I am further of the view that there are two major categories of things. That which existed in it's entirety prior to language and that which did not.
— creativesoul

Isn't that the distinction Davidson rejects as the third dogma of empiricism? — Banno

That's an interesting take. The words aren't the same. Are the referents?

I've got a half-dozen browser windows open with a different sub-thread on each. Just going to close down for a bit and let it settle.

So... how does the fact of the setting sun differ from the setting sun? — Banno

It's fine to eliminate the idea of a fact. But then we have an object (the sun) allowing us to put the sentence to use. Davidson says "nothing, no thing..."

Isn't that the distinction Davidson rejects as the third dogma of empiricism?
— Banno

Yes, he rejects the conceptual scheme/ empirical content dualism, and with that rejection I agree. — Janus

That's not the distinction I've raised though. I reject both rationalism and empiricism on the same ground.

So, given that Banno was drawing an equivalence between what Davidson called the "third dogma" and what I wrote, then the answer is "No, Davidson did not reject that distinction as the third dogma of empiricism".

The astute listener/reader could then also add, "He did reject the conceptual scheme/empirical content dualism, though. I agree with that rejection."

:wink:

But it it not the sun - that very thing, considered apart from all else - that makes "the sun is setting" true.

SO the sun is not the thing that makes "the sun is setting" true...

SO the sun is not the thing that makes "the sun is setting" true... — Banno

Particularly since it's not true that the sun does set when speaking of the actual sun.

But then we have an object (the sun) allowing us to put the sentence to use. Davidson says "nothing, no thing..." — ZzzoneiroCosm

We have an appearance of a setting sun. The actual fact of the matter is the Earth's rotation.

Why is being pedantic about this important? Because we're talking about truth.

Consider saying, "The stick is bent when in water". That would be false. Same thing here.

SO the sun is not the thing that makes "the sun is setting" true...
— Banno

Particularly since it's not true that the sun does set when speaking of the actual sun. — Marchesk

Don't bite Banno.

It's too easy, and the interesting stuff we're heading towards has yet to have come...

But it it not the sun - that very thing, considered apart from all else - that makes "the sun is setting" true.

SO the sun is not the thing that makes "the sun is setting" true... — Banno

So it's more the history of language use - the linguistic-holism-thing somebody mentioned earlier - that makes the sentence true?

Particularly since it's not true that the sun does set when speaking of the actual sun. — Marchesk

Hu? So when you say that the sun is setting, you are never talking about the actual sun?

We have an appearance of a setting sun. — Marchesk

Nuh. That's off-track.

Don't bite Banno. — creativesoul

Damn. You are right. End of that discussion, March.

Davidson rejects truth makers...

We have an appearance of a setting sun. The actual fact of the matter is the Earth's rotation. — Marchesk

Of course. It's just an example sentence. Let's stay on track.

Davidson rejects truth makers... — creativesoul

Is there a paper on this? Preferably by Davidson.

So it's more the history of language use - the linguistic-holism-thing somebody mentioned earlier - that makes the sentence true? — ZzzoneiroCosm

Yes - but no - nothing makes the sentence true.

Hu? So when you say that the sun is setting, you are never talking about the actual sun? — Banno

It's a fact that the sun does not set. The reason we have that as part of our language is because of an outdated astronomy where the word usage originated.

See Banno's verbatim report of Davidson's own words... the paper we're discussing... in the beginning if memory serves me.

Of course. It's just an example sentence. Let's stay on track. — ZzzoneiroCosm

But I think it illustrates why the truth of a statement is not quite so simple.

Yes - but no - nothing makes the sentence true. — Banno

Is there a Davidson essay that expands on this?

Relevance?

But I think it illustrates why truth is not quite so simple. — Marchesk

I agree with that: Truth is a funhouse, evil clowns and warped mirrors and all. But Davidson is interesting too.

A parallel argument is found in Kripke, as he dismisses the theory that a proper name refers in virtue of an associated description.

Proper names just refer directly to the thing named; nothing, and certainly no description, mediates that reference.

And "the sun is setting" is true only if the sun is setting. No fact is needed to mediates that truth.

But I think it illustrates why truth is not quite so simple. — Marchesk

Being true is Davidson's focus.

Relevance? — creativesoul

Well...Davidson says he defends his "Nothing, no thing" notions in True to the Facts. I'll take a look at that one next.

Davidson also rejects talk of the facts, if for no other reason than such talk is somehow inadequate for translatability.

True to the Facts - which I think we have already mentioned.

Althogh it is important to note that, so far as that essay implies a form of correspondence theory of truth similar to Austin's, Davidson later rejects any notion of correspondence making sentences true - in the article that this thread is about, as it turns out.

Being true is Davidson's focus. — creativesoul

And what does it mean for a statement to be true? Is it enough to say, yep looks like the sun is setting!

Davidson also rejects talk of the facts, if for no other reason than such talk is somehow inadequate for translatability. — creativesoul

If you have a minute to explain that further, I'm interested.

Althogh it is improtant to note that, so far as that essay implies a form of correspondence theory of truth similar to Austin's, Davidson later rejects any notion of correspondence making sentences true - in the article that this thread is about, as it turns out. — Banno

And yet, we all know that correspondence must be adequately accounted for... it is after-all the default position of unquestioned naive realism that we all have in common.

Althogh it is improtant to note that, so far as that essay implies a form of correspondence theory of truth similar to Austin's, Davidson later rejects any notion of correspondence making sentences true - in the article that this thread is about, as it turns out. — Banno

Footnote 13 at the bottom of the "Nothing...no thing..." paragraph refers the reader to "True to the Facts" for a defense of that paragraph.

Is there another essay, to your knowledge, where he takes up the subject again?

Being true is Davidson's focus.
— creativesoul

And what does it mean for a statement to be true? Is it enough to say, yep looks like the sun is setting! — Marchesk

"Being true" is Davidson's focus. Davidson kicks out correspondence. His doing so leveled the playing field by requiring only coherence. In this way they are all equal. All coherent views are meaningful to the the agent. So, translatability involves precisely that.