And if you don't like that neither then tell me, is consciousness a type of feeling at all, and if not, then what in the world is it? — Zelebg

Consciousness is the conviction that I am not a rock.

I agree with that, but then what is conviction: feeling, sensation, experience, understanding, illussion... what is conviction?

When I say the word conviction, do you understand me?

If you do, then you know what a conviction is.

Pain is pain, but is also a sensation. Joy is joy, but is also a feeling. Now, I see you are insisting conviction is conviction, but what I asked you is it also a feeling or not, is it also maybe a sensation or not, is it anything besides 'conviction'. Do you understand?

I'm not insisting a conviction is a conviction. Not at all.

I'm insisting you know what a conviction is.

In the same light I would insist you know what consciousness is.

Consciousness is more a verbal trick than a thing. It’s the adjective “conscious” with the suffix “ness” attached to it, giving solidity to pure wind.

I'm insisting you know what a conviction is.

I asked you, but if you insist then I am convinced. I feel that I know conviction is an emotion. And now you know too. Fantastic!

consciousness = awareness

color, sound, feeling = qualia

consciousness and qualia are two sides of the same eternal omnipresent coin

the mind is just a reflection of this, in this.

Is there nothing we can say about it? Is it process, succession of separate events? Is it feeling, sensation? Can we not even say yes or no to those questions?

consciousness = awareness

Is awareness not just a sum of all inner feelings and external sensations?

color, sound, feeling = qualia

Is there a fundamental difference betwee feeling taste or smell, and feeling joy or desire?

consciousness and qualia are two sides of the same coin

What do you mean?

And if you don't like that neither then tell me, is consciousness a type of feeling at all, and if not, then what in the world is it? — Zelebg

If you're looking for a philosophical definition of "Consciousness", you may find that each poster has his own opinion. But if you're looking for a cutting-edge treatment of the latest scientific research on the Mind/Body question, check out Christof Koch's latest book : The Feeling of Life Itself. The title expresses Koch's personal answer to your question.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christof_Koch

"Consciousness is experience. . . . consciousness is lived reality. It is the feeling of life itself. It is the only bit of eternity to which I am entitled."

".. . experience. It is the one fact I am absolutely certain of. Everything else is conjecture, including the existence of an external world."

Thanks. Is there some site where I could find recent papers on the subject free to download?

If you don't like that, how about I say consciousness is nothing else but sum of all the inner feelings and external sensations? — Zelebg

That’s about as broad and accurate a definition as there can be. The main issue is how we then unpack what this means and what use it is to us to say so.

Note: the dichotic utterance of ‘inner’ and ‘external’ has always been a hazardous field of play - hence dualistic notions and no logical means to claw our way around such attitudes and keep a reasonable dialogue flowing.

And if you don't like that neither then tell me, is consciousness a type of feeling at all, and if not, then what in the world is it? — Zelebg

There is a base assumption at play here: that consciousness can be categorised, using language, under a more general term. But is this necessarily the case? Perhaps some basic concepts, like consciousness, defy further categorisation?

Note: the dichotic utterance of ‘inner’ and ‘external’ has always been a hazardous field of play - hence dualistic notions and no logical means to claw our way around such attitudes and keep a reasonable dialogue flowing. — I like sushi

Right, but we could reframe the debate to be how I experience the rock and how the rock is, assuming they are not the same thing. If we have good reason to suppose that rocks are more than our experience of them, then that raises the possibility that rocks differ in some way from how we experience them. And so on for the rest of the world, including our own bodies and other people.

So we end up with some kind of dichotomy, however we want to define that. And it's as old as philosophy itself, even if the terms and nature of the debate have changed over time. And there are many reasons for supposing this dichotomy exists, or at least appears to exist.

In "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness" (1995), Chalmers wrote:[4]


It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to experience an emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does.

In the same paper, he also wrote:

The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive there is a whir of information processing, but there is also a subjective aspect.

Then, of course there is Dennett's qualia who identifies four properties that are commonly ascribed to qualia.[2] According to these, qualia are:
1.ineffable ; that is, they cannot be communicated, or apprehended by any means other than direct experience.
2.intrinsic ; that is, they are non-relational properties, which do not change depending on the experience's relation to other things.
3.private ; that is, all interpersonal comparisons of qualia are systematically impossible.
4.directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness; that is, to experience a quale is to know one experiences a quale, and to know all there is to know about that quale.

Then there is also Schopenhauer's metaphysical Will, and Kant's metaphysical noumena.

Many of those attempt to explain the various non-physical aspects of the conscious phenomena.

I hope that helps some...

It should be relatively clear from the other thread that when it comes to this topic I lean far more toward a phenomenology investigation so talking about what ‘exists’ isn’t really something that concerns me.

The only other reasonable approach is through the cognitive neurosciences as far as I’m concerned.

I think most other philosophical ideas have pretty much run their full course. There is likely more life left in the idea of Language as Consciousness, not to mean as a positive approach, but the area of linguistics combined with cognitive neurosciences is certainly an intriguing area - again though, I think a partially phenomenological approach would help there too.

To add to this: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=zNRAF3AFlqM

That's about as broad and accurate a definition as there can be. The main issue is how we then unpack what this means and what use it is to us to say so.

Word "sum" narrows down some of it and can inspire some quite specific ideas, like this: consciousness, or a function of it, is kind of a loom integrating all the cognitive, sensory and emotional threads and vawing them into the memory as a single unified tapestry of experiences.

More interesting and better analogy, however, is an antenna, since it can both encode and decode, i.e. memory-store & memory-recall. Thought of having an antenna in your head may be disturbing, but the concept is concrete and functionally specific, so we can properly investigate and maybe even predict some consequences for empirical testing.

Is consciousness a feeling, sensation, sum of all feelings and sensations, or something else? — OP

Something else.

Apparently, it's what the multiverse is made of.

It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C?

I do not see what's so perplexing aside from it perplexes me to see people keep talking like that...

Why is it that when our ears engage in hearing the middle C being played that we hear the middle C being played?

What did I miss?

How can we explain why...

By taking account of our own thought and belief and it's effect/affects upon ourselves including our subsequent attitudes and behaviour.

It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises.

Granted.

Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does.

"Why ought" is not the right question at all.

Perhaps taking careful consideration of both the physical and the non physical aspects of all experience would be helpful?

I do not see what's so perplexing aside from it perplexes me to see people keep talking like that...

What did I miss?

The same thing you missed when I said in another thread: "any experience is necesarilly subjective experience", and you disagreed without given explanation or example. You are missing the 'subjectiveness' of the experience. It is that "I" in "I think, therefore I am", and the only concept directly implied and necessary real.

By taking account of our own thought and belief and it's effect/affects upon ourselves including our subsequent attitudes and behaviour.

That's just behaviour. Where do you see the difference then between a human and robot awareness?

"Why ought" is not the right question at all.

Perhaps taking careful consideration of both the physical and the non physical aspects of all experience would be helpful?

What do you mean?

How about I say consciousness is a type of 'receiver', something where output information from cognition, sensations and emotions gets "in", either externally induced from the environment, or internally from the memory.

And what if I say consciousness is not a result of some computation or any kind of process, but immediate effect phenomena like reflection in a mirror or raindrops splashes.

Now the only alternative remains consciousness is not really actualized right there and then, in our head, but instead the information is transmitted somewhere else, perhaps eventually being projected on some kind of screen for amusement to our reptilian shapeshifting alien overlords, or god, or even maybe our own ghosts. I think now I narrowed it down.

Thanks. Is there some site where I could find recent papers on the subject free to download? — Zelebg

Christoph Koch on Consciousness

The Wikipedia page has lots of references : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christof_Koch

2018 article : https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-05097-x

personal site papers: https://christofkoch.com/my-books-and-papers/

Scientific American articles : https://christofkoch.com/category/sciam-column/

In my view analogies help bring together sets of ideas. Here you don’t really have any ideas and have just used an analogy to make the loose idea appear more substantial - you’ve not succeeded with me.

How about I say consciousness is a separate feeling with its own sense, its own receptors like that of taste or smell? — Zelebg

If you're saying that the brain is a sensory organ for meaning, that pretty well sums it up. But there are no dedicated sensors (like eyes) specifically for Consciousness. Some have postulated that the brain works like an antenna to receive transmissions from out in the ether. That may be a crude analogy, but there are no aliens out there trying to contact us: it's just Mother Nature calling. Besides, the "feelings" associated with meanings are ordinary emotions evoked by their relevance to me.

IMHO, Consciousness is not a thing or a signal or a sensation, or a soul, but a holistic process. It's merely what highly organized brains do --- as a whole system. All of your physical senses detect energy in various wavelengths and the brain interprets the dots & dashes into meaning. As in Morse code, the interpreter must already know the code. We are born decoders of meaning. If you want something more technical than that, check out Koch's book.

Christoph Koch on Consciousness

Great, thank you.

Some have postulated that the brain works like an antenna to receive transmissions from out in the ether.

I think I only heard Rupert Sheldrake mention something among the lines to facilitate absorbtion of collective memory in his morphic resonance theory. Is there any other referrence to "antenna" in relation to mind or sentience you know of?

Zelebg In my view analogies help bring together sets of ideas. Here you don't really have any ideas and have just used an analogy to make the loose idea appear more substantial - you've not succeeded with me.

Then I think you might enjoy this problem, it can not get more concrete than this. Below is a personal computer hardware configuration for which I claim is conscious, self-aware, and free willing. And the definition of consciousness is: "act of self-observation".

1. Camera A: visual input extern -> feeds into 2.
2. Program A: subconsciousness & memory -> feeds into 3.
3. Display A: visual output inner -> feeds into 4.
4. Camera B: visual input inner -> feeds into 5.
5. Program B: cognition & free will -> feeds into 6.& 2.
6. Speaker: audio output extern

First, and most importantly, is there anything here that contradicts empirical knowledge? And then everything else, like is there any logical or even just intuition based contradiction here?

As far as I’m concerned you need to ‘feel’ to be conscious, and you need a body to ‘feel’. Ergo you cannot have a ‘computed consciousness’ and compare it to human consciousness.

Basically my view is pretty much that of Damasio’s when it comes to exploring what consciousness is and how best to equip our delineations between this or that phenomenon.

I wouldn’t call an orange the same as a human simply because they both have living cells. Nor would I say an orange is conscious, but that doesn’t mean I dismiss out of hand that an orange (or rather orange tree) doesn’t possess something that ‘experiences’ its environment - note I say ‘experiences’ not experiences; meaning that an orange tree clearly alters dependent upon environmental factors and does so by ‘experiencing’ the environment in some fashion. I say the later as a distinction between a rock and tree. A rock doesn’t ‘experience’ anything as it has no homeostatic act of balancing, no ‘life’.

As a rough model I’d be much more inclined to take on board theories in neurosciences about top down and bottom up models exploring consciousness. What you’ve outlined above is pretty much nothing at all tbh. You’d probably have greater success in theory crafting if you focused on one of those items in intricate detail - visual ‘input’ and the human brain is a fascinating place to begin with items like how we ‘see’ lines, 3D objects relating to neural networks, and how attention is focused and inhibited by something called ‘priming’.

Simply stating this is self-aware and conscious because that’s what I call it is certainly a problem, but it’s your problem not mine. Please don’t take my words too harshly here. No doubt you have good reason to put this out there beyond what you’ve outlined. At is all you’ve shown is a highly speculative and ambiguous set of words that claim to say something yet don’t have any evidence or reasoning conveyed to back them up.

Consciousness itself is a relatively ambiguous term so if you start extending it to items like oranges, rocks, trees or cats, then we’re going to start to disagree about the technical use of ‘consciousness’ very quickly.