You say it that way.
What if I said: Things appear (where 'thing' is taken in the broadest sense as objects, processes, colours, basically anything you can think of). What is it then that "has" properties? Are not properties just among the "things" that appear (if we allow that shapes, colours, textures and so on are even separable from shaped, coloured and textured objects)? — Janus
So my take is: concepts mediate and inspire bodily processes and comportments rather than being strongly (probabilistically) tied to the neural architecture involved with executing (most types) of them. — fdrake
That's really cool. Do you think there's any correspondence with model averaging in stats, if you're familiar? If we imagine anticipation and memory as models of input states based on previous patterns of association; there might be more than one anticipation (model) running at once; a multithreading of thought-action chains (neural+sensorimotor impetus for the body's comportment, including thoughts) that originate in multiple places; these will amplify and die out in accordance with continual feedback (models learning different weights); but the feedback mechanism might 'get stuck' in a certain pattern of valuation. Edit: perhaps when, say, two patterns (which are models in this analogy) generate predictions (anticipations) that are "valued" very highly by each other? (edit: analogy breaks down a lot here, models and loss functions... stupid loss functions). — fdrake
There's no way to check anything about any model if there are no objective properties. What would you be checking? — Terrapin Station
There is a way that things are, but the way that things are is always from some point of reference. — Terrapin Station
How if biology is a concept you created and it has no properties independent of that? — Terrapin Station
.......implies two separate and distinct mechanisms from which concepts arise. Is that what you meant to suggest? — Mww
....concepts mediate and inspire.... — fdrake
rather than being strongly....tied to the neural architecture — fdrake
How can both inhere in a pure wetware environment? In effect, law is subsumed by mere rule, which contradicts itself. — Mww
Isn't a contingent just a law that describes a necessary function - if->then? — Isaac
Then, have we not succeeded in complicating the rationally system without proper warrant? — Mww
The question then arises, how is it possible to distinguish whether concepts arise from different mechanisms, or concepts arise by degree from a simpliciter, or, divide into simpliciters from a whole, from one mechanism? — Mww
The kind of mechanism that notices a contradiction between propositions is probably a more abstract form of the kind of thing that notices a discrepancy between the ball and the position of my body; reasoning is (well, conjecture with some evidence) just one way of attenuating discrepancies and forecasting our actions. — fdrake
"Property" is just a name. — creativesoul
Yes, I think of concepts arising in one of three ways (mostly based on standard child development work). There are clearly concepts we're born with (spatiotemporal models for one), then a whole bunch seem to come along immediately post-natally (object permanence for example), then the refinements come in adolescence/adulthood (social theories, science etc). — Isaac
it's a know-how, an embodied concept, requiring adaptive regulation between our body's state and the ball's state through how we process our senses and integrate information from all of 'em and about ourselves. — fdrake
So do properties, for you, exist prior to our naming them? I think it is reasonable to say that they do, but they are not in any way separate from, or "had by" or "attached to" things, as naming can make them seem to be. — Janus
Some things exist in their entirety prior to our naming them. The properties of such things must also exist prior to our naming them if such things consist, in part at least, of those properties — creativesoul
The question then arises, how is it possible to distinguish whether concepts arise from different mechanisms, or concepts arise by degree from a simpliciter, or, divide into simpliciters from a whole, from one mechanism? — Mww
I'm not convinced this is helpful...I think that would better be called an embodied cognition than an embodied concept, since animals do these kinds of things just as well as we do. — Janus
I think that would better be called an embodied cognition than an embodied concept, since animals do these kinds of things just as well as we do. — Janus
You say it that way.
What if I said: Things appear (where 'thing' is taken in the broadest sense as objects, processes, colours, basically anything you can think of). What is it then that "has" properties? Are not properties just among the "things" that appear (if we allow that shapes, colours, textures and so on are even separable from shaped, coloured and textured objects)? — Janus
I can’t walk and walk. Isn’t that more incomprehensible than contradictory? I didn’t think comprehension to be the proper measure of contradiction. — Mww
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.