Has anyone equated (free) will with identity like this...

Zelebg

Let me define 'identity' as material, electro-chemical 'code' which determines who you are by defining the structure of your body and the brain, the way you think, the way you process sensations. Your identity is your DNA at the start of your life, and as you live, this code, now reflected in the patterns of your brain, combines your memories and thoughts to change and update itself. By "brain patterns" I mean whole spatial and temporal description of every atom/molecule and charge in the whole nervous system.

Clearly, every thought, intention or volition must be a function of this identity. But I am not just saying "you are the source of your intentions", I want to phrase it like this:

You can not choose otherwise because your choice is determined by who you are.

And 'who you are', your identity, while changing through time it is nevertheless a single description at any point in time. Asking for free will is like asking for multiple personality disorder - you can not have it because as soon as you get it you are not you anymore. I conclude, 'will' can not be decoupled from 'identity' and thus makes no sense to be 'free'.

It follows 'free will' ought to be defined not in terms of choice, but naturally in terms of independence and autonomy. And most importantly this new definition must specify whether this freedom is supposed to be from the environment, from itself, or what. Until then the only true answer might as well be that it depends on the context given by the level of abstraction, i.e. depends on the point of view.

Mww

.......or what. (...) i.e. depends on the point of view. — Zelebg

Pretty much, yep. One point of view is to separate free from will, because as you say there are times when the will is not free at all, then define freedom as the absolutely necessary condition under which the will is permitted to operate autonomously.

The problem is as it has always been....the concept of freedom, as any pure abstract concept, cannot be proved to either exist, or to function as supposed. The very best that ever be deduced from it, is that the determinations given from its mere possibility, do not grant any self-contradiction within the theory that employs it.

Still, if we cannot choose because who we are always determines the choice, and who we are always changes, then it follows that choices must also change in order to keep up with who we are. If everything seems to be changing, it must be considered whether we are free to choose our particular volitions from the myriad of changes in our identities.

Good first post, far better than others on the same topic.

Echarmion

It follows 'free will' ought to be defined not in terms of choice, but naturally in terms of independence and autonomy. And most importantly this new definition must specify whether this freedom is supposed to be from the environment, from itself, or what. Until then the only true answer might as well be that it depends on the context given by the level of abstraction, i.e. depends on the point of view. — Zelebg

One approach to the solution would be to ask why we care about whether or not we have "free will". Is it because we want our decisions to be free from the environment, or from ourselves? Perhap what we want from free will, is for our decisions to accurately reflect just who we are. To represent those parts of our identity that we wish to become operative in the world. That implies a certain freedom from circumstance. It also implies a certain freedom from ourselves.

We need to figure out what we consider to be autonomy, and then, as @Mww has already stated above (an excellent reply btw, as usual), we can perhaps identify the necessary conditions for said autonomy.

Zelebg

I actually have a lot more to say about and what goes along with this, like mechanism proposal for 'free will' with true downward causation, or so I would call it. Even if closely related with what I have already said here, I guess a separate thread for that whole thing is more appropriate.

My main reason for joining this forum is to find out if these or similar ideas where discussed or written about before, and if they have I'd like to see that, so some pointers as to what exactly I should be looking for would be very much appreciated.

On the other hand, if it turns out there is enough material to publish something, then I'd very much like to do that. However, as I gather, it would be extremely hard for me to do it alone since I have never done it. So, what are the chances I could find someone experienced and willing to basically take over my ideas, perhaps polish and expand them, then turn them into article or paper?

180 Proof

If 'embodied cognition' (of which 'volition' is a function) is what you mean, Zelebg, then off the top of my head I recall that following philosophers have given it some thought: Epicurus ... Spinoza ... Schopenhauer ... Nietzsche ... Merleau-Ponty ... Douglas Hofstadter ... George Lakoff et al ... Paul & Patricia Churchland ... Daniel Dennett ... Thomas Metzinger ... :chin:

It follows 'free will' ought to be defined not in terms of choice, but naturally in terms of independence and autonomy. And most importantly this new definition must specify whether this freedom is supposed to be from the environment, from itself, or what. Until then the only true answer might as well be that it depends on the context given by the level of abstraction, i.e. depends on the point of view. — Zelebg

:up:

Welcome to our sandbox (TPF).

Zelebg

I mean this concept in particular:
You can not choose otherwise because your choice is determined by who you are.

180 Proof

I mean this concept in particular:
You can not choose otherwise because your choice is determined by who you are. — Zelebg

Yeah. That falls under the rubric of compatibilism. Also, Schopenhauer's On The Fourfold Root of Sufficient Reason might be the very first thoroughly explicit speculation on 'involuntary choice' (which, in large part, inspired both Nietzsche's and Freud's deflationary interpretations of the role of consciousness in volition (i.e. the Unconscious)).

Zelebg

↪180 Proof

Thanks.

I like sushi

↪180 Proof

You can not choose otherwise because your choice is determined by who you are. — Zelebg

Actually, that isn’t classical compatibilism at all is it? Compatilbilism, in some cases, generally say that you can choose to do otherwise. There are so many nuanced arguments within this area it gets confusing quickly.

Generally when it comes to moral responsibility everyone assumes free will.

NOS4A2

↪Zelebg

You can not choose otherwise because your choice is determined by who you are.

I’m not aware of anyone proposing this, but wouldn’t this be an argument for free will rather than against it? A choice is, at some level of identity, chosen by that identity and no one and nothing besides. The choice is self-caused.

I’d say the “free will” is a one-to-one ratio to “identity” as it is with other abstractions of the organism.

Zelebg

↪NOS4A2

I’m not aware of anyone proposing this, but wouldn’t this be an argument for free will rather than against it?

I see it as argument for neither, but rather as a paradox asking for redefinition of 'free will'.

Zelebg

↪NOS4A2

Actually, that isn’t classical compatibilism at all is it?

Based on how much compatibilism didn't make any sense to me before, I'd say there is something quite different, if not "more", implied in that statement.

I like sushi

↪Zelebg

There is no singular definition of ‘free will’ in philosophical circles. It is certainly a common mistake of many to assume everyone means the same thing - they really don’t (hence the hodgepodge of various types of determinism, fatalism, compatibilism, etc.,.)

This is a good place to start (the compatibilism section on there gives a nice overview of the history of compatibilism too)

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/

Zelebg

↪I like sushi

I do believe I went through all that at some point in time, more or less, otherwise I would not think there is something different here and worth talking about.

I like sushi

↪Zelebg

Some confusion here ... you misquoted someone else with my words.

From my understanding of compatibilism one version says ‘free will’ in terms of the physical laws of nature allowed for another route (some go down the multiple worlds path there) whilst another version says ‘free will’ meaning you could literally have gone down another path in a kind of ‘soft determinism’ view where although there are set deterministic natural laws there is something akin to quantum weirdness that allows leeway for agency. The harder determinists and the ‘free will’ bunch all pretty much agree that in terms of moral choice ‘free will’ is a given - logically it follows that we’re better off assuming ‘free will’ rather than making a strange bet on a ‘choiceless’ existence.

Of course you’re free to believe in fatalism ;)

Zelebg

It sounds impossible in principle, but I think it's very much an open question can a deterministic system of elements give rise to emergent units consisting of those deterministic elements, and yet still be enough autonomous and independent from the environment to deserve the name of 'free acting agent'.

Reminds me of n-body problem and how we were surprised to find out even 3-body problem is already unsolvable to us. Can be simulated, though. So do you think there is some logic or math with which we can indeed reject such possibility?

Zelebg

Consider Matrix type simulation in a detrrministic universe. Could it be made in principle, such that entities in there would have free will, given laws of physics could be defined any way desired?

Has anyone equated (free) will with identity like this...

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