But for some reason when it comes to beliefs, too many people are just that unreasonable. Sure you maybe believe P because Q because R because S but you believe S because you just look at the world around you and it just seems to be true, that's just how the world appears, that's just what you believe. Too many people would then say "so you have no good reason to believe it then" as though that's a reason for you not to believe it, but it's not. You're free, epistemically as in you're not committing any error of reasoning, to believe whatever you damn well please, whatever just seems true to you, until someone can show you a good reason not to believe it. — Pfhorrest

The notion of direction of fit, fits here. A belief has the direction of fit of world-to-word: that is, it says that "the world is thus:...", and hence that the world fits to these words.

And that allows for error, because sometimes the world is not thus.

They can be in error, sure, which is why it's possible that someone could show you good reason not to believe it. But "you don't have good reason to believe it" is not, in itself, good reason not to believe it.

And unless you're a moral nihilist (in which case it's not worth arguing, just stop reading here), it's possible for the things you want to be "in error" too (for you to want the wrong things, things you shouldn't want), so good reasons can also be given to not want those things. But "you don't have a good reason to want that" is not, in itself, good reason not to want it.

They're perfectly analogous.

Yep.

Why not?

I like vanilla. There's no reason that I like vanilla, I just do. It's unjustified. SO what? It explains my purchase, too often, of a vanilla milkshake. I don't wee anything untoward in this little story. Yet my unjustified predilection justifies my purchase. — Banno

It explains your purchase, but it does not justify it. Explaining and justifying are not the same. To explain is to make something clear by providing further information. To justify is to demonstrate the correctness of something. If buying vanilla is considered to be a bad thing, unethical for some reason, then explaining that you buy it because you like it, does not justify buying it.

Notice that explaining something requires no judgement of success or failure, while justifying something requires success. You say something, you believe that what you have said explains something, and that is your explanation, regardless of whether anyone understands it, let alone believing or agreeing to it. To justify on the other hand requires agreement, that's where "the correctness of" comes into play.

But for some reason when it comes to beliefs, too many people are just that unreasonable. Sure you maybe believe P because Q because R because S but you believe S because you just look at the world around you and it just seems to be true, that's just how the world appears, that's just what you believe. Too many people would then say "so you have no good reason to believe it then" as though that's a reason for you not to believe it, but it's not. You're free, epistemically as in you're not committing any error of reasoning, to believe whatever you damn well please, whatever just seems true to you, until someone can show you a good reason not to believe it. — Pfhorrest

That's right, providing the reason for an act does not justify the act. One must provide a "good reason" for the act This is evident from the fact that providing a bad reason (unsound argument) cannot justify an act. That's why it's very difficult to justify acts, as well as beliefs, through reference to "feelings". This is contrary to the common belief that we justify by referring to sensations ("I saw it" for example), which just provides us with appearances and no real principles.

The notion of direction of fit, fits here. A belief has the direction of fit of world-to-word: that is, it says that "the world is thus:...", and hence that the world fits to these words.

And that allows for error, because sometimes the world is not thus. — Banno

Right, error is common place, and that's why this notion of "fit" is not a good principle to base such judgements on. One person's method of judging a "fit" is completely different from another person's method. What method does your auto-correct use? You might notice here at TPF that some people have very odd ways of choosing words. I find it very odd that you would be judging whether the world fits to the words rather than judging whether the words fit to the world. When making a "fit" something must conform to the shape of the other. We conform the words to fit to the world, not vise versa.

You clearly use a completely different method for judging the "fit of wold-to-word" from me. You judge that "justified" is a word which fits your vanilla purchase, when all you've said in your attempt to justify, that you buy vanilla because you like it. I see that you are trying to conform the word "justify" to fit your perception of 'the world', but I reject your proposed conformation as a misunderstanding of the world.

To justify is to demonstrate the correctness of something. — Metaphysician Undercover

Even if one accepts this, "I like vanilla" is sufficient to justify my purchase.

And you seem to have misunderstood direction of fit.

Even if one accepts this, "I like vanilla" is sufficient to justify my purchase. — Banno

If this were true, I could justify "2+2=5" with "I like it like that". But it's not true, because "I like vanilla" does not demonstrate that it is correct for you to purchase vanilla, and that's what's required for justification.

And you seem to have misunderstood direction of fit. — Banno

it's not that I've misunderstood your "direction of fit", I see right through it. As I said, there is no such thing as "the world fits to these words", we make the words fit to the world. Clearly your sense of direction is askew. And you even exemplify this, attempting to make the words fit to the world, in practise, by trying to shape "justify" to the way you that perceive the world.

The problem, as I explained, is that justification requires success. And you've failed. Sorry.

If this were true, I could justify "2+2=5" with "I like it like that". But it's not true, because "I like vanilla" does not demonstrate that it is correct for you to purchase vanilla, and that's what's required for justification. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure. That just doesn't negate my point. Flavours and numbers are different.

it's not that I've misunderstood your "direction of fit", I see right through it. As I said, there is no such thing as "the world fits to these words", we make the words fit to the world. Clearly your sense of direction is askew. And you even exemplify this, attempting to make the words fit to the world, in practise, by trying to shape "justify" to the way you that perceive the world. — Metaphysician Undercover

Seems to me you haven't read Anscomb, nor Austin.

As I said, there is no such thing as "the world fits to these words", we make the words fit to the world. — Metaphysician Undercover

A religious person certainly has the world fit the words of the bible. Hence, bible scholars.

I met a bible scholar who said, when reading the line from his version of the bible, "there will be no women", that it does not mean there will be no women. He said his interpretation was derived from reading other parts of the bible.

How can you trust a narrative if it is misleading or irreconcilable with itself? By declaring that some parts of it did not mean what it actually said. Instead of admitting to a mistake, you make up an intricate set of reinterpretations, which necessitates the alteration of the normative meaning of the text. The problem with this approach is that others may take the same parts, and draw different conclusions with the same premises. Which they do, hence the sectarianism in Evangelist Christianity. The alternative, that is, to not take this approach, is impossible for a Christian, since normative understanding of the text leads to discrepancies, which the bible critics with the persuasion of secular atheism thrive on.

To make order between perceived reality, the bible's teaching, and the inner model of the world the person has, one has to fit one or the other of these three worlds to some of the extant worlds of these three. Surprisingly, the religious will not only fit the existing world to an inner model erroneously, but also in ways that are incompatible with all logic and reason. Yet they fight for the rightness of this fit.

A secular atheist will look at the world, and form an inner model of it; and from then on, will work with the model, that is, fit the world to his mental model, until a discrepancy alerts him that his model is not a good fit with the world.

You don't need to read Anscomb, Aristotle, Astute, or Augustine, (or Austin for short) to see that. (In alphabetical order of appearance.)

@Metaphisical Undercover, it is true that it is not justified why @Banno likes vanilla ice cream. But it is also conceivable, that not everything needs justification.

There are situations where justification is needed, but is not possible to give. (I.e. cohesion of ideals and concepts as per the Bible.)
There are situations where justification is needed, and it is given. (I.e. evolutionary theory.)
There are situations where justification is not needed. (I.e. personal preference or taste.)

"I like vanilla" does not demonstrate that it is correct for you to purchase vanilla — Metaphysician Undercover

I think correctness is a superfluous, unnecessary and irrelevant aspect of the preference that one has for an ice cream flavour. Your demand that it have some correctness, is meaningless, or unjustified.

Yet my unjustified predilection justifies my purchase — Banno

It explains your purchase, but it does not justify it. Explaining and justifying are not the same. To explain is to make something clear by providing further information. To justify is to demonstrate the correctness of something. If buying vanilla is considered to be a bad thing, unethical for some reason, then explaining that you buy it because you like it, does not justify buying it. — Metaphysician Undercover

1. Buying vanilla instead of Rocky Road is not a sin, or an unethical act.
2. It is the taste that is unexplained-- and hence, unjustified. To buy something to satisfy one's taste preference I see as justified, because it prevents the person's suffering. Minor suffering, such as one that would present, should the person buy chocolate flavoured ice cream instead of vanilla, when both are equally available with no moral restriction. So the avoidance of minor suffering is a cause that renders the selection justified.

Flavours and numbers are different. — Banno

But justification is justification, and "because I like it" doesn't justify anything.

A religious person certainly has the world fit the words of the bible. — god must be atheist

What purpose does "has" serve here? I really do not know what you mean here. Are you saying that the person shapes the world to fit to the bible? I do not believe this, I believe the religious person shapes the words of the bible to fit to the world.

The problem with this approach is that others may take the same parts, and draw different conclusions with the same premises. — god must be atheist

This is a matter of interpreting the words differently. And that is shaping the words, just like Banno wants to shape the word "justify" to suit some personal goal. Interpretation is not an act of making the world fit to the words, it's an act of making the words fit to the world.

To make order between perceived reality, the bible's teaching, and the inner model of the world the person has, one has to fit one or the other of these three worlds to some of the extant worlds of these three — god must be atheist

You are totally neglecting the role of words here. This 'fitting' is done through the use of words. The "bible's teaching" is not "a world" to the reader, it is a bunch of words. So there is not "three worlds" here. Furthermore, I do not believe you can distinguish between "perceived reality" and "inner model of the world" as you claim. One's "perceived reality is one's "inner model of the world", the two are the very same thing. So now I have reduced your "three worlds" to just one world.

Surprisingly, the religious will not only fit the existing world to an inner model erroneously, but also in ways that are incompatible with all logic and reason. Yet they fight for the rightness of this fit. — god must be atheist

Now you introduce a fourth world, the "existing world". But you've given no ontological principles to justify the claim of an existing world, so the "existing world" is still nothing more that one's "perceived reality', of 'inner model" of the world. This claim of an existing world is no more justified than Banno's claim that buying vanilla is justified by "I like it". Justification requires demonstrating the correctness of the act, or assertion.

A secular atheist will look at the world, and form an inner model of it; and from then on, will work with the model, that is, fit the world to his mental model, until a discrepancy alerts him that his model is not a good fit with the world. — god must be atheist

Again, you are leaving out the role of words. A person has an inner model of the world, a perceived reality. The person will try to fit words to this world. There is no such thing as trying to "fit the world" to this mental model, because until the person apprehends that other people have their own inner models, (perceived realities) this is the only world that there is. So, what the person does is try to fit words to this mental world. There are two distinct types of this activity, one is putting words together to speak or write, and the other is interpreting spoken or written words. Each is a different type of shaping words to fit one's "world".

If you want to talk about shaping "the world" we would have to consider how one's inner model, one's perceived reality, comes to exist, and changes over time, because this is the only instance of "world" which has been justified.

it is true that it is not justified why Banno likes vanilla ice cream. But it is also conceivable, that not everything needs justification.

There are situations where justification is needed, but is not possible to give. (I.e. cohesion of ideals and concepts as per the Bible.)
There are situations where justification is needed, and it is given. (I.e. evolutionary theory.)
There are situations where justification is not needed. (I.e. personal preference or taste.) — god must be atheist

Right, I agree that there are many situations in which justification is not asked for. Justification is only really needed when it is asked for, and we often accept things without asking for justification. This is the case for instance when we trust the authority of the person speaking.

What Banno was arguing, is that there are things which are unjustifiable, personal taste for example, and that these unjustifiable things form the basis, the foundation, of all justifications.

I think that this is a misunderstanding. What forms the foundation of all justifications is things which we do not ask for justification of. These are things which for some reason or another (perhaps we trust the authority of the person speaking), we do request justification for. This is very distinct from Banno's claim that these things are unjustifiable.

The things which we do not ask for justification of, which Banno calls "unjustifiable", are in fact justifiable, and all we have to do is doubt them, and ask for justification, to get someone motivated to move on justifying them. Banno wants to claim that they are somehow beyond doubt, because it would be ridiculous to ask for justification of them. But this is an incorrect approach, because it is by doubting these foundational things, asking for justification, that we expand our knowledge beyond the limits set up by those people, who at one time, were the authorities whom we would not ask for justification.

So Banno, claims "I like vanilla" is unjustifiable. But that doesn't prevent me from asking for justification. Prove to me that you like vanilla by showing me when you have eaten it, and describing to me what it is about it which you like. It is false that the claim "I like vanilla" is unjustifiable, and false to claim that it ought not be doubted because it is unjustifiable. If Banno insists that it is unjustifiable, this is just a ploy to avoid having to justify it.

I think correctness is a superfluous, unnecessary and irrelevant aspect of the preference that one has for an ice cream flavour. Your demand that it have some correctness, is meaningless, or unjustified. — god must be atheist

The demand is for justification, and this by definition is to demonstrate the correctness of the thing being justified. If Banno claims "I like vanilla", I can request proof that this claim is true, i.e. justification. Bannno has used the claim to justify buying vanilla, and implied that the claim is unjustifiable. It is not. The preference for vanilla may be demonstrated.

So Banno, claims "I like vanilla" is unjustifiable. But that doesn't prevent me from asking for justification. Prove to me that you like vanilla by showing me when you have eaten it, and describing to me what it is about it which you like. It is false that the claim "I like vanilla" is unjustifiable, and false to claim that it ought not be doubted because it is unjustifiable. If Banno insists that it is unjustifiable, this is just a ploy to avoid having to justify it. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know if you're right, @Metaphysician Undercover. One can cite "there is no accounting for taste". Maybe taste is justifiable (by saying it's unavoidable); but our knowledge of how taste develops is scanty, it is only in the early theoretical stage. We justify the differntness in preference for ice cream taste with the same blanket justification that explains all differentness: the different mutations in DNA.

Beyond that, I would be really hard pressed to state if Banno ate the ice cream because he wanted to perform a just, moral, ethical and correct act. He ate it because he likes it, is my opinion, and I think justification of it may be available (by DNA analysis) but it certainly is a modern development in the history of justification theory.

But justification is justification, and "because I like it" doesn't justify anything. — Metaphysician Undercover

A justification shows why something was done. "I prefer vanilla" is sufficient justification for my choice of vanilla.

That's it.

Three terms: god, religion, theology. Pick any or all. Start your post with "God is," or "Religion is," or "Theology is." — tim wood

I think there was a consensus that g/G is an idea but not any kind of separately existing being or thing.

Religion as the expression of the ideas based on the idea of g/G, leading to and grounding consequential beliefs and behaviours.

Theology as thinking - trying to reason - about religion(s).

Anybody left out? Anybody have any substantive disagreement?

Anyone who's been paying attention knows this sub-forum is for philosophy of religion That means immediately that most threads probably should be deleted out of the box. And if the above is accurate as to being a consensus, that means there can be no philosophy of religion except as thinking about what religion is, v. what religions are about. So, as God is a regulative idea (as I read it), the philosophy of thinking about that is just thinking about the thinking about a set of ideas.

This isn't, to my way of thinking, ether a bad thing or a waste of time. If there is anything worthwhile about this kind of thinking, it places its substance in human mind, and not in some conjectured supernatural being or beings. It takes, then, as starting point, that we are responsible. And responsibility = freedom = duty = obligation. And (imo, again) it all is either solidly based in reason, or it is not solidly based at all.

If, as idea, g/G is the striving towards an ideal, it seems to me worth thinking about that ideal, what it looks like and how it works, and for whom under what circumstances (or for everyone no matter the circumstances). I suspect the conclusions that kind of thinking might lead to, namely denial of self-interest in favour of others, is a kind of third-rail thinking that kills all who touch it. I.e., we're not ready. But maybe the dialogue, as dialectic, gets us on the way....

But it's not true, because "I like vanilla" does not demonstrate that it is correct for you to purchase vanilla, and that's what's required for justification. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, this highlights the fact that something only requires justification, and it is only appropriate to speak about it in terms of justification, if it has the potential to be incorrect in some way.

Anybody left out? Anybody have any substantive disagreement? — tim wood

Yeah, I strongly doubt you will find agreement on that of God there from theists, and I personally disagree with that definition of religion.

That definition of theology seems pretty uncontroversial though.

Yeah, I strongly doubt you will find agreement on that of God there from theists, and I personally disagree with that definition of religion. — Pfhorrest

Simply what I saw here. And they can speak for themselves. What's yours on religion?

One can cite "there is no accounting for taste". Maybe taste is justifiable (by saying it's unavoidable); but our knowledge of how taste develops is scanty, it is only in the early theoretical stage. We justify the differntness in preference for ice cream taste with the same blanket justification that explains all differentness: the different mutations in DNA. — god must be atheist

So you agree then, it is possible to account for taste.

A justification shows why something was done. — Banno

This is false. Justification shows the correctness of something. I've told you this already, look it up if you do not believe me. As I said, you are trying to adjust the meaning of "justify" to make it fit to your perception of the world. But your model of "the world" is an unacceptable one.

Yes, this highlights the fact that something only requires justification, and it is only appropriate to speak about it in terms of justification, if it has the potential to be incorrect in some way. — Janus

Right, I'll agree to that. One form of justifiable things is propositions, they may be true or false, so we might ask for justification of the proposition, demonstration of its truth.. However, justification goes further than this, because like in the example of Banno's purchasing vanilla milkshakes, we also ask for justification of actions.

This leaves things which are neither correct nor incorrect, as unjustifiable. Banno's proposition "I like vanilla", as a proposition, may be either true or false, therefore it is justifiable. Now the question is whether something which is unjustifiable (neither correct nor incorrect) could be used to justify something else. Notice that a proposition cannot fall into this category (unjustifiable) because a proposition must be either true or false, and true is a instance of being correct.

I think there was a consensus that g/G is an idea but not any kind of separately existing being or thing. — tim wood

This would be an atheist's definition. A theist believes that God has real independent existence. It does not make sense to use an atheist's definition, because if you want to define a term, you must refer to those who actually use that term, to determine the definition. You wouldn't turn to someone without an education in physics, to get a definition of "quantum entanglement", you'd turn to a physicist. Likewise, you wouldn't turn to someone without an education in theology to get a definition of God, you'd turn to a theologian.

This is false. Justification shows the correctness of something. I've told you this already, look it up if you do not believe me. As I said, you are trying to adjust the meaning of "justify" to make it fit to your perception of the world. But your model of "the world" is an unacceptable one. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not so much. My dictionary says you are wrong; but what would it know?

Let's look at what is salient, and what was claimed. There are justifications that do not depend on other justifications. "I like Vanilla" is one. It is sufficient, when I am asked, "why did you choose vanilla?", to reply "I like vanilla". It would be obtuse to go on and ask:"OK, so you prefer vanilla to the other flavours on offer, but why did you choose it?"

But then, you like obtuse.

As do I, when there is something to be revealed by it.

SO is there a point to your being obtuse? I've missed it, if so. Can you try again?

I think there was a consensus that g/G is an idea but not any kind of separately existing being or thing. — tim wood

No, I would not concur with that. The issue with reducing 'God' to an idea or a projection, construction, or social consensus, is that it deflates it to an artefact of the mind, individual or collective. This is the common attitude, practically the default. But I think the question is understood this way because modern culture doesn't have any scale along which to understand what 'transcendent' means, which is an inevitable consequence of the process of secularisation. So the secular response is: by transcendent, you mean deity, and that is not something objectively ascertainable, so it must be subjective or social. There's simply no other place to envisage it or put it.

But the point is, whether or not there is God or supreme being, this principle or person does not exist in the sense that material phenomena exist. Everything that exists is composed of parts and has a beginning and end in time. As 'the sacred' is not composed of parts and is a-temporal, ergo, not something that exists. This is the subject of the essay - by a Bishop - God does not exist.

There is an old maxim, 'God is never what you think'. The principle is that thought itself is inherently incapable of comprehension of the sacred. That is why spiritual philosophies rely on silence, meditation, 'un-knowing', and the like; although this understanding is not so much characteristic of modern religion, it's associated more with contemplative spirituality (although you now find it in alternative spirituality, like Eckhardt Tolle.)

I think there was a consensus that g/G is an idea but not any kind of separately existing being or thing.
— tim wood
This would be an atheist's definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sweet Jesus, MU! Did you even read the sentence? Or the post? Or the OP? Or many of the other posts? See, here's what it says; it starts, "I think there was a consensus...". I wrote that because that seems the substance of what people who have posted to this thread have said. Did I miss a post? Given that, in what way or respect is your post anything but a non sequitur?

Further, Theists, many, absolutely believe, and as seems best to them profess that belief. With them I at least have no issue. I have my beliefs too, and I think believing is an important aspect of moral thinking. But I know of no even remotely Christian-based thinker who understands his religion (i.e., Christian) who claims g/G has real independent existence. Kant's denial of knowledge to make room for faith is also significant here. But to those who insist their belief is knowledge of, then make it knowledge: show us! Or, to be less kind, put up or shut up!

to those who insist their belief is knowledge of, then make it knowledge: show us! — tim wood

They might ask you: what would you be prepared to do, to find out?

Sorry, Wayfarer, but this is non-sense. Try this, "God is...". Complete the sentence. Let's hear what you think, not apologetics for someone or something else. And if you wish to quiet me, then, if you deny material existence and you deny immaterial existence (as an idea) then what do you have? And if you say spirit, well then, how and in what does that inhere? And how do you know? Keeping in mind that I do not challenge belief, only the claim that the thing believed is also an independently existing thing, known as such.

Interesting is that if you profess a belief, critics may address what they perceive as flaws - an exercise in logic perhaps, or reason - but criticism doesn't touch belief, because belief does not claim to know. Claim your belief is true, and you have relieved yourself of any responsibility to know or even think beyond that.

They might ask you: what would you be prepared to do, to find out? — Wayfarer

I'm sure there are many ways of wriggling out of the problem without addressing it. As you just did.

Did I miss a post? — tim wood

Yes, quite a few it appears. You seem to have a selective form of "consensus".

But I know of no even remotely Christian-based thinker who understands his religion (i.e., Christian) who claims g/G has real independent existence. — tim wood

Are you serious? I think it is quite clear in Christian religions that human beings are dependent on God as creator, and God is not dependent on human beings for His existence. Therefore God has real independent existence for Christian based thinkers.

Try this, "God is...". Complete the sentence. — tim wood

God is the creator. I think we could get consensus on that.

Let's look at what is salient, and what was claimed. There are justifications that do not depend on other justifications. "I like Vanilla" is one. It is sufficient, when I am asked, "why did you choose vanilla?", to reply "I like vanilla". It would be obtuse to go on and ask:"OK, so you prefer vanilla to the other flavours on offer, but why did you choose it?" — Banno

Your claim was that there are unjustifiable things which could be used to justify other things.. These unjustifiable things are beyond doubt, because they are foundational, and to doubt them would undermine one's own capacity to doubt. You suggested that god might be like this.

The problem is that such foundational things which are proposed as being beyond doubt do not exist. There are no such things. If they are foundational, they act as propositions which can be either true or false and we can ask for justification, therefore they are not beyond doubt. That's why we can doubt god (for example). If they cannot be doubted, they are neither correct nor incorrect, as janus pointed out. But they are not foundational.

Regardless of whether "I like vanilla" justifies your purchase, it is not itself unjustifiable, and not beyond doubt. So the example does not suffice and is a digression.

Sorry, Wayfarer, but this is nonsense. — tim wood

It really isn't. It's a fundamental idea in philosophical theology. The trouble is, whenever I try to explain it, you first become exasperated, and then hostile, because of your 'mind-map' or the heuristic by which you categorise all these ideas. Which is something like: It's perfectly OK to believe in God, because by so doing, all you're doing is professing faith, saying something about yourself. But if you wish to show there is such a being, then you obviously can't, because it's not objectively verifiable.

Is that close?

What I'm arguing is that what is 'objectively verifiable' is not all there is to be known. Or, put another way, there are other modes of knowing, or cognitive models, within which 'ideas of the sacred' are quite demonstrable, if not necessarily objective.

I acknowledge it's a deep subject and topic, and not everyone will want to go there, but if you start a thread on 'towards a philosophy of religion' then you might at least be willing to think outside your particular square about it instead of continually blowing up about it. :wink:

Try this, "God is...". Complete the sentence. — tim wood

'God is...' will do just fine, thanks.

To those who insist their belief is knowledge of, then make it knowledge: show us! — tim wood

OK, I will try again. If you seriously set out on a quest to 'find out if there really were a God', like the proverbial buried treasure, how would you go about it? Where would you go, or what would you do, to find out? I mean, I explored the question at least some of the way through academia; others have set off to remote regions or searched out spiritual teachers or resided at ashrams. So to understand this kind of question requires engaging with it, requires adopting a method which is commensurate with the kind of question it is. And that's not necessarily something our techo-centric, science-centric, objectivist culture is going to know much about. (Although there's always Andrew Newberg....)

I think there was a consensus that g/G is an idea but not any kind of separately existing being or thing. — tim wood

Theologically speaking, the role of the creator as being imminent or transcendent has been mostly dealt with as differences of opinion to how closely such an agent may be involved with the concerns and affairs of a single person. So, in one sense, it has always been a problem of accepting an idea because thinking one way or another changes the decisions a person makes.

But making decisions of that kind is not the same thing as deciding what is valid to accept as evidence for one state of affairs or another in a discussion of our creation as a shared reality and wondering what made it the way it is. Nobody starts their journey as an ethical being by making sure it can be defended through philosophy.

Kant, particularly in the Critique of Judgement, makes a distinction between the two approaches. In that tome, he complains that Spinoza was too dark in his view of the person and what they could hope for.

So I propose it is difficult to move forward with these considerations because we, as people trying to sort things out, cannot simply point to this or that articulation of the problem as a shared point of departure.