This video appeared on reddit recently. It offers some thoughts about whether we can ever go beyond being pragmatic about defining words. Tell me what you think: — frank
Similar skeptical reasoning can be applied to any word of any human language. The power of Kripke's example is that in mathematics the rules for the use of expressions appear to be defined clearly for an infinite number of cases. Kripke doesn't question the validity in mathematics of the '+' function, but rather the meta-linguistic usage of 'plus': what fact can we point to that shows that 'plus' refers to the mathematical function '+'. — Wikipedia
We begin from the obvious, unquestionable meanings of such words and build our word-empire from there — TheMadFool
And has it not always been the case that the recipient could keep his or her own counsel on the matter; and further that they might even arrive at a meeting of the minds? — tim wood
And in terms of the meanings of words, it seems to me less a matter of drilling down to some incontrovertible meaning as bedrock, which the video makes clear is problematic/impossible, than it is a matter of correct focus, outside of which either way, the meaning retreats and withdraws into a blurred ambiguity and then meaninglessness. — tim wood
This video appeared on reddit recently. It offers some thoughts about whether we can ever go beyond being pragmatic about defining words. — frank
The fact of a statement of agreement.What fact would you point to to assure yourself that a meeting of minds has taken place? — frank
The idea of establishing meanings relevant to present purpose. If I call this piece of furniture a chair and you say not-so-fast, it's just profoundly empty space with some really, really small particles whizzing around within its outer boundaries, then a) we have not (yet) had a meeting of minds, and b) we need to focus on what we need to mean to have a conversation.Correct focus? What's that and how does it work? — frank
Even if this is true, the Empire is apt to be filled with fudge factor.
That doesnt help us to know by observation of people whether they understand words exactly the same way we do. — frank
I think it's this flexibility that leads to the Wittgenstein paradox. — TheMadFool
I think you're right. Natural language is in use where experiences vary (as Leo pointed out). It would take time and special personalities to even uncover this. — frank
I'm very gratified when I find I'm not the only person on the planet who thinks x. But yea, retract claws, abort missile launch. What's for lunch?Doesn’t matter. Appears we do generally agree.
Boring — I like sushi
In short there is no error and the difference in the rules is just a question of degrees of correctness. — TheMadFool
There is no black and white. Simply shades of grey. — TheMadFool
There are two possible rules — TheMadFool
A = {1, 4, 8,...}
We're asked to find the next number in the sequence.
There are two possible rules given what we do know:
1) 1 + 3 = 4 and then 4 + 4 = 8
2) 2^0 = 1, 2^2 = 4, 2^3 = 8
As you can see the problem isn't with mathematics <language> but with inadequate data. — TheMadFool
... or as many as you like. I think you're back on Plus/Quus.
Just saying, offside rule disputes may be a good example of a different (interesting) problem, but not this one. — bongo fury
I think we agree. It's not a problem with mathematics or language. It's that on reflection, we note that there's no way to verify that communication has the clarity and precision we assume it has.
More data wouldn't resolve that. It's similar to the problem of induction. — frank
guess the example given is insufficient to capture the essence of Wittgenstein's paradox because both the off-side example and the plus-quus example are about acquiring more information. — TheMadFool
I guess the example given is insufficient to capture the essence of Wittgenstein's paradox because both the off-side example and the plus-quus example are about acquiring more information.
Could you guys give me a better example? Thanks. — TheMadFool
How would you know you have all the required info? What fact would you point to to show that you have it? — frank
Presumably plus-quus isn't in doubt as a case of Kripgenstein, at least? But compare blue-grue if you want another (or very close).
I was questioning offside as a suitable example of (yes) generalising from limited (but presumed non-vague) information, and recommending it as a case of vagueness, specifically the ineliminability of vagueness in measurement with no margin of error. — bongo fury
I think vagueness requires a continuum to exist in. The classic heap paradox illustrates that quite well I believe. — TheMadFool
However Wittgenstein's paradox seems to be about clear and distinct rules. No continuum. — TheMadFool
If the meaning of words were how they are used, and the the way we are taught the meaning of words is by using them to point to things in the world, not to point to things in our head, or our experiences, then when we use words we would be using them as we've seen others use them and how they taught us to use them. There would be no pointing to our experiences in using words, only pointing to the world outside of our experiences.One example I like to use is that of the dictionary. Even if we all used the exact same dictionary, with all the exact same definitions for each word, we would still have zero guarantee that we would understand one another, because there is a missing link between the words and what experiences the words refer to. A dictionary relates words with one another, not with actual experiences, feelings, perceptions. — leo
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