Fresco/Derrida claims meaning doesn't exist. I say it does. How can we both be right? — Harry Hindu

Not sure about Derrida. However, @fresco described how meaning could work. How he described its function is not inconsistent with other definitions of meaning. It’s just another mode of understanding meaning. If Derrida deconstructed meaning into nothingness (I’m just speculating as I’m not familiar with his philosophy) that is another manner, and it shouldn’t be analyzed through the Anglo-American analytic tradition as then his meaning would be missed.

My reading of Derrida suggests that 'meaning' is a transient directive aspect of our interactions. Contexts are dynamically shifting so that a word like 'car', say, means (has import) at one time 'a convenience', at another 'an expense', etc, whithout those usages being functionally synonymous with respect to subsequent action or thought (aka 'neural activity'). Obviously dictionary definitions attempt to give relationships to other words, or suggest potential usage contexts but that statistical aspect of 'meaning' is also transient over a greater time period. (Consider the word 'nice' for example which was originally related to the word 'knife').

For Derrida 'frame' (usage context) is as important as the focal 'word'....even in text, which in turn is framed by previous texts and 'reading attitude'. This is why he denies that the 'meaning' of text is any more permanent than speech, even though 'the squiggles' are ! And this point is valid even for the authors of the text themselves. Thus so-called 'inconsistencies' are to be likely to occur.

No wonder traditional philosophers don't like him !

The scientific method is metaphysics. — T Clark

Whatever it is, it isn't metaphysics!

Hello everyone.

Some thoughts:

Perhaps if we differentiate understanding and meaning, we can clarify our conceptualization and use of the word ‘meaning.’

Understanding is a mental process, an embodied experience. When we are able to construct understanding from a given sample of language, we ascribe the attribute of “meaning” to that sample. We commonly say the sample “has meaning”—as though meaning somehow exists in the language itself. And if we are unable to construct understanding, we say the sample has no meaning, as though the sample just doesn’t contain meaning. But meaning or lack of it depends on whether or not we can construct understanding.

Dispute about the meaning of language arises when people construct different understandings of the language. Whole hermeneutics arise to guide such interpretations, and sometimes evidence can be presented about the author’s intent—that is, their understanding expressed in the language they generated—but this does not negate the fact that different interpretations can be constructed from that language. An interpretation’s legitimacy or illegitimacy is up for grabs, established only by subscription to one hermeneutics or another, including by generally prevailing use in the language community at a given time.

Understanding is a mental process. We can construct shared understandings and meanings because in a given language community we share mutual associations of words and expressions with experiences. We have learned which words and expressions “go with” which experiences, and our syntax tells us how to construct understanding from how the words are strung together. Note that when we are unable to construct understanding from a language sample, we say we are unable to “make sense” of it. “Make sense” is a very telling expression, revealing an embodied experience. ”Make” emphasises our active construction of our experience of understanding, and the “sense” or lack of it ultimately rests on sensory experiences we’ve learned to associate with the words and expressions.

This may be a little over simplistic but I don’t see how it can be denied:

What has no meaning cannot be spoken of.

Any attempt to counter this with an example will only do so by presenting ‘meaning’ - albeit nonsensical or otherwise.

Of course some could argue that something with no discernible pattern has no meaning, yet I would counter that knowing this makes the point ‘meaningful’ rather than absent of meaning (whatever that could mean?).

I guess the general problem is in the application of language and highly abstract terms like ‘absolute’ and ‘total’.

What sorts of things are meaningful? How do these things become meaningful? To whom are these things meaningful?

meaning=purpose, but since things do not have purposes but are given purposes by the individual, purpose=use. So, what sorts of things are useful? Everything you know and perceive and do is useful in the game of the will to power, which is why Nietzsche's amor fati is indispensable from the conception.
Every other conception of meaning is reactive.

So, the persistence and/or continued existence of meaning is clearly not existentially dependent upon any individual user, but rather it is existentially dependent upon language being used in a consistent way. That consistent usage is satisfied - it happens - when a plurality of capable creatures draw correlations between the specific language use and other things. — creativesoul

I agree. Meaning is independent of any particular vessel. This reminds me of one of my favorite themes in Derrida.

Derrida (1930-2004) famously argued that writing preceded speech. By this I believe he meant that the “iterability” of language logically preceded its spontaneous performance...that is, repeatable in any context whatsoever, just as this very introduction to Derrida I’m writing now must be able to signify as an introduction to Derrida after this semester is over [hey! like now!], after I’m dead, after you cease to read it, after the expiration of every element of the context in which I am composing it now. That, writes Derrida, is the very condition of writing itself, without which we simply do not recognize writing as such: if the writing is not “iterable,” it is not writing. — link

We all learn to point at the tree when uttering "tree". This is rudimentary shared meaning:A plurality of creatures drawing correlations between the same things. In this case, it's a plurality of creatures drawing correlations between the name and it's referent(between "trees" and trees).

We all 'agree' that those things are trees and these things are not... by virtue calling those things "trees" but not these things. This agreement is necessary for language to proceed in it's evolutionary process. The 'agreement' need not be an intentional act. To quite the contrary, prior to the ability to voluntarily enter into an agreement about the referent of a name, one must already be deeply embedded in language use. — creativesoul

I very much agree, with only a slight suspicion about 'correlation,' and I associate this with Wittgenstein. One of my favorite philosophical themes is how radically embedded we are in language use. I don't think it can be over-stated. Even this 'I' that doesn't think it can be overstated is, as a sign, embedded in the way we learn to use 'I.'

To be a human is perhaps most essentially to be co-embedded in a language. The 'we' is utterly prior to the 'I' in the sense that the 'I' is only constructed within the 'tribe' and understands itself in relation to other selves. Far from being controversial, I think such things are obvious to those who are willing to make their tacit knowledge explicit against the resistance of theories that tell us otherwise (and often flatter us.)

“Make sense” is a very telling expression, revealing an embodied experience. ”Make” emphasises our active construction of our experience of understanding, and the “sense” or lack of it ultimately rests on sensory experiences we’ve learned to associate with the words and expressions. — Brainglitch

I like 'embodied.' I'd also add embedded, embedded in a society,embedded in what is expected and prohibited. Embedded in what something that looks like a chair or a knife or a tire is used for. I don't have to remind myself to walk on the sidewalk and not in the middle of the road. This is automatic, along with so many other things, like how close to stand to strangers at a bus stop, how loud to talk.

I'd also add (basically agreeing) that the sense we make doesn't have to focus on sensory experiences. When someone talks to us and we don't understand, we might experience this in terms of not knowing what they want from us. We don't know where they're coming from. It's as if we try to put ourselves in their position as charitable listeners. For better or worse, as online philosophers we are tempted to emphasize differences. Maybe it's easier to see what a theory gets wrong, at least when a theory is the other person's.

Why does it seem so difficult to do this when talking about conceptions/uses/senses/etc, of the same term "meaning"? Is it not a reasonable question to ask someone when they're using the term "meaning" what they are referring to? Ought not the speaker know what they're referring to, when using the term as a noun? — creativesoul

If you ask them what they mean by 'meaning,' won't they be forced to add more links to the chain of signs? What do we refer to by 'I' ? Or 'you'? Is there a finite chain of signs that can get this exactly right? If the signs are intelligible at all, they can be quoted or repeated in other contexts, among other signs, and be understood differently.

It's us philosophers who find it difficult to determine the meaning of meaning, mostly because we want to do a good job, and perhaps because we're questionably attached to a project of juicing words for their maximally context-independent meanings. I like the game, but I also see it as an infinite game. The interpretation of any text is one more text that's open to interpretation. This is not at all to say that all interpretations are equal. It's just that to live is to be still determining and interpreting. I think even a dogmatic philosopher is always still figuring out what exactly he means by his dogma. We can repeat the words in our mind, but is this really a repetition of something like exact meaning? Perfect, exact meaning is like God or pure spirit.

I've no issue with this at face value. I agree. What I take issue with is the idea that that somehow applies to thought and belief that does not involve understanding a text. We're talking about all thought and belief and what they have in common at a basic level such that that content is capable of evolutionary progression...

Correlations. — cs

I think Derrida makes a strong case that speech is 'writing.' (He uses writing as a metaphor for a new concept.) He challenges the notion of meaning being simply and directly present to a subject. The pure subject and the pure meaning present to it are related concepts.

I very much agree, with only a slight suspicion about 'correlation,' and I associate this with Wittgenstein. One of my favorite philosophical themes is how radically embedded we are in language use. I don't think it can be over-stated. Even this 'I' that doesn't think it can be overstated is, as a sign, embedded in the way we learn to use 'I.'

To be a human is perhaps most essentially to be co-embedded in a language. The 'we' is utterly prior to the 'I' in the sense that the 'I' is only constructed within the 'tribe' and understands itself in relation to other selves. Far from being controversial, I think such things are obvious to those who are willing to make their tacit knowledge explicit against the resistance of theories that tell us otherwise (and often flatter us.) — Eee

There is no denying the affect/effects that common language use has upon human thought and belief. However, there's no good reason to believe that we cannot acquire knowledge of that which exists in it's entirety prior to language. We do it all the time. There's also nothing stopping us from taking proper account of our linguistically mediated thought and belief.

You mentioned suspicion about 'correlation' - which is my notion of thought and belief. All thought and belief consists of correlations drawn between different things.

If behavior is the effect of some cause, the cause is the meaning of the behavior... — Harry Hindu

That doesn't follow. Rather it fails to draw the distinction between causality and meaning. "Neglects" may be a better word choice here. "Conflates" works as well.

If you ask them what they mean by 'meaning,' won't they be forced to add more links to the chain of signs? — Eee

Undoubtedly, but that's true of asking anyone what they mean by any other term as well...

What do we refer to by 'I' ? Or 'you'? — Eee

If one does not know the difference between you and I, well, there can be no distinction between who says what.

Is there a finite chain of signs that can get this exactly right? If the signs are intelligible at all, they can be quoted or repeated in other contexts, among other signs, and be understood differently. — Eee

Is there a finite amount of signs that can get this right? What on earth is this? Is there a finite chain of signs that can be used to comprehend how we use the terms "I" and "you"???

Is that what you're asking me here?

It's us philosophers who find it difficult to determine the meaning of meaning, mostly because we want to do a good job, and perhaps because we're questionably attached to a project of juicing words for their maximally context-independent meanings. — Eee

Perhaps is right.

I like the game, but I also see it as an infinite game. The interpretation of any text is one more text that's open to interpretation. This is not at all to say that all interpretations are equal. It's just that to live is to be still determining and interpreting. I think even a dogmatic philosopher is always still figuring out what exactly he means by his dogma. We can repeat the words in our mind, but is this really a repetition of something like exact meaning? Perfect, exact meaning is like God or pure spirit. — Eee

Nothing likable about that game from this vantage point.

Bein' reasonable is thinking about our own thought and belief, including but not limited to statements thereof. That's the best place to start looking. After-all, if our notion of belief is not amenable to evolutionary progression it can - and ought - be dismissed out of hand as soon as we realize that it's not. — cs

I agree, but I think we need to add something. I'm not reasonable merely by thinking about my thinking. I have to meet some implicit standard. To put it dramatically, I am only reasonable when 'we' are thinking 'through' me. Earnest philosophy tries to avoid the distortion of its petty individual 'host.'

If the history of Philosophy merely represented various opinions in array, whether they be of God or of natural and spiritual things existent, it would be a most superfluous and tiresome science, no matter what advantage might be brought forward as derived from such thought-activity and learning. What can be more useless than to learn a string of bald opinions, and what more unimportant? — Hegel

Undoubtedly, but that's true of asking anyone what they mean by any other term as well... — creativesoul

I agree, and I think that's significant. Is it really the case that a 'full' meaning is present that we are merely finding more words for? Or something else?

Is it really the case that a 'full' meaning is present that we are merely finding more words for? Or something else? — Eee

"Full" meaning is present?

I don't talk like that. Something else.


All answers to the question of what one means by some word or other requires increasing signage... Some explanation increases signage. We agree here, I think.

You mentioned suspicion about 'correlation' - which is my notion of thought and belief. All thought and belief consists of correlations drawn between different things. — creativesoul

Correlation is fine, but I guess I want more info. If we stretch correlation enough, maybe it'll work.

If one does not know the difference between you and I, well, there can be no distinction between who says what. — creativesoul

Of course. And of course I know how to use the signs 'I' and 'you.'

Is there a finite amount of signs that can get this right? What on earth is this? Is there a finite chain of signs that can be used to comprehend how we use the terms "I" and "you"???

Is that what you're asking me here? — creativesoul

Yes, that and the meaning of meaning. I think to know a language is like knowing how to ride a bike, primarily non-theoretical. The words just pour out of us most of the time. And we can read and understand as a fish moves through water.

Heidegger constantly reminds us throughout Being and Time, the account of 'inauthentic' life of everyday anyone is not to be interpreted evaluatively or morally but rather ontologically. It is an a priori Existential of being human: "the anyone is the condition of possibility of all human action" (p. 2). Thonhauser writes: "To be socialized in the framework of established modes of intelligibility and regulated modes of comportment is the prerequisite for becoming an agent in one's own right" (ibid.). — link

This 'framework' is like W's 'form of life.' So in some sense I'd argue that the 'I' and the 'you' depends on a 'we' that is prior. Or to put it another way, Kant had to know German in order to write the CPR. But knowing German or English, however mundane, is also a symbol for being human.

https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/from-conventionalism-to-social-authenticity-heideggers-anyone-and-contemporary-social-theory/

"Full" meaning is present?

I don't talk like that. Something else. — creativesoul

In other words, do we know exactly what we mean? Are we ever done knowing what we mean? We have words that feel right enough, but when asked what we mean...are we not also being creative and still figuring out what we 'originally' meant?

Derrida (1930-2004) famously argued that writing preceded speech. By this I believe he meant that the “iterability” of language logically preceded its spontaneous performance...that is, repeatable in any context whatsoever, just as this very introduction to Derrida I’m writing now must be able to signify as an introduction to Derrida after this semester is over [hey! like now!], after I’m dead, after you cease to read it, after the expiration of every element of the context in which I am composing it now. That, writes Derrida, is the very condition of writing itself, without which we simply do not recognize writing as such: if the writing is not “iterable,” it is not writing. — from above

Basically the mortality of the subject is tied up with the iterability of the sign. This is a dramatic way to express it, but the point is that language is 'exterior' in some sense. We know that something like 'pure meaning' is translatable. So I can read quasi-Derrida in English. I hope you see why I bring this up. A fundamental idea in philosophy is that it is translatable. Any knowledge that is universally rational shouldn't be caught in a particular language. So philosophy understands itself as a kind of anti-poetry, and therefore would like to exclude metaphor as vague and misleading. But if literal terms are dead metaphors..., and if the idea of the literal is itself a dead metaphor...

All answers to the question of what one means by some word or other requires increasing signage... Some explanation increases signage. We agree here, I think. — creativesoul

Excellent. And I think we agree that language is a social phenomenon, only possible for a community in a shared world. It makes no sense without bodies and objects 'outside' of the 'mental.' I put these in quotes only because language has to be in place for us to think in terms of bodies and objects. Language is an invention and yet 'prior' to us being able to say so.

It probably evolves from talking about and orchestrating the handling of objects. At the same time, myth/religion seems so human that from the very beginning we were also trying to talk about important internal experiences, create solidarity, etc.

All answers to the question of what one means by some word or other requires increasing signage... Some explanation increases signage. We agree here, I think.
— creativesoul

Excellent. And I think we agree that language is a social phenomenon, only possible for a community in a shared world. — Eee

Agreed.

The meaning of "meaning" consists of the correlations drawn between it's use and other things.

Correlations being drawn between different things does not require language use to be one of those things. The meaning of "meaning" is existentially dependent upon language use. Correlations are not.

The meaning of "meaning" consists of the correlations drawn between it's use and other things. — creativesoul

By correlations you mean 'a mutual relationship or connection between two or more things'? It does seem clear that language largely deals with relationships. But surely there is more to say, even if that's a start. And maybe there can be no end to the talk about talk. Perhaps what we mean by meaning is largely dark for us, because what we can make explicit is just the tip of the iceberg. That doesn't mean I'm against trying to clarify. I just speculate that the nature of meaning might prevent an exhaustive definition of meaning.

In my view, meaning is tied to feelings and values.. Of course, my definition will largely depend on the context. ‘Meaning’, i’m sure many would agree, is a broad term. I find the discussion on blogs frustrating at times because people are really only arguing semantics. Put it in some context everyone can at least agree on first..

Put it in some context everyone can at least agree on first.. — halo

Right, but that's very hard in philosophy. We humans are good at teaming up to deal with objects. But when we talk about talking things get wild. Meanings evolve historically. To understand what thinker X means by word Y requires backtracking and reading one's self into a long conversation. For instance, Derrida uses 'writing' in a special way, for a reason that only makes sense slowly. At the same time I'll never be done understanding Derrida. Furthermore I re-read older writers having read Derrida and find new meanings, new connections. So in that sense that future determines the past as much as the past determines the future.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hermeneutic_circle

For some thing to have meaning, it has to be tied to a value for that person or people. Such as, a sense of status or independence.. An idea that encompasses a value or opposes them, would have meaning to it. It has to touch one of your higher values in a personal way.

For some thing to have meaning, it has to be tied to a value for that person or people. Such as, a sense of status or independence.. An idea that encompasses a value or opposes them, would have meaning to it. It has to touch one of your higher values in a personal way. — halo

I agree. So that's why I like to call philosophy 'taking the impersonal personally.' It's difficult. Most people don't care about clarifying the talk about talk. So the philosopher as such finds a 'higher value' is carefully articulating what he and the world are.

The meaning of "meaning" consists of the correlations drawn between it's use and other things.
— creativesoul

By correlations you mean 'a mutual relationship or connection between two or more things'? — Eee

All meaningful use of the term "meaning" consists of the correlations, associations, and/or 'connections' drawn between it's use and other things. It's mutual(shared) when a plurality of individuals draw the same correlations between the use and other things.

It does seem clear that language largely deals with relationships. But surely there is more to say, even if that's a start. And maybe there can be no end to the talk about talk. Perhaps what we mean by meaning is largely dark for us, because what we can make explicit is just the tip of the iceberg. That doesn't mean I'm against trying to clarify. I just speculate that the nature of meaning might prevent an exhaustive definition of meaning. — Eee

I disagree here.

All attribution of symbolic/linguistic meaning requires something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized and a creature capable of drawing correlations between different things. All attribution of meaning by language less creatures requires only the creature capable of drawing correlations between different things... none of which are linguistic devices and/or marks(signs/symbols), and all of which are directly perceptible things. That situates the kinds of correlations that are drawn at a level some call 'beneath' common language.

It's mutual(shared) when a plurality of individuals draw the same correlations between the use and other things. — creativesoul

I agree that we have an intuition of sharing meaning. I trust (irrationality?) that you understand these words roughly as I intended them. That, by the way, is the 'anyone' or 'shared subject' I'm talking about, or part of it. Nothing mystical, just our basic sense of being mutually intelligble and understanding chairs as chairs and not random shapes with no obvious purpose. Co-enworlded with language.

Leaving intution out of it, there's also this beetle in the box video.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x86hLtOkou8

Which you've probably seen/read. But it's well done if you haven't, and short.

All attribution of meaning requires something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized and a creature capable of drawing correlations between different things. — creativesoul

I agree that what you say corresponds with the typical use of 'meaning.'

All attribution of meaning by language less creatures requires only the creature capable of drawing correlations between different things... none of which are linguistic devices and/or marks(signs/symbols), and all of which are directly perceptible things. That situates the kinds of correlations that are drawn at a level some call 'beneath' common language. — creativesoul

This seems reasonable. Cats and dogs understand the world in some way. Maybe they have their own kind of a childlike thinking. I haven't studied it closely.

So let's grant a pre-linguistic kind of meaning.

But I'm still most interested in the highest levels of human thinking, which, it seems to me, requires words. 'Life is the dream of a monster.' This is one of those suggestive phrases that has no clear meaning. It asks us to (creatively) interpret it. We meet it with our entire pasts.

As I said above: For instance, Derrida uses 'writing' in a special way, for a reason that only makes sense slowly. At the same time I'll never be done understanding Derrida. Furthermore I re-read older writers having read Derrida and find new meanings, new connections. So in that sense that future determines the past as much as the past determines the future.

That element of the future determining the past seems important to me. As you read this sentence you'll find its beginning organized by its end. The 'time of reading' is strange. As humans, we find new meaning in things we read long ago.

We know that something like 'pure meaning' is translatable. — Eee

These notions of exact meaning and pure meaning are foreign to me. The "pure" qualification makes no sense to me given that all meaning consists of correlations drawn between different things. If "pure" is meant to denote something in it's most unadulterated uncorrupted and/or basic state, then it doesn't get any purer that what I've set out here.

How much more precise can a universal criterion be? There are no exceptions to the contrary. There is no stronger justificatory ground. There are no simpler means of negation. All it takes is one example of the attribution of meaning that does not include a creature drawing correlations between different things.

What's not to love?

But I'm still most interested in the highest levels of human thinking, which, it seems to me, requires words. — Eee

Naming and descriptive practices.

Derrida was quite a prolific writer.

If "pure" is meant to denote something in it's most unadulterated uncorrupted and/or basic state, then it doesn't get any purer that what I've set out here. — creativesoul

By pure meaning I just mean the imagined context that can be moved from French to English. That somehow an English translation is the 'same' book suggest the notion of a language-independent meaning, though many translators will stress that they have only done their best and actually created a new, only similar work.


What do you make of this?

Language, Saussure insists, has an oral tradition that is independent of writing, and it is this independence that makes a pure science of speech possible. Derrida vehemently disagrees with this hierarchy and instead argues that all that can be claimed of writing - eg. that it is derivative and merely refers to other signs - is equally true of speech. But as well as criticising such a position for certain unjustifiable presuppositions, including the idea that we are self-identical with ourselves in 'hearing' ourselves think, Derrida also makes explicit the manner in which such a hierarchy is rendered untenable from within Saussure's own text. Most famously, Saussure is the proponent of the thesis that is commonly referred to as "the arbitrariness of the sign", and this asserts, to simplify matters considerably, that the signifier bears no necessary relationship to that which is signified. Saussure derives numerous consequences from this position, but as Derrida points out, this notion of arbitrariness and of "unmotivated institutions" of signs, would seem to deny the possibility of any natural attachment (OG 44). After all, if the sign is arbitrary and eschews any foundational reference to reality, it would seem that a certain type of sign (ie. the spoken) could not be more natural than another (ie. the written). However, it is precisely this idea of a natural attachment that Saussure relies upon to argue for our "natural bond" with sound (25), and his suggestion that sounds are more intimately related to our thoughts than the written word hence runs counter to his fundamental principle regarding the arbitrariness of the sign. — SEP

To me one of the interesting themes is a destabilizing of the so-called mental realm, the idea of which is tied up with pure meaning. Of course we have intuitions of being minds, and we take this granted, the talk of minds filled with thoughts. But there's no private language, and we use 'I' fairly automatically.

To put Derrida in context, there's Braver's A Thing of This World.

On Braver’s narrative, Kant’s Copernican revolution inaugurates anti-realism by allowing him to conceive of phenomena as dependent upon the structuring activity of the mind; this provides the basis, as well, for Kant’s rejection of correspondence truth. On the other hand, Kant still retains a realist view of the “transcendental” subject responsible for this structuring work, as well as the notorious “realist” commitment to the reality of noumena or things-in-themselves. It is Hegel’s critique of the latter commitment in particular, according to Braver, that produces the more thoroughgoing anti-realism of the Phenomenology of Spirit and substantially leads to the decisive Hegelian claim (essential to all varieties of continental anti-realism that follow) for the necessarily historical character of all philosophical inquiry. The rejection of realism about noumena also leads Hegel, according to Braver, to see reality as “mind-dependent” in another, and more radical, way than Kant had. In particular, relying rather heavily on contemporary “social pragmatist” interpretations, Braver suggests that Hegel ultimately sees Spirit as a kind of “communal intelligence” coming about through the intersubjectivity of a speech community and that the culmination of the system of the Phenomenology in “Absolute Knowledge” expresses the deeply anti-realist claim that “there is no higher court of appeal for our beliefs than our community”

https://www.unm.edu/~pmliving/Braver%20review.pdf

Braver talks about 'impersonal conceptual schemes,' which is basically what I mean by being 'in' a language community and / or form of life.

Perhaps you can see how this connects to the idea of being reasonable and ultimately with the very identify and self-consciousness of philosophy.