supernagic) could (literally) be raised to explain anything, and therefore explains nothing. — jorndoe
appeal to supernagic seems a bit ... odd. — jorndoe
aware of your ignorance — OmniscientNihilist
don't know — Opening post
Let's not pretend to know what we don't. — jorndoe
I think some of what gets classed as supernatural magic is real. I said 'classed as' since I think these phenomena are simply things that science has not (yet) or perhaps cannot confirm or won't in the near future, but they are real phenomena. One could say I consider them natural, in the sense that they are part of the potential processes of reality. Not things that are 'super' to reality. They are not breaking rules, they follow rules or laws or potentials. I have experienced enough of some of these pheneomena to be convinced.But what do you think? — jorndoe
Do words not physically exist? Can we not say Harry Potter physically exists as a word in a book which is attached to our idea of Harry Potter? — Mark Dennis
- https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/possible-objects/#SubVsExi3.1 Subsistence vs. Existence
Alexius Meinong’s theory of objects has had much influence on some contemporary theorists, resulting in a variety of proposals. These proposals are known broadly as Meinongian. According to Meinong, a subject term in any true sentence stands for an object (Meinong 1904). So the subject term in the sentence, ‘The sixth right finger of Julius Caesar is a finger’, stands for an object, assuming that the sentence is true. (Such an assumption is strongly disputed in Salmon 1987.) Even though the exact respects in which contemporary Meinongian proposals are Meinongian and the extent of their Meinongianism differ from one proposal to another, all of them inherit this claim by Meinong in some form. They are thus united in resisting Bertrand Russell’s criticism of Meinong, which mandates analyzing sentences containing a definite description, like the one above concerning the sixth right finger of Julius Caesar, as general statements rather than singular statements (Russell 1905); see 3.1.2 for a particularly famous piece of Russell’s criticism and how two leading Meinongian theories handle it.
Meinong distinguishes two ontological notions: subsistence and existence. Subsistence is a broad ontological category, encompassing both concrete objects and abstract objects. Concrete objects are said to exist and subsist. Abstract objects are said not to exist but to subsist. The talk of abstract objects may be vaguely reminiscent of actualist representationism, which employs representations, which are actual abstract objects. At the same time, for Meinong, the nature of an object does not depend on its being actual. This seems to give objects reality that is independent of actuality. Another interesting feature of Meinong’s theory is that it sanctions the postulation not only of non-actual possible objects but also of impossible objects, for it says that ‘The round square is round’ is a true sentence and therefore its subject term stands for an object. This aspect of Meinong’s theory has been widely pointed out, but non-trivial treatment of impossibility is not confined to Meinongianism (Lycan & Shapiro 1986). For more on Meinong’s theory, see Chisholm 1960, Findlay 1963, Grossmann 1974, Lambert 1983, Zalta 1988: sec.8. For some pioneering work in contemporary Meinongianism, see Castañeda 1974, Rapaport 1978, Routley 1980. We shall examine the theories of two leading Meinongians: Terence Parsons and Edward Zalta. We shall take note of some other Meinongians later in the section on fictional objects, as their focus is primarily on fiction. Parsons and Zalta not only propose accounts of fictional objects but offer comprehensive Meinongian theories of objects in general.
Supernagic is ...
real or nonsense — jorndoe
What does it mean to be unknowable? Is it that it is knowable to some, but not to others? Or is it that there is nothing to know at all - that we are mistaking imaginary things for real things and then asking questions about those imaginary things as if they were real.saying 'i cannot know' = making a claim that the answer is intrinsically unknowable — OmniscientNihilist
Give me a time Machine, a cigarette lighter, a pressurised can of flammable liquid, a gun and a hoard of modern Anti biotics and I have the power to be perceived as a god in much of the past so long as I keep everyone in the past ignorant of how I am performing these “Miracles”. — Mark Dennis
3. Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.
[...] It could be God or his messenger/prophet ( :rofl: ) or Descartes' demon. I sincerely hope it's not the latter. To think of it even the former possibility is laden with difficulties. — TheMadFool
It was Meinongianism I was thinking of. — Mark Dennis
might have some insights on Meinong's jungle. — jorndoe
So (per Feynman), magic = don't know ? — jorndoe
What does it mean to be unknowable? — Harry Hindu
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.