Conceptually I want to make a division here. Into the material consciousness and the experiential consciousness. Let's call it MC and EC. (maybe there's terminology for it already, I'm such a noob). — TheHorselessHeadman
...they might also have different types of experiences. It sounds completely nuts, but maybe some type of atom (let's say all carbon atoms) just experiences the color green, and others experience what we identify as pressure, another as what we identify as warmth. — TheHorselessHeadman
As already elaborated in my previous essay on being, I reject that dualist ontology that originally prompted the mind-body problem, and hold that there is only one kind of stuff of which minds and bodies both are made.
The mention of dualism was not meant to reject the distinction between "material consciousness" (access consciousness) and "experiential consciousness" (phenomenal consciousness), which you'll note I go on to spend the rest of that essay discussing... — Pfhorrest
and the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on consciousness. — Pfhorrest
Access consciousness. States might be conscious in a seemingly quite different access sense, which has more to do with intra-mental relations. In this respect, a state's being conscious is a matter of its availability to interact with other states and of the access that one has to its content. In this more functional sense, which corresponds to what Ned Block (1995) calls access consciousness, a visual state's being conscious is not so much a matter of whether or not it has a qualitative “what it's likeness”, but of whether or not it and the visual information that it carries is generally available for use and guidance by the organism. In so far as the information in that state is richly and flexibly available to its containing organism, then it counts as a conscious state in the relevant respect, whether or not it has any qualitative or phenomenal feel in the Nagel sense.
And here it is apparently distinguished from "what it's like-ness", and hence presumably also distanced from qualia. — Banno
Unless you're a panpsychist, like @TheHorselessHeadman and me, in which case everything is "experience-conscious" (phenomenally conscious, in Block's terminology), and consequently that doesn't really mean anything of importance. (I explained my view on what that means and why it's trivial more succinctly in this post in another thread recently. I have a note to integrate that shorter explanation into my essay I linked earlier).SO I guess a thermostat is access-conscious of the temperature, without being experience-conscious? — Banno
And it doesn't mean that I believe that individual atoms are having complicated experiences as we do. But that different atoms, just as they have different measurable chemical properties they might also have different types of experiences. It sounds completely nuts, but maybe some type of atom (let's say all carbon atoms) just experiences the color green, and others experience what we identify as pressure, another as what we identify as warmth. — TheHorselessHeadman
Everything just appears, and I might think "Hey, no, I can control things. I can snap my fingers anytime I want." But those words also just arrived. — TheHorselessHeadman
conscious experience could just be a side-effect, like smoke rising from a train-engine and which has no bearing on the train itself. — TheHorselessHeadman
How do you know it is consciousness that is switched off, rather than unitary identity that is disrupted? — bert1
Do you think that the atoms of a dead human body have these experiences? Such experiences probably exist on the level of neural structures, not atoms, and can be temporarily switched off by general anesthesia. — litewave
Either way it seems arbitrary to me to confine experiences to neural structures, which in the most general reductionist sense is just a certain configuration of atoms. — TheHorselessHeadman
it just "seems strange to me", that an entirely new phenomenon could arise in the universe, (suddenly blue exists), because atoms acquired a certain combination of molecules and ions in the brain. — TheHorselessHeadman
So in the example of general anesthesia I would probably view it in the same way as bert1 expressed, as the anesthesia disrupting the unification of the experiences, and maybe pain as an example isn't a fundamental conscious property but an amalgam of different kinds. — TheHorselessHeadman
Then there's just the question of why we don't experience everything all at once then, why my consciousness doesn't stretch to include the rest of my brain, and out through my skull, into the air and across the globe and include yours as well ;D So it appears that there are some boundaries. — TheHorselessHeadman
Giulio Tononi has proposed a measure of organized complexity for the determination of the level of consciousness called "integrated information." — litewave
I think the IIT theory might be a very good theory of identity - every system that integrates information is a conscious individual. But as a theory of consciousness I think it fails, as it gives no reason to suppose that the integration of information couldn't happen, as it were 'in the dark'. — bert1
I'm still developing my own position on the controversial concept of Consciousness. It begins by noting that Consciousness is an abstract quality, not a concrete thing. It's what you do, not what you are. Consciousness is a functional attribute of brain quality, not the substance of neurons in any quantity. In a computer metaphor, it is the property of processing Information at a high level of through-put, but in the sense of Quality, not Quantity. Faster is not necessarily better.Why is consciousness conscious? — TheHorselessHeadman
Conceptually I want to make a division here. Into the material consciousness and the experiential consciousness. Let's call it MC and EC. (maybe there's terminology for it already, I'm such a noob). — TheHorselessHeadman
If panpsychism was true then would not you expect that the lowest forms of animals with brains would share very similar abilities of MC/EC as do humans b/c they all have practically the same hardware (neurons, nerves, connectivity, etc.)? However, we already know that few animals are even self-aware (e.g., few are able recognize themselves and ID their own agency) let alone having EC. — Sir Philo Sophia
seems to be where we end up.untestable near supernatural theories of quantum/atomic source — Sir Philo Sophia
That is not realistic, b/c we know that things like multitude of tastes we have for detection of various molecules are completely made up. e.g., nothing about the hydrocarbon chain of sugar contains the already existing taste of sweetness. Moreover, the only reason we are programmed for sweetness to be a pleasure experience is b/c we need it for survival vs bitter tastes that we associate with molecules that tend to be toxins to us.more as a matter or organising what was already there (conscious experience) into different shapes through brainprocessing rather than complicated networks of neurons producing something entirely new. — TheHorselessHeadman
but the experience of colors could have existed before there were eyes with which to receive information, and a brain with which to organize the experience of colors into the mental representation. — TheHorselessHeadman
Unlikely b/c the color conversion and information signals creation all happen in the eye and the optic information (color/shape representation) signals are transmitted through the optic nerve to the back of the brain where they are spatially remapped on the surface of our brain. The optic information optic nerve has no intrinsic “fundamental property of matter itself”, it is just info processing sent to the brain in a pseudo-interpreted form.Perhaps red and blue is a more fundamental property of matter itself and is something that the brain uses and organises to represent information rather than creating it. — TheHorselessHeadman
That is well modeled to be the unconscious mind, and decisions and confidence feelings are well documented (by NCC) to be made when certain neuron firing thresholds are passed triggering neural network cascades to avalanche into the action/feeling/perception.It seems to me at least -- from the personal experience of the consciousness which is aware of typing these words, that I am not aware of the brain-processing which is deciding what words to put here. They simply appear, as suggestions from some unknown, and then decisions are made on whether or not to put the words down or not, and the decisions themselves also appear from that same unknown — TheHorselessHeadman
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