I was feeling around (guessing) what you were talking about with the while ice cream business. Clearly I got what you were trying to convey wrong if what I posted made no sense and/or seemed irrelevant. — I like sushi
Does the fact that we're always working under assumptions entail that the coral does not have a true perimeter? I don't think it does. The error we make depends upon there being a true coral size as well as there being a fallible modelling process applied to it. — fdrake
I have almost no idea what you were or are talking about. We don’t possess knowledge from an objective position - meaning like some omnipotent being - we possess knowledge as a subject of a world. The ‘world’ is the means of objectivity (aka intersubjectivity).
We’re talking right past each other here. — I like sushi
Say you measure the perimeter of a bit of coral's by taking a photograph at it and drawing a line around its border. You can draw lots of lines, and it's a really irregular object, and you don't get the same line each time.
If your measurement of the coral's perimeter is LL, and the true perimeter of the coral is TT, you can write (assume a model):
T=L+eT=L+e
where ee is some error. If we knew the true measurement TT there'd be no need to form LL in the first place. But this is also true for ee, if we knew what the error was exactly, we'd be able to add it to LL and recover TT exactly.
But what we can do is take a bunch of measurements, draw a bunch of lines, straighten them out to get a length. Say we've taken nn measurements. Then you can add all the length measurements LiLi together and divide by nn to get the mean length:
L¯=1n∑ni=1LiL¯=1n∑i=1nLi
The virtue this has is that when you take their mean , the mean is known more precisely than any of the individual estimates (under some assumptions about ee). — fdrake
The perimeter is always from some (set of) spatiotemporal location(s), per some concept of what it is to "measure the perimeter" (since especially for something like coral a number of decisions are going to have to be made about what counts as measuring it versus what details can be ignored). — Terrapin Station
Reminds me of the rabbit-duck.. Despite the geometric identicality, it presents differently depending on what's perceived as anterior vs posterior. I think it's surprising that in spite of knowing this, you can't really perceive it otherwise, or at the very least it's incredibly difficult to see it simply as squiggles.Which is part of why it's frustrating that people find it "so obvious". There's a whole theory of perception required just to look at what the "features" of our experience really are, and where they come from.
Edit: so just for an example. There's change blindness, like in the door study. Something that phenomenal character usually has associated with it is that we are aware of the phenomenal character or that it is somehow accessible within the experiential state. Whatever makes the guy giving directions in the door study not notice (not be aware) that the person he's giving directions to changes shows that what perceptual features are accessible; those which partake strongly in the phenomenal character of experience; are strongly context sensitive. The context down-weights the relevance of visual feature changes in the guy giving directions' environmental model because of what he's currently doing and how he's doing it. Even then, the result would not hold (probably) if the people looked sufficiently different.
So, we can't even go from "visual processing" to "phenomenal character of vision" without auxilliary contextual information. With the right context, say classifying images for presence of red, even "red quale" might make sense! — fdrake
Recognizing the assumptions are key I think. — creativesoul
...often is the case, that assumptions involve an unrecognized categorical error. — Mww
And the phenomenological approach would be to investigate the subjective requirements we hold to in order to talk about this ‘thing’ called ‘size’. (...) So what is it like to experience ‘size’? — I like sushi
often is the case, that assumptions involve an unrecognized categorical error.
— Mww
Are such errors determined by categories of our own choosing... — creativesoul
Do you believe that we can be mistaken about that which exists in it's entirety prior to common language use? — creativesoul
You claimed that you do not believe other people exist. You're now speaking about believing a range of things in different contexts, and not believing a single thing...
Are you familiar with the notion of performative contradictions? — creativesoul
The error we make depends upon there being a true coral size as well as there being a fallible modelling process applied to it. — fdrake
Perhaps you’re drawing off the fact science can monitor the stimulus/reaction complex, and thereby affirming the antecedent, by re-naming the stimuli as disposition to act, hence, belief. (?) — Mww
I cannot have your pain. I can most certainly have my own. If we know what having pain consists of... then it doesn't make much sense to say that having pain is inaccessible, does it? — creativesoul
I (and others) haven't arrived at this belief because it's the way the world seems to us to be, We've arrived at it becasue of a failure to feel satisfied with any objective criteria for distinguishing objects. So If you've got such a criteria, then we can ditch the whole idea of model dependent realism. Say an alien comes to earth, they don't even see in colour like we do, they detect some other part of the electromagnetic spectrum, and maybe the Weak Nuclear Force directly, maybe they have completely different model of how evolution and DNA works (afterall, we had a completely different model 200years ago). Give me an reason why they would still recognise you as one thing and me as another. Or even you as one thing and the chair you're sitting on as another. — Isaac
The fact that pattern matching occurs means there's some sort of objective organization that results in pattern matching. Model Dependent Realism doesn't exist as a philosophy if nature doesn't produce creatures who do philosophy. — Marchesk
In order to do philosophy, there has to be something real that makes the philosophizing a possibility. — Marchesk
Philosophy doesn't just exist. It exists in response to a world by creatures who are puzzled by their place in the world. — Marchesk
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