I'm a physicalist simply because it seems a default for me, and I need a good reason to discard it. — Isaac
Simple: the colors, sounds, smells, tastes and feels aren't properties of the physical environment you interact with. Or at least not when it comes to our physical models. — Marchesk
But they're properties of my brain. I mean, when brains are interfered with those things respond differently, so I don't see that as a reason to discard physicalism. — Isaac
Could this not be the case the with the true coral perimeter? — Isaac
pieces can be removed from an item, but ‘moments. cannot be removed — I like sushi
but I do find it interesting even though I don’t grasp what he meant/means exactly. — I like sushi
There is certainly more than a hint at the distinction between ‘act’ and ‘object’ yet they are more like different sides of the same ‘object of intentionality’. — I like sushi
They may be in reality, but brain models of neurons and neurotransmitters don't include sensation. That's just a correlation or outcome that we know exists from having brains. — Marchesk
Perhaps you’re drawing off the fact science can monitor the stimulus/reaction complex, and thereby affirming the antecedent, by re-naming the stimuli as disposition to act, hence, belief. (?)
— Mww
In a sense, yes, but any problem with doing so would only arise from a position that some previous definition existed whose only flaw was its inability to be thus monitored, and I'm not at all convinced that such a definition existed. — Isaac
there is some error which comes from a comparison of an observable whose value is not an output of some model. — fdrake
there is some error which comes from a comparison of an observable whose value is not an output of some model. — fdrake
Here, I suppose such a problem would arise, because if belief is held to be a subjective institution, re: judgement, and thereby defined with a priori predicates alone, it certainly cannot lend itself to empirical monitoring. — Mww
...how? How do we get access to an observable that's not an output of some model? We can't take in any sensory data without it being merely confirmatory of some model. — Isaac
I believe Nagel was saying that science uses an objective view from nowhere (perspective-less or lacking subjectivity) to create explanations. But the subjective doesn't fit into these explanations. And yet subjectivity is part of the world.
If the universe went bang, and stars formed fusing heavier elements leading to life evolving, then somehow subjectivity emerged. — Marchesk
, you haven’t really learned what you set out to discover, insofar as you’ve got the “how” but not necessarily the “how come”, because your subject himself may not even know.look at the behaviour as indicative of what the whatever-it-is does to the inputs — Isaac
I was under the impression methodological naturalism was created to circumvent the likelihood of error... — Mww
I wonder if that's entirely true. Scientific objectivity doesn't mean you ignore essential and defining aspects, here subjective experiences, of the object of study. Rather scientific objectivity is specifically designed to eliminate observer bias and in no way does it/should it overlook, in this case, subjective experiences. — TheMadFool
The categories don’t determine errors, and we don’t choose them. Errors arise from irrational or illogical associations the subject thinks, and categories are merely the theoretical conditions which make cognition possible, so they exist in their entirely long before we give them names. Obviously, because we always cognize first, speak later, and never the reverse, about any one thing.
The idea of categories solves a problem, If you think it just causes another one, that would be on you, wouldn’t it? — Mww
Do you believe that we can be mistaken about that which exists in it's entirety prior to common language use?
— creativesoul
Depends what you mean by mistaken. — Isaac
Having pain is the experience. I have direct access to having pain of my own, and I have indirect access to another's. There are two kinds of accessibility here, yet you've claimed we have none. — creativesoul
...categories are merely the theoretical conditions which make cognition possible, so they exist in their entirely long before we give them names. — Mww
You claimed that you do not believe other people exist. You're now speaking about believing a range of things in different contexts, and not believing a single thing...
Are you familiar with the notion of performative contradictions?
— creativesoul
Yes, but I don't see how it applies here, you'd have to flesh the argument out. — Isaac
Pretty much, with the caveat that “categorization” might not carry the proper inflection. One shouldn’t confuse speculative categories such as Aristotle’s or Kant’s, with Ryle’s semantic categorical mistakes. Rush’s song “Time Stands Still” is a categorical mistake of semantics; space is a property of objects is a categorical error of reason. — Mww
Like when an error is observed in Friston's hierarchy and passed down. A prediction is compared to some input data, the error propagates down the hierarchy of models, producing adjustments. — fdrake
I reject it because I just don’t like it; it’s anathema to my ego. Pretty piss-poor reason for rejecting a form of relative proof, I know — Mww
, you haven’t really learned what you set out to discover, insofar as you’ve got the “how” but not necessarily the “how come”, because your subject himself may not even know. — Mww
Being mistaken about X is forming, having, and/or holding false belief regarding X. — creativesoul
Simply put, you've claimed to think X but not believe X. In addition, you've claimed to not think that others exist, and yet here you are... — creativesoul
"There's no reason at all why the Bayes optimal model would be true, truth is not important here" — Isaac
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