So what sounded at first like a thrilling discovery - that
truth is relative to a conceptual scheme - has not so far been
shown to be anything more than the pedestrian and familiar fact
that the truth of a sentence is relative to (among other things) the
language to which it belongs.
Towards the bottom of page 17, Davidson wrote:
I turn now to the more modest approach: the idea of partial rather than total failure of translation. This introduces the possibility of making changes and contrasts in conceptual schemes intelligible by reference to the common part. What we need is a theory of translation or interpretation that makes no assumptions about shared meanings, concepts or beliefs. The interdependence of belief and meaning springs from the interdependence of two aspects of the interpretation of speech behavior: the attribution of beliefs and the interpretation of sen-
tences...
What we need is a theory of translation or interpretation that makes no assumptions about shared meanings, concepts, or beliefs.
Snow is directly perceptible. — creativesoul
What do you mean by 'directly' perceptible? As opposed to what 'indirect' perception? — Isaac
Physiological sensory perception that is unmediated by language use. — creativesoul
Physiological sensory perception that is unmediated by language use.
— creativesoul
In opposition to what? — Isaac
It sounds like you've just stated the equivalent of "perception is unaffected by the price of bread", no one ever thought it was. — Isaac
What I wrote sounds nothing like what you wrote. — creativesoul
Being unmediated by language use is not so much in opposition to anything... aside from being informed by language, and thus being existentially dependent upon language. — creativesoul
Come on, a little charity! — Isaac
ou're talking about 'perception' - the processing of visual stimuli, right? — Isaac
All physiological sensory perception. "Visual" points to one kind, one system, etc. There are more as you well know. — creativesoul
Who has suggested (or who do you think might suggest and so need correction) that the physiology of these systems might be mediated by language use - the act of communicating with words. — Isaac
The new dualism is the foundation of an empiricism shorn of the untenable dogmas of the analytic-synthetic distinction and reductionism shorn, that is, of the unworkable idea that we can uniquely allocate empirical content sentence by sentence.
Meanings gave us a way to talk about categories, the organizing structure of language, and so on; but it is possible, as we have seen, to give up meanings and analyticity while retaining the idea of language as embodying a conceptual scheme. Thus in place of the dualism of the analytic-synthetic we get the dualism of conceptual scheme and empirical content. The new dualism is the foundation of an empiricism shorn of the untenable dogmas of the analytic-synthetic distinction and reductionism shorn, that is, of the unworkable idea that we can uniquely allocate empirical content sentence by sentence
Nothing, however, no thing, makes sentences and theories true: not experience, not surface irritations, not the world, can make a sentence true. That experience takes a certain course, that our skin is warmed or punctured, that the universe is finite, these facts, if we like to talk that way, make sentences and theories true.
all that matters for Davidson's argument is whether incommensurable differences in conceptual schemes necessitate irreconcilable differences in language use. — fdrake
Look back at Moliere's posts. He did an excellent job of explaining the role of vantage point in Davidson's argument. A person who claims incommensurable conceptual schemes is assuming a vantage point she couldn't possibly have. — frank
Were you informing me of Moliere's excellent posts because you wanted to criticise something in my posts — fdrake
Of any such account; we can ask if the differences implied between incommensurable conceptual schemes entail irreconcilable differences in language use; we can re-ask the central framing device of the paper. — fdrake
I guess I didn't understand why you said this: — frank
Oh, that post was motivated to get the discussion back on what I see as the central issue. The scheme-content distinction. The "red herrings" I highlighted are only of importance because they show up in the thread, and aren't really addressing what I see as the central issue in the paper. — fdrake
The failure of intertranslatability is a necessary condition for difference of conceptual schemes;
nothing, it may be said, could count as evidence that some form of activity could not be interpreted in our language that was not at the same time evidence that that form of activity was not speech behavior.
My strategy will be to argue that we cannot make sense of total failure [of translatability]
To posit intranslatability without access to transcendence produces an incoherent picture. How could human Jim know the instructions were impossible to translate? If he couldn't know that, he shouldn't be insisting that there is incommensurability. — frank
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