That's not the context where you exist as a collective entity. — Zelebg

I'm talking about objective existence, the 'context' in which we determine existence is subjective, it's a decision we make, there's no reason why we should determine objects on any given level of heirachy. We're we justifiably uncertain of our existence prior to having a model of molecules, cells etc? How would our alien, who only senses weak nuclear forces, have any concept of a boundary at a cellular level?

Surely at this level there should be no confusion what is and how much it is different and separated from everything else at the same level. — Zelebg

OK, so describe to me where 'you' end, and why there. Maybe some more detail will help me see where you're coming from.

Which are 'the forces of nature' and which are my movements, prior to identifying me as an entity?


Can you state the problem directly, with some example if possible? — Zelebg

You said that 'I' act against the forces of nature, but that would involve distinguishing between 'my' actions and those originating from the forces of nature. Without begging the question as to my separate existence, I'm asking what features of 'my' actions allow you to distinguish them from actions caused by 'the forces of nature'.

becasue of a failure to feel satisfied with any objective criteria for distinguishing objects — Isaac

Objective criteria, granted. But the human species in general, as observer, does distinguish objects, from himself and from each other, which implies there is some criteria for doing so.

Would the subjective criteria of space and time be sufficient for distinguishing objects?

I find it odd when someone claims that they do not think other people exist. — creativesoul

Yes, but incredulity does not constitue an argument. I'm asking you what your argument is, not what your feeling is about mine.

Do you believe the following statement?

Other people exist. — creativesoul

I don't hold single beliefs about the subject. As I've said already, for me, a belief is simply a disposition to act as if. It is therefore contextual. In the context of thinking about reality, in the widest sense I can, I'm disposed to act (in this case actions are all talking/typing) as if people do not exist, as separate objects. In the context of my day to day life, I'm disposed to act as if other people do exist.

Neither of these dispositions tells me anything about what actually does exist.

Would the subjective criteria of space and time be sufficient for distinguishing objects? — Mww

Yes, absolutely. What I'm arguing for here is model dependent realism. Not that nothing really exists, not any form of idealism, just that the only way we know reality is through our models of it and so (this is, for me, the important bit) no model can ever be shown to be more 'true' (where that means corresponds to reality) than any other, and no objects distinguished by those models really exist in preference to any other conceivable way of determining objects.

I can't remember why we got talking about model dependent realism in a thread about the expression 'what it's like'.

I'm talking about objective existence, the 'context' in which we determine existence is subjective, it's a decision we make, there's no reason why we should determine objects on any given level of heirachy.

The reason for separation are new emergent entities, properties, and meanings. So we can talk about things like wetness and acidity, or letters and words, or ball and wheel, or osmosis and chirality... Subjective, perhaps, so what? Decision is not arbitrary.

We're we justifiably uncertain of our existence prior to having a model of molecules, cells etc?

I don't see how that question relates to what I said. What problem you are talking about - who has that problem, when, why?

How would our alien, who only senses weak nuclear forces, have any concept of a boundary at a cellular level?

In that case it wouldn't.

OK, so describe to me where 'you' end, and why there. Maybe some more detail will help me see where you're coming from.

Individual organisms are distinguished from the environment by connections and relations between entities that make up that organism, like shared circulatory system, synchronized motion of all the parts, shape constraints that make up the body...

I'm asking what features of 'my' actions allow you to distinguish them from actions caused by 'the forces of nature'.

Autonomy & independence, like you can climb a mountain and raindrop can not. Is there some point to all these questions?

I'm asking what features of 'my' actions allow you to distinguish them from actions caused by 'the forces of nature'. — Isaac

No member of Nature can act contrary to the forces of the Nature of which he is a member. None of my actions can be distinguished from forces found naturally, even if I am permitted to modify them to my advantage or interrupt their natural progression. Even the act of pure spontaneity, which we formerly considered the ground of pure thought, has its natural exhibition in random....a form of spontaneity.....nuclear decay, and theoretical quantum physics.

Subjective, perhaps, so what? Decision is not arbitrary. — Zelebg

What is the non-arbitrary aspect then?

I don't see how that question relates to what I said. What problem you are talking about - who has that problem, when, why? — Zelebg

We're definitely getting crossed wires here, sorry. I don't know what part of my writing you think has expressed a problem.

Individual organisms are distinguished from the environment by connections and relations between entities that make up that organism, like shared circulatory system, synchronized motion of all the parts, shape constraints that make up the body... — Zelebg

So you're not 'connected' to the environment? How's that work?

Independence, like you can climb a mountain and raindrop can not. — Zelebg

I'm asking why the forces which lead to me climbing a mountain are not 'forces of nature'.

Is there some point to all these questions? — Zelebg

Yes, I'm trying to clarify what your objection is.

No member of Nature can act contrary to the forces of the Nature of which he is a member. None of my actions can be distinguished from forces found naturally, even if I am permitted to modify them to my advantage or interrupt their natural progression. Even the act of pure spontaneity, which we formerly considered the ground of pure thought, has its natural exhibition in random....a form of spontaneity.....nuclear decay, and theoretical quantum physics. — Mww

Yes, exactly. So I'm asking Zelebg how that distinction he set up can help him objectively identify a separate object. I can't see any distinction at all myself.

What I'm arguing for here is model dependent realism — Isaac

The human cognitive system is predicated on models it constructs of its own accord. Whether or not the models so constructed correspond one-to-one with reality is only governed by logical law.....which we also invented. On a smaller scale, if Nature informs us of an error in our models, we just start over. On a large enough scale, if our models are in error, Nature will treat us as any other non-evolutionarily viable entity, and rid itself of us.

Yes, I'm trying to clarify what your objection is.

My objection? To what point of yours when you made no point, but keep asking questions?

Do you have any point to make, what is it?

We appear to be talking past each other probably due to a difference in terminology/view of the question of knowing ‘the-thing-in-itself’. We cannot know the thing in itself. This is the idea of ‘pure objectivity’ - for me not refutable completely, but clearly unknowable. This harks back to the differentiation made by Kant in The Critique of Pure Reason. The ‘noumenon’ is only true for us in a ‘negative’ sense, as a limitation.

The objective stance I am guarded against is naive realism. There is no ‘knowing’ ice cream only subjective experience, an ‘object’ of experience. I don’t see how ‘knowing’ can possess unbounded universality. What is known truly is only known within set limits - been through exhaustively elsewhere I believe.

You don’t know by way of someone else’s knowing. You know only through you - which is subjectivity. The further issue is understanding that ‘objective knowing’ is ‘intersubjectivity’: the interplay of subjects not some item know as ‘the-thing-in-itself’.

Two subjects owning the same existence/reality are not ‘two’, that is maybe another point that causes confusion in this kind of topic?

if Nature informs us of an error in our models, we just start over. — Mww

How does nature inform us of an error in our models when we have no direct access to nature against which to check them, only other models?

How does nature inform us of an error in our models when we have no direct access to nature against which to check them, only other models? — Isaac

Good point, and pardon my speaking too loosely. I claim dialectic license.

We do have direct access, but that doesn’t mean we are given Nature as it is in itself, but only as we perceive it. It follows that Nature doesn’t inform us so much as we inform ourselves, of errors in our models, when some model of ours isn’t consistent with another of ours, or isn’t consistent with subsequent observations of ours from which all models with empirical predicates are constructed, Nature merely giving the occasion for such possible disparities to be cognized.

Still, models are useless without something to which they relate, wouldn’t you agree?

I can't remember why we got talking about model dependent realism in a thread about the expression 'what it's like'. — Isaac

Nor I, but there is precedent galore for these types of discussions wandering off into the subjectively-driven hinterlands.

Ehhhhhh...from where I sit, what it’s like to experience something, when push comes to shove, is none other than the experience itself. In other words, it’s a pretty dumb question to begin with. I mean, what it’s like to experience stubbing your toe is a lot like the experience of hitting your thumb with a hammer, which isn’t saying much, but what the experience of stubbing your toe is exactly like is .......well.....stubbing your toe, which isn’t saying anything at all, because we already knew that.

I think people ask what it’s like because “what does it mean” is just too hard.

As we say out here in the hinterlands......

I claim dialectic license. — Mww

Absolutely. A claim which should be allowed with much generosity, I think. We're only writing pithy responses, often (in my case) on a phone whilst travelling, we cannot be expected to write full technical explanations in parentheses to every term. So yes, licence granted...trouble is there are many posts where a charitable reading turns out to be the wrong one, and the term one thought a brief placemarker for a much more nuanced position was, in actual fact, meant as the full brazen assertion it superficially seemed to be... So it was worth a check.

Nature doesn’t inform us so much as we inform ourselves, of errors in our models, when some model of ours isn’t consistent with another of ours — Mww

True, but we mustn't sublime consistency. It is only what it is, no holy grail, nor marker of truth. A whole set of consistent models might still be miles away from reality, or consistent and close to reality but utterly useless to us.

Still, models are useless without something to which they relate, wouldn’t you agree? — Mww

No, I don't think I would, but I get what you're saying. I don't think proximity to reality measures the usefulness of the model. As such, I think it's theoretically possible that a model might be useful without relating to anything at all, but I haven't thought about that much, so my intuition may well be wrong. Interesting question.

what it’s like to experience stubbing your toe is a lot like the experience of hitting your thumb with a hammer, which isn’t saying much, but what the experience of stubbing your toe is exactly like is .......well.....stubbing your toe, which isn’t saying anything at all, because we already knew that — Mww

Yes. Which makes it muchtthe same as what a 'game of tennis' is like. Its a bit like a game of badminton, but not quite, the only thing it's exactly like is a game of tennis, which doesn’t get us anywhere when talking about it. Nothing special about consciousness in that respect, as far as I can see.

I find it odd when someone claims that they do not think other people exist.
— creativesoul

Yes, but incredulity does not constitue an argument. I'm asking you what your argument is, not what your feeling is about mine. — Isaac

I'm asking what you believe to be the case. What claim and/or assertion are you asking me to argue for?

Do you believe the following statement?

Other people exist.
— creativesoul

I don't hold single beliefs about the subject. As I've said already, for me, a belief is simply a disposition to act as if. It is therefore contextual. In the context of thinking about reality, in the widest sense I can, I'm disposed to act (in this case actions are all talking/typing) as if people do not exist, as separate objects. In the context of my day to day life, I'm disposed to act as if other people do exist.

Neither of these dispositions tells me anything about what actually does exist. — Isaac

I find all of that odd as well.

A rubber ball is disposed to bounce when dropped onto a hard surface. According to your definition, rubber balls have belief.

We appear to be talking past each other probably due to a difference in terminology/view of the question of knowing ‘the-thing-in-itself’. We cannot know the thing in itself. This is the idea of ‘pure objectivity’ - for me not refutable completely, but clearly unknowable. This harks back to the differentiation made by Kant in The Critique of Pure Reason. The ‘noumenon’ is only true for us in a ‘negative’ sense, as a limitation. — I like sushi

That last comment does not make sense.

Earlier you denied/rejecting my comparison between Kant and phenomenology, instead opting for Husserl(???). Weird now to revert back to Kant. I've already briefly spoken about Kant's shortcomings. Some folk hereabouts think I've gotten him wrong. So, to avoid any and all disagreements about whether or not Kant meant and/or said what I reported him to have, I'll say this...

In order to be able to know what one is talking about when drawing and maintaining a distinction between the way things are and the way things appear to be one must have direct access to and knowledge of both.

As you note above, Kant posits the way things are(Noumena) as a negative limit to our thought. That is a purely(pun intended) self-imposed limitation borne of inadequate language use and/or linguistic framework.

The objective stance I am guarded against is naive realism. There is no ‘knowing’ ice cream only subjective experience, an ‘object’ of experience. I don’t see how ‘knowing’ can possess unbounded universality. What is known truly is only known within set limits - been through exhaustively elsewhere I believe.

You don’t know by way of someone else’s knowing. You know only through you - which is subjectivity. The further issue is understanding that ‘objective knowing’ is ‘intersubjectivity’: the interplay of subjects not some item know as ‘the-thing-in-itself’.

Two subjects owning the same existence/reality are not ‘two’, that is maybe another point that causes confusion in this kind of topic? — I like sushi

What confuses me, at this point, is how/why you think that that has anything at all to do with what I wrote about knowing???

As I've stated many many times in past, and no doubt here in this thread as well, I reject the objective/subjective dichotomy.

What I'm arguing for here is model dependent realism. Not that nothing really exists, not any form of idealism, just that the only way we know reality is through our models of it and so (this is, for me, the important bit) no model can ever be shown to be more 'true' (where that means corresponds to reality) than any other, and no objects distinguished by those models really exist in preference to any other conceivable way of determining objects.

I can't remember why we got talking about model dependent realism in a thread about the expression 'what it's like'. — Isaac

Perhaps because what it's like to experience X consists - in very large part - of the candidate/subject's own thought and belief about and/or during that experience.

What is it like to experience having a sense of fairness/justice?

:wink:

Of course, it seems to me that the answer to that question requires knowing what a sense of fairness/justice consists of.

I'm asking what you believe to be the case. — creativesoul

As I explained, I don't think I 'believe' a single thing, I believe a range of different (possibly even contradictory things) in different contexts. So I simply can't answer your question.

What claim and/or assertion are you asking me to argue for? — creativesoul

Implied (but I could be wrong). You're saying that you find it odd, but you're not saying that you'll cast out your old thinking and accept this new 'odd' way of looking at things. Yet you've not presented any justification for finding it 'odd', just the bare declaration. So what I get from that is that you find it odd, and that the mere fact that you find it odd is sufficient for you to reject the idea. So the assertion is that what I've said is not a good way of looking at things, yet the backing for this seems to be just that you find it odd.

Of course, it's possible you're just declaring you find it odd as nothing more than a point of interest. In which case, noted, but do you have an opinion on how useful the idea might, odd or not?

A rubber ball is disposed to bounce when dropped onto a hard surface. According to your definition, rubber balls have belief. — creativesoul

Yes, I don't see any functional distinction in this context, but I'm equally happy to say that 'beliefs' are just such dispositions that occur in brains.

but we mustn't sublime consistency. It is only what it is, no holy grail, nor marker of truth — Isaac

Agreed, sublime here I understand to mean exalt to higher worth, so we mustn’t attribute to consistency more than it avows on its own. It isn’t a marker of truth, but merely an example of the form of its possibility. Nevertheless, we in our human endeavors naturally seek to lessen our own confusion, the means to which we demand of logic, which in turn absolutely requires consistency. Of course, logic itself is nothing if not a model of consistency.
——————-

I don't think proximity to reality measures the usefulness of the model. — Isaac

Perhaps not, but it remains for a model’s usefulness to relate to something, just from the fact it is a model. I’d say an empirical model, or, a model constructed on empirical principles, should proximate reality as much as the principles admit. A purely rational model, built on a priori principles, those of which no proper object belongs, do not get us any closer to reality, but rather, prevent us from straying too far from it.
———————-

Nothing special about consciousness in that respect, as far as I can see. — Isaac

I’m not sure how consciousness got into this. Did someone lay the whole “what it’s like” thing on human consciousness? If one employs reductionism far enough, and under certain conditions, he should arrive at consciousness as the ground of all human a posteriori experience, thus diametrically opposed to a priori suppositions of “what it’s like”.
———————

As I've said already, for me, a belief is simply a disposition to act. — Isaac

On another note: I rather think belief is a judgement of relative truth. One’s disposition to act is every bit as much a judgement he makes relative to some truth he has already considered. Close enough?

we in our human endeavors naturally seek to lessen our own confusion, the means to which we demand of logic, which in turn absolutely requires consistency. — Mww

Yes, absolutely. We seem to dislike inconsistency - sometimes, I think, to our detriment... But then, I'm a psychologist, we get to play fast and loose with trivial things like logic, if it makes people feel better.

I’d say an empirical model, or, a model constructed on empirical principles, should proximate reality as much as the principles admit. — Mww

I'm not sure what "as much as the principles admit" refers to here, so I might be raising an issue you've already covered, but on the face of it, this seems wrong. Take the weather for example, the way it 'really' is (and here by 'really' I just mean according to our most intricate models) is really complex. At the moment, some of the world's most powerful supercomputers are used to process our models of the weather. Now suppose we made that model even closer to reality, that wouldn't make it better would it. It would become too complex for even our fastest computer and so next to useless.

Sometimes reality might be fiendishly complex and so what we really need is a model which isn't as close as we can get, because otherwise it would be too complex to use.

I rather think belief is a judgement of relative truth. One’s disposition to act is every bit as much a judgement he makes relative to some truth he has already considered. Close enough? — Mww

I'm trying to ground things like belief in the physical. A disposition to act can be represented (theoretically) in neural architecture, response to stimuli stuff. Calling it a judgement makes perfect sense, but just kicks the can further down the road insofar as what that judgement actually is physically.

What claim and/or assertion are you asking me to argue for?
— creativesoul

Implied (but I could be wrong). You're saying that you find it odd, but you're not saying that you'll cast out your old thinking and accept this new 'odd' way of looking at things. Yet you've not presented any justification for finding it 'odd', just the bare declaration. So what I get from that is that you find it odd, and that the mere fact that you find it odd is sufficient for you to reject the idea. So the assertion is that what I've said is not a good way of looking at things, yet the backing for this seems to be just that you find it odd. — Isaac

The assertion is that I find it odd. Whether or not it is a good way of looking at things has yet to have been determined. I'm not certain that I understand it enough to render such a judgment at this time. I do think that the notion of belief that you're working from is inadequate.

Of course, it's possible you're just declaring you find it odd as nothing more than a point of interest. In which case, noted, but do you have an opinion on how useful the idea might, odd or not? — Isaac

It could be used as a 'structural member' of a notion/conception/idea of mind that - quite simply - consists of a number of false conclusions, assuming consistency/coherency.

I'm trying to ground things like belief in the physical. — Isaac

Acquiring knowledge of belief includes knowing how it is formed and held, which in turn allows one to know that all belief requires the physical and the non physical, for it consists of both and is existentially dependent upon both.

What I'm arguing for here is model dependent realism. Not that nothing really exists, not any form of idealism, just that the only way we know reality is through our models of it and so (this is, for me, the important bit) no model can ever be shown to be more 'true' (where that means corresponds to reality) than any other, and no objects distinguished by those models really exist in preference to any other conceivable way of determining objects. — Isaac

I'm puzzled here as well. You're claiming that no model can ever be shown to be true more-so than another competing/contradictory model...

Again, that's quite an odd claim.

Do you believe that we can be mistaken about that which exists in it's entirety prior to common language use?

I'm asking what you believe to be the case.
— creativesoul

As I explained, I don't think I 'believe' a single thing, I believe a range of different (possibly even contradictory things) in different contexts. So I simply can't answer your question. — Isaac

You claimed that you do not believe other people exist. You're now speaking about believing a range of things in different contexts, and not believing a single thing...

Are you familiar with the notion of performative contradictions?

:brow:

I wanna throw this into the arena because it looks like a good test case @creativesoul @Isaac @Terrapin Station.

Say you measure the perimeter of a bit of coral's by taking a photograph at it and drawing a line around its border. You can draw lots of lines, and it's a really irregular object, and you don't get the same line each time.

If your measurement of the coral's perimeter is $L$, and the true perimeter of the coral is $T$, you can write (assume a model):

$T = L + e$

where $e$ is some error. If we knew the true measurement $T$ there'd be no need to form $L$ in the first place. But this is also true for $e$, if we knew what the error was exactly, we'd be able to add it to $L$ and recover $T$ exactly.

But what we can do is take a bunch of measurements, draw a bunch of lines, straighten them out to get a length. Say we've taken $n$ measurements. Then you can add all the length measurements $L_i$ together and divide by $n$ to get the mean length:

$\bar{L}=\frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^{n} L_i$

The virtue this has is that when you take their mean , the mean is known more precisely than any of the individual estimates (under some assumptions about $e$).

So, we end up with a more precise estimate of $T$, but only if the assumptions are satisfied. Can we check if the assumptions are satisfied? Yeah, to some degree anyway. Is there always some doubt that the assumptions are correct? Yeah, since how you check the assumptions also has assumptions.

Does the fact that we're always working under assumptions entail that the coral does not have a true perimeter? I don't think it does. The error we make depends upon there being a true coral size as well as there being a fallible modelling process applied to it.

A disposition to act can be represented (theoretically) in neural architecture — Isaac

It would seem to be buried in there somewhere, somehow, inasmuch as if not, we are left with (personal subjective) absurdities as universal consciousness, and such even less empirically obtainable possibilities. I am drawn up short by the fact we do not think in the same terms we use to model the mechanisms we think with, and as things stand in the current state of our knowledge, belief is still something we think. So I hesitate to grant belief can be.....or soon will be.....attributed to neural architecture, but I don’t have a problem with the idea that disposition to act can be.

Perhaps you’re drawing off the fact science can monitor the stimulus/reaction complex, and thereby affirming the antecedent, by re-naming the stimuli as disposition to act, hence, belief. (?)

And yes, invoking the faculty of judgement does indeed kick the can down the same speculative road.

The perimeter is always from some (set of) spatiotemporal location(s), per some concept of what it is to "measure the perimeter" (since especially for something like coral a number of decisions are going to have to be made about what counts as measuring it versus what details can be ignored).

The spatiotemporal location of the surface of the coral isn't an objectively preferred spatiotemporal location. There are no objectively preferred spatiotemporal locations (or objectively preferred anythings for that matter).

I was feeling around (guessing) what you were talking about with the while ice cream business. Clearly I got what you were trying to convey wrong if what I posted made no sense and/or seemed irrelevant.

It happens.