That's why Davidson moved on from such an approach, right?

if we know what it takes for a statement to be true, then we know what the statement means? — creativesoul

Well, what else is there?

Yep.

That's why Davidson moved on from such an approach, right? — creativesoul

Sure.

But it wouldn't eliminate eliminative materialism, as Banno suggested. It would throw the entire set of referents into question. It would create mystery as to the referents of the new dialect. The old dialect would be thrown into confusion as well, as the influence of the new dialect increased.

To deepen my understanding...

Take the sentence: "The snow is white" is true iff the snow is white.

I take this formula to be the linguistic form the truth must take; but it's a formula without the ability to make a truth-claim. Nothing in this formula is claiming that it's true that the snow is white. The entire thing is a conditional.

So we have a formula, but to put it to use we need a fact: Namely, the snow's whiteness.



In your view, is it accurate to say the T-sentence reflects the form (or formulatability) of truth, without actually saying a thing about what is true?


(After saying - "The snow is white" is true iff the snow is white - we still don't know whether it's true that the snow is white. We do, however, know that if the snow is white, it follows that "the snow is white" is true...) — ZzzoneiroCosm

Just to be clear, did you say "yep" to all of this?

Read the thread and set it out for us. Everybody has to read the thread. Yep, it's a lot to read through. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I have read through the thread, but I don't remember the specific parts about the dolphins well enough to see how they might answer my question and I think it's not too much to ask someone to link to particular posts if they are citing them rather than expecting me to look back through the thread to try to find which posts might be the ones being referred to.

Yep.

This is a bad example since snow is always white. (Unless someone adds something, like pee, to it.)

Let's say:

1) "The sun is setting" is true iff the sun is setting.

How can we put this sentence to use without "pointing to" or "attaching it to" or "corresponding it to" a fact? (Not wanting to quibble over the phraseology.)

Without connecting 1) to some fact, how can it be put to use? It's fine as a formula. But we still don't know whether "the sun is setting" is true.

If T-sentences have no use - if they're just a satisfying, deflationary (setting the extensionality of truth) formula - I don't see an issue. But if T-sentences have a use, it seems they can only be put to use when some person links them to some fact (in this case a setting sun).

I have no issue with the T-sentence formula, but in connection to truth, and the desire to make truthful statements - especially on subjects more complex than snow and the sun - I don't see a way to put it to use. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Shit. I meant this one. Did you say "yep" to this?

It's not too much to ask. But saying "it's a lot to read through" can be a turn-off.

It would throw the entire set of referents into question. It would create mystery as to the referents of the new dialect. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Same as usual, then... :razz:

That's the point; the new Scientific Language makes no difference. Eliminative materialism fails to eliminate what it set out to eliminate, and hence should be eliminated.

I'm not in disagreement. Uncharacteristic of me... sure. Nonetheless, sometimes convention agrees and/or supports my own position. Davidson has influenced me... through you.

:wink:

From long ago... that very notion... still underlies much of my own approach to thought, belief, and statements thereof.

But it wouldn't eliminate eliminative materialism, as Banno suggested. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I cannot speak to that.

I am of the view that there is one world, and it includes us. I am further of the view that there are two major categories of things. That which existed in it's entirety prior to language and that which did not. The overlap is the interesting bit here at least. It includes all naming and descriptive practices that are already in use prior to any individual user.

Davidson closes by saying: In giving up the dualism of scheme and world, we do not give up the world, but reestablish unmediated touch with...objects...

You mentioned this as a kind of joke. I had been thinking of it as the point of the entire essay. Do you agree - do you think it's important - that Davidson is saying "we reestablish ummediated touch with...objects..."?

It's not too much to ask. But saying "it's a lot to read through" can be a turn-off. — ZzzoneiroCosm

OK, well what I am questioning is relative to this from the paper:

The key phrase is: for all I know. What is clear is that retention of some or all of the old vocabulary in itself provides no basis for judging the new scheme to be the same as, or different from, the old. So what sounded at first like a thrilling discovery - that truth is relative to a conceptual scheme - has not so far been shown to be anything more than the pedestrian and familiar fact that the truth of a sentence is relative to (among other things) the language to which it belongs. Instead of living in different worlds, Kuhn's scientists may, like those who need Webster's dictionary, be only words apart.

There seems to be an equivocation going on between equating conceptual schemes with whole languages and considering different conceptual schemes within a language.

So, Chinese medicine would seem to be a conceptual scheme, as would Western medicine. Both are understandable in the Chinese languages and in English. Are the two schemes translatable into each other? If you want to say they are not, which I would agree with, then does it follow that one of the schemes must fail to be "true and meaningful"?

But we still don't know whether "the sun is setting" is true. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Yeah, we do. We know "the sun is setting" is true if the sun is setting. SO if the sun is setting, then "the sun is setting" is true.

What more do you want?

I am further of the view that there are two major categories of things. That which existed in it's entirety prior to language and that which did not. — creativesoul

Isn't that the distinction Davidson rejects as the third dogma of empiricism?

Yeah, we do. We know "the sun is setting" is true if the sun is setting. SO if the sun is setting, then "the sun is setting" is true. — Banno

Unless the sun doesn't set, but rather only appears to do so. Then it's not true on a literal reading of the statement, which people used to believe.

There are many such statements in ordinary language which aren't strictly true. And people may or may not believe them. "My heart longs for you my darling!" But no, it doesn't really. It just pumps blood.

Yeah, we do. We know "the sun is setting" is true if the sun is setting. SO if the sun is setting, then "the sun is setting" is true.

What more do you want? — Banno

But there seems to be a fact in the mix: a setting sun.

Davidson says the sentence doesn't make reference to a fact. "The sun is setting" is true iff the sun is setting - this sentence doesn't refer to a fact; true enough; the fact is obscured by the conditionality. But we need the fact of a setting sun to put the sentence to use. We need the fact of the setting sun to know whether "the sun is setting" is true.

I don't see how this can work without the fact of a setting sun. Can you explain? Or is there a paper on the subject I could take a look at?

It's an important joke.

The mediation being rejected here is the baggage of theories of reference, meaning, truth, and so on.

Why do we need them? Folk seem to just get on with using language without the help of epistemologists. Why shouldn't it just be that we use words to talk to each other, and that's it?

Yeah. I think I have answered that.

Why do we need them? Folk seem to just get on with using language without the help of epistemologists. Why shouldn't it just be that we use words to talk to each other, and that's it? — Banno

Because maybe as Socrates demonstrated, people don't really know what they're talking about.

Why do we need them? Folk seem to just get on with using language without the help of epistemologists. Why shouldn't it just be that we use words to talk to each other, and that's it? — Banno

Sure, that sounds great. It seems to be a kind of eliminative skepticism vis-a-vis certain kinds of epistemology, metaphysics, and the rest of it. Is that how you see it?

Yeah. I think I have answered that. — Banno

Where?

See A nice Derangement of Epitaphs.

Isn't that the distinction Davidson rejects as the third dogma of empiricism? — Banno

Yes, he rejects the conceptual scheme/ empirical content dualism, and with that rejection I agree.

There seems to be an equivocation going on between equating conceptual schemes with whole languages and considering different conceptual schemes within a language. — Janus

Can you give us some direct quotations from the paper where you see this happening?

Davidson says the sentence doesn't make reference to a fact. "The sun is setting" is true iff the sun is setting - this sentence doesn't refer to a fact; true enough. But we need the fact of a setting sun to put the sentence to use. We need the fact of the setting sun to know whether "the sun is setting" is true. — ZzzoneiroCosm

There's good reason to suppose that thinking in terms of "referring to a fact" is... problematic. A simple bit of logical substitution will show how this leads to there being only one fact...

See Truth and Meaning

We can reach

"The snow is white" is true iff Der Ozean ist Wasser. — Moliere

quite quickly in this way.

See Truth and Meaning — Banno

Thanks. I'll take a look.

Who said we don't have unmediated connection to the objects we think of as real?

I don't see how this can work without the fact of a setting sun. Can you explain? — ZzzoneiroCosm

So... how does the fact of the setting sun differ from the setting sun?

Is the idea that somehow "the fact of the setting sun" intercedes between the statement "the sun is setting" and the setting sun?

Davidson is rejection that, restoring unmediated touch between "The sun is setting" and the setting sun.

I don't see how to put it more clearly than that. Philosophers have taught themselves to talk in terms of facts, and elevated them to the status of explanations. But they are not needed.