The required info would be instances where the disagreement arises, thus revealing that different rules are/were in play. — TheMadFool

If no disagreement arises, the parties would never know a gap in understanding exists.

I guess Liebniz's law of identity would apply here viz. that indistinguishability implies identity. In fact Wittgenstein's paradox admits that it's the impossibility of telling two rules apart from a fixed number of instances as the source of the paradox.

In my humble opinion the paradox requires a high degree of similarity between the rules involved but is absent when the rules under scrutiny are violently opposed in meaning i.e. there are absolutely no instances of concurrence between the rules because they contradict each other. I mean a total absence of agreements between rules would imply a clear division in the meanings of given rules. Therefore, the rules aren't so fundamentally different i.e. there are no obvious fatal contradictions in our thinking to make the paradox a real unmanageable problem for language.

Ambiguity and vagueness seem to part of the problem too but for now I'm still in the dark as to how exactly they weigh in. What do you guys think?

Ambiguity and vagueness seem to part of the problem too but for now I'm still in the dark as to how exactly they weigh in. — TheMadFool

Oh gosh, is that my fault, for suggesting that offside is about vagueness, not induction? And you thought I meant induction is about vagueness, not the opposite? Or you thought it would be just a shame to examine induction without ambiguity and vagueness in the mix (even if that was good enough for Hume, Goodman and Kripke, and probably Wittgenstein)? And hey what about Leibniz's law too?? You want it all in the pot!!

You mad fool!

guess Liebniz's law of identity would apply here viz. that indistinguishability implies identity. — TheMadFool

You can't convict Fred of murder just because the witness can't tell the difference between him and the perpetrator. Eye witnesses are known to give crap evidence.

Oh gosh, is that my fault, for suggesting that offside is about vagueness, not induction? And you thought I meant induction is about vagueness, not the opposite? Or you thought it would be just a shame to examine induction without ambiguity and vagueness in the mix (even if that was good enough for Hume, Goodman and Kripke, and probably Wittgenstein)? And hey what about Leibniz's law too?? You want it all in the pot!!

You mad fool! — bongo fury

:joke: :grin:

Well the claim seems to be that it's impossible to know whether people engaged in discourse are talking about the same thing. I agree that many, possibly infinite, rules or definitions may have enough similarities for one to pass of easily as any other in the list. However, there's got to be an underlying similarity between them that makes us not see the difference. For instance in the plus-quus example, subtraction can never be one of the other rules mistaken as plus or quus. There is clearly a limit to the confusion. That's to say, even admitting of vagueness or ambiguity or the problem of induction or whatever else, we can have meaningful discourse.

Also although some subjects involving inherently vague or ambiguous terms may be rendered difficult, if not impossible, by Wittgenstein's paradox, there are limits to the paradox which, in my opinion, provides enough room for a reasonable conversation, as this one we're having.

You can't convict Fred of murder just because the witness can't tell the difference between him and the perpetrator. Eye witnesses are known to give crap evidence. — frank

My contention is that the necessity for some alignment between different rules/definitions so that they may both apply simultaneously as in the paradox, reveals that the problem isn't catastrophic either to language or logic.

My contention is that the necessity for some alignment between different rules/definitions so that they may both apply simultaneously as in the paradox, reveals that the problem isn't catastrophic either to language or logic. — TheMadFool

It just means that if you want to locate the basis of communication in rule following, one of your challenges will be to explain telepathy.