Are you suggesting that it is impossible to understand what a box is without the word box? — I like sushi
And this is not arbitrary definition. It's strongly correlated with the very somatic feedback which modulates our perceptual experience. At what angle does a very steep floor become a wall? The angle at which we can no longer walk on it without falling over. Would spiders distinguish between floors and walls? — Isaac
Not all thought and belief should be deemed "a report" because some exists prior to language. — creativesoul
In the neural model paper you linked me; there are external states with their own dynamics and outputs which are then integrated into ourselves, and modified by our actions. The external states are not phenomenal, nor are the effects of our actions on our environment. — fdrake
I’m afraid whatever you’re talking about bears no relation to phenomenology then. Semantics and linguistics are no the direct concern of the phenomenological investigation. — I like sushi
For what it’s worth it doesn’t make any sense to me to say we can understand the function of a box yet not know what a box is. — I like sushi
Rather than doing so randomly, we do so by minimising variance — Isaac
Is there a way to know the world without our modeling of it? — Mww
Whether that's the case or not (that it's really minimizing variance with respect to other models), it would be arbitrary that you're going with "minimizing variance" as the metric. — Terrapin Station
Is there a way to know the world without our modeling of it?
— Mww
Yes. Observe it. — Terrapin Station
Token and type. I can understand the function of a box, or even every box I encounter or can imagine. None of that gives me the first clue as to what a box is and isn't as a type — Isaac
Yes absolutely. I fear we might be talking past one another here. — Isaac
I'm not in any sense arguing that there are not external states, nor that our internal states aren't tightly connected to them. — Isaac
What I'm concerned to avoid is an assumption that our phenomenal experience of our sense representations marks any natural or real division of those external states. — Isaac
That defining this measure (as opposed to that) is similarly placing divisions in some general field of 'states of affairs' which are intrinsically linked to our form of life, and in this case, the biology with which we carry it out. — Isaac
I was definitely misreading you as some kind of 'external world constructivist' or something. Interpretive bias on my part. — fdrake
the phenomenal character of our internal states being populated with representational entities that don't track the mechanisms that generate them (like an idea like "the will", which is sort of a conceptual feature analogous to a perceptual feature). — fdrake
Like, when we see stuff, it's usually because it's there and reflecting light — fdrake
It just means on a whim, without a system or reason. — Isaac
Hmmm, yeah, I suppose. Observation tells me that, but use of “modeling” makes explicit I wish to know of. Observation in itself, tells me nothing of the world except it is not nothing. — Mww
As when deciding to go with "minimizing variance" for a metric. — Terrapin Station
We're tracking something, but any and all descriptions of that something are themselves just models, and there's only one player in that game. — Isaac
OK, so take light as an example. One model it's just the opposite of dark, the stuff that we see, visible light. But that's just a model-dependent division of a wider electromagnetic spectrum no reason (apart from our eyes) why 430-770THz has any external world significance — Isaac
Observation shows you what things are like, properties they have, patterns that occur, etc. It tells you all sorts of things. — Terrapin Station
Minimising variance is a well-supported principle of self-organising systems. A large proportion of neuroscience, and significant sectors of biology are now based on the idea that systems aim to minimise variance as a means of maintaining equilibrium steady state, so unless you have anything substantive to counter that theory with contrary empirical data, — Isaac
But I understand what you mean: I observe a ZR1 and recognize it is like a Yugo. — Mww
All “likes” as characteristics/properties/qualities are themselves comparisons. — Mww
Can you imagine a really load noise? Can you imagine the set of all sets? Can you imagine if you forgot where your home was?... — Isaac
I suppose one can just look at something and not consider anything about it. But what if it interests him? — Mww
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