There's a lot of ego in that attitude.

Maybe something in your unconsciousness affecting your perception of reality. Stranger things.

There's a lot of ego in that attitude. — ZzzoneiroCosm

There had better be a lot of ego in folks acting like children and trying to be "difficult," because the other option(s) is less attractive.

Maybe something in your unconsciousness affecting your perception of reality. Stranger things. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Maybe, although there would be no reason to believe that it's unconscious mental content.

Maybe, although there would be no reason to believe that it's unconscious mental content. — Terrapin Station

You say minds are brains. M is B.

It would follow that mental content is brain content. MC is BC.

If some BC is unconscious then some MC is unconscious.

Dogs are animals. Therefore if x is an animal, x is a dog?

Your post is irrelevant.

You say minds are brains. M is B.

It would follow that mental content is brain content. MC is BC.

Do you disagree?

Dogs are animals. Therefore if x is an animal, x is a dog? — Terrapin Station

This rejoinder would be relevant if I had said:

Minds are brains = brains are minds.

I haven't said that.

To be clear I changed the = to an 'is'.

Yes, mental content is brain content. Just like dog behavior is animal behavior. It doesn't follow from this that all brain states are mental states. Just like it doesn't follow that all animal behavior is dog behavior.

, mental content is brain content. — Terrapin Station

Looks like my logic was flawed.


"Some brain content is unconscious" is the closest we can get to an agreement.

"Some brain content is unconscious" is the closest we can get to an agreement. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Right, we agree that some brain states, activities etc. are unconscious.

And thoughts are physical? A thought-tree is physical? Is a thought-tree made of atoms?

Yes. Thoughts, desires, emotions, memories, etc. are physical. They're properties of molecules/atoms in particular relations (structures), undergoing particular processes (so the structures are dynamic).

Why would it seem more plausible to you to say that thoughts are vague "nonphysical" > >whatevers<< ?

duplicate post

Why would it seem more plausible to you to say that thoughts are vague "nonphysical" > >whatevers<< ? — Terrapin Station

Thoughts are vague whatevers. Yes.

And molecules and atoms are vague whatevers.

These days, physicists don't even seem to know what a particle is.

So with molecules, for example, we can give their location at a particular time.

What's an example of a property we can specify like that of a vague nonphysical >>whatever<<?

Perceptibility.

A thought-tree is perceptible.

A molecule as such isn't perceptible.

Are you using "perception" in a way that doesn't refer to becoming aware of information via our senses?

"able to be seen or noticed"

https://www.google.com/search?q=perceitible&oq=perceitible&aqs=chrome..69i57j0l5.5191j1j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8

Matter and mind both have extremely mysterious properties.

They're properties of molecules/atoms in particular relations (structures), undergoing particular processes (so the structures are dynamic). — Terrapin Station

So the thought-tree is a property of a molecule or atom?

"able to be seen or noticed" — ZzzoneiroCosm

Are you saying that you literally see thoughts with your eyes?

So the thought-tree is a property of a molecule or atom? — ZzzoneiroCosm

As I said above: "They're properties of molecules/atoms in particular relations (structures), undergoing particular processes (so the structures are dynamic)."

Are you saying that you literally see thoughts with your eyes? — Terrapin Station

No.

Able to be seen or noticed.

I notice I have thoughts.

So you're not using "perception" in the conventional sense, because that has a connotation of information obtained via our senses. You're just saying that you can be aware of something, it's "noticeable," and that's a property of nonphysical things. Being noticeable isn't a property of physical things though?

"They're properties of molecules/atoms in particular relations (structures), undergoing particular processes (so the structures are dynamic)." — Terrapin Station

It seems far-fetched to call a thought-tree a property of atoms or molecules. At best it's an imprecise use of language.

A thought-tree may be a product or correlate of "molecules/atoms in particular relations (structures), undergoing particular processes (so the structures are dynamic)."

It's a dogmatic leap to reduce the thought-tree to a property.

It's a dogmatic leap to reduce the thought-tree to a property. — ZzzoneiroCosm

It's much more far-fetched to just say that you don't know what it is, exactly, but it is.

At any rate, there isn't anything that's not properties.

Dogmatism and humility are the polarities in question.

Dogmatism denies the mysterious, positing certainty or knowledge. Humility accepts the mysterious.

Dogmatism and egoism (non-humility) go hand in hand.

Being noticeable isn't a property of physical things though? — Terrapin Station

It's not a property of atoms, molecules, particles. The basis of the physicalist view.

It's not a property of atoms, molecules, particles. — ZzzoneiroCosm

How are they not noticeable? Note that we're not saying that we can't perceive them with our senses, because that's not what you're saying about thoughts, either.

A table is noticeable. An atom isn't.

An atom is just as mysterious as a thought.

I don't know what a thought is made of. And I don't know what an atom is made of.
I don't know what a thought is made of. And I don't know what a particle is made of.