And, furthermore, dear Banno, do you believe in propositional attitudes? — Wallows

Well... yes. "The moon is full"; a proposition. "John believes that the moon is full"; John's attitude towards that proposition.

It would be like if everyone had their own home, but no one was allowed to go into others' homes, there was no way to take pictures of others' homes, etc. The person who lived there would know exactly what it's like inside, but other people wouldn't. That wouldn't stop anyone from talking about what their homes are like inside, however. — Terrapin Station

What words would they use then?

but that's not identical to what is like at any other spatio-temporal location. — Terrapin Station

Sure. Just so long as we agree that what is true for A is also true for B - subject appropriate translations. I'm thinking of the Principle of Relativity.

...what it's like to have subjective mental content, including qualia, with respect to those perceptions. — Terrapin Station

The furniture in your house - mental or unvisited.

I'm not convinced that there is a "what it's like", for bats or otherwise.

Nothing is identical from two different spatiotemporal locations. — Terrapin Station

Einstein might disagree. He went to great lengths to show that they were identical.

why is direct realism NOT incompatible with private content? — Wallows

YOu've lost me... How is direct realism incompatible with private content? Set it out for us.

I don't think Quine meant to imply anything more than that. — sime

Yep.

An interesting few comments. I hadn't thought about whether I attribute beliefs to Siri.

But I don't see why I shouldn't. A belief is a proposition taken as being trusted. I ask Siri where the nearest fish and chip shop is; why not say that Siri believes it's 600m to the north?

There's some good arguments against our folk psychology being replaces by a more - should I call it a scientific - approach. The one I find convincing simply asks is there a difference between Siri or Alexa having a faulty database and their having a false belief? Perhaps that's all a false belief is.

I'm not convinced that there is a "what it's like", for bats or otherwise. — Banno

I'm not convinced that anyone isn't convinced of that. I just refers to properties as such. I don't think it's conceivable to think of anything sans properties.

Einstein might disagree. — Banno

More fool him then.

Just so long as we agree that what is true for A is also true for B — Banno

It often won't be (also reading "true" as "what's the case for")

The question is, why do we not here recognize the distinction between the practical and the theoretic? — tim wood

I'm a bit lost as to what part of the thread this is about...

Yeah, this part I don't entirely get. If I were a direct-realist, then there wouldn't really be unsharable content in my mind. Let me know why would you think otherwise? — Wallows

What is meant by "unsharable content" in this thread? That you can't talk about it? Or that other people can't directly access it?

Even direct realists have dreams, which they can talk about if they remember, but someone telling me their dream doesn't mean I get to experience it. I can imagine what the dream was like, but it's not the same thing as having the dream myself. And so it goes for every other experience. But the point of dreams is that they're not perceptual, and thus direct realism is irrelevant to them. So there are experiences outside of direct perception to deal with for this kind of discussion (whether mental content is shareable).

And so the problem still presents itself for direct realists, because it's not just about perception, but all subjective experience.

For Terrapin, but for others, too. Einstein developed a set of transformations that allowed the laws of physics to be the same for all observers. The principles here is that what is true for one observer will also be true for another observer, given the appropriate translations.,

gives us the neat example of a shape in the sand. You see a 9, I see a 6, but we both realise that if we swopped places, I would see a 9, and you would see a 6. There is no disagreement as to the facts, once they are expressed well enough.

I think of Davidson as having presented a more general case of the same principle. It's the flip side of the Principle of Charity: Assume that what your interlocutor is saying is true.

If something is true, it can be expressed in such a way that there is general agreement.

And so the problem still presents itself for direct realists — Marchesk

As a direct realist, maybe you can explain what the problem is supposed to be, because it's not clear to me what Wallows was thinking.

Yeah, that's a key issue: what is it that is unsharable.

What's easier to see is what is shared - our shared world gives us a basis for talking to each other. And we can talk about things like pain on the basis of our shared experiences, even though in the normal course of things pain is taken as private to the person in pain.

So keeping to our shared world is a good idea. Hence my caution when it comes to Qualia.

I don't see dreams as a problem for direct realism. There's a clear difference between dream experiences and conscious (waking) experiences. We can agree that a direct realist whop dreams of flying sheep is not obligated to assert that there are flying sheep.

For Terrapin, but for others, too. Einstein developed a set of transformations that allowed the laws of physics to be the same for all observers. — Banno

I'm not a realist on physical laws, but aside from that, the fact that the laws of physics would be the same for all observers is different than the properties that something has relative to a particular spatiotemporal location. For example, something might be round from one spatiotemporal location but oblong from another spatiotemporal location.

I am not a direct realist. I think the supposed dichotomy between realism and - whatever - is muddled.

I'm not a realist on physical laws, but aside from that, the fact that the laws of physics would be the same for all observers is different than the properties that something has relative to a particular spatiotemporal location. For example, something might be round from one spatiotemporal location but oblong from another spatiotemporal location. — Terrapin Station

One can overthink this perception stuff.

Sure, you see a 6, I see a 9. We are looking at the very same thing. You understand why I see a 9, and I understand why you see a 6.

What's the problem? There's no disagreement here.

As a direct realist, maybe you can explain what the problem is supposed to be, because it's not clear to me what Wallows was thinking. — Terrapin Station

I understand it to be that since direct realists deny the contention that we're aware of some mental idea or representation when perceiving (instead of the physical object itself), then there isn't some inaccessible mental content that can't be shared. Instead, we're just talking about the objects themselves.

However, there are experiences in addition to perception such as dreams, and the problem of sharing those experiences comes up. Also, there are going to be issues even for direct perception between differing abilities. If you're a super taster and I'm not, then my ability to understand your taste experiences will be somewhat limited (inaccessible).

I'm not convinced that there is a "what it's like", for bats or otherwise. — Banno

Do you think bats have experiences that might differ qualitatively from ours in some aspects? If not bats, then dolphins, dogs, chimps even other people?

Sure.

That's not quite the same as a "what it's like".

These issues are resolved.

Dreams are also directly perceived. They are just different things we are encountering. To see dream dragon is to encounter a different thing to my house.

Differing abilities aren't a problem either. Each object itself is multiple. It is what anyone perceives of it.

Dreams are also directly perceived. They are just different things we are encountering. To see dream dragon is to encounter a different thing to my house. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Are you saying that the contents of dreams are real? Your use of perception in dreams is highly non-standard. In any case, dream experiences mostly don't originate with the use of the sensory organs.

Differing abilities aren't a problem either. Each object itself is multiple. It is what anyone perceives of it. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I'm not sure what you mean here. Are you asserting idealism? This sounds like some TGW philosophizing.

That's not quite the same as a "what it's like". — Banno

Maybe. You're taking issue with the language usage. I take it you think that leads to a problem that might not be a problem.

What are qualia?

It's what you see or perceive.

I see or perceive a tree. The tree is not a quale, it's a tree.

No, not that, Banno - your perception-of-the-tree is the quale.

So it's sort of a thing in my head? But my perception-of-tree, what I see, changes as I move around. Which of them is the tree-quale? or is it all of them? and if it's all of them, how is it different from my seeing the tree?

What gets added or explained by bringing qualia into the already complex story?

I take it you think that leads to a problem that might not be a problem. — Marchesk

Oh, yeah.

Yes, real, but not existent on Earth. When you encounter something in a dream you are experiencing something which is there. It's a fact of the world someone can be wrong about.

I'm asserting that existing things are many different ways. A simple example is colour: any given thing is not just one colour, but ALL then colours which are there to be perceived. The banner of our forum is not only purple, but also, for example, grey (as seen by those who cannot see any hues)..

I understand it to be that since direct realists deny the contention that we're aware of some mental idea or representation when perceiving (instead of the physical object itself), then there isn't some inaccessible mental content that can't be shared. Instead, we're just talking about the objects themselves. — Marchesk

It's important to understand that direct realists are not saying that we're not dealing with perception. Direct realism is a stance in philosophy of perception after all. It's not a stance that essentially says "there is no perception." So we're not actually just talking about the objects themselves. We're still talking about perception, about mental phenomena.

What makes the difference is the character of perception, not whether there's perception or not.

An analogy that's useful is that of a camera. No one is going to say that the camera isn't involved in the camera taking photos, or that the photos aren't a product of the camera. The issue is whether the photo "directly captures" the subject matter, and whether we can know this, in addition to being able to know when something is going wrong because the camera isn't capturing something right, versus whether we're going to claim that all we can know is the camera qua the camera, so that it's presenting images of the camera itself somehow, and we don't know what those images' relationship is with the external world, presuming there is one.

What gets added or explained by bringing qualia into the already complex story? — Banno

Sure, so we could stick with perceiving properties of things. Then that can lead to questions over whether all those properties belong to the things perceived, or whether some belong to the perceiver. And then from there you have Locke and can bootstrap your way to Nagel, and then you're a short step from Chalmers.

That's not what I had in mind, but it looks like it might work.

Hm. Adding the camera puts me in mind of homunculi.

I am not sitting in my head looking at an image of a tree. I am looking at a tree.

I am not sitting in my head experiencing tree-quale. I'm looking at a tree.

To further your analogy in context of my replies to Banno, if your camera then adds a filter along with some metadata to the picture, then that extra stuff are not properties from the object itself. That information is generated by the camera.