns kittens in a burlap sack that we can apply the statement. If they drown kittens in a plastic bag, or even if they think about drowning kittens, the statement has no practical use in clarifying ‘good’ behaviour.

Allow me to suggest an alternative:

‘Increase awareness, connection and collaboration.’

This statement challenges much of what we consider to be ethical behaviour. Many people would reject this as a comprehensive statement of ethical principles, because it does nothing to protect the agent from pain, humiliation, lack or loss. To fully embrace this as an ethical principle is to face our fears - to recognise that we cannot ensure our survival, safety or stability without compromising our moral progress, and vice versa.

It’s not a perfect statement, but for me it is the closest I think we can come to an objective ethical principle.

Yet if it came down to choosing between a human life and, say, a shark, then under what circumstances might the shark be the priority?

We value ‘non human parts of the biosphere’, but only insofar as they are of benefit to human survival, stability, security, etc. As I’ve said before - we need to be honest about the limits of our ‘symbiosis’.

Good question; it depends greatly on the shark and the human and whether or not I am capable of saving them without it being a suicide mission for myself.

So let’s build a thought experiment; You are standing atop a cliff overlooking the bay. You have two remote detonators in your hand. One attached to a human swimming in the bay and the other to a shark swimming a short distance away and the detonators connect to explosives on each. Next to you on the cliff is someone else with the exact same setup and are connected to the same shark and human swimming in the bay.

This person tells you, “that if the shark attacks the human they will press the detonator attached to the shark, killing it. but not if you press the detonator for the human and kill them first or you could blow up the shark first and save the human.

So, if you do nothing then both the shark and the human will die. If you make a choice between the two only one will die. What do you do?

Is your answer going to be based on the identity of the individual human if they can be known or the species of shark if it can be known? What if it is an endangered species of shark and the human a serial killer? What if it’s a prolific shark species and a child? If we are taking into account all of these factors then we are morally considering all parties and are engaging in biocentrism no matter how we choose to act. If however we make it humans vs nature and we save the human every time then we are engaging in anthropocentrism

As for your second paragraph; I don’t believe this is true as there are plenty of animals on the endangered species list with little to no discernible benefits to our species save for our appreciation of its existence. Why are we valuing them I wonder? Why do things need to have a benefit for us in order for us to just appreciate the fact that they exist?

Take bacteria, if we didn’t get bacterial infections at all, where would we be right now in terms of managing our resources if bacteria didn’t play it’s part in thinning us out a little bit? Same question for Mosquitos?

we need to be honest about the limits of our ‘symbiosis’.[

This statement I agree with. We can’t ignore that we value our own place in the biosphere also and naturally will defend our ability to remain a part of it. However one can hope it never requires the total genocide of any life but Anthropocentrists I’m sure will make sure the biocentrists recognise when this is the only alternative or will act so biocentrists don’t have to do something they consider immoral. Just in case a species with Dalek like motivations and psychology happens to crop up. For me, a genocide would only be justified for us or another species to carry out if that aggressor species is a genuine threat to ALL life or just ALL human life specifically.

So for example, if an extremely large Asteroid with an atomosphere that contained some form of life was on a collision course with our planet, I’d say we’d be justified in blowing it out of the sky if diverting its course isn’t an easy option.

Also to anyone reading my last; if that shark happened to be Bruce the vegetarian Shark from Finding Nemo... then I highly encourage you to push the other person with detonators off the cliff.

Again, I must call attention to a Youtube video. I am not allowed to post links, but I can post here the search terms to find it. Try
ethics private and public 2019 09 22

The guy talks about ethics as a dual mechanism: drowning kitties and puppies is abhorrent, and more abhorrent is drowning your own children. Nobody does that**, and people even go into a burning building, much like cats do, to save their children. The guy calls that private ethics, and he juxtaposes that with public ethics, and he claims that public ethics grew out of private ethics, by transferring the reward-punishment system from one, which preserves the closest relative possible, to ethics that preserve society as such. He names a number of parameters, most of which I can't remember, that are different between what he calls private ethics and public ethics, but the jist is that private ethics are DNA driven, inborn; public are taught by peers and by other educators. Oh, and private ethics are universal, unavoidable, not a matter of choice, (see **) but public ethics are varied, and the individual not necessarily makes all of them his own.

Luckily he has some typed charts at the end of his video, because his accent is incomprehensible.

I would really like to see what @Mark Dennis and @Artemis have to say about the proposition the video makes.

** A few people with the applicable genetic mutations might.

As for your second paragraph; I don’t believe this is true as there are plenty of animals on the endangered species list with little to no discernible benefits to our species save for our appreciation of its existence. Why are we valuing them I wonder? Why do things need to have a benefit for us in order for us to just appreciate the fact that they exist? — Mark Dennis

They may or may not play vital role in the preservation of the interconnected food chain. Their poop may be a delicacy to those microbes that are the feed for other bigger microbes, that feed the algea with nitrogen, and the algea feed blue whales and halibut... which feed us.

This what I wrote is conjecture, but I can see some merit in figuring that humans have not uncovered for their own edification some vital links in the natural preservation of life on this planet.

They may or may not play vital role in the preservation of the interconnected food chain. Their poop may be a delicacy to those microbes that are the feed for other bigger microbes, that feed the algea with nitrogen, and the algea feed blue whales and halibut... which feed us.

This what I wrote is conjecture, but I can see some merit in figuring that humans have not uncovered for their own edification some vital links in the natural preservation of life on this planet.

It may be conjecture but its point is pretty valid as we do have data on a lot of systems like you describe.
This strengthens my point that there is value in these systems and each creature within the system has a right to what it values from it, so long as it doesn't endanger the system itself.

The guy talks about ethics as a dual mechanism: drowning kitties and puppies is abhorrent, and more abhorrent is drowning your own children. Nobody does that**, and people even go into a burning building, much like cats do, to save their children. The guy calls that private ethics, and he juxtaposes that with public ethics, and he claims that public ethics grew out of private ethics, by transferring the reward-punishment system from one, which preserves the closest relative possible, to ethics that preserve society as such. He names a number of parameters, most of which I can't remember, that are different between what he calls private ethics and public ethics, but the jist is that private ethics are DNA driven, inborn; public are taught by peers and by other educators. Oh, and private ethics are universal, unavoidable, not a matter of choice, (see **) but public ethics are varied, and the individual not necessarily makes all of them his own.

As grotesque and abhorrent as I find the idea of drowning kittens and puppies, to say that nobody does that is wrong. However, we could also argue that the only motivation behind this is mental illness and the acts of the mentally ill cannot be moral statements outside of lucidity (Depending on the condition, Episodic Schizophrenics for example can make acts out of moral motivation when not in an episode).

I'm about to go to sleep but I will search and watch what you suggested and give you a thought out perspective on it tomorrow at some point.

Mahalo.

Is that Austin or Searle, or someone else? It's from the Speech Act Theorists, isn't it?

Creativesoul just helped me illustrate this case. — god must be atheist

You've misunderstood. Different folk have different ideas of what's good. So what?

It originates with Austin and was mostly developed by Searle in regard to Speech Act Theory, yes. I don't remember what name was associated with whatever I read about it in the moral psychology class I learned about it from over a decade ago (I've always been bad at bibliography), but since I think that was also the place I first learned of Speech Act Theory I'd guess it was probably Searle. Some quick Googling suggests that someone named Velleman is mainly responsible for its introduction to philosophy of mind, and since we were discussing the status of moral beliefs (a la Kantianism vs Humeanism) in the context where that was introduced, rather than the meaning of moral assertions (though I might be confusing that class with my metaethics class, which were the same term at university and I think back to back), I think it might have actually been Velleman that we were reading, and maybe Searle was just mentioned by Velleman or something.

Austin's How To Do Things With Words maybe?

I have a copy...

I've never thought about an utterance of ought in terms of direction of fit. Promises... that's another matter altogether... Very interesting when talking in terms of what counts as a moral claim, moral facts, and what it takes for one(the claim that is) to be true(matching the moral fact(s) where "facts" are what has happened and/or is happening. That's my current working framework.

On your account are promises moral claims?

Some quick Googling suggests that someone named Velleman is mainly responsible for its introduction to philosophy of mind, and since we were discussing the status of moral beliefs (a la Kantianism vs Humeanism) in the context where that was introduced, rather than the meaning of moral assertions

I’d very much like to hear your opinions of Humeanism in this regard as it will make an interesting study in discussing new beliefs from the same geographical location today by comparing them to my own. (Me and Hume are both from Edinburgh although admittedly his family also had an estate down south in Berwick.) So I’d be very interested to hear your thoughts on how the Cultural context of Scotland effected the status of Humes moral beliefs and then I can tell you what contextual differences there are there now.

So let’s build a thought experiment; You are standing atop a cliff overlooking the bay. You have two remote detonators in your hand. One attached to a human swimming in the bay and the other to a shark swimming a short distance away and the detonators connect to explosives on each. Next to you on the cliff is someone else with the exact same setup and are connected to the same shark and human swimming in the bay.

This person tells you, “that if the shark attacks the human they will press the detonator attached to the shark, killing it. but not if you press the detonator for the human and kill them first or you could blow up the shark first and save the human.

So, if you do nothing then both the shark and the human will die. If you make a choice between the two only one will die. What do you do?

Is your answer going to be based on the identity of the individual human if they can be known or the species of shark if it can be known? What if it is an endangered species of shark and the human a serial killer? What if it’s a prolific shark species and a child? If we are taking into account all of these factors then we are morally considering all parties and are engaging in biocentrism no matter how we choose to act. If however we make it humans vs nature and we save the human every time then we are engaging in anthropocentrism — Mark Dennis

What I would do is attempt to convince the other person not to press any detonator at all - that punishing the shark would not bring the human back, and so would be a pointless act of hate towards an animal that is unaware of how important that human is to either of us. If the shark attacks the human, or the person next to me blows up the shark, these are not actions that I choose to initiate, and seeking to prevent harm by causing harm is not justifiable in my book.

seeking to prevent harm by causing harm is not justifiable in my book.

Even if you have to cause harm to an adult to stop them killing a child? Or a dog attempting to kill a baby or a kitten?

Austin's How To Do Things With Words maybe? — creativesoul

That sounds familiar, so maybe.

On your account are promises moral claims? — creativesoul

I hadn't really thought before about where promises fit into this scheme, but on a bit of quick consideration my first-pass answer is that they're probably double-direction of fit, the same category as things like the utterances "I do [take them to be my spouse]" and "I now pronounce you man and wife" in a wedding. That's different from either the direction of descriptive assertions or prescriptive assertions.

Alternatively, they could possibly be interpreted as in the same category of moral claims, if a promise is taken to be a declaration of one's intention to do something, where on my account an intention is identical to what others would call a "moral belief" (see below).

I’d very much like to hear your opinions of Humeanism in this regard as it will make an interesting study in discussing new beliefs from the same geographical location today by comparing them to my own. (Me and Hume are both from Edinburgh although admittedly his family also had an estate down south in Berwick.) So I’d be very interested to hear your thoughts on how the Cultural context of Scotland effected the status of Humes moral beliefs and then I can tell you what contextual differences there are there now. — Mark Dennis

I don't actually know very much about the sociocultural context of Hume, just his philosophical conclusions. I'm not sure if this is at all what you were asking or something you already know, but Hume's position on moral beliefs is that there is no such thing, there are only desires, non-cognitive feelings that something should be some way, about which we cannot reason (though we can reason about what will bring about those things we desire).

In contrast Kant held that moral beliefs are genuine beliefs that are cognitive and can be true and false and reasoned about in all the same ways as non-moral beliefs.



My position is that there is a false dichotomy between Hume and Kant, and that in addition to prescriptive feelings (desires) and descriptive thoughts (beliefs), there are also descriptive feelings (perceptions), and prescriptive thoughts (intentions). Feelings cannot be reasoned with, neither prescriptive nor descriptive, but they can be judged (by the same person having them) and accepted or rejected to form thoughts, prescriptive or descriptive, which can be reasoned about. The form of logic used in that reasoning is the same either way (with some suggestions I have for formally clarifying that), and the standards of evidence for both are experiential, phenomenal, but different aspects of our phenomenal experience for each, empirical in the case of descriptive beliefs, hedonic in the case of prescriptive intentions (as elaborated earlier in this thread).

Powerful first impression(linking your site).

I wonder, since it is evident that you take all this quite seriously...

How important is it, by your lights, for us to get thought and belief right?

I reject Hume and Kant on different grounds than you've mentioned here. But... the difference is one of degree, it seems and not kind so much. I mean I agree with what you just pointed out about Hume's and Kant's frameworks.

Even if you have to cause harm to an adult to stop them killing a child? Or a dog attempting to kill a baby or a kitten? — Mark Dennis

It would be rare that such an action would suddenly be my only option, and to find myself in such a position would suggest (to me) that I had chosen not to be aware, to connect or collaborate at some earlier point. Any harm that I initiate is my responsibility - the adult is responsible for their actions towards the child, but not for my actions towards them. I may very well choose to cause harm in these situations, but the adult or the dog are not to blame for that harm, and my actions are not justified by ‘objective’ ethical principles, even if they are deemed ‘justified’ by law or by anyone else.

Powerful first impression(linking your site). — creativesoul

Thanks!

How important is it, by your lights, for us to get thought and belief right? — creativesoul

I'm not sure I understand the question, but maybe this will answer it: I think all of our actions are driven by a combination of beliefs and intentions, so everything we do hinges entirely on us having the right beliefs and intentions. So, I guess my answer is "very important". But still within limits; being right in your beliefs or intentions about circumstances that have no effect on you or that you can have no effect on is not, in practice, very important.

Let me see if I can clarify... Your answer was fine.

Getting thought and belief right, is not equivalent to having true thought and belief, except if and when we're talking about having true thought and belief about our own thought and belief. I'm particularly interested in what all thought and belief consists of.

You draw a distinction between intentions and belief. I would concur. However, while intentions consist of more than just belief, they are existentially dependent upon belief, but not the other way around. Intentions are plans... forethought to do something in particular. Whereas belief can be as simple as attributing causality or perhaps having/holding/forming expectation.

I'm going to look a bit closer at your site... the belief icon in particular...

Cheers!