Your "interlocutors" are part of your model, no? — Terrapin Station
So why would it be noteworthy that people you're making up share the model you're making up? — Terrapin Station
It's more curious that some people you're making up--like me--think that you're a philosophical mess. — Terrapin Station
I was asking if that assumption was the one you're holding..
— creativesoul
Yes, I understood that, and the answer was, no, that's not the full assumption I'm holding because it does not contain the assumption that I need to convince you otherwise. To clarify, I think non-linguistic primates have a sense of fairness, I'm working on the presumption that you don't (because you stated that fairness requires a pre-existing agreement and that such agreements are impossible without language), I'm arguing in defence of my position, I've no desire to get you to change yours (at this time). Does that clear things up? — Isaac
That notion of belief grants inference and disposition to act to inanimate objects.
— creativesoul
I have no problem with beliefs being attributed to non-living things, but if you do, then the notion could be limited to such states when expressed in the architecture of a brain. It makes no difference to my defence. The main point is that I don't believe they can be sensibly talked about as having 'content' in the same way a book has 'content', they are not necessarily 'about' other concepts (though they can be). — Isaac
I'm asking you for exactly what counts as a sense of fairness? What is the criterion which - when met by any and all candidates - counts as a case of that candidate having a sense of fairness? You and I meet the criterion.
What is it such that the non human primate meets it too?
— creativesoul
A sense of fairness, for me, is a belief that some restorative action should be initiated if certain resources in certain scenarios are not distributed either equally (by default) or according to some rule which has been previously established between individuals in a group.
Non-human primates can be said to have met that criteria if the[y] take restorative action (complain, show negative emotion etc) in such scenarios. The evidence is stronger where alternative explanations for those restorative behaviours have been ruled out by careful experiment design such as the use of ultimatum games, tokens, eliminating social hierarchies etc. instead of simple resource distribution. — Isaac
I am not of the opinion that such alternative explanations for apparent restorative behaviour needs to be entirely ruled out before we accept the hypothesis because I think that would imply an unwarranted principle of anthropocentrism. We know we evolved from primates, we should presume, as a default, that they share all of our traits until we demonstrate one to be unique, not presume all of our traits are unique until we prove that they're not. — Isaac
The evidence is stronger where alternative explanations for those restorative behaviours have been ruled out by careful experiment design such as the use of ultimatum games, tokens, eliminating social hierarchies etc. instead of simple resource distribution. — Isaac
because there is no it, the whole concept of 'the experience of seeing red' as opposed to just 'seeing red' is incoherent. — Isaac
So is experiencing eating cake different from eating cake? — Banno
What would be the point in asking such a question? What knowledge would we be getting that we couldn't acquire by thinking about it differently? — Harry Hindu
I think Jackson proves is that there is such a first-person experience that we have, the likes of which philosophical zombies would not have. Which, again, is a complete trivialism because I think everything necessarily has that and it's incoherent to talk about not having it so saying something has it really doesn't communicate anything of greater interest than disagreement with such nonsense. — Pfhorrest
Yeah. I would only be careful: we are of reality, and don't stand outside of it looking in. "If no people existed, objects would be...?" is still a strange question. "If there are no clouds, objects would be...?" - one has to wonder: what even is this question? How does the one relate to the other? It's loaded, but badly. — StreetlightX
because there is no it, the whole concept of 'the experience of seeing red' as opposed to just 'seeing red' is incoherent.
— Isaac
This is wrong, because we do have experiences of seeing red without seeing red. Dreams, memory, imagination and optical illusions do not count as seeing red. And as was noted earlier, the part of the brain that creates color experiences can sometimes be stimulated in blind people by other means. — Marchesk
It's not a trivialism when we try to determine whether machines can be conscious, which is also the case for other animals. Does a pig or a cow experience pain, and if so, is it ethical to eat them? Should we medically test rats if they have subjective experiences of suffering?
Those are meaningful questions. — Marchesk
Yes, but the existence of phenomenal consciousness is a trivialism within the worldview (that I have) that of course pigs and cows and rats experience pain and of course machines can be conscious, if they have the right functionality to do so (which pigs and cows and rats and humans clearly do).
Are not properties just among the "things" that appear (if we allow that shapes, colours, textures and so on are even separable from shaped, coloured and textured objects)? — "Janus
hat our sensory input does not reflect true reality is separate problem from ontology of the subjectiveness of experience. — Zelebg
I would say it is akin to visualization; when I imagine the house of my childhood, it is not as though I am looking at it, or at a photograph of it; it's not as if I can look at my visualization and count the bricks, compare their colours and so on; yet I call it visualization nonetheless. — Janus
But I am honestly amused - like it makes me smile irl - to think people look out at the world around them and honestly believe in their heart of hearts that what they see are 'properties'.
— StreetlightX
I mean, I'm mostly on board the embodied cognition train that says we see for the most part "affordances", opportunities for action, sites of relief and rest, goals to arrive at, hazards and safety, speed and rest, and so on.
— StreetlightX
! — bert1
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