Are there unconscious brainstates? — ZzzoneiroCosm

Yes. They're not cognitive.

So if we make an analogy between A and B, if anything is different ontologically when it comes to A and B, there's a problem with the analogy? — Terrapin Station

Generally, yes. Arguing by analogy is inherently imprecise.

In this case, certainly, yes. A mind or brain is far more complex than a car alarm. There's no comparison.

Generally, yes. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Yeah, that's pretty stupid.

You don't have an analogy if A and B are identical.

Yes. They're not cognitive. — Terrapin Station

So at T1 brain-state X is unconscious to you. At T2, T3, T4 and T5, brain-state Y is conscious to you. You note the similarities between T1, T2, T3, T4 and T5 and hypothesize that brain-state X may be similiar to brainstate Y, the central distinction being, possibly, that at T1 I was unconscious of the nature of brainstate X.

What do you take issue with here?

You note the similarities between T1, T2, T3, T4 and T5 and hypothesize that brain-state X may be similiar to brainstate Y, — ZzzoneiroCosm

There's no reason to say that there's a brainstate X at T1 if you're not conscious of X at T1.

Yeah, that's pretty stupid. — Terrapin Station

Analogical argumentation is inherently imprecise.

"Strength of an analogy
Several factors affect the strength of the argument from analogy:

The relevance (positive or negative) of the known similarities to the similarity inferred in the conclusion.[2][3]
The degree of relevant similarity (or dissimilarity) between the two objects.[2]
The amount and variety of instances that form the basis of the analogy.[2]"

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_analogy#False_analogy

In this case "the degree of relevant similiarity" between minds and car alarms is in doubt.

There is certainly a brain-state at T1.

I'm calling it brain-state X.

What would you like to call it?

Analogical argumentation is inherently imprecise. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Noting that there's an ontological difference between A and B is irrelevant to whether the analogy works. It's stupid to suggest that it's relevant. Analogized things are necessarily different ontologically, otherwise it's not an analogy. You need to be able to focus on what's being analogized, not irrelevant ontological differences.

There is certainly a brain-state at T1.

I'm calling it brain-state X.

What would you like to call it? — ZzzoneiroCosm

There's going to be some state as long as there's a brain, sure. What are we using for evidence of the state in question, and what does it have to do with anything cognitive or conscious if we're not aware of it?

There's going to be some state as long as there's a brain, sure. — Terrapin Station

So let's call it brain-state X.

Again:

So at T1 brain-state X is unconscious to you. At T2, T3, T4 and T5, brain-state Y is conscious to you. You note the similarities between T1, T2, T3, T4 and T5 and hypothesize that brain-state X may be similiar to brainstate Y, the central distinction being, possibly, that at T1 you were unconscious of the nature of brainstate X.

What do you take issue with here?

So at T1 brain-state X is unconscious to you. At T2, T3, T4 and T5, brain-state Y is conscious to you. You note the similarities between T1, T2, T3, T4 and T5 and hypothesize that brain-state X may be similiar to brainstate Y, the central distinction being, possibly, that at T1 you were unconscious of the nature of brainstate X. — ZzzoneiroCosm

The next problem: what similarities are we noting? You're saying something about similarities, but you're not saying what's supposed to be similar. Similarities of brain states? To whom?

The next problem: what similarities are we noting? You're saying something about similarities, but you're not saying what's supposed to be similar. Similarities of brain states? To whom? — Terrapin Station

Sorry, I'm not answering your questions until you've answered mine.

What do you take issue with in the above scenario?

Sorry, I'm not answering your questions until you've answered mine.

What do you take issue with in the above scenario? — ZzzoneiroCosm

My question is the next thing I take issue with.

"You're saying something about similarities, but you're not saying what's supposed to be similar. "

"The next problem" should cue you in to the fact that that's something I take issue with.

We're not going to add that you have reading comprehension problems to the rest of this now, are we? I'm so tired of the complete bullshit way that folks like you try to have conversations online.

We're looking at a logical abstraction. It isn't necessary to know what the similarities are. What do you take issue with in the logic of this abstraction?

So what similarities is someone noting, and who is the someone?

We're looking at a logical abstraction. It isn't necessary to know what the similarities are. — ZzzoneiroCosm

The scenario doesn't make any sense without specifying some sort of similarities we're noting.

First off, "x is similar to y" is a judgment that an individual has to make.

The scenario doesn't make any sense without specifying some sort of similarities we're noting. — Terrapin Station

I'm sorry this logical abstraction doesn't make sense to you. I don't think we can go any further.

I'm sorry this logical abstraction doesn't make sense to you. I don't think we can go any further. — ZzzoneiroCosm

So you're incapable of specifying any sort of similarity we could be noting?

So you're incapable of specifying any sort of similarity we could be noting? — Terrapin Station

I'm interested in the logic of the abstraction. Not in filling in the variables.

"You note the similarities between T1, T2, T3, T4 and T5 " -- it can't be the person who had the conscious thoughts at T2, T3, etc. noting similarities of the conscious thoughts and X at T1, because they're not similar.

If it's supposed to be someone noting the similarities of the brain states from a third-person observational perspective, then we could specify that easily enough, but we'd have to justify how they're warranted in making a conclusion about there being mental content at T1 when the person with the brain in question wasn't aware of mental content at T1.

Without bogging down the discussion by filling in variables, is there something you take issue with in the logical form of the abstraction?

Without bogging down the discussion by filling in variables, is there something you take issue with in the logical form of the abstraction? — ZzzoneiroCosm

I just pointed out the problems with it. If you want to just ignore that, I guess you can. That would suck from any sort of conversational or philosophical standpoint though.

I just pointed out the problems with it. If you want to just ignore that, I guess you can. That would suck from any sort of conversational or philosophical standpoint though. — Terrapin Station

The logical form. The logical structure. What do you take issue with in the logical form or structure?

How would you even attempt to formalize it? You've got a bunch of terms like "noting similarities" that have no standard formalization.

That's okay. It was fun. :)

It wasted my time. I'm still looking for an honest, straightorward conversation with someone who won't resort to bullshit tactics.

Every conversation has to end. On these forums they rarely end in a happy agreement. It's good brainwork.

I always feel like I'm dealing with children (well, or teens/people with a teen mentality) who are trying to find creative ways to be "difficult," and that's all I'm doing. I'd rather have what I'd consider a good faith conversation with an adult.