For one, imagine if folks were interested in others persons' views simply because they find other people and their differences interesting. — Terrapin Station

Ha! Very drole.

The ‘regard’ is the ‘mode’ in the sense I meant it. — I like sushi

Replacing one idiosyncratic technical term with another is hardly an explanation. A system which can only be explained in terms of its own technical language is just waffle. You need to bridge what you think Husserl means by his technical terms by reference to ordinary language. No one ordinarily use 'mode' to mean anything like what you're using it to mean.

This doesn't follow. A belief that the distinction of another mind is just a model is not the same as saying that only I exist. I'm quite convinced the external world exists (I actually think it is impossible to genuinely doubt that), I just don't agree that the distinctions we draw are real outside of our minds. — Isaac

So what you're saying is that other people exist, it's just that our talk of other minds is itself a model, and the model can be disputed. You're disputing the model that the experiences of other minds is inaccessible. That subjectivity is fundamentally different from objectivity. And thus you disagree with the hard problem of consciousness, that it's a "hard" problem.

Alright, fair enough. I think there's some room there for debate over exactly how "hard" the distinction is between subjective and objective. It could be that the distinction is only a human one due to a limitation of how we think, or based on how philosophy and language has developed into the current debate, or just that science hasn't quite caught up yet.

What I'm noting is that this distinction goes all the way back to the beginning of philosophical inquiry, so there's something fundamental at least in terms of human knowledge. The distinction being one between the appearance of the world to us, and how the world actually is. The current consciousness debate is just the most recent development of the long argued problem of perception and skepticism that arose a long time ago when people started asking questions about sticks looking bent in water and people having different experiences of sensation (perceptual relativity), and how animal sensory capabilities can differ from our own.

So what you're saying is that other people exist, it's just that our talk of other minds is itself a model, and the model can be disputed. You're disputing the model that the experiences of other minds is inaccessible. That subjectivity is fundamentally different from objectivity. And thus you disagree with the hard problem of consciousness, that it's a "hard" problem. — Marchesk

So close, it's hardly worth quibbling, but I don't think other people exist either. I think the real world, all that is the case, exists. Any division of that into separate objects, forces, etc are just models, just one way of subdiving things, among other options.

The distinction being one between the appearance of the world to us, and how the world actually is. — Marchesk

Yes, only I don't see how there can possibly be a way the world really is. Any 'ways' it could be require distinction (shape and form, even if only figurative) and I cannot see any convincing way in which distinction can be the case without anyone doing the distinguishing.

So close, it's hardly worth quibbling, but I don't think other people exist either. I think the real world, all that is the case, exists. Any division of that into separate objects, forces, etc are just models, just one way of subdiving things, among other options. — Isaac

Yeah, that is definitely worth quibbling over! So, do you exist?

Yes, only I don't see how there can possibly be a way the world really is. Any 'ways' it could be require distinction (shape and form, even if only figurative) and I cannot see any convincing way in which distinction can be the case without anyone doing the distinguishing. — Isaac

But then how does the subdividing happen? What's making the distinctions? Is it "your" mind? Based on what?

Parmenides started this whole business by arguing that despite appearances, change was impossible and the world was really a sphere. My biggest issue upon hearing that is what makes the world appear like it does change, and it's much more than a sphere?

We can ask the same sort of think of a Kantian. What gives the mind the ability to categorize the noumena into the phenomena we experience? Doesn't that imply a pre-existing order?

And if there is a pre-existing order, then we have some basis for inferring it.

Quibble away. Give me a reason to think that the boundary between 'I' and 'not I' is one which would continue to exist (differently to the boundary between two other molecules of 'me') without some model determining that these molecules belong together as one thing, whilst these others belong together as another.

When I say people don't exist, I'm not suggesting there's nothing there, it's the grouping, the distinguishing, I'm disputing, not the existence of anything at all.

But then how does the subdividing happen? — Marchesk

Same way anything happens, I'm not sure what you're asking here.

What's making the distinctions? — Marchesk

Depends on what model I'm using. I don't believe it's possible to refer without models, so I can't answer a 'what' question outside of some model dividing the world into individual referrents.

Based on what? — Marchesk

I went through this earlier in the thread. Just because I don't believe in any objective division of the world into parts, doesn't mean I think it's homogeneous.

Doesn't that imply a pre-existing order?

And if there is a pre-existing order, then we have some basis for inferring it. — Marchesk

No, I don't see any logical reason for it to imply anything more than heterogeneity. We can identify a pattern in a random sequence of dots, does that mean the pattern was really there all along? Yes, I think so. But does that mean the pattern is the way the random sequence is? No. It's just one pattern that can be determined out of many.

went through this earlier in the thread. Just because I don't believe in any objective division of the world into parts, doesn't mean I think it's homogeneous. — Isaac

So the world is a heterogenous flux allowing for seeing different kinds of patterns. And this flux on occasion produces pattern matchers?

I'm asking how the pattern matching occurs in the flux of things. In any case, that sets up a dichotomy between the flux and the pattern matching, because we can ask how our patterns match up with the flux of the world.

I'm asking how the pattern matching occurs in the flux of things. — Marchesk

There is no pattern matching, there's just the flux of thing. The only way we can talk about pattern matching going on is by agreeing to a model in which there are such things as patterns and matching.

In any case, that sets up a dichotomy between the flux and the pattern matching, because we can ask how our patterns match up with the flux of the world. — Marchesk

Just because we can ask something, doesn't mean the world is the way the question assumes.

Patterns will always match up some way with the world, and will always be in error some way (because they are not the actual world).

I'm confused as to how patterns can be recognized or in error if there is no pattern matcher or mind or self or whatever we want to call the organizing principle that makes sense of the flux (finds patterns).

We cannot measure subjectivity by objective means.

If all is just electro-magnetic chemistry, that is 'material' in a sense it is measurable, then all we need is true definition. Right? For example, if definition of 'subjectivity' turns out to be "measure of self-reflection" then we would look for some kind of dynamics which is symmetric in some way, and compare one side with the other to see how closely they match, or "self-reflect". For example.

The experience itself is inaccessible, because you don't have someone else's pain. — Marchesk

I cannot have your pain. I can most certainly have my own. If we know what having pain consists of... then it doesn't make much sense to say that having pain is inaccessible, does it?

:worry:

I don't think other people exist either. — Isaac

What on earth could be wrong with saying "other people exist"?

What on earth does "measuring subjectivity" have to do with knowing what it's like to experience X?

I already have explained in normal language. I have explained what ‘intentionality’ means by using ‘mode’. I was just saying that in the same manner we talk of a ‘distant’ past we don’t mean distant in the usual context.

People do use ‘mode’ to mean ... well, mode. It is the manner/regard/approach used. It does take a certain mental leap to appreciate what Husserl is talking about because there is no concern for a physical agent.

Phenomenology isn’t directly concerned with empirical sciences or the naturalistic attitude.

Experience is subjective. You ‘know’ subjectively yet you don’t know how you know. We can objectively measure physical phenomenon and find out a lot, but the scientific approach has no means of dealing with subjective phenomenon other than by way of resorting back to empirical means.

What on earth does "measuring subjectivity" have to do with knowing what it's like to experience X? — creativesoul

Experience is subjective. — I like sushi

Part of it is.

...the scientific approach has no means of dealing with subjective phenomenon... — I like sushi

What's the difference between your notion of "subjective experience" and your thought and belief about what counts as such?

You ‘know’ subjectively yet you don’t know how you know. — I like sushi

Sometimes. Not all.

One can know that their holding an ice cream cone and not know how to say it. This would satisfy your criterion.

One can know that when her mother utters "ice cream" that they are about to eat ice cream. They cannot say anything about the correlations that they are drawing, but they can be shown to clearly have already drawn correlations between their own mother's naming and descriptive practices and ice cream. This would satisfy your criterion.

They get quite happy when they entertain having it again. When mother starts asking again in the same way she always does they draw correlations between the language use and eating ice cream. They know what it's like to believe that they are about to eat ice cream, but they do not know how they believe that. They draw correlations between the language use and ice cream. This would satisfy your criterion.

The use of the terms directly involves her mother speaking endearingly with a certain tone accompanied with a certain loving facial expression. She can know that she's about to get ice cream because she's drawn correlations between her mother's language use and eating ice cream, and yet not know how she knows that much. This too satisfies your criterion.

That's only to say that sometimes we know yet do not know how we know...

Sometimes we know X as well as knowing how we do.

We know how to use this site to interact. We also know how we know. We learned how to use the site by learning to follow the procedure needed in order to do so. We learned how to talk about that learning experience as well. We know and we know how we know.

This does not satisfy your criterion. Rather it offers an example to the contrary. Thus, at a minimum, we must further qualify your claim captured in the quote directly above. Hence, my reasoning for the opening statement.

Phenomenology isn't directly concerned with empirical sciences or the naturalistic attitude.

It's like you are saying you'd rather keep imagining than look through a telescope. Is it not the ultimate goal to actually move, if possible, any and all "phenomena" from philosophy to one of natural sciences?

I'm confused as to how patterns can be recognized or in error if there is no pattern matcher or mind or self or whatever we want to call the organizing principle that makes sense of the flux (finds patterns). — Marchesk

There isn't no pattern matching. I'm not saying that nothing exists and that things don't happen. Pattern matching is happening in some part of reality, part of that pattern matching is identifying the thing doing the matching, in the same way as if I count the number of people on my bus the person doing the counting is one of those people part of the pattern [number of people} is the thing recognising the pattern. I'm disputing that there is an edge to that pattern making goings on that objectively defines it as one thing and the rest of the universe as other things(s).

I (and others) haven't arrived at this belief because it's the way the world seems to us to be, We've arrived at it becasue of a failure to feel satisfied with any objective criteria for distinguishing objects. So If you've got such a criteria, then we can ditch the whole idea of model dependent realism. Say an alien comes to earth, they don't even see in colour like we do, they detect some other part of the electromagnetic spectrum, and maybe the Weak Nuclear Force directly, maybe they have completely different model of how evolution and DNA works (afterall, we had a completely different model 200years ago). Give me an reason why they would still recognise you as one thing and me as another. Or even you as one thing and the chair you're sitting on as another.

What on earth could be wrong with saying "other people exist"? — creativesoul

Depends what you mean by 'wrong'. As a model, it's a brilliant one - useful, elegant, highly accurate predictions. But as some objective measure of the way reality 'really' is...I'll ask the same as I asked Marchesk above - what would the criteria for such a distinction be?

People do use ‘mode’ to mean ... well, mode. It is the manner/regard/approach used. — I like sushi

Right, but you said...

Phenomenology is the investigation into the ‘modes’ (intentionality) that ‘give aboutness’. — I like sushi

No 'mode' in the ordinary language sense (approach used) can 'give aboutness' in the same ordinary language sense because 'aboutness' is not a term in ordinary language either. A particular approach to thinking gives aboutness? Is that what you mean?

And none of this seems to at all address the concern I've been raising all along which is how we then proceed to speak about the results of these investigations without being able to use terms which both parties recognise the referents of, and if both parties recognise the referents, then the matter is not subjective, is it?

What on earth could be wrong with saying "other people exist"?
— creativesoul

Depends what you mean by 'wrong'. — Isaac

Not I sir...

I've no issue at all with saying that. Do you?

I've no issue at all with saying that. Do you? — creativesoul

Saying what? I've lost your thread.

I don't think other people exist... — Isaac

You said the above. I responded by asking what on earth could be wrong with saying "other people exist"?

If it is the case that you don't think other people exist, then there must be something wrong with you saying "other people exist".

What is it?

If it is the case that you don't think other people exist, then there must be something wrong with you saying "other people exist". — creativesoul

Yes, that's what I thought you meant. Which is why my answer was "it depends what you mean by 'wrong'".

If you mean objectively 'wrong' in a normative sense - 'one ought not to say "other people exist"', then you'd be suggesting that my believing something to be the case somehow creates a normative imperative for other people to agree, and speak that way. I wouldn't agree with you here.

If by 'wrong' you mean ineffective, not conducive to the task, then again, I disagree because we use different models for different tasks and most of the time, the model in which people don't exist is not very useful. That doesn't in any way prevent me from believing it to be the case.


I'm not going to continue to list all the other senses of 'wrong' you could have meant and their implications, you get the picture. I need to know what you mean by 'wrong' before I can answer your question.

Give me an reason why they would still recognise you as one thing and me as another. Or even you as one thing and the chair you're sitting on as another.

Because you occupy different location in space, and especially because you seem to move infependently from the forces of nature. I guess I could say then, because you seem unnatural.

Because you occupy different location in space, and especially because you seem to move infependently from the forces of nature. I guess I could say then, because you seem unnatural. — Zelebg

Every atom occupies a different location in space from every other, so that alone doesn't provide any grounds, not to mention the fact that 3d space seems to be a model which itself is open to question.

Which are 'the forces of nature' and which are my movements, prior to identifying me as an entity?

Every atom, occupies a different location in space from every other, so that alone doesn't provide any grounds, nit to mention the fact that 3d space seems to be a model which itself is open to question.

That's not the context where you exist as a collective entity. You need to look several levels of abstraction above... atom - molecule - cell - organ - organism. Surely at this level there should be no confusion what is and how much it is different and separated from everything else at the same level.

Which are 'the forces of nature' and which are my movements, prior to identifying me as an entity?

Can you state the problem directly, with some example if possible?

I find it odd when someone claims that they do not think other people exist.

Do you believe the following statement?

Other people exist.